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UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
Abstract 
What are the main features of the development of South African energy policy, what were the 
factors which determined policy outcomes, and what is its potential for the future? The study 
below uses a combination of three theoretical approaches (networks, multiple streams, and 
institutiOnal/organisational theory) to approach these questions, combined with a model of 
energy policy development to situate the development of South African energy policy and its 
associated institutions in a broader context. The model is useful both as a way of classifying and 
comparing various energy policy regimes, and also because it has some predictive power: it 
associates certain energy policy 'paradigms' with certain policy capabilities. 
Following a review of the theoretical frameworks and an outline of the model, the study recounts 
a detailed history of the four main areas of energy policy activity, namely coal policy, electricity 
policy, nuclear policy and liquid fuels policy, followed by an account of the development of 
energy policy activity and institutions in government, and an analysis of the main policy and 
institutional developments in each case. A variety of sources were used, including official 
documents, interviews, media reports and secondary sources. 
The outcome of the study was that the development of energy policy in South Africa was 
significantly influenced by two factors: apartheid, and the structure of the South African energy 
system. Although there are a number of significant discontinuities between apartheid-era and 
post-apartheid energy policy, notably in the social and institutional dimensions, there are other 
underlying continuities which are more deeply related to the structure of the South African 
energy system, and which contribute to the frustration of current energy policy initiatives. Thus, 
in order to tackle problems such as energy poverty and global warming successfully, future 
energy policymakers will have to consider measures which address the structure of the energy 
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Roberts, H - senior CEF official from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s; acting head of CEF in the 
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Stumpf W - senior nuclear engineer in the AEB/ AEC from the late 1970s to the late 1980s; CEO 
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Van Den Berg, S - official in the Department of Commerce in the 1960s; senior official in the 
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Exploring, and attempting to explain, the origins and development of South African energy 
policy can take a number of different routes. Contrary to the ordinary use of the term 'energy 
policy' by analysts and practitioners, a historical review such as the one undertaken below gives 
rise to significant complications, given the changes in the way in which 'energy policy' has been 
defined or understood in different periods, in South Africa and elsewhere. The concept of 
'energy' is relatively new, dating back only to the mid-19th century in physics, and the concept of 
'energy policy' is even more recent, as is its associated 'energy policy vocabulary' (concepts 
such as 'energy planning', 'energy balance' or even 'energy demand'). 
The concept of 'energy policy' first appeared in the latter half of the 20th century in industrialised 
countries, and was centred around the concept of the 'energy sector', a new way of organising 
our thinking about these industries, their development, and most importantly, the connection 
between them. Previously, governments had been concerned to various degrees with the supply 
and production of wood, coal, electricity and petroleum; the birth of energy policy heralded not 
only a new project1 of government involvement in the sub-sectors and related components of the 
energy sector per se, but a new conceptual basis for government involvement in society and the 
economy, based on the introduction of an unfamiliar quantitative measure (Joules) into public 
policy processes: whereas previously the cost and the volume or mass of each energy carrier 
were the only quantities of significance to policy makers, the energy content now became 
significant to decision-makers. 
Energy policy denoted a new area of activity for government, which not only linked previously 
separate sets of activities, but rapidly led to new patterns of research, regulation, planning and 
investment. The energy crisis, various environmental crises, and new perspectives on energy-
development issues outside the DECD led to llew concepts such as the energy system, and 
demand-driven energy policy based on 'energy services' in addition to or as an alternative to the 
supply-based concepts of the industrial energy sector, including non-commercial energy 
production, transactions and use. The concept of the 'energy system', a representation of the 
I The sense in which the concept 'project' has been used in this context has been borrowed from critical theorists such as Jargen 
Habermas (for instance, Habennas 1997). Habermas and others use the concept to denote a coherent and deliberate historical 
undertaking usually involving many 8.9t;ors, which is elaborated in conceptual and concrete terms by each generation of actors. In 
this sense, although historical projects have a definite historical starting point, they are always provisional and never 'completed', 
but instead modified, redefined or abandoned by the next generation of participants. This use of the term captures the evolution 











flows of commercial and non-commercial usable energy in relation to societal activities 
(including the energy sector), formed an expanded basis for energy policy, particularly for 
developing countries. The concept of 'energy services' (services associated with energy 
provision, but partially or completely substitutable by other non-energy-supply measures, such as 
building insulation or spatial planning), is not easily encapsulated even by the concept of the 
energy system, even though it is a key concept in some countries' energy policies. 
Different linkages to issues such as nuclear weapons proliferation, the. geopolitics of the Middle 
East, deforestation and health issues in poor communities, various forms of globalisation, 
pollution and other environmental issues, define the scope of the project differently in different 
national and international contexts, and involve a complex of issues not conceptually unified by 
either the concepts of the energy sector or the energy system. Technical developments, both in 
physical technology in the energy system as well as in areas such as economic regulation and 
fmancial and equity markets, developed the scope of potential government involvement in areas 
of society not defined by the formal boundaries of the energy sector. In addition, current 
challenges in energy policy broadly grouped under the problem of sustainability, encompassing 
social, environmental and economic problems, are proving the most complex addressed so far, 
and solutions will probably demand a radical reassessment of the scope and nature of energy 
policy, or possibly the abandonment of the energy policy project altogether, and its replacement 
with a more ambitious policy paradigm embracing a more complex set of social and institutional 
relations. 
This rapid development over a period of only decades poses certain problems of method in 
undertaking a historical analysis of this kind, and there are three possible approaches. The first 
can be termed an analytical approach, which delineates energy policy in terms of government 
involvement with a specific subset of the social and/or economic system such as the energy 
sector, and considers all policy activities defined in this way as 'energy policy'. Thus, electricity 
policy or coal policy can be considered 'energy policy'. The advantages of this approach are 
conceptual simplicity and critical rigour, particularly for the evaluation of specific policies, but it 
obviously risks historical anachronism, as well as being unable to offer a satisfactory account of 
institutional change. 
A second approach can be termed a historical approach, which starts from the opposite basis, 
specifically a study of policy activities delineated by state participants as 'energy policy'. In this 
case, energy policy in South Africa only makes an appearance at the end of the 1960s, and its 
scope undergoes significant changes during the subsequent decades. A clear distinction is drawn 
between related categories of policy, such as electricity or coal policy, which have a much longer 











'energy policy', rather than on an analytically-defmed domain of society or the economy, and its 
governance. Its most significant advantage over the analytical approach is that it provides a 
perspective on the emergence and evolution of new defining concepts such as 'energy services', 
which establish the potential scope and form of energy policies in a particular milieu. At the 
same time, the critical value of this approach is blunted by its inability to distinguish between 
energy policy-related conceptual innovations and largely contingent definitions of the energy 
policy domain (for instance, the classification of nuclear non-proliferation as an energy policy 
issue rather than a defence issue), as well as by its inability to separate the intent of policy and 
institutional changes from their execution. 
I will thus propose a third approach, a critical-historical approach, which attempts to add to the 
historical approach a degree of critical reflection on historical practice in relation to an evolving 
normative framework for energy policy activity. The critical-historical approach involves 
conceiving 'energy policy' as a historical project; a specific pattern of governmental activity 
beginning at a specific historical point and taking a specific institutional form. Defining energy 
policy as a historical project and a type of governmental activity provides a broad scope to 
understand its establishment and development not afforded by an exclusively analytical or 
historical definition. A specific energy policy project, rooted in a particular context, has specific 
aims which develop with the project itself. These can be evaluated against an abstract model for 
the development of energy policy per se; each phase of this development has slightly different 
aims and potentialities, and there is thus a correlation between specific phases of the abstract 
model and various kinds of policy challenge, such as energy poverty or global warming. 
The central feature of almost all energy policy projects is their evolution in what the policy 
theorist Aaron Wildavsky termed a 'dense policy space' (Wildavsky 1979:64-66), populated by 
existing policy systems which incorporated energy supply industries into their domains, such as 
economic policy, industrial development policy, or minerals policy; thus, these industries and 
their corresponding markets were regulated or planned within these policy domains. Initially, 
these functions were partially or completely reorganised on a new basis, with the aim of 
achieving a higher degree of co-ordination, co-operation and integration between different 
energy-related policy spheres. Overlaying this process was a set of novel activities, the function 
of which was to collate and process relevant data on energy flows, usually in the context of some 
form of planning processes, as well as a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. 
These processes (of both integration and innovation) can be categorised into a series of energy 
policy paradigms, which each involve not only a different conceptual outlook, but also a 
different scope of intervention, and a corresponding set of institutional arrangements. It will be 











and its pre-existing institutions, and the success or failure of attempts to establish an energy 
policy capacity, and to progress from one paradigm to another. 
It will also be argued that these problems have been particularly acute in the South African case. 
The development of South African energy policy has some peculiar features: it developed far 
later than in other industrialised countries, and suffered from a perpetually weak institutional 
basis, which was only remedied to a limited extent by the end of apartheid. The structure of 
South Africa's energy system (with its overwhelming dependence on domestic coal) 
differentiated it from those of other countries; South Africa did not make the transition to oil 
undergone by other countries in the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, the conditions which prompted 
the development of energy policy in other industrialised countries were lacking in South Africa; 
however, the apartheid-related oil embargo added another dimension to energy supply crises 
experienced by other countries in the 1970s. Nascent interest in energy policy from the political 
elite in the late 1960s and early 1970s developed into an acute concern as the result of a series of 
energy policy-related crises in 1973, 1979, the mid-1980s, and during the political transition2 
(from 1993 to 1994). Institutional innovations resulted from these crises in establishing new 
areas of energy policy activity, but the structure of energy-related policy communities resulted in 
only partial success in achieving higher levels of integration, co-operation and co-ordination 
between energy-related centres of policy activity. These problems were exacerbated by certain 
features of the apartheid state: energy policy was conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy in 
which the energy sector was accorded a strategic status, and the energy needs of the majority of 
the population were ignored. The transition from apartheid solved some of these problems, but 
others remain. 
The study below has three related goals. The first, in the almost complete absence of any 
secondary literature on the history and development of South African energy policy, is to provide 
a historical account. This has been hindered by a lack of historical data, which is partly a result 
of a lack of institutional memory in the form of Written records, from both government and the 
private sector, and partly an enduring legacy of the extreme culture (and legal regime) of secrecy 
which enveloped much of the energy sector in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to this, the lack 
of disaggregated data on energy production and use is partly a symptom of the weaknesses in the 
energy policy agencies of government itself during this period: historical energy data is thus 
potentially unreliable, and provides only a broad indication of trends in the country's energy 
:: 'Political transition' refers to the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid, which involved two elements: negotiation (1991-
1994) between the apartheid government and the anti-apartheid opposition, mainly (but not solely) represented by the African 
National Congress, which led to the adoption of an interim constitution specifying the parameters for the first post-apartheid 
election (1994), which led to the ANC taking power in 1994. Transitional processes, however, stretched considerably beyond the 
election in many areas of national life. From this point on, the transitional period and associated events will be referred to simply 











system. The aim of developing a historical narrative is also a motivation for the level of detail 
below, which may otherwise not always be justified by its function in supporting the key 
I arguments of the thesis. 
~. 
The second goal is to trace and explain the development of energy policy in South Africa, and to 
place this within an international context, and the third goal is to provide some critical reflection 
on the relationship between the institutional capabilities associated with specific energy policy 
paradigms and specific energy policy challenges. 
The theoretical framework for the study, discussed in Chapter 1, considers three complementary 
approaches to understanding and explaining the development of South African energy policy. 
The first draws on structural theories of the policy environment, particularly those dealing with 
policy networks and policy spaces. The second is concerned with the extent of broader political 
influence on policy processes, and the third with institutional and organisational influences. 
Chapter 2 outlines the international context regarding the development of energy policy, and a 
conceptual framework for categorising energy policy paradigms, as well as provide an overview 
of the development of the South African energy system as a context for the development of 
energy policy. Chapters 3 to 6 provide in-depth accounts of the development of key areas of 
energy-related policy, and Chapter 7 provides a detailed account of the development of energy 
policy institutions within the South African state. A final conclusion will synthesise these 













"It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical 
or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the 
state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved .. 
.. The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is 
doing work." (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, points 125, 132) 
Introduction 
In his introduction to a recent collection of review articles titled Theories of the Policy Process, 
Paul Sabatier observes that the policy process "involves an extremely complex set of interacting 
elements over time" (Sabatier 1999:3). Since academic study of the policy process began with 
Lasswell (1951), a great deal of research on the policy process has provided a more detailed 
picture of this complexity, using a wide range of disciplinary approaches, which at the same time 
as providing more insight into policy processes, has also led to the proliferation of theoretical 
approaches: 
''Not the least of the reasons that [the study of] public policy has proved so unwieldy is that 
it is the property of everyone and no-one. The disciplines required to understand public 
policy cut right across the old academic lines of demarcation. Indeed, it is this 
interdisciplinary quality which makes the approach so interesting for both student and 
teacher alike. But the flipside of such a splendid single market of ideas and techniques 
wherein all the borders between disciples and sub-disciplines are breached is that the subject 
is always verging on complete fragmentation" (Parsons 1997:xv). 
Aspects of the policy process have been productively explored by applying conceptual 
frameworks and methods from political science, institutional and organisational theory, 
economics, anthropology, systems theory, evolutionary biology and others. Choosing a 
theoretical approach for the current study thus poses a significant problem, which is largely due 











" .. given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the analyst must find some way of 
simplifying the situation in order to have any chance of understanding it. One simply cannot 
look for, and see, everything" (Sabatier 1999:4). 
The process of simplification requires the construction of theoretical frameworks which rest on a 
set of presuppositions, which direct the observer's attention to certain features of the policy 
process and exclude others, and "define the categories in which phenomena are to be grouped" 
(Sabatier 1999:4); having made sense of the policy process in this way, the theoretical 
framework: has certain explanatory capacities, based on the resultant simplified image of the 
process. Different presuppositions thus lead to different explanatory capacities. There is also an 
element of conceptual disagreement between theoretical frameworks, even with regard to basic 
concepts such as 'policy'; many of these concepts meet Gallie's criteria for 'essentially contested 
concepts' (Gallie 1956, Connolly 1983), and thus different conceptions cannot be resolved either 
empirically or analytically. 
These points are illustrated by Allison and Zelikow in their detailed study of decision-making 
leading up to and during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison & Zelikow 1999), in which three 
different theoretical frameworks were applied3• At the end of this process, the question of which 
approach was superior cannot be clearly answered, since 
" .. not only do [different] lenses lead analysts to produce different explanations of problems 
that appear, in their summary questions, to be the same. Lenses also influence the character 
of the analyst's puzzle, the evidence assumed to be relevant, the concepts used in examining 
the evidence, and what is taken to be an explanation." (Allison & Zelikow 1999:385). 
Although differences between theoretical approaches cannot be empirically resolved, applying 
multiple frameworks did however possess significant advantages, partly because of the 
conceptual capabilities of different theoretical approaches (Allison & Zelikow 1999:386). By 
contrast, a comprehensive survey of theoretical frameworks undertaken by Lane as a prelude to 
his study on institutional reform in higher education in Sweden concluded that 
" . .it is hardly possible to argue that one of these approaches to the policy process is superior 
to the others .... The search for one true approach to the public policy process is a venture 
bound to fail" (Lane 1990:39). 
Lane's use of a number of ' meta theoretical criteria' such as "deductive power or falsifiability, 
scope of applicability, degree of confirmation or realism, coherence, simplicity, and practical 
usefulness" (Lane 1990:3-4), might have helped to rationalise his choice of a new institutionalist 
framework for his study, but the grounds on which he made his decisions were largely 
3 These were the Rational Action Model (explaining decisions through assuming that the agent maximises hislher/its rational 











pragmatic, based on the "affInity" of a specific theoretical framework with both the subject 
material of his study and the kinds of questions which he wanted to explore (Lane 1990:38). 
The approach used here to select a theoretical approach is based on a combination of Lane's 
pragmatism and Allison and Zelikow's advocacy of the potential for a ''multiple lens" to develop 
a more complex understanding of a specific set of policy phenomena, a point of view supported 
by Kingdon (1995 :77-80), and Sabatier: 
"Knowledge of several different perspectives forces the analyst to clarify differences in 
assumptions across frameworks, rather than implicitly assuming a given set. Second, 
multiple perspectives encourage the development of competing hypotheses that should lead 
ideally to "strong inference" - or at least to the accumulation of evidence in favour of one 
perspective more than another. Finally, knowledge and application of multiple perspectives 
should gradually clarify the conditions under which one perspective is more useful than 
another." (Sabatier 1999:6) 
Given the close relationship between theoretical frameworks, key research questions, and the 
identification of pertinent data, the procedure followed in this study was to conduct a basic 
review of competing policy frameworks, review the material in question, outline broad 
characteristics of the material, identify key questions, and use the latter two processes to identify 
several theoretical approaches which were a) compatible with the scope and nature of the case 
material, b) able to provide insight (if not definitive answers) into the key research questions, and 
c) if possible, complementary in approach and likely results. Further in-depth research was then 
conducted, (included a period of participant observation 4, and use of interviews to supplement 
the sparse documentary record), the re ults of which forms the bulk of the thesis. 
Broad parameters of the case material are: 
• The broad historical context: the period under consideration spans a period of significant 
political change in South Africa, from an apartheid to a post-apartheid state, which 
involved significant changes to both the content and context of policy and policymaking. 
On the other hand, there were significant continuities in policy across the transition. 
• The character of state institutions: apartheid state institutions were a direct legacy of 
South Africa's former status as a colony of the United Kingdom, and thus resembled UK 
institutions (in their historical form) closely. These were reformed by the post-apartheid 
state, but similarities remain. 
• Contrasts between the development of the South African energy system and others: the 
South African energy system retained a significant dependence on coal, and did not 
4 The author spent two years (2001-2002) as the ANC's parliamentaJy researcher for Minerals and Energy, primarily doing 
research on minerals and energy policy issues for the chairperson ot: and the ANC caucus in, the Portfolio Committee for 











undergo the transition to oil and other energy carriers as did other countries from the 
1950s to the 1960s. 
• The emergence of a new area of policymaking: the study encompasses the emergence of 
energy policy, which was accomplished through both the integration of existing energy-
related policy activities, and the development of new energy policy-related institutions. 
• A historical perspective over a long time period: most events in the development of 
energy policy in South Africa took place from the 1960s to the present, but the 
antecedent areas of policy activity (individual energy supply sector policies, and various 
other antecedent institutional innovations such as planning) began long before this, the 
first beginning before the formation of South Africa in 1910. 
Key research questions are: 
• What were the causes of the apartheid state's decision to embark on the energy policy 
project? 
• How did the differences between the development of the S uth African energy system 
and others, and apartheid, influence the development of energy policy institutions and 
policies? 
• What were the key factors in determining energy policy choices? 
• What was the relationship between decision-making processes in energy policy 
processes, sub-energy policy processes (for instance, electricity policy), and other 
decision-making processes? 
• What were the continuities and differences between apartheid and post-apartheid energy 
policy and institutions? 
• How influential were the changes in the general political environment from apartheid to 
post-apartheid on energy policy processes? 
• Can South African energy policy be understood in terms of a policy paradigm, or 
sequence of paradigms, and what were the processes by which the paradigms were 
defined? 
Given the small number of actors in the development of energy policy and the continuity of their 
presence in the energy policymaking process, and the complex structural features which 
characterised the energy policy subsystem, an approach based on policy networks was chosen as 
the main theoretical approach for the study. Two other complementary theoretical approaches 
were also chosen: the first, the 'multiple streams' approach (Kingdon 1995) was chosen on 
account of its potential to illuminate relationships between policy processes and broader political 
processes; the second is an approach based on the theory of organisations and institutions, which 











African (and other) energy policy. Below is a brief discussion of definitions of key policy-related 
concepts, followed by a more detailed discussion of the approaches specified above, and a 
conclusion outlining the way in which these theoretical approache~ will be applied to the 
historical data. 
Concepts and Definitions 
Contrasting theoretical approaches to the policy process rest on differing conceptions of 'policy' 
itself, which, as well as posing a conceptual problem, poses a practical methodological problem: 
how to identify policy phenomena as such in a specific area. While the conceptual problem 
probably cannot be definitively resolved, the aim of this discussion is to reach a practical 
resolution of the methodological problem. Almost all conceptions of policy share the basic 
attribute of policy as a form of intention, norm or 'decision-rule', a higher-level principle which 
can establish the scope for lower-level decisions and/or actions; other attributes can be expressed 
in terms of three dimensions. 
The first of these dimensions consists of a continuum from policy as decision-making to policy 
as norms. Identifying policy in the fIrst case is relatively simple: policy is an output of a state 
decision-making process (Dror 1968:13); in the absence of a decision, there is no policy. In the 
second case, policy is a set of norms revealed through state action, which do not require a 
specific decision-point, or a conscious endorsement by key political actors (Vickers 1995). If a 
state decides one thing and does another, then the first concept would define the policy as being 
the result of the decision-making process (and something previous to and separate from action), 
and the second, the principles underlying the action which actually results (conceptually separate 
from action, but in reality inseparable). 
The second dimension is a distinction made concerning legitimacy, which is a key aspect of 
policy, and the complexity of state institutions. At one pole, policy is cOnceptualised as a unitary 
state-sanctioned entity for which governmentsS should be held to account (Hogwood & Gunn 
1984), and at the other pole, policy is conceived as a complex interaction of different decision 
processes in multiple (and often competing) state agencies (Smith 1991,1993; Wildavsky 1979); 
the complexity renders the problem of accountability more complex. For the former view, policy 
corresponds to what the state actually does (if " .. parliament enacts a law .... but provides 
insufficient resources and generally does little to enforce it, then we are entitled to say that the 
S The difference between the term 'state' and 'government' is not often clear, but is important. In this context, 'government' will 
generally be used to indicate the executive, comprising the political leadership of the state, whereas 'state' will be used to 
indicate the totality of public institutions. Thus, the state includes the executive, but also other state agencies. There is a 
significant debate on whether organisations such as stafe.owned enterprises fonn part of the state; in the following study these are 
generally referred to as 'state agencies'. since the South African government clearly regarded them as such in the 1970s and 











Government's policy is not to implement its own law" (Hogwood & Gunn 1984:21)), whereas 
for the latter, action does not flow from the state per se (which is, according to Smith, just a 
collection of institutions), but from a range of often competing state agencies (Smith 1993 :50); 
thus, conflicting policies are frequently espoused by competing agencies, which makes deducing 
policy from state actions much less straightforward. 
The third dimension is a distinction between policy as a discrete set of decisions (the output of a 
'decision-making moment'), and as a continuous process of adaptation and modification. 
Adherents of the former view require policies to be endorsed by formal decision-making 
processes by credible (politically and institutionally legitimate) authorities, which are relatively 
infrequent, whereas adherents of the latter view regard policy as a 'work-in-progress', which is 
constantly revised and elaborated, including during implementation. The former view would 
delineate policy far more narrowly, whereas the latter view would include a far wider range of 
pronouncements, programmes and processes. Ibis is underpinned by another distinction: 
whereas the former view would tend to regard the line between policymaking and 
administration, and between policymaking and implementation, as being fairly well-defined 
(sometimes institutionalised), the latter view would not, both because of the frequent 
involvement of administrative officials in policy processes, and because of the undefined 
relationship between detailed programmes ;and policy frameworks. A further division of 
theoretical policymaking frameworks related to this dimension is the division between theories 
which subscribe to what Sabatier refers to as the "stages heuristic" (Sabatier 1999:6-7), which 
encompasses theories which portray policymaking as taking place through a sequential series of 
'stages' (from agenda-setting to implementation), and others, which portray policymaking as a 
far more complex and interactive process: in terms of Sabatier's distinction, the three theoretical 
approaches elaborated below do not subscribe to the "stages heuristic". 
Here, we will make use of a conception of policy based on Ham and Hill, who define policy as a 
'web of decisions', consisting of both formal policy decisions, and other less formal decisions 
made in different phases of the policy process. These decisions are linked together into a web in 
two related ways: the first is a temporal succession of similar decisions, whereby policy 
decisions are elaborated, refined and transmuted, and the second is a structural elaboration of a 
policy framework, where one or more policy decision{s) is augmented and/or interpreted by a 
series of less important and more specific decisions, which contextualise and define the initial 
decision{s), and establish links to other areas of decision-making. Actual policies pertaining to a 












" .. the defmitional problems posed by the concept of policy suggest that it is difficult to treat 
it as a very specific and concrete phenomenon ... .it is hard to identifY particular occasions 
when policy is made ... .it tends to be defmed in terms of a series of decisions, which, taken 
together, comprise a more or less common understanding of what policy [in a specific sector] 
is" (Ham & Hill 1984:11-12). 
In fact, the definitive decision-making 'moment' in organisations is often difficult to identify. 
While there are rare moments where fonnal policy positions are pronounced by the executive, 
these are inevitably the culmination of a long process of decision-making, or the rationalisation 
of policy positions espoused by other state agencies: 
" . .in real life, what at first sight appears to be a deliberate decision is apt to tum out to be the 
formal culmination of a slow process of commitment over a period of time, in which the 
range of possibilities has gradually been narrowed as different members of the organisation 
contribute to it in their tum. Decisions cannot often be attributed to one person, or even to a 
group of people consciously acting together at one time." (Brown & Steel 1979: 175). 
Ham and Hill also suggest that policy 'evolves' further in the 'implementation' phase (Ham & 
Hill 1984: 11-12) as policies are elaborated and details are sketched in; this process not only 
provides a more detailed and specific policy framework, but also specifies more precisely what 
the policies mean in a specific context, which is to all intents and purposes a continuation of 
policymaking. 
This conceptualisation of policy fits into the above three dimensions of policy concepts as 
follows. In tenns of the first dimension, policy as a 'web of decisions' favours the concept of 
policy as decision-making, that is, as a conscious act by agents of the state; however, it is not 
necessarily a well-delineated process. In tenns of the second dimension, policy is more of a 
complex, multi-agency phenomenon than a set of positions we can attribute to the state as a 
unitary actor; however, policy has several functions, and it is possible to distinguish, within this 
complexity, a political function (policy as the expression of a political position, or as part of a 
platfonn for a coalition), and an administrative function (POlicy as a decision-making 
framework, or as a programme goal); since policy fulfils both these functions simultaneously, 
there is in almost every case a constant tension between them. 
In tenns of the third dimension, we subscribe here to an approach which is more continuous than 
discrete, and more the output of a system than the culmination of a process. To that end, the 
concept of policy activity is defined as any activity related to, and with the intention of, making 
policy, which includes analytical activities such as policy-oriented research, analysis, and the 
specification of policy alternatives, political activities such as lobbying and coalition-building, 
and other activities such as networking and relationship-building. Policy activity takes place 











~ . (Wildavsky 1979:64-66), which consists of policies pertaining to a specific policy domain, which 
will be defined below. 'Policy density' is the measure of the intensity of policymaking within a 
specific policy domain; a specific domain (for instance, welfare), might contain policies from a 
number of competing agencies (a high policy density), which places constraints on future 
policymaking, or it might contain few or no policies (a low policy density), which gives carte 
blanche to agencies seeking to establish policies in that domain. 
The policy environment consists of two sets of elements: the 'background' consists of the whole 
conceptual structure of the policymaking process (including agendas, alternatives and existing 
policies), and the foreground consists of actors which enter the policy environment when their 
actions are policy-oriented, i.e. when they seek to undertake any activity the aim of which is to 
influence the outcome of a policymaking process. A policy domain is an area of policy 
delineated by a set of state-sanctioned institutions (usually corresponding to an organisation such 
as a government department, and/or a corresponding function in the executive). The way that 
policy domains are delineated is extremely significant for policymaking processes, since the 
delineation process largely determines lines of authority in making and implementing policy. 
Domains inevitably overlap partially, which results in polici s in the same domain being made 
by different agencies, usually with different perspectives. For instance, in South Africa 
electricity policy is overseen by a Department of Minerals and Energy, but the state-owned 
electricity utility reports to a Department of Public Enterprises; a significant portion of the 
electricity distribution industry resides in local authorities, which are powerful political entities 
in themselves, and are overseen by the Department of Provincial and Local Government. 
Domains are not static; they are created, expand, contract and disappear for a number of complex 
reasons, with significant consequences for policymaking activity. 
Any consideration of policy in a particular policy domain will reveal a conceptual structure: the 
organisation of policies into broader 'policy frameworks', which have been variously categorised 
in a strong and a weak sense. Weak categorisations of policy frameworks attribute no special 
significance to them, other than as a form of 'meta-policy', a set of unifying concepts or values 
which underpin specific policies. Strong categorisations, however, in terms of 'policy ideology' 
(Smith 1991, 1993), 'policy paradigms' (Smith 1993, Menahem 1998) or 'policy regimes' 
(Wilson 2000), make a distinction which has significant explanatory power between policies and 
policy frameworks, which centres on the problem of policy change: the distinction is best 
elucidated by Sabatier (1988:144), who distinguishes between 'Core Policy Beliefs', and 
'Secondary Aspects'. The former consist of broad policy principles and strategies, and the latter 
consist of individual policies and strategies aimed at achieving the Core Policy Beliefs. Policy 











which does not involve significant deviance from the 'Core Policy Beliefs', and the second is a 
change in the overall policy framework. For purposes of clarity, and a conceptual commitment to 
the theory of policy communities, in this study we will use the term 'policy paradigm' to refer to 
policy frameworks or 'Core Policy Beliefs', which will be further elaborated on below. Thus, 
minor policy change involves changes only in individual policies, whereas major policy change 
involves change in the policy paradigm itself. Policy activity, as outlined above, is in most cases 
orientated towards the elaboration of individual policies within a larger framework, and less 
commonly towards the development of a new policy paradigm. 
Finally, in the current study, it was evident that within a specific domain (in this case, energy 
policy), different policies or sub-areas of policy were contrasted by different levels of policy 
activity, different degrees of implementation, and different levels of resource allocation for 
implementation and policy activity; in order to describe and explain these differences, we will 
introduce the concept of actualisation of policies. The degree of actualisation of policies is 
reflected in a) the degree of ongoing policy activity, b) the resources dedicated to 
implementation and further policymaking in the same area, and c) the degree to which the policy 
has been matched with implementation capacities. Actualised policies are thus matched with 
appropriate organisational capacity, their implementation is well-resourced, and further policy 
initiatives are being pursued in the same area; by contrast, non-actualised policies are not 
matched with appropriate organisational capacity, implementation is not well-resourced, and 
there is little or no pursuit of further policy initiatives. In terms of the above conception of 
policy, actualised policies are comprised of an extensive web of decisions, and actively-pursued 
links to other related areas of policy activity, whereas non-actualised policies are comprised of a 
very limited web of decisions, and are not well-integrated into other potentially related areas of 
policy activity: this will be further elaborated in the section on institutional and organisational 
aspects of the policy process further below. First, various approaches to conceptualising and 
explaining the structure of the policy environment will be discussed. 
Policy Networks and Complex Policy Spaces 
Since the 1960s, students of public policy have taken an interest in what were termed 'policy 
subsystems', a term used to describe the patterns of enduring relationships between state actors 
and others in the policy environment within a specific policy domain; these patterns were noted 
in the US in policymaking processes in transport, agriculture and education, where stable 
relationships existed between congressional committees, government agencies and interest 
groups (Howlett & Ramesh 1995:125) which formed 'iron triangles' or 'policy monopolies', 











developed the concept of the 'policy community' to describe the close collegial and sometimes 
institutionalised relationship between state agencies and other actors (particularly interest 
groups) in specific policymaking processes. These 'communities' provide participants with a 
significantly-enhanced opportunity to influence policy outcomes, as well as providing the state 
with a high level of co-operation from key non-state actors in a specific policy domain. This 
work was developed into general theories of 'policy networks', which has rapidly developed into 
the " .. dominant paradigm for the study of public policymaking" (KBnig 1998:387). 
Policy theorists are not however in agreement concerning the nature and membership of 
networks, and there are several different approaches to classifying and delineating these. Smith 
and other theorists such ~ Rhodes and Marsh (Rhodes 1992, Rhodes & Marsh 1992) tend to 
identify the key members of policy networks, and particularly policy communities, as interest 
groups and state agencies6• Members are identified through "resources dependencies" (Smith 
1993:58), and networks are held together by mutual interests in resource exchange; thus the 
interaction in policy networks is predominantly strategic. One of the criticisms of this approach 
is that it tends to underestimate the role of experts such as scientists and other policy analysts, 
which might have less significant (or more one-sided) resource dependencies, and emphasises 
the interplay of strategic interests at the expense of ideas in the evolution of policy (Sabatier 
1988:131). 
An alternative approach to policy communities is advocated by Kingdon (1995), who defines 
policy communities as the collection of "specialists in a given area" (Kingdon 1995: 117), which 
includes any individual from within a government agency or an interest group who a) has 
expertise in a specific policy area, and b) who is a regular participant in policy deliberation, 
advocacy or analysis in that area. The central activity of policy communities is thus 
communicative rather than strategic, although the work done by Smith's conceptualisation in 
explaining strategic interactions is done elsewhere in Kingdon's model. Although Kingdon's 
concept shares some of the features of Smith's (including a tendency to limit policy alternatives 
through various forms of consensus), it represents a smaller subset of actors in the policy 
environment. Another key difference is that Kingdon's communities tend to consist of 
individuals (albeit with strong organisational affiliations) organised into tight networks which 
develop limited consensus on alternatives, whereas Smith's communities consist largely of 
groups with mandates to negotiate policy outcomes. 
6 For theoretical purposes, the distinction between the roles of actors in policy communities is easiest to express as a distinction 
between stakeholders and state agencies (and the following discussion will use this distinction), but in reality these roles are often 
considerably blurred. especially when stakeholders are state agencies (such as state-owned enterprises or other 'quasi-state 
agencies'). It thus makes sense to distinguish an actor or actors in a policy community which are legitimate state policy agencies, 
i.e. which have the formal jUnction of making policy in a specific area on behalf of the state, from those which are not, and thus 
have a monopoly on this 'resource'. There are still occasions where publicly-owned or privately-owned stakeholders fulfil this 











A third and significantly different approach is advocated by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (Sabatier 
1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999), who propose a different structural approach to policy 
subsystems, which they divide into a number of competing 'advocacy coalitions', which vie for 
influence on policymaking in a particular sector over time. These coalitions are 
" .. composed of people from various organisations who share a set of normative and causal 
beliefs and who act in concert" (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 128). 
Members of coalitions have three-tiered belief systems, consisting of 'Deep Core Beliefs' (basic 
values and ideological orientations), 'Policy Core Beliefs' ("basic strategies and policy positions 
for achieving Deep Core beliefs in the policy area/subsystem in question"), and 'Secondary 
Aspects' , consisting of "a multitude of instrumental decisions and infonnation searches 
necessary to implement the Policy Core in the specific policy area" (Sabatier 1988:144). The 
criteria for membership of a particular advocacy coalition is that one shares Policy Core Beliefs 
with other members, and that one interacts with them in developing knowledge and strategies 
aimed at improving the coalition's chances of influencing or detennining policy. Membership of 
advocacy coalitions thus embraces a much larger group of actors than policy communities, and a 
more plainly activist role is attributed to experts. Another important distinction is 
characterisation of policy frameworks as belief systems, and the consequent subordination of 
strategic interests to beliefs in policy subsystems, since according to Sabatier, interests do not 
exist prior to intemction with the policy subsystem, but are fonnwated and refined during 
interaction with the policy process within advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988:131,142). 
These different accounts have various characteristics which simplify a choice of approach in the 
current study. There are two contextual features which are significant. The first is the provenance 
of the approaches: both Sabatier and Kingdon developed their approaches from studies of the US 
political system, whereas Smith's approach is based on research in the UK political system. One 
of the key features of the US political system is its federal structure, which renders policy 
processes far more open and multi-faceted than in the UK, which has a far more centralised, 
closed policy system. The South African political system was and is far closer to the UK system 
in this respect, since key institutions (particularly before the abolition of apartheid) are modelled 
on those of the UK. In addition, the apartheid state imposed further restrictions on access to 
policy processes. 
The second is the difference between the South African policy environment and those of both the 
UK and the US, which can be summed up in terms of resources available for policy activity. Not 
only were state resources more limited, but societal resources for participation in policy 
processes were far scarcer. In addition, other barriers to entry existed under apartheid, both on 











and infonnally through the zealous exclusion of dissenters), and because of the authoritarian 
character of the apartheid bureaucracy. 
Initial examination of the data on energy-related policy activities, as well as other areas of policy 
in South Africa, seems to indicate that the impact of the above factors on policy processes 
generally was to significantly limit the number of participants into tightly-dermed networks and 
to privilege strategic interaction over conceptual innovation; other groups (including experts and 
civil society groups) had a very tenuous presence in policy subsystems. This would indicate that 
Smith's approach will be more useful, and that the alternative, Sabatier's theory of advocacy 
coalitions, will be far less useful as an overall approach to explaining policy change, particularly 
in the apartheid era, since initial analyses of the data for this study raised the question as to 
whether there was more than one advocacy coalition in some energy policy-related domains 
(given Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's stringent criteria (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 128»; 
one advocacy coalition per policy subsystem would probably behave in similar ways to a policy 
community7. The concept of an 'advocacy coalition'S, as well as Kingdon's 'multiple streams' 
approach (discussed further below), however, will be applied in a limited sense to remedy the 
one lacuna in Smith's approach, the role of experts in policy subsystems (and particularly their 
role in alternative specification). 
The analysis of policy networks can be regarded as the first of two levels of analysis in exploring 
the structure of the policy environment: the second level is concerned with complex interactions 
of various sorts between different foci of policy activity. In reality, almost every policy domain 
is related to a set of other domains, since the complexity of contemporary societal systems 
renders completely autonomous policy domains impossible; however, the way in which the 
relationships between different policy processes are institutionalised is of central importance. 
Below, a theoretical approach to policy communities (as proposed by Smith and others) will be 
outlined and discussed, before building on this discussion to investigate alternative ways of 
conceiving more complex structural relationships in the policy environment. 
Typology of Policy Networks 
Policy networks have been variously defined (Smith 1993:56-60; Parsons 1997:184-194; 
Thatcher 1998:391-395). Three salient characteristics are a) that networks consist of state 
agencies and other groups which have an interest in a delineated area of policy; b) that some 
7 There is possibly significant scope to apply the advocacy coalition framework to South Africa and other developing country 
policy processes with more adaptation and research, and particularly to post-apartheid South Africa, but very little use will be 
made ofit here as a theory of policy change (see below). ' 
8 Although it does not fit easily into the theoretical framework proposed by Smith, the concept of an 'advocacy coalition' seemed 
to describe quite closely the succession of 'energy policy advocates' which formed a consistent part of the energy policy project 
over the last three decades, particularly in emphasising the continuity of their role (for which the advocacy coalitions approach is 











contact and exchange of infonnation occurs between participants; and c) that to varying degrees, 
there are mutual resource dependencies between participants (Smith 1993:56-58; and Smith 
1993:58 after Rhodes 1992:77-78). Policy networks vary considerably, from relatively loosely 
structured 'issues networks', characterised by a large number of participants, infrequent contacts 
between participants, low barriers to entry, and a low degree of resource exchange (Smith 
1993:62), to 'policy communities', characterised by a tight structure, a small number of 
participants, frequent (even institutionalised) contact between participants, high barriers to entry, 
and a high degree of resource exchange (Smith 1993:64). Whereas issue networks are 
characterised by the participation of multiple state agencies (frequently in conflict), policy 
stalemates (lack of consensus) and open access, policy communities are characterised by the 
participation of one state agency (which has a dominant position within the state in sanctioning 
policy in a specific domain), closed access and a high degree of policy consensus. One of the 
important elements of policy communities is exchange of resources, which is the key motivation 
for the participants to sustain a policy community; since policy c mmunities are the policy 
networks with the most relevance for this study, these will be discussed in some detail below. 
The Origins and Sustainability of Policy Communities 
Policy communities are based on the reciprocal exchange of resources, as well as on several 
other fonns of mutual benefit. Resources are of two kinds: the first is infonnation (state agencies 
possess political infonnation, and other actors possess other kinds of infonnation not necessarily 
available to the state), and the second is influence; state agencies deliver influence over policy 
outcomes and regulatory systems, and non-state actors deliver the co-operation of their 
constituents in the implementation of policy changes. Policy communities are a means for the 
state to increase what Smith tenns the "infrastructural power" of the state (Smith 1993:52), 
which, particularly in complex modem states, involves the extension of the state's influence over 
specific areas of society through the development of relationships with key civil society groups, 
and the implementation of new institutions; these in most instances require the co-operation and 
involvement of key stakeholders: whereas the state has extensive fonnal powers, its real power 
in different social and economic domains is related to its infrastructurru. power in these domains. 











exercise of which is very risky for the state9• Thus, by comparison to an issue network, where 
there are clearly policy winners and policy losers, in a policy community: 
.... power is a positive-sum. In other words, a policy community does not involve one group 
sacrificing power to another. It could involve each group in a mutual expansion of power as 
each increases its influence over policy" (Smith 1993:64). 
Policy communities thus involve an expansion of localised state power (in the specific policy 
domain). This in tum is. dependent on the various actors in the policy community having a 
legitimate mandate from their constituencies. State agencies have to guarantee that they have a 
dominant position, or a monopoly, on the influence that they bring to the community, which 
implies that a competing agency can undermine the effectiveness of the pol~cy community if 
they can offer similar influence within the state as a whole. Other groups have to guarantee that 
they have a dominant influence over their members, and can guarantee their co-operation with 
policy changes. This has two effects. The first is to "depoliticise" policymaking, since policy 
communities function as conflict-resolution mechanisms between state agencies and 
stakeholders, and effectively exclude non-members from the policy processes, thus avoiding the 
airing of policy conflicts in broader political spheres. The second is that the risks of policy 
change are minimised: for the state, co-operation of stakeholders is assured, and for stakeholders, 
risk of adverse or unexpected policy change is minimised, and policy-related strategic goals can 
be more easily pursued. The establishment of policy communities also potentially enhances the 
prestige and influence of state agencies vis-a.-vis inter-agency rivalries. 
Access to policy communities is generally limited, and requires participants to follow the 'rules 
of the game', which include using 'insider' tactics in advocacy, not taking an oppositional stance 
in public, and keeping demands within a specific framework. In an actual policy environment, 
this structure is likely to be more complex, depending on the interest and issue structures 
involved. There is usually a "core" and a "periphery" or a "primary" and "secondary" 
community (Smith 1993 :61); since specific sectors usually involve a complex structure of issues 
and sub-issues, not all actors will be involved in all these issues; some will have interest or 
influence only in a specific sub-issue that does not often arise, and thus have a more tenuous 
relationship with other players other players will be excluded altogether. The significance of 
this is that the 'rules of the game' and the norms that are necessary for the existence of a policy 
9 The contrast between 'infrastructural' and 'despotic' power echoes a long-standing debate in political philosophy on the nature 
of power (see especially Lukes 1974; Arendt 1972), between a concept of power based on the notion of 'power over', or the 
ability of one agent to influence another, and a concept based on the notion of 'power to'. or the empowennent of an agent or 
group of agents to act in a specific context. This latter and more unusual conception of power is epitomised by Arendt's contrast 
between power and violence, which she defines as a lack of power; thus. if the state requires violence (or other coercive means) 
to achieve its aims. then it lacks power. Whereas despotic power is a straightforward reflection of the first (and more orthodox) 
conception, infrastructural power is closer to the second, in that a) this kind of power requires co-operation and co-ordination, 











community are usually set by the core actors. Networks can shift significantly for specific issues, 
integrate or de-integrate with other networks, can have a diversity of state actors, interstate 
actors, or non-state actors. 
Policy Consensus, Policy Paradigms and Policy Change 
For a community to exist, there should also be a degree of consensus on policy, and on the 
framework within which policy is made. In a situation where there is long-term stability and 
little membership change in a policy community, consensus in a policy community often goes 
beyond this: 
"In fact a policy community often has more than a consensus; it actually has an ideology 
which determines the community's 'worldview'. Ideology is a way of making sense of the 
world by defining and ordering it. Ideology defmes not only what policy options are 
available but what problems exist. In other words, it defines the agenda of issues with which 
the policy community has to deal" (Smith 1993 :62). 
Policy communities develop 'policy paradigms', which Menahem (following Hall) dermes as: 
" .. the system of ideas and standards that specify the goals of policy, the kind of instruments 
that can be used to attain them, and the very nature of problems they are meant to address" 
(Menahem 1998:283) 
Policy paradigms consist of three basic features. The first is a conception of how the policy 
domain is dermed: what policy issues a specific domain involves, and who the relevant actors 
are; the second is a consensus regarding broad policy goals, and the third is a representation of 
valid policy problems, and valid policy alternatives. This last feature i~ ascribed by Menahem to 
'causal stories' which develop and are sustained within policy communities (Menahem 1998:288 
after Stone 1988). Stone's conception of policy problems is in tum based on a "social 
constructionist" view (Stone 1988:282), in terms of which 'conditions' (which afflict people in 
various ways) only become 'problems' when it can be demonstrated that something can be done 
about them. In order to demonstrate this, the cause of the problem must be shown to be amenable 
to human intervention, if policy change is to be successful in tackling the relevant problem 
(Stone 1988:284-285). Almost all public problems have complex causes; the function of 'causal 
stories' is to portray a simplified narrative account of problems or conditions which demonstrate 
a simple causality, which excludes other causes and allocates responsibility (or non-
responsibility) for a set ofproblems. 
Under what conditions does major policy change take place in policy domains which are 
characterised by an entrenched policy community? In terms of Smith's framework, major policy 
change is usually linked to changes in the policy community itself; without changes in the policy 











1993:96). Below are two case studies: one undertaken by Menahem (1998) of Israeli water 
policy, where an entrenched policy community successfully resisted policy change, and the other 
of food policy in the UK., where the policy community itself collapsed into a broader issue 
network, and the dominant policy paradigm was replaced. 
In Israel in the early 1950s, promoting the growth of agriculture was perceived as a national 
priority, and was closely linked to early Zionist concepts of state-building. The primary function 
of water policy was to supply agricultural projects with whatever water these required at 
subsidised prices, so as to promote the expansion of agriculture. Since agricultural interests were 
thus seen as the key interest group in the water policy domain, a policy community based 
primarily on these interests was established and strongly institutionalised (given a formal power 
of veto). This led to the establishment of a water policy paradigm based on two principles: the 
first was that the problem was shortage of water supply, and the solution was to increase water 
supply (through discovering additional water sources), and the second was that since the primary 
aim of water policy was the growth of agriculture, water should be sold to farmers below cost 
(thus diminishing price incentives to save water) (Menahem 1998:291-295). 
Both the policy community and the policy paradigm proved immune to repeated water crises, as 
well as potential legitimation crises caused by repeated reports on the Israeli water situation, 
which emphasised repeatedly that overex1raction was damaging key aquifers. Although the 
importance of agriculture had declined, in economic and political terms, the strongly 
institutionalised nature of the policy community retained the dominance of the policy paradigm. 
Other state agencies were not able to successfully challenge its dominance, and resorted to non 
co-operation (Menahem 1998:296-300). The policy community was able to retain the policy 
paradigm by advocating desalination (a technocratic solution which avoided the possibility that 
institutional reform was urgently required, which would have moved policy outside the 
paradigm). Only when new paradigms began to impinge on the structure of the policy 
comm\m}tyitge1f;was the position of the dominant paradigm threatened (Menahem 1998:307). 
There are several conclusions which follow from this case. The first is that past policies create 
and entrench policy communities, which are thereafter able to resist change for a considerable 
period after the resources of the community members (which was the basis for their inclusion in 
the community) decline: 
" .. In view of the remarkable resilience of agricultural interests within the water policy 
network it can be suggested that the erosion of political power of participants outside the 
network appears to only gradually leak into the network itself .. " (Menahem 1998:301) 
The second is that the policy community was able to defend itself against repeated policy crises 











opposition of other significant state agencies; the only option left to the state would have been to 
have imposed institutional refonn on the water policy domain, which did not happen during the 
period of the case study. The third significant conclusion was the ability of the community to 
apply its 'causal story' to deflect repeated scientific reports on the dire consequences of existing 
water policy, and recast them in tenns of the dominant policy paradigm. When a central tenet of 
the paradigm (that new supplies could be developed) was too badly damaged by the facts, it was 
replaced by a strong commitment in the policy community to desalination, which was appealing 
because it did not pose a challenge to the existing institutional arrangements or paradigm. 
By contrast, events which undermine the structure and integrity of the community itself have 
significant consequences for policy change, as illustrated by Smith (1991) in a study of the 
changes in the food policy network in response to a political crisis in the fonn of Salmonella 
infection of eggs. Food policy in the UK. was tightly-controlled by a policy community 
dominated by agricultural interests and government technocrats, established after the second 
world war with the primary aim of maintaining food security. From then until the 1980s, there 
was a growing public concern with food safety, which promised to supplant the old policy 
paradigm (a shift of emphasis from a focus on food security and production to a focus on 
consumer health and safety). Change was resisted by the policy community until a political crisis 
broke out in the mid-1980s (Smith 1991:240), which divided the policy community in two 
important ways: first, the control of food policy by the state's agriculture bureaucracy was 
threatened by the state health agencies' growth in interest in food safety; and second, conflicts of 
interest which grew amongst members of. the policy community (specifically fanners and 
retailers). The result was that the policy community was unable to maintain a consensus and food 
policy was ''politicised''; the tightly-structured policy community evolved under the weight of 
the crisis into a more loosely-structured issue network, with a significantly greater number of 
participants, and a broader policy domain (Smith 1991 :253-4). 
In the more extreme case of regime change (which is directly applicable to the present study), 
policy communities can survive if the same resource dependencies are re-established between 
interest groups and the new regime. New regimes do not usually have, but do require, detailed 
policy programmes, which are often provided by existing policy communities. Thus, although 
regime change can lead to policy discontinuities, existing policy communities can often facilitate 
a high degree of policy continuity, which will be one of the central questions explored in the 
current study. Thus, minor policy change, in response to threats to the policy community, is 
usually accomplished and managed within the policy community, which is able to resist more 
significant policy change, whereas major policy change, or a shift in policy paradigm, is only 











Complex Policy Structures 
In most cases, theories of policy networks focus on networks which correspond in a fairly 
straightforward way with single policy domains. Since in reality most policy domains are not 
discrete, however, there are a large number of ways in which networks interact: one network 
might be 'nested' inside another, or might intersect with another (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 
1999: 136); networks can 'expand' and 'contract' to encompass subsets of policy issues (Smith 
1993:66). Some policy domains are quite integrated, whereas others are 'fragmented' to a large 
extent (Kingdon 1995: 118-119). Conceiving these relationships can be slightly simplified 
through Dery's distinction between areas of policy which are 'policymaking' and areas which 
are 'policy-taking' (Dery 1999: 163). The former are characterised by 'primary policies', and 
policy-makers "implicitly presume control over the key variables that shape policy in a given 
area", whereas the latter are characterised by 'policy by the way', which is " .. primarily or 
entirely shaped by the pursuit of other objectives .. " (Dery 1999: 165); in other words, determined 
by other policy processes elsewhere. The distinction rests on Wildavsky's concept of a dense 
policy space (outlined above), in which policies from competing domains strive for influence. 
One of the features of a policy community, as outlined above, is the authority to be a 'policy 
maker'; policy domains which are primarily 'policy takers' are more likely to be loosely-
structured issue networks. If a new policy domain such as energy policy is introduced, a 
significant challenge is posed both to both the autonomy and existence of existing policy 
communities which are operating in areas of policy related to the new domain, since the new 
domain would be accompanied by the creation of new state agencies. In terms of the theoretical 
framework outlined above, one would expect either a) a restructuring of policy communities, or 
b) successful resistance to change. The new policy domain might develop its own policy 
community; the key questions, which need to be answered empirically in each case, are a) how 
autonomous are the 'sub-communities', and which way does influence over policy flow, and b) 
what influence do the 'sub-communities' have on the policy paradigm of the overall community 
(assuming it exists)? The conditions for the sustainability of a policy paradigm based in a 
complex structure such as the one outlined above might be different from those outlined above 
for a 'simple' policy community; this is a central question which will be addressed in the study 
below. 
Policy and Politics 
The aim of this section is to conceptualise the relationship between energy-related policy 
phenomena and the political sphere, which will be approached primarily through a framework 











framework is twofold. The first aspect is an account of policy agenda-setting based on a social 
constructivist, as opposed to a rationalistlO, conception of problem formation (Stone 1989:281, 
Kingdon 1995:114): problems are not objectively 'given', but arise within the political 
environment. People (or society) are beset by 'conditions' or 'difficulties', but these are 
converted from time to time into 'problems' which can be addressed by policy change, which are 
differentiated from the former by their amenability to state intervention (Stone 1989:282). The 
second aspect is a conceptual framework for explaining policy change which Kingdon adapted 
from Cohen, March and Olsen's 'garbage can' decision-making model (Cohen, March & Olsen 
1972, March and Olsen 1994), which is based on the discrete existence of three streams of 
policy-related activity, namely problem recognition, policy formulation, and politics (Kingdon 
1995:87). 
'Multiple Streams': Problems, Policy Alternatives and Politics 
The 'problem' stream consists of those issues which occupy the attention of "important people in 
and around government". While the number of potential problems (those which could be 
demonstrated to pose problems for a significant number of people) in a particular country is very 
large, the attention of the relatively small group of analysts, bureaucrats, politicians and others 
who populate the policy environment is limited, meaning that only a small number of problems 
reach prominence at one time. These are the problems which are usually addressed in some way, 
and matched to potential solutions in policy processes. The way in which problems become 
prominent in this way is usually a combination of two factors, which Kingdon terms "pervasive, 
necessary and powerful indicators" and "focusing events, crises and symbols" (Kingdon 
1995:93-95). Unlike a rationalist approach to problem-formation, prominent indicators are a 
combination of empirical information, institutional capacities (to apply resources and 
organisational capacity to the processing of selected information), and legitimation. Some 
indicators (such as GDP or inflation) are almost universally accepted as of central importance, 
but the importance of others needs to be established: 
10 Rationalist approaches to understanding policymaking are epitomised by two basic characteristics, well-expressed by Harold 
Lasswell in his ground-breaking paper in Ihe 1950s, and Rolhwell in his introduction to Ihe collection containing Lasswell's 
paper (Lasswell 1951, RolhwellI951). These are what Sabatier termed Ihe 'stages heuristic', which conceives Ihe policy process 
as a series of 'stages' (for instance, problem identification, policy alternative formulation, policy evaluation, and decision-
making), and an instrumental-rational view of policy-related decision-making, which corresponds wilh the 'stages heuristic', 
since if poIicymaking is decision-making, rational policymaking is instrumentally rational, and Iherefore the stages should 
conform to an instrumentally rational decision-making process. Thus, policymaking should at its heart be a form of problem-
solving through Ihe application of knowledge-based techniques, or technology (in its broad sense). According to Lasswell (and 
many other policy theorists), problems exist objectively, and 'are out Ihere' to be 'discovered' by diligent policy analysts, who 
ought not to be taken in by merely 'topical' issues: " .. lhe basic emphasis of the policy approach, Iherefore, is upon Ihe 
fundamental problems of man in society, rather Ihan upon Ihe topical issues of Ihe moment .... (Lasswell 1951:8; see also Rittel & 
Webber (1973) for an incisive critique of a problem-based approach to policy and planning). On Ihe olher hand, a 'social 
constructivist' approach to problems emphasises Ihat Ihe process of converting issues into problems also 'frames' Ihe issues by 











"Demonstrating that there is indeed a problem to which one's solution can be attached is a 
very real preoccupation of participants in the policy process .... Constructing an indicator and 
getting others to agree to its worth become major preoccupations of those pressing for policy 
change .. " (Kingdon 1995:93) 
In order to indicate a problem, indicators needs to be interpreted: 
" .. the data do not speak for themselves. Interpretations of the data transform them from 
statements of conditions to statements of policy problems ... • (Kingdon 1995:95) 
This process of translating requires that the significance of the potential problem is highlighted. 
which, according to Kingdon, is most often achieved by a problem-related event or series of 
events, which provides a simple narrative context to illustrate forcefully the meaning and 
urgency of the problem, particularly for less-visible areas of policy. For instance, in South 
Africa, paraffin use by poor households for cooking and lighting is a major problem. For about 
six years, this problem has been highlighted by annual studies which determine the alarmingly 
high number of people affected by either fires, burns or poisoning linked to paraffin use, but this 
data only reached the headlines once; the reason for this was that a) there had been a spate of 
fires in informal settlements in a short time period, and the media were looking for a 'story' 
behind them. and b) the paraffin angle was 'sold' to the media by an NGO, which skilfully 
connected fires and paraffm, and thus converted the fire problem into a paraffm problem. This 
process is referred to as 'framing' (Simons 2001: 116-119), which is defined as selecting 
" .. some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicative text, 
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation. and/or treatment recommendation for the item described .. " (Entman, quoted in 
Simons 2001:120). 
Framing involves the reduction of a complex problem to a relatively simple causal relationship, 
which legitimates varioUs types of intervention or non-intervention (Stone 1988:295). In 
addition, because of the mediated nature of problem-related events, their extent and impact is 
also dependent on structural media phenomena such as attention cycles ll and a related preference 
for particular sorts of events (airline crashes over famines). 
Problems fade from agendas for a variety of reasons. Since attention to a problem is usually a 
result of pressure from a wide range of sources (what Sabatier terms an 'advocacy coalition'), 
continued focus of attention on the problem requires the maintenance of the coalition. This is 
threatened by a number of circumstances. First, partial success (resulting in the implementation 
II Problems become 'news' when they are, literally, new, and their news value fades after this. This is ideally suited to events 
such as airline crashes, the relevance of which fades swiftly, but for more pervasive problems such as AIDS, newsworthiness is 
only brought about by a 'focusing event' which has some news value (such as the death of a celebrity, or the release of a 
shocking report); however, the media's attention declines as the event passes. Thus, attention is directed at AIDS-like problems 











of policy measures) often removes the impetus for further intervention, since the problem has for 
many actors been 'addressed': 
" .. to strategists pressing for a fuller solution, such a result may be more distressing than no 
passage (of policy-related measures) at all .. " (Kingdon 1995:104) 
Second, the coalition might dissolve if the problem is not addressed in the short term: 
"It takes time, effort, mobilisation of many actors, and the expenditure of political resources 
to keep an item prominent on the agenda. If it appears, even after a short time, that the 
subject will not result in legislation or another form of authoritative decision, participants 
quickly cease to invest in it.." (Kingdon 1995:104) 
Maintaining an effective presence in the policy environment is costly, and particularly difficult 
for groups of actors such as consumers or socially-marginalised groups without access to a 
continuous resource base (Sabatier 1988:143), or a resource base which depends on visible and 
timely progress in focusing attention and effort on specific problems (for example, fund-raising 
from individuals). A third reason is the perceived costs of remedial measures, which might cause 
the problem's reversion to a 'condition' which cannot realistically be addressed; portraying a 
problem in this fashion (for instance, global warming, which is frequently portrayed as too costly 
to address in the short term) is a much-used and highly-effective strategy for removing problems 
from the agenda. 
There is not, in Kingdon's 'multiple streams' approach, a direct causal relationship between 
problems and solutions. Potential solutions, in this case policy alternatives, are generated in a 
stream of relatively independent activity, and 'coupled' to potential problems when the 
opportunity arises. For instance, advocates for a federally-funded public transport programme in 
the US linked their 'solution' to three different 'problems' in sequence: 
"When a federal programme for mass transit was first proposed, it was sold primarily as a 
straightforward traffic management tool. If we could get people out of their private 
automobiles, we would move them about more efficiently, and relieve traffic congestion in 
cities, making them more habitable. When the traffic and congestion issues played 
themselves out in the problem stream, advocates of mass transit looked for the next 
prominent problem to which to attach their solution. Along came the environmental 
movement. Since pollution was on everybody's minds, a prominent part of the solution could 
be mass transit: get people out of their cars and pollution will be reduced. The environmental 
movement faded, and what was the next big push? You guessed it: energy. The way to solve 
the country's energy problem, so reasoned the advocates of mass transit, was to get people 
out of their cars when commuting .. " (Kingdon 1995:173) 
The type of activity which generates policy alternatives takes place in Kingdon's 'policy 











which work in the same area of policy, and develop and communicate alternatives within the 
community. Possible alternatives develop in a "policy primev~ soup"; in a process akin to 
natural selection, a few of these alternatives are developed into fully comprehensive potential 
policy programmes, on the basis of technical feasibility, "value acceptability" (amongst the 
specialists), and anticipation of future constraints. There are aspects to ''value acceptability": the 
first are common ideological commitments, both intrinsic to the policy community, as well as 
anticipated external ideological constraints. The second are intellectual commitments to values 
such as efficiency and comprehensiveness. These combine to create a specific 'policy ethos', 
based on a historical set of policy deliberations; in a specific context, certain alternatives are 
regarded as 'feasible', and others are not (Kingdon 1995:132-5, Lindblom 1959:88). The process 
of selection creates a 'short list' of relatively complete proposals which have a good chance of 
being adopted. Consensus around policy proposals is primarily built on intellectual grounds, by 
communication and persuasion (Kingdon 1995:159). 
By contrast, in the political stream, consensus is largely a product of strategic interaction of the 
type ascribed by Smith to policy communities, involving the construction of coalitions based on 
compatible and/or tradable strategic interests (Kingdon 1995:159-160). Kingdon uses the tenn 
'politics' in a narrow sense to describe "electoral, partisan or pressure group factors" (Kingdon 
1995: 145), which excludes broader and more undefined political processes. Different sets of 
criteria are applied to policy alternatives in the policy and political streams: 
"Expertise [in the policy stream] presumes a process by which alternative theories are 
evaluated systematically against ava lable data within a framework shared by ''reasonable'' 
(i.e. well-trained) people in order to rank ideas in tenns of their plausibility. Politics 
presumes a process by which alternative policies are compared on the basis of the political 
resources of the people supporting them in order to rank programs in tenns of their 
acceptability. On the surface, one process attempts to reduce subjectivity through 
standardised procedures designed to assure verifiable knowledge; the other attempts to 
organise subjectivity through a set of bargains designed to assure social stability. One 
process seeks data; the other seeks allies .... The classic outcome of confrontation of 
contending ideas among experts is the confrrmation of one and the rejection of the others; the 
classic outcome of confrontation of political ideas is the building of a coalition that makes 
compromises among some in order to exclude others." (March & Olsen 1989:30) 
The aim of political reasoning is to build constituencies for action (Stone 1988:308); whereas 
policy specialists often develop commitments to policy positions in themselves, actors in the 
policy stream almost always have secondary strategic motives for embracing policy positions. 
Kingdon identifies three types of influence in the policy stream: a ''national mood", organised 











"national mood" are unpredictable, and frequently cyclic, and render certain policy alternatives 
politically viable and others unviable. Organised political forces, on the other hand, such as 
interest groups, enter the policy environment with clearly-defmed strategic goals; by contrast to 
analysts in the policy stream, interest groups are not committed to specific policy outcomes, but 
merely to outcomes which favour them strategically. Since interest groups will support or 
obstruct policy change according to these criteria, achieving specific policy changes requires the 
building of coalitions, as does opposing policy change. Opposition from organised political 
interests can however be overcome by other changes in the political stream (in the national 
mood, or in government), or in changes in the structure of interests themselves (Kingdon 
1995:152). The third factor is government: changes in government, including elections, changes 
in key personnel, changes in jurisdiction, and competition between agencies, can also have 
significant effects on the political stream. 
'Policy Windows', 'Coupling' and Policy Change 
Kingdon's theory of major policy change involves the interaction of the three streams outlined 
above: policy alternatives are matched to problems, and coupled with a coalition of favourable 
political forces. These fortuitous events are related to the occurrence of 'policy windows', which 
are 'windows of opportunity,12 for policy change. Policy windows open in the problem or the 
political stream: at certain times, attention is focused on specific problems (by crises or other 
events, or even by regular events such as elections or budgeting processes), or changes in the 
political stream create a favourable atmosphere for specific policy proposals (Kingdon 1995:173-
175). When windows open, potential exists for the streams to be 'coupled', for policy proposals 
to be linked with problems, with sufficient political impetus to win acceptability. The actual 
process of coupling is often brought about by actors that Kingdon refers to as "policy 
entrepreneurs", which can be any actor which is: 
" .. willing to invest their resources - time, energy, reputation, money - to promote a position 
in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive or solidary benefits" 
(Kingdon 1995: 179) 
The probability that policy change will take place is thus increased if a) there is a plausible 
policy alternative available, b) there is a matching policy window in the problem or political 
stream (or both), and c) there is a policy entrepreneur(s) who is prepared to facilitate the 
coupling of the streams. Policy windows create an opportunity for policy change, but do not stay 
open long; if the opportunity is missed, then policy change does not occur (Kingdon 1995:169). 
12 Kingdon's original metaphor was 'launch windows' for spacecraft, which are only 'open' for very short periods of time. Ifa 











Kingdon's account of policy change is conceptually different from theorists such as Smith, and 
difficult to compare directly; however, the one element which these approaches have in common 
is the importance of 'focusing events', which result in the glare of public attention being directed 
at a specific policy domain. Whereas a policy community (Smith's conception) would normally 
be able to keep issues off the government's problem agenda, the occurrence of a crisis makes this 
very difficult, and weakens the policy community's ability to exclude participants, or divides the 
community itself and destroys the existing consensus. Such an occurrence can be termed a policy 
crisis, a situation which demands a policy response from the government. If the existing policy 
community can respond with a plausible policy alternative, or resist pressure for change until the 
crisis fades and the 'window' shuts, then only minor policy change results, whereas if the crisis 
leads to the collapse of the policy community, then major policy change is more likely, which is 
contingent on the availability of plausible policy alternatives; if these are absent, no change is 
likely. 
Ideas and Politics 
An aspect of Kingdon's model which is superior to that of the network models addressed above 
is his approach to the specification and elaboration of policy alternatives, via a 'policy 
community' of specialists. Network theorists tend to underestimate the role of ideas in policy 
change: 
" .. the content of the ideas themselves, far from being mere smokescreens or rationalisations, 
are integral parts of decision-making in and around government. ... both the substance of the 
ideas and political pressure are often important in moving some subjects into prominence 
and in keeping other subjects low on governmental agendas" (Kingdon 1995:127). 
Other theorists have criticised the 'iron triangle' approach to policy networks for 
underestimating the role of specialists (Saba tier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 127) in policy processes, 
and their commitment to specific policy positions. It appears that the policy process is an 
important site for matching interests to ideas, and defining the interests of the state (Menahem 
1998:287), but the way in which ideas are produced, refined and propagated is also very 
important in understanding policy continuity and change. The strength of Kingdon's theory is the 
concept of a community of specialists who develop and sustain a 'realm of ideas' subject to 
specific constraints, which are usually a required resource for developing and sustaining policy 
paradigms. Thus, while interest groups often define the scope for policymaking (what can be 
achieved politically), the community of specialists, often within the civil service, define the 
details of policy alternatives, and influence the selection of alternatives. Actual policy outcomes 











(including expertise), and how well members of the community are integrated with political 
decision-makers. 
The relationship between specialists and political actors is thus very important, and is subject to 
an important series of constraints arising from the different institutional roles of these actors. 
Because political actors do not have the capacity to evaluate specialist knowledge, its validity 
(and value) is generally established by its provenance: valid and valuable knowledge originates 
from, or is validated by, trusted specialists. Thus, the key question is how trust is established and 
sustained. March and Olsen characterise this trust as resting on three pillars; competence, 
reliability and irrelevance. Competence is " .. what any professional would mean about technical 
competence in the field" (March & Olsen: 1989:32); however, for the political actor this cannot 
be assessed directly, since they are not "in the field"; thus competence must be assessed. by 
reputation, consistency and reliance on personal accounts from other political actors or trusted 
specialists ('expert' in March & Olsen's terminology). Reliability means " .. the degree of 
congruence between the values and personal style of the expert and the values and personal style 
of the policymaker" (March/Olsen 1989:32); these are conditions both for trust and for effective 
communication. Irrelevance means the expert's lack of political ambition; if the specialist has 
political ambitions of his or her own, then the information is less trustworthy, since the specialist 
will be suspected of acting strategically in dispensing expertise. The problem of trust is easier to 
solve in a "homogeneous, relatively stable society" where policymakers and experts have very 
similar backgrounds and values; however, in a heterogeneous society, where there is a lack of 
consensus on values between politicians and specialists, 
" . .it is possible that politically important groups (most conspicuously lower-status groups 
and non-establishment social movements) will have difficulty obtaining expert advice from 
competent advisors they trust" (March/Olsen 1989:32). 
This problem has been restated in economic terms as the 'principal-agent problem' (Allison & 
Zelikow 1999:272), where politicians who have the formal responsibility of making a decision 
are 'principals', and expert advisors are 'agents' whose role is ideally " .. an essentially 
mechanical instrument of the principal performing a desired function" (Allison & Zelikow 
1999:272). The relevance of this problem to the current study is that it is obviouSly extremely 
important in rapidly-changing political environments, where the basis' for trust between experts 
and politicians is significantly undermined, particularly in the event of regime change. This 
applies not only to non-governmental advisors, but also to specialists within the civil service, and 
even senior civil servants. In situations of political instability and polarisation, irrelevance and 
reliability are often conflated, since specialists with unacceptable political outlooks are often 











which imposes an important limitation on policymaking, and, particularly in a relatively 
technical area of policy, can deprive a new regime of a considerable fraction of the policy 
analysis skills available to it for policymaking. In terms of Kingdon's framework, the way in 
which the community of specialists selects, structures and packages policy alternatives can be 
profoundly affected by political change. One would therefore expect an important element of 
specialisation in a specific area of policy to include knowledge and experience of interaction 
within a specific political environment; a profound change in the political environment would 
thus potentially render expertise useless as policy expertise. 
Organisational and Institutional Factors 
A third and fmal element in the theoretical approach which will be taken in this study is the 
influence of institutional and organisational factors on policy change, a traditionally neglected 
avenue of exploration by policy theorists which has recently produced a wide range of influential 
work (Parsons 1997:223). The current study is concerned to a large extent with institutional and 
organisational innovation (the establishment of an energy policy function in government), and 
two closely related topics are discussed below: the development of institutional and 
organisational capacity, and the influence of organisational characteristics on policy change. 
Institutional Capacity and Change 
Whereas the concept of an organisation is not generally problematic, there is considerable 
confusion concerning the definition of nstitutions (Ostrom 1999:37). Here, Ostrom's definition 
will be adhered to, which is defmed and elaborated as follows: institutions are 
" .. the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organised by rules, norms, 
and strategies. By rules, I mean shared prescriptions (must, must not and may) that are 
mutually understood and predictably enforced in particular situations by agents responsible 
for monitoring conduct and for imposing sanctions. By norms, I mean shared prescriptions 
that tend to be enforced by the participants themselves through internally and externally 
imposed costs and inducements. By strategies, I mean the regularised plans that individuals 
make within the structure of incentives produced by rules, norms and expectations of the 
likely behaviour of others in a situation affected by relevant physical and material 
conditions" (Ostrom 1999:37). 
In this context, the specific concern is governance institutions, which regulate the activities of a 
sector of society characterised by its subjection to state attention in the form of policy activities. 
These institutions would include formal governance institutions embedded in various state 











agencies and others, and infonnal arrangements between stakeholders sanctioned or tolerated by 
the state. 
These institutions are generally embedded in specific organisational contexts. The relationship 
between organisations and institutions is considerably confused by the tendency for the tenns to 
be used interchangeably13; in this context, institutions are defined as above, and organisations are 
defined as " .. collections of human beings arranged systematically for harmonious or united 
action" (Allison & Zelikow 1999:145). Whereas organisations tend to be relatively well-defined, 
often have very clear criteria for membership, and are thus easy to identify, institutions are 
'invisible' (Ostrom 1999:37-38). In almost all cases institutions exist within one or several 
(fonnal or infonnal) organisational contexts, and here we will assume that this is generally the 
case. Thus, organisations comprise sites where institutions are actualised, sustained and 
elaborated. 
There is a direct relationship between the success of institutional innovations and the creation of 
appropriate organisational contexts to implement these. The ability of societies to do this can be 
tenned a society's 'institutional capacity', which consists of 'institutional resources' in the fonn 
of existing institutions and the corresponding organisational capacity. There is also an important 
distinction between a society's institutional resources and those of the state, which fonn a subset 
of the fonner. Institutional resources are comprised of organisational structures and routines 
which provide the required infonnation, accumulate practical and specialised experience, and 
maintain appropriate relationships. The development of completely novel institutions thus 
involves a period of uncertainty while these capacities are developed, which might involve a 
period of years. Successful institutional innovation is usually based on existing institutional 
resources which have been successfully recombined into new institutional structures to meet new 
challenges (March & Olsen 1989; Skocpol & Finegold 1982); this is cogently illustrated by 
March and Olsen in a discussion of the development of new institutions to promote the 
development of, and regulate, the oil industry in Norway after the discovery of oilfields in the 
North Sea. 
Generally, oil discoveries have not furthered the national development of states: on the contrary, 
" .. oil discoveries and their exploitation have created new power and dependency relations, 
social distortions, cost pressures, inflation, migration, and deindustrialisation, despite the 
express intention of authorities to avoid such developments" (March & Olsen 1989:35). 
In fact, most small countries have found it extremely difficult to benefit from the discovery of 
oil, and, rather than direct the resulting wealth to national development, have experienced (in 
13 Compare for instance, March's work on organisations with Simon (1967), and his later work with Olsen on institutions (1989, 











many cases, severe) disruption to their economies and their political and social systems. After 
the discovery of oil in the North Sea, Norway was an exception to this rule; the Norwegian state 
managed to develop and inaugurate a successful set of new institutions to promote and regulate 
the emerging oil industry so that it furthered national goals and avoided negative outcomes 
commonly associated with oil exploitation. 
In a study to determine the reason for this, Olsen concluded that the new institutional 
arrangements deployed by the Norwegian state were in fact based very closely on pre-existing 
arrangements for regulating electricity, shipping and labour. Relationships with multinational oil 
companies active in the Norwegian oil fields were institutionalised along similar lines to those 
with foreign companies which had been involved in the development of hydroelectricity 
resources earlier in the century (March & Olsen 1989:36-37). An additional significant factor 
was the decision-making process, which was primarily based on the deployment of existing 
routines rather than on a rationalist cost-benefit analysis (March & Olsen 1989:36), which 
suggests not only that existing institutional resources were widely used in developing a new 
institutional environment, but that older institutions also altered the way in which state agencies 
understood the challenge itself: and influenced the decision-making process accordingly. There 
is a further element which is missing from the above example, which is the way in which the 
Norwegian state successfully accomplished a relatively high degree of co-ordination between 
different elements in the new institutional dispensation. 
This case study suggests a few useful relationships between policy change and institutional 
resources. First, it suggests that when the state develops policies for institutional reform, both 
policy choices and outcomes are influenced by existing institutional resources available to the 
state. Second, inadequate institutional resources would hinder the state's ability to make and 
implement successful policy for institutional innovation; thus, a) the nature of policy change 
involving institutional reform can be partly explained by the availability of institutional 
resources, and b) the success or failure of policies involving institutional change can be partly 
explained by the lack of available institutional resources. Why this is the case, as well as a more 
detailed elaboration on the way in which these processes function will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
Organisations and Policy Change 
Government decisions, including policy decisions, are also a form of organisational output 
(Allison & Zelikow 1999:143, 164), since in almost all cases, policy is developed within an 
organisational context. The resources available to governments for both policymaking and 











creates certain capacities and imposes certain limitations which have a significant impact on both 
policy fonnulation and implementation. 
The basic motivation for creating organisations is to accomplish tasks collectively which would 
be difficult to accomplish individually, due both to the limitations of individuals and to the 
complexity of tasks. Organisations are thus structured systematically to undertake a complex 
series of tasks, for which specialisations and routines are developed, through which various 
organisational capabilities are established. Thus, organisations are "less analogous to an 
individual than to a technology or bundle of technologies" (Allison & Zelikow 1999:146), a 
collection of routines and skills which give the organisation various capabilities (March & Olsen 
1989:24). These are tenned 'Standard Operating Procedures' or SOPs, by Allison and Zelikow 
(1999:147-8). 
SOPs comprise a combination of experience, specialist knowledge and routines for gaining 
infonnation and task execution, and require a consistent supply of resources to develop. While 
these SOPs enable an organisation to respond to a range of challenges, the repertoire of available 
SOPs also impacts on the way that a specific organisation responds to novel situations: 
.... a programme, i.e. a complex cluster of SOP's, is rarely tailored to the specific situation in 
which it is executed. Rather, it is (at best) the most appropriate of the programmes in the 
existing repertoire" (Allison & Zelikow 1999: 178) 
Two other related effects are important. The first concerns the establishment of organisational 
goals; since many organisations have what March and Simon refer to as 'non-operational goals' 
(March & Simon 1967:156), such as 'enhancing energy security', organisations derive sets of 
'operational goals', with clear quantifiable ends, such as 'increasing local production of energy 
carriers', which become the main focus of the organisation's activity. The second is the 
development of 'organisational culture', a set of beliefs concerning the function of the 
organisation, proper procedures for accomplishing tasks and responding to challenges, and 
criteria held within the organisation for success and failure (Allison & Zelikow 1999: 153). 
In the policy environment, in most cases the key organisations in both policymaking and 
implementation are state agencies, and particularly the civil service (government departments). 
The way in which government departments influence policy outcomes is related to their role in 
the policy process; although they seem to exercise little control over the policy agenda, they 
seem to have a major influence on the short-list of policy alternatives from which policy-makers 
choose policies (Kingdon 1995:30-32); whereas policy agendas specify problems which should 
be addressed, viable policy alternatives consist of far more detailed potential programmes. This 











The first is that both policy choice and implementation are influenced by the existing capabilities 
of state agencies; if these fonn part of a policy alternative, it is more likely that the alternative 
will be chosen. The reasons for this are that a) the capability exists and does not have to be 
created (which would consume more resources and destabilise existing inter- and intra-agency 
relationships), b) the out'flme is more predictable (and less likely to fail), c), more accurate and 
detailed infonnation is available, and d) the state agency in question is frequently also the key 
policymaking agency (Allison & Zelikow 1999:176-177). This is also the basis for Lindblom's 
theory of 'incrementalism' (Lindblom 1959), which proposes that 'incremental' policy changes 
are most likely, for the same reasons. Implementation is likely to be influenced in the same way, 
since capabilities required by new policy programmes will largely be derived from existing 
organisational capabilities. The second factor is organisational culture, which is closely related to 
existing organisational capabilities, and defmes the scope and the style of likely policy 
alternatives to be advocated by an organisation. For instance, in South Africa in the 1970s, when 
coal policy was being reconceptualised, the engineering-based culture of the Department of 
Mines favoured supply-based policies based on massive increases in productive capacity, 
whereas the resource planning-based culture of the Department of Planning favoured 
conservation policies. 
The concept of actualisation introduced above can be considerably elaborated in organisational 
tenns. As outlined above, a high degree of policy actualisation involves three things: a) a high 
level of ongoing policy activity, b) a high level of resources dedicated to implementation and 
further policymaking in the same area, and c) that the policy has been matched with appropriate 
implementation capacities. Thus, actualisation is a measure of the degree to which policies 'take 
root' in an organisational context. Since state agencies have a central role in policymaking and in 
implementation, there is an internal link, as mentioned above, between conditions a) to c) above. 
Organisational capacity for policymaking will be strongest in areas where organisational 
capacity already exists for implementation, and resource flows have already been established. 
Departure from existing organisational capacity will thus pose a significant risk for the state, as 
well as require a commitment to provide further resources and political support; meanwhile new 
organisational capacity will initially be weak and subject to multiple pressures from hostile 
agencies and stakeholders, and lack the complex combination of experience of specific 
institutional arrangements and detailed knowledge of implementation available in more familiar 
areas of activity. The ability to elaborate further policy adjustments is also closely linked with 
detailed operational knowledge linked to a specific organisational capacity. 
By way of example, Skocpol and Finegold's paper (1982) on New Deal programmes is 











Great Depression: the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
Whereas the second was based on " .. a long process of institution building whose roots go back to 
the Civil Wax" (Skocpol & Finegold 1982:275), and was relatively successful, there was very 
little institutional precedent (or organisational capacity) for the fIrst (which was mainly 
concerned with economic planning) except wax-time contingency planning. As a result, 
implementation of NIRA " .. simply exceeded the grasp that could be afforded by the public 
institutions and intelligence of the day" (Skocpol & Finegold 1982:278), and the NIRA did not 
achieve its objectives. The different outcomes were ascribed by the authors to a number of key 
organisational factors. In the case of the agricultural programme, existing institutions and 
organisational capacities created an "administrative will to intervene" based on a combination of 
a strong organisational culture, professional skills and an "orientation to practical action", as well 
as 
"a process of 'political learning' about what could be effectively done for fanners and 
society as a whole through public agricultural policy" (Skocpol & Finegold 1982:276). 
After Recio, the authors distinguish between the "occasion for new policy" and ''what to do", the 
actual specifIcation of policy alternatives; whereas the former arises from policy crises, interest 
group pressure or broader political change, the latter 
" .. tend to come from government administrators and other expert elites who have been 
closely in touch over time with attempts and' failures in a given field of public-policy 
endeavour .. " (Skocpol & Finegold 1982:276), 
which strongly echoes Kingdon's fmding on the distinction between the influence of 
stakeholders and the influence of communities of specialists on the policy process: stakeholders 
tend to influence the problem agenda, whereas specialists tend to influence the policy 
alternatives agenda. Amending or extending the state's power through the formalisation of new 
institutional arrangements thus rests more on available organisational resources than the formal 
aspects of the institutions themselves: 
"Even successful increases in administrative power have had as their basis less the ability to 
issue authoritative commands than the capacity to draw upon administrative resources of 
information, analysis, and expertise for new policy lessons and appropriate conclusions on 
increasingly complex issues." (Heclo, quoted in Skocpol & Finegold 1982:277) 
Thus, both policy activity (including the specification of further policy alternatives) and the 
actualisation of policies is significantly enabled and inhibited in different ways by the scope of 
existing organisational resources, in a way which is not explained by policy networks 
frameworks, which tend to assume that strategic requirements (for specifIc policy alternatives) 
imply their existence. In policy environments with severe reSOUfce constraints (such as 












Three different approaches have been outlined above for approaching the analysis of the 
development of South African energy policy, encompassing policy networks, the 'multiple 
streams' framework, and institutional and organisational factors. While there are difficulties in 
attempting to relate these frameworks theoretically, there are some useful ways in which these 
complement each other, which are worth highlighting. 
The core methodological approach will be based on the concept of policy communities and 
policy paradigms; in terms of the above discussion, policy communities will be identified 
empirically in terms of five criteria: 
• there is some form of policy-related interaction between the actors who form part of the 
community 
• there is an exchange of resources between members, but particularly between legitimate 
state policy agencies and stakeholders 
• there is a common commitment to a policy paradigm 
• the community is successful in preventing the 'politicisation' of policy problems 
• the community has a decisive influence on the policymaking environment 
As referred to above, this approach alone, although very powerful in explaining the context for 
policy continuity and change, has some limitations. Some of these are 'blind spots' in the policy 
environment which are simply not addressed by policy networks theories, and others are aspects 
of the policy environment which are not well-elaborated by this approach. 
The aspects of the policy process which are better elaborated by the other two approaches 
include Kingdon's exploration of policy crises, which provides a more detailed and subtle 
account of the conditions under which a 'focusing event' or other crisis might challenge the 
policy status quo, and also his exploration of the problem agenda, and the way in which 
problems appear and disappear from the agenda. Finally, more insight is provided by Kingdon's 
framework into the conditions in which a policy community's influence over the policy process 
might be weakened or abolished, both as a result of crises, but also other factors in the 'political' 
stream, such as changes in leadership and changes in the 'national mood'. 
Aspects which are not well-addressed, or not addressed at all by the policy networks approach 
are encompassed by the more subtle insights from both Kingdon and new institutionalists 
concerning distinctions between the roles and influence of different types of actors within the 
policy environment. The emphasis on strategic interaction by network theorists underestimates 
the role of specialists, and the impact of the organisational and 'institutional environment on 











Finegold, is between a 'problem agenda', which tends to be significantly influenced by 
stakeholders, and a 'policy alternatives agenda', which tends to be more influenced by 
communities of specialists, which undertake detailed specification of policy alternatives. This 
process is promoted and/or limited by the organisational and instituti6nal context and available 
resources, which are very significant factors in determining alternative specification, policy 
choice, and implementation. Having applied these three frameworks to the understanding of the 
material in the following five chapters, their relative contributions will be discussed in more 
concrete terms in the Conclusion. 
What follows below is an outline for the methodological approach which will be taken in the rest 
of the study. The first process which was undertaken was an identification of relevant data, 
which was done in terms of the three frameworks outlined above, and a subsidiary framework 
for classifying energy policy paradigms developed in the next chapter, which played an 
important part in making decisions about the historical and conceptual scope of the study. 
Research on the history of South African energy policy is almost entirely lacking, with the 
notable exceptions of Hofmanner (2002) and Steyn (2001); as a result, much of the data was 
gleaned from primary sources, including interviews with senior officials who had been involved 
in energy-related organisations, annual reports, legislation, commissions of inquiry and media 
reports. Historical data on energy production and consumption is highly aggregated and probably 
inaccurate; however, data which has been used below has primarily been sourced from the 
Department of Minerals and Energy and Eskom. 
The actual analysis was organised according to the outcome of an initial survey of the key areas 
of energy policy-related activity in the South African state. There were five main areas of policy 
activity. Three of these formed the core of the energy supply industry in South Africa: coal, 
electricity and liquid fuels. The fourth, nuclear energy, was included because of the significant 
resources devoted to its development in South Africa and because of the policy proposals for a 
large nuclear power programme made in the 1970s, and the fifth consisted of a review of the 
overall development of energy policy institutions and decision-making processes, into which 
policymakers attempted to integrate the previous four areas of policy activity with varying 
degrees of success. Other areas of policy activity were either omitted or dealt with in one of the 
five areas above, because of their lesser importance as sustained areas of policy activity. Lesser 
supply sectors, such as gas and renewable energy, were not included (except in passing) due to 
the lack of policy activity and outcomes during the period of the study - significant policy 
developments took place in both areas after the period surveyed here. Demand-side policies were 
not surveyed except in passing due to their almost complete absence from South African energy 











absence. The first is environmental poli«y, which has not been included as a separate section, 
again on account of the lack of significant energy policy-related environmental policy initiatives 
during the period studied, and the second is household energy provision for the poor. This issue 
was ignored by apartheid energy bureaucrats until the late 1980s; what followed was a period of 
significant research (mainly by outside agencies) into the complexities of energy poverty. 
However, the complex approach to policymaking in this area which was emerging in the 
Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs in the mid-1990s was subsumed by the success of 
the electrification programme, and policy on energy poverty largely 'collapsed' into 
electrification policy. This has been briefly discussed in the last chapter, but will be the subject 












The Structure and Context of South African and 
International Energy Policy 
Introduction 
Energy as a unifying concept in physics emerged only in the mid-19th century. The emergence of 
energy policy as a preoccupation of governments is a relatively recent phenomenon, which 
began in the post-war era as an outcome of the development of techno-economic systems within 
which energy carriers were substitutable. This development created new possibilities for state 
intervention in national energy systems; new institutions were introduced, and strategies were 
developed to replace more traditional energy carriers such as coal with cheap crude oil. 
The 1973 oil crisis put an end to this trend, as countries developed new and more elaborate 
energy policy institutions under the guidance of the newly-established International Energy 
Agency to partially reverse this process and 'de-oil' their economies. Additional problems, such 
as the emerging environmental crisis, posed further challenges to existing energy policies, 
culminating in international negotiations on global warming at the end of the century. 
Developing countries faced further complications in the challenges posed by energy poverty, 
lack of energy infrastructure and capital, and the declining quality of their physical 
environments. 
The development of energy pOlicy by various governments in response to these challenges can 
be usefully categorised into a series of 'energy policy paradigms', which are characterised by a 
central set of concepts, a scope of influence, characteristic types of institutions, and a repertoire 
of problems and corresponding solutions, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Against this 
background, the South African energy system developed with some unique features which, it 
will be argued below, were a key factor in the way that energy policy-related institutions 
developed. These developments outlined above will be discussed in detail below as a prelude to 











The Energy Concept 
The Dictionary of the History of Science (1983:122) identifies three traditions which combined 
in the development of the physical concept of energy in the 19th century. The first concerned the 
conservation of a 'vis viva' in motion, which was indicated by the damage a moving object could 
do, or the extent it could displace an object it collided with. The second involved a "correlation 
of forces" in 18th-century theories of "a single universal fluid responsible for the phenomena of 
heat, light, electricity and magnetism", which developed with discoveries of the battery and the 
properties of magnetism and induction. The third tradition came from engineering: 
" .. the stearn engine offered an every-day example of the equivalence of chemical affinity, 
heat and mechanical work" (The Dictionary of the History of Science 1983:122). 
Camot posited an 'imponderable fluid calorific', which flowed unhindered from coal to heat to 
motion, which conflicted with Joule's work on efficiency of electric motors, which inherently 
involved a hindrance of some kind in the translation of electric current to motion. The resolution 
of this conflict led to the formulation of the two laws of thermodynamics (The Dictionary of the 
History of Science 1983:122). 
The development of the energy concept, related so directly to the development of new industrial 
technologies, foreshadowed the deployment of the concept in the economic, social and political 
realms in a far narrower sense. While states had been concerned for centuries with the supply of 
energy carriers such as wood, charcoal, and even coal, these had not been distinguished from 
other types of commodities. The industrial revolution, with its increasingly centralised and 
mechanised modes of production, was based largely on a steep rise in energy intensity; whereas 
a few proto-industrial enterprises such as ceramics and metallurgy had required high energy 
intensities, this was by the 19th century an almost universal requirement for production. The 
requirement for high energy intensity spread from productive processes to almost all other 
societal processes as societies industrialised. 
As a result, a class of industries developed which specialised in supplying 'energy carriers', 
commodities which could be converted into useful energy by contemporary technologies. 
Initially these industries developed through the commodification of pre-industrial energy carriers 
such as coal and charcoal, but technological developments led to the emergence of a new 
generation of industries such as gas, electricity and liquid fuels producers and distributors. What 
was initially a succession of energy technologies (for instance, wood-+coal), diversified with the 
development and proliferation of energy technologies into a complex network of substitutability; 
thus, electricity could be generated from wood, coal, gas, liquid fuels or water; electricity could 
be used for space heating, as could gas or wood, etc. This led initially to a series of quasi-energy 











'energy' itself implied a class of commodities which were bought, sold and delivered by the 
'energy industries'. This conceptual development created the basic conditions for the emergence 
of energy policy in the latter half of the 20th century. 
The Emergence and Development of Energy Policy 
Energy Policy developed internationally in several phases. The first phase (which will be tenned 
'proto-energy policy' and constitutes the pre-history of energy policy proper) from the 
development of modem energy industries during the 19th century to the 1940s, saw the 
emergence of state interest in energy supply14 and the emergence of regulatory institutions in 
individual supply sectors; from the 1950s onwards, rapid economic growth, shortage of energy 
supplies, and a more thorough integration of energy supply technologies led to a new fonn of 
state interest in the energy sector in general, and policy and institutions were for the first time 
developed on the basis of the energy sector as a Whole. The next phase was heralded by the oil 
crisis in 1973, and again in 1979, which highlighted severe shortcomings in energy policy 
amongst OECD countries. This led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency, and 
increased state interest and involvement in the energy sector. The oil crises, coupled with several 
waves of environmental crises, led to significant conceptual and institutional innovations in 
energy policy. The problem of climate change currently poses another serious challenge. 
The three phases of energy policy development considered above can be considered in tenns of 
three related dimensions: conceptual developments, which specified the scope of energy policy 
as well as the conceptual framework within which it operated; institutional developments, which 
constituted the sorts of institutions set up by the state to implement energy policies; and 
technological developments, which provided the material conditions which fonned the 
background against which the first two dimensions developed. Below, the three phases outlined 
abov~ will be discussed in detail. 
The Development of Proto-Energy Policy 
The significance of the immediate pre-history of energy policy lies in the nature of the decision-
making processes and associated institutions which were inherited by and integrated into the first 
phase of development of the energy policy project. Since this phase (see below) was concerned 
only with energy supply and not with broader issues, the current section will focus only on the 
relevant features of the pre-energy policy decision-making processes and institutions of the 
energy supply industries. 
14 There were also a numbCr of scattered instances of pre-modem states developing policies on the supply of energy carriers such 











These industries developed in several waves, beginning with the proto-industrial development of 
the coal industry, particularly in the UK and China, based for the fIrst time on the supply of an 
energy carrier with a relatively high calorifIc value to emerging urban areas, and to industrial 
processes which required a high degree of energy intensity. Other industries followed: notably 
the coal gas industry at the beginning of the 19th century, the oil industry from the mid-19th 
century and the electricity industry towards the end of the 19th century (patterson 1991 :22-23), 
with others such as the nuclear industry following during the 20th century. 
These industries had a number of characteristics in common. All of them were capital intensive, 
and required long lead times for increasing productive capacity, which led to the establishment . 
of a set of planning processes based on predicted demand growth. Since demand for these 
commodities grew at the rate of, or faster than, national economies, demand forecasts were 
relatively simple. In addition, a process of continual technological improvement which 
constantly increased the most efficient plant size encouraged economies of scale, a trend which 
was reinforced by the continuous expansion of the energy system. The vertical integration of 
energy supply companies created large oligopolies or monopolies, which were the subject of 
ground-breaking anti-trust legislation in the 1920s. 
This trend was enhanced by state responses to the institutional challenges posed by the network 
industries such as gas and electricity, which constituted natural monopolies. In most cases, the 
problem was resolved by granting exclusive access (a legal monopoly) in a specifIc geographical 
area to one fInn. The ~owth in economies of scale, and the concomitant development of 
regional distribution systems, reduced the number of these fIrms to a handful or only one. In 
some cases, states opted to create national state-owned utilities. These monopolies were 
regulated in various ways: prices were set, technical standards were established, and obligations 
to supply any consumer within a licensed area were established. 
The obligation to supply was an outcome both of the monopoly status of network industries and 
of the requirement that energy industries provide a continuous supply of energy carriers, given 
the growing importance of energy supply in industrial economies. While aggregate demand was 
not difficult to forecast, short-tenn demand was unpredictable, and obligations to supply 
combined with a technology-based organisational culture created a planning culture which 
privileged the responsibility to supply over most other considerations: 
"This responsibility became fundamental to the outlook of gas and electricity suppliers, and 
coloured their approach to forecasting and planning. Under their influence, the consequent 












These planning processes were inevitably based within the energy supply industries. State 
interest in the industries, and the corresponding policy activity, corresponded to three areas. 
The first was security of supply, which interested the state for two reasons: first, as mentioned 
above, the growing importance to national economies of the energy industries, particularly the 
electricity industry which by its nature was more vulnerable to disruption than others; second, 
the strategic nature of oil supplies in particular, underpinned by the switch to oil by navies during 
the first world war, and the strategic role of oil supplies during the second world war, which 
contributed decisively to the defeat of the Axis powers. 
The second was the area of natural resource policy, which encompassed all primary energy 
sources in use at the time. The primary area of policy was mining, which covered the extraction 
of fossil fuels, but there were also substantial institutional arrangements and policies established 
for the regulation of hydroelectric resources, and in some countries (for example Sweden) for 
wood use. Regulation and promotion of natural resources for energy use was a subset of more 
general regulation and promotion of natural resource use. 
The third was national industrial development: energy industries were classed as 'infrastructure 
industries', a group of industries including telecommunications, transport and others which 
provided essential inputs to other economic activities. Since there appeared to be a direct 
correlation between economic growth and the growth in services provided by these industries, 
bottlenecks to economic growth could only be avoided by promoting their adequate growth. 
Thus, infrastructure industries were granted a special status in economic growth strategies, first 
in the industrialised countries, and then in the developing world through the influence of 
organisations such as the World Bank. 
Thus, to conclude, during this phase a unified conceptual approach to energy policy had not yet 
emerged, and the development of both energy supply and energy use technologies occurred as 
part of the general development of the economy. However, apart from general industrial policies, 
energy supply industries were commonly subjected to three areas of policy. The first was the 
promotion of and regulation of network industries as natural monopolies; the second was natural 
resource policy, where institutions for the promotion and regulation of natural resource use were 
developed; and the third was the promotion by the state of 'infrastructure industries', which 
included the energy industries. Decision-making concerning the regulation and expansion of 
energy supplies was confined to a) the finns themselves, which instituted internal planning 
processes based on demand projections, and b) government departments corresponding to 
individual industries in one of the categories above; there was no conceptual or institutional 











The I nauguration of Energy Policy 
The origins of energy policy per se as a state activity lie in the 1950s and the 1960s. By the late 
1970s, almost all countries had adopted the conceptual vocabulary of energy policy. As LlSnnroth 
observed in the 1970s concerning the emergence of Swedish energy policy: 
" .. energy as a gestalt is fairly new. It emerged during the 1950s. Earlier Sweden did not have 
an energy policy but an electricity policy, a fuels policy, and so forth" (LBnnroth 1978:268). 
LlSnnroth implies two simultaneous processes at work: the first was the integration of existing 
strands of policy pertaining to the energy supply industry, and the second was the development 
of a new conceptual framework which would delimit both the new policy domain and the state's 
involvement in it. This was brought about by a combination of two developments. 
The first was the increasing convergence of energy systems. Whereas before, energy carriers had 
displaced one another in a sequence of technological improvements (for instance, lighting 
improved from candles to paraffin lamps to gas lamps to electricity), by the 1950s the same 
energy service could be delivered by a number of different energy carrier-technology 
combinations. The development of energy conversion and distribution technologies also 
rendered the relationship between energy carriers and energy services more complex, since, for 
instance, gas could be used to generate electricity, or compete directly with electricity to heat 
space. However, the relationship between energy carriers and end-use technology simultaneously 
became more specialised, increasing the transaction cost of switching energy supply for a 
particular application. Thus, many more configurations of the energy system were possible, but 
commitment to a specific configuration involved long-term sunk costs. This in turn implied that 
the market in energy carriers would not necessarily produce the 'optimum' configuration, and 
thus the achievement of such a configuration would require intervention by policymakers, who 
might also wish to attain non-economic objectives (for instance, security of supply). These 
developments provided the conceptual and the economic basis for an integrated approach by the 
state to the energy supply industries. 
On a conceptual level, a 'proto-energy policy' vocabulary had developed during the early part of 
the 20th century. Energy carriers associated with combustion-based end-use technology, in a 
technological sequence from wood through coal to oil and gas, were collectively referred to as 
'fuel', whereas electricity, which was based on motive power, was classified separately as 
'power'. The convergence of these concepts as 'energy' was accompanied by the development of 
the collective term, the 'energy sector', to describe the part of the economy inhabited by the 












An example of this convergence is discussed in a case study of the origins of Swedish energy 
policy by LOnnroth; whereas 'electricity policy' and 'fuels policy' had previously been 
autonomous, the "rather rapid merging of the fuel issue and the electricity issue into an energy 
issue" in Sweden in the 1950s was precipitated by the possibility of nuclear energy providing 
both district heating and electricity (traditionally 'electricity policy), oil-fired plants potentially 
doing the same (traditionally fuels policy), and low electricity prices making electricity a 
possible source of space heating; thus 
" .. electricity and fuel became one energy issue because of technological change that held 
out the possibility of merging two hitherto separate supply systems that made electricity 
economically competitive with fuel for space heating" (Lijnnroth 1978:268-269). 
The second development which precipitated the emergence of energy policy was the series of 
energy supply crises in the 1950s and 1960s in many industrialised countri~s at a time of 
unparalleled economic growth, which were caused by swiftly rising demand. These recurrent 
energy shortages served as 'focusing events' which, given the conceptual and technological 
changes mentioned above, highlighted the crises not as coal shortages (which many of these 
were) or electricity shortages, but as 'energy shortages', a consciousness which was partly 
brought about by the rapid substitution of o~l for coal after the second world war, and which 
partly accelerated this trend in the following dec~es. There were three interrelated outcomes. 
The first of these was the rapid penetration of oil as the key primary energy source for most 
industrialised countries in the period from 1950 to 1973; at the same time, oil-producing 
countries emerged as major sites of strategic conflict, and newly-independent developing· 
countries built their energy infrastructure on cheap oil. The initial impetus for the oil revolution 
was the inelasticity of coal production, which could not keep up with demand when traditionally 
coal-dependent western European economies began to rebuild themselves after the war, as well 
as a shortage of electricity generation plant Oil production by contrast was far more elastic, and 
oil-fired electricity plant had far shorter lead times. 
In addition, there was a complex synergy between the growth of the refining industry, the motor 
industry, road-building, petrochemicals and electricity generation, which utilised a considerable 
supply of fuel oil as a low-value by-product1S of refining (Saumon & Puiseux 1978:130). The 
IS Petrol and diesel have not proved to be substitutable during the 20th centuty for powering motorcycles,. cars, and larger 
vehicles, the only alternative being another transport mode such as electric trams or trains. Crude oil consists of molecules 
comprising different lengths of hydrocarbon 'chains', and refining involves the separation of these chains into aggregate 
fractions; the lighter fractions are high-value products such as gasoline/petrol, LPG, diesel and paraffm/kerosene, whereas the 
heavier fractions are low-value products such as fuel oil and tar. Thus, since the requirement for petrol and diesel in the short and 
medium term has been relatively inelastic, this has necessitated the production oflower-value by-products easily able to compete 
with coal on convenience and price for ships' bunkers and industrial power applications (other than in South Africa), including 
electricity generation. Earlier refineries produced only relatively small amounts of high-value product per barrel of oil by 












development of 'dynamic' industrial complexes such as these was intimately related to the 
ascendancy of oil: 
"Dynamic industries, like motor cars and petrochemicals, were linked with oil products. 
Their growth produced increased demand for oil. Transition to oil was both the result of 
economic growth, induced by dynamic industries, and at the core of economic growth." (de 
Oliveira & Girod 1990:530) 
Added to this, the extremely low and stable price of oil in the 1950s and 1960s entrenched a 
growing dependence on oil in almost all countries. For instance, crude oil rose from 25% to 66% 
of French primary energy consumption between 1954 and 1974; the UK, with significant 
domestic coal reserves, increased its crude oil dependence from 10% of primary energy in 1950 
to 46% in 1973. Other countries were similarly affected, including the US, which had been a 
major net oil exporter; domestic demand had significantly outstripped supply by 1973 (Saumon 
& Puiseux 1978:123, Chess hire et al. 1978:38). Thus, primary energy consumption of 
industrialised countries shifted between 1925 and 1972 from "an overwhelming dependence 
(over 80%) on coal to a predominant reliance (around 70%) on oil and natural gas" (Goldemberg 
et al. 1988:5). This trend was accelerated by environmental concerns related to coal production 
and consumption, and by 1973, the world coal industry was in decline. 
The second outcome was the development of energy planning systems, the goal of which was 
" .. to correctly forecast energy demand and promote the necessary increase in supply that will 
make it possible to satisfy this demand .. " (de Oliveira & Girod 1990:530) 
The basis for this planning approach was the energy sector, the cluster of energy supply 
industries which constituted the only site of state intervention envisaged in this phase of energy 
policy development. Energy demand was not at this stage considered a site for state intervention; 
thus energy policy was based on fulfilling demand at the lowest possible cost to society. Thus 
" .. the expected future energy system is no more than an extrapolation of current trends" (de 
Oliveira & Girod 1990:530). 
As Girod and de Oliveira put it, in this approach, 
" .. there is no place for major structural changes that would introduce a breakdown in the 
energy-society relationship .. " (de Oliveira & Girod 1990:530). 
In other words, this initial approach to energy policy was defined in narrow parameters which 
did not foresee any significant structural change to the energy system, or any variance in the 
stable demand growth patterns exhibited since the second world war. In the relatively stable 
conditions of the post-war period, these assumptions held relatively welL 
The progression from the previous phase was clear in the form that this phase assumed. 
Institutions for planning expansion of the energy industries were simply augmented by the new 











energy policy problems which were addressed in this phase. The first was the problem of 
security of supply, which was primarily threatened by a lack of sufficient growth in the output of 
the energy sector. The second problem was the promotion of least-cost energy solutions, which 
involved the substitution of oil for coal, and later natural gas and nuclear energy (de Oliveira & 
Girod 1990:530). Energy planning in this phase was thus simply a generalisation of planning 
institutions developed in individual supply sectors, coupled with various forms of influence on 
the development of future energy supplies. Given the phenomenal growth in primary energy 
consumption over this period, in order to achieve this latter objective, energy policies were not 
required to bring about significant structural change in the energy system, but merely to augment 
the influence of existing economic forces in the growth of the energy system. 
To conclude, the emergence of energy policy heralded the cre~tion of new conceptual 
frameworks and a new form of planning (energy planning), which created a basis for state 
intervention in the energy sector as a whole. Planning and policies were based entirely on 
supply-side measures, engaging only with the energy supply industries, rather than with the 
energy system more broadly. 
The 1973 Oil Crisis and the Broadening of Energy Policy 
The 1973 oil crisis heralded the third phase in the development of energy policy internationally. 
The crisis itself consisted of three components: an effective challenge to the international oil 
production system by key producer nations (OPEC), which involved a wave of nationalisation 
and an end to the dominant role of multinational oil companies based in the US and Europe in 
setting prices and production; a concomitant rise in prices imposed by". producers; and fmally an 
oil embargo imposed by Arab members of OPEC against perceived supporters of Israel in the 
1973 Arab-Israeli conflict (Yergin 1992:596). The impact of these combined events was to push 
the price of oil up by around four times, and impose restrictions on supplies for the period of the 
embargo (about 5 months). Whereas there had been previous oil supply crises during the 1950s 
and 1960s (notably the during the Suez crisis in the 1950s), the 1973 crisis had a profound 
systemic effect on the global economy, due to two factors: the first was the level of dependence 
on cheap oil achieved by the world economy, and by the OECD countries in particular, and the 
second was the fact that although the US was one of the largest oil producers, which had been 
able to boost output in previous crises in response to shortages, by the 1970s the US had become 
a net importer of oil. 
The 1979 oil crisis, precipitated by the Iranian revolution and the overthrow of the Shah (and the 
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more for their oil imports than they. would have paid had the oil price remained at the 1972 
level. This expenditure, equivalent to one-sixth of aggregate GDP of OEeD countries in 
1980~ resulted in a loss of purchasing power for other goods and services~ and was a major 
contributor to the 1970s phenomenon of 'stagflation" (Goldemberg et al 1988: 1 0). 
The effect on developing countries was more marked, causing massive balance-of-payments 
problems and in many cases rampant inflation and economic depression. The crises thus served 
as 'focusing events' for a change in energy policy paradigm~ which included conceptual and 
institutional frameworks~ as well as the scope of policy. Many of the challenges posed by the 
structural problem of the oil crises could not be addressed by limiting the scope of analysis of 
energy problems only to the energy sector without increasing the risk of further supply crises. 
This was reinforced by other less immediate problems such as various forms of environmental 
problems~ which were not easily addressed in terms of the existing approach to energy policy 
alone. Whereas 'energy' had previous implied the energy supply industries, it now became the 
expression of a more complex set of societal interactions. Lindberg (1978) differentiates between 
post-war policies emphasising supply sectors only, and post-1973 policies extending to the 
energy system as a wholel6: 
"Post-war energy shortages led to the policy objective of expanding coal supply. This 
objective was subsequently extended to incorporate petroleum and nuclear energy as the 
potential of these resources became obvious .... nations then attempted to develop coordinated 
fuel supply policies covering research and development allocation~ pricing policie~ and the 
like .. " (Lindberg 1978:9) 
The 1973 crisis, however, redefined 'energy policy'~ and elevated it to a more fundamental 
status: 
" .. with the 1973 boycott the policy boundary was suddenly expanded again to energy - a 
concept implicitly incorporating demand and international and security dimensions and 
leading to a new and complex set oftradeoffs. The economic price that ensued rapidly forced 
upon one and all the realization that energy policy has profound implications for price~ 
employment, and economic growth policy. Awareness of higher prices, impending shortages 
and continued international vulnerability now began to highlight the extent to which energy 
policy is inseparable from development policy writ large and from the evolution of economic 
and political structures, cultures, lifestyles, the human and the natural environment at 
national and international levels." (Lindberg 1978:9) 
Whereas post-war energy policy was aimed at optimising energy supply to the economy, the 
1973 crisis indicated a deeper structural crisis, and required a broader assessment of the 'energy 
system' as a whole, not only the energy sector (de Oliveira & Girod 1990:531); whereas the pre-
16 Lindberg applies the expression 'fuel policies' to cover energy policies limited to the supply sector, and 'energy polices' to 











1973 basis for energy policy had been the energy sector, a growing awareness developed of a 
broader context for energy policy, the 'energy system', a societal subsystem which, unlike the 
energy sector, was not a subset of the formal economy, but embraced a far wider range of energy 
transactions or energy 'flows', from production to end-use; the path along which energy flowed 
between various conversion technologies was referred to as an 'energy chain'. Energy flows 
could thus be traced through the energy system, from power plant to toaster or hot water-bottle, 
through a series of energy conversion and transport technologies; coal was mined, burned to 
produce heat, heat produced steam, which drove a turbine to produce electricity, which was 
transmitted through a network to a household, where electricity was converted to heat by a kettle, 
which boiled water for a hot water bottle, which is a technology for storing and slowly releasing 
heat into a bed. Thus, the new domain for energy policy ought to include 
" .. all the multiple facets of energy (physical, economic, technical, financial, social) and its 
links with the social and economic environment" (de Oliveira & Girod 1990:531). 
Thus, the scope of energy policy is radically extended to potentially intervene in any aspect of 
the energy chain, or transformation of the whole energy chain (de Oliveira & Girod 1990:531). 
Previously, the scope of energy policy had been limited to energy supply and taken energy 
demand for granted: energy demand was now also subject to intervention: 
" ... [energy] planning can now design a future energy system on the basis of the long-term 
equilibrium that society wants to achieve. Energy demand is no longer a sovereign 
consumer's decision which the energy sector has to meet, using only prices as an adjusting 
mechanism. Planning can and should use many other mechanisms to lead supply and 
. demand in directions politically chosen by society" (de Oliveira & Girod 1990:531). 
Conceptually, an approach based on the energy system as a whole began with energy end-use as 
a starting point for energy policy strategies, which was tied to a further concept: energy services. 
The concept of energy services specified the associated service which the energy consumer 
received from consuming a quantity of an energy carrier. For instance, space heating can be 
supplied by a fire, electricity, or gas, but in fact, the consumer requires not a specific amount of 
an energy carrier, but what energy service the energy carrier, via a conversion technology, 
renders; in this case, an indoor temperature above a minimum threshold. 
However, the same 'energy service' is partly provided by the house itself, and if the house is 
designed intelligently and insulated, in many climates heating is not required. The important 
point made by this simple example is that given an energy system-wide perspective, solutions to 












aspect of the energy chain, or by eliminating the energy chain altogether17• Previously, policy 
options for a lack of space heating involved investigating ways in which to increase the supply of 
energy; these could now be augmented either by improving the efficie~cy of the energy chain, or 
by a 'non-energy' solution, such as intelligent design or roof insulation. In terms of the scope of 
energy policy, this possibility created linkages with almost any other area of policy which 
impinged on any aspect of the energy system. In particular, linkages could be made with 
environmental issues in every part of the energy system, the problem of energy poverty could be 
approached directly as an energy policy problem, and issues of economic efficiency could be 
addressed throughout the energy system. 
The actual development of energy policy after 1973 faced a complex set of limitations. The key 
development comprised the creation of the International Energy Agency (lEA) by OECD 
countries, built on the measures for co-operatively managing potential oil supply disruptions set 
up in the 1960s. These measures proved ineffectual because of failures of co-operation between 
OECD countries which would have been necessary for their implementation (Scott 1994:37). 
The Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, driven mainly by the US under the 
auspices of Henry Kissinger, led to a number of interim measures resulting in the establishment 
of the lEA, which was seen strategically as a direct response to the very effective organisation of 
the producer countries in OPEC. Interim measures were put in place to facilitate oil distribution, 
and longer-term measures were put in place to prepare for future crises. 
However, from an institutional point of view, the most significant aspect of the founding of the 
lEA lay in the adoption of an 'International Energy Programme', which "was made in binding 
treaty form under international law"; signatories thus 
"intended to adopt the I.E.P. in the most solemn fonn of international instrument to ensure 
the highest commitment of governments" (Scott 1994:55), 
which ensured both the concerted involvement of OECD governments in the management of 
their energy systems through some form of energy policy, and the harmonisation of many of 
these measures throughout the OECD, which represented the main energy-consuming nations in 
the world at the time. 
This programme involved not only a range of institutional mechanisms to cope smoothly with I 
future oil crises, including mandatory strategic stocks levels and multilateral co-operation in .. 
procedures for rationing and distribution of emergency supplies, but more importantly, long-term/ 
measures to curtail dependence on imported oil, including fuel-switching and development of 
other supplies. Ironically the latter was made possible by the raised oil prices, without which it 
, 
17 This would of course involve replacing heating equipment with passive solar heating, but removing heating technology from 















would not have been economical to develop North Sea and other fields. Thus, the core of the 
binding agreements at the heart of the lEA was focused solely on the problem of oil security; 
however, the lEA's activities focused on energy policy generally, including modelling, planning 
and diversifying supply, and later on a range of other areas, including environmental issues. On 
account of the institutional structure of the lEA within the OECD, the lEA energy policy 
paradigm attained unprecedented influence; this was enhanced by periodic reviews by the lEA of 
member and non-member countries' energy policies, as well as the establishment by the lEA of 
norms for collecting and processing energy data. 
The founding of the lEA lent significant impetus to the development of energy policy institutions 
in OECD countries: whereas energy policy had generally been a subset of industrial policy, 
dedicated government departments or sub-departments were established in the wake of the 1973 
crisis. As energy policy institutions evolved, these were restructured, merged into other policy 
areas, or abolished. Various institutional linkages were established: a few countries linked 
energy departments with environmental regulation (Denmark), others with natural resources 
(South Africa, Canada), and others disaggregated energy policy functions, placing energy sector 
policy functions with other industrial policy functions, and energy demand policy functions in 
specialised agencies (UK). 
For instance, the UK Department of Energy was inaugurated in 1974, largely converted from 
another department which had dealt with 'fuels policy' from the 1940s (Cheshire et al 1978:36). 
The US Department of Energy was founded only in 1977 (www.doe.gov 1211112004), and 
included much of the US nuclear establishment, including responsibility for many weapons-
related functions. South Africa only inaugurated energy policy activity in 1972, and only 
established an energy department in 1980. Of countries which are members of the lEA, in 1976 
only three had separate energy departments; in 1986, nine, and in 1996, only the United States 
(lEA 1996a: 17). At that point, 17 countries included energy policy functions in departments of 
trade, industry or commerce, two had Departments of Industry and Energy, two included energy 
functions in Departments of Natural Resources, and one housed energy policy functions in a 
Department of Environment and Energy (lEA 1996a:18). However, this apparent decline in the 
prominence of energy policy institutions masks another development: the diversification of 
independent regulatory authorities in energy markets, which often undertake a planning or policy 
role, and the diversification of energy institutions. In the UK, for instance, energy supply policy 
is located in the Department of Trade and Industry, but significant demand-side programmes, 
including energy efficiency programmes for households and industry, are located in separate 
agencies. In France, responsibility of energy supply policy is linked with mining and resource 











whereas responsibility for developing and implementing energy efficiency and renewable energy 
policy and programmes is located in a non-departmental state agency (ADEME) (lEA 
1996a: 137). 
The development of energy policies followed this institutional evolution. Whereas before the oil 
crisis, energy policies were aimed at increasing energy supply and replacing coal with oil and 
other new energy carriers, the initial response to the oil crisis (aside from international strategic 
co-operation) was 'energy conservation', which involved a curtailment of energy consumption 
and thus reducing consumption of energy services. By the beginning of the 1980s, more demand-
focused energy policies had begun to replace 'conservation' with 'energy efficiency', which 
involved an improvement in the efficiency of conversion of energy carriers to energy services, 
and thus a reduction in energy consumption while maintaining the same level of consumption of 
energy services. Whereas conservation policies usually involved exhorting or preventing 
consumers from using as much energy as they had previously, energy efficiency policies 
involved more structural changes to the energy system, including end-use technology 
improvement and other measures such as boosting the use of public transport. By analogy, 
energy poverty problems involve a complex interaction of different societal systems, including 
social factors, availability and cost of energy carriers and technologies, the formal and informal 
economies, and other factors (Eberhard &Van Horen 1995:44-87). A supply-oriented approach 
would involve increasing the availability of energy carriers, based on the assumption that 
households would move up a 'ladder' of energy sources beginning with 'traditional' carriers 
such as wood, passing through a 'transition' of carriers such as paraffin, which are 
commercialised but inferior, and culminating with electricity or gas, which are 'modern' and 
convenient. An end-use approach would embrace a much broader set of factors in formulating 
policy options. 
Energy Policy Paradigms 
While there was considerable variation between energy policy regimes in different national 
contexts, there are a few common underlying conceptual and theoretical frameworks (de Oliveira 
& Girod 1990:530-531), which correspond to the phases of development of energy policy 
outlined above. These can thus be used as a basis for the classification of energy policy 
paradigms into several different types. This will be done below by developing a framework of 
four 'abstract' paradigms, in terms of which concrete historical paradigms can be classified. The 
framework, in addition to forming a system of classification, ought also to have significant 
explanatory power on account of the relationship between paradigm types, conceptual 











correspond to a specific abstract policy paradigm should have certain institutional and policy-
making capabilities and limitations delineated by the paradigm. Another useful property of the 
framework is that it provides a basis for comparing different national energy policy regimes, and 
thus situating these in an international context. 
Defining Energy Policy Paradigms 
In chapter 1, the concept of a policy paradigm was referred to, and defined as 
" .. the system of ideas and standards that specifY the goals of policy, the kind of instruments 
that can be used to attain them, and the very nature of problems they are meant to address .. " 
(Menahem 1998:283) 
To this was added an institutional dimension, which included a specific set of institutional 
resources (including the corresponding organisational capacity) related to the policies 
comprising the paradigm. It will be argued below that the historical development of energy 
policy outlined above can be divided into four 'abstract' energy policy paradigms, based on the 
conceptual frameworks underpinning the paradigm (the 'system of ideas'), a set of 
corresponding problems, a set of common policy alternatives, and a set of corresponding 
institutions. This set of paradigms is based on the general historical development of energy 
policy and constitutes a theoretical framework for classifying concrete energy policy regimes in 
different countries according to the types of actualised policies constituting their respective 
energy policy regimes, as well as their available organisational and institutional capabilities; this 
classification would then provide an insight into the capabilities of specific energy policy 
systems by indicating their scope and manner of response to specific policy challenges. 
There are several reasons why it is possible to construct a theoretical model of this type, which 
pertain specifically to energy policy, and might have limited application in other policy domains. 
In logical terms these can be divided into external and internal reasons: the external reasons 
comprise global convergence of industrial systems and industrial economies and their 
interpenetration, the role of international agencies such as the lEA, the UNDP and the World 
Bank in homogenising energy policy, and the global dissemination of energy-related technology. 
Internal reasons comprise the logical succession of paradigms in terms of the development of 
institutional resources, and the match between the scope of a particular paradigm and the 
development of appropriate institutions and organisational capacity. 
As outlined above, there are two key points in the development of energy policy globally. The 
first is in the 1950s, with the emergence of state interest in the energy sector specifically, and the 
second is in the 1970s, when the oil crisis led to a wider awareness of the energy system. This 











energy supply, and the second, based on the energy system, and concentrating on both energy 
supply and demand, since the two periods are in theory separated in tenns of the criteria outlined 
above. The first paradigm is well-defined, whereas the second is less so: the range of policy 
responses is too large to be encompassed by a single paradigm. Thus, post-1973 energy policy 
has been divided into two paradigms. The first, which resembles many post-1973 policy regimes 
in the OEeD, is based on an extension of the domain of energy policy to energy end-use 
technologies, but not finther, to more fundamental aspects of the energy system such as social 
structure. The second includes policy interventions which impact more fundamentally on 
structural aspects of society-energy relationships, and have strong links to policies pertaining to 
other resource flows. In reality, this paradigm is largely hypothetical, and based on authors such 
as Lovins (1977), Patterson (1991), and especially Hawken, Lovins and Lovins (1999); the 
paradigm is useful however as a counterfactual, since there is a set of energy policy measures 
associated with complex contemporary challenges such as global warming and energy poverty 
which, to be implemented successfully, would probably require the institutional arrangements 
potentially established in this paradigm. In addition to these three paradigms, another 'proto-
energy policy' paradigm has been identified, which is simply a typical set of policies applied to 
individual sub-sectors of the energy supply industry before the switch to energy policy. This, 
however, forms a useful part of the framework because a) in most historical cases, similar 
policies were applied to energy sector indUstries during this phase, and b) there were influential 
institutional and policy antecedents established during this phase which have significant bearing 
on policy outcomes in paradigm 1; another salient point (which adds a qualification to (a» is that 
in different national contexts, institutional developments were shaped by the specific 
development of the energy system, and particularly by the key sources of primary energy (mined 
resources, renewable resources and/or imported energy carriers). The four paradigms are 
represented diagrammatically in Figure 2.2 below. 
The main characteristics of the energy policy paradigms are as follows: 
O. Pre Energy Policy - Autarky 
In this 'pre-paradigm', energy sector industries are not governed in any integrated way. 
However, usually they form part of a subset of industries which are grouped together as 
'infrastructure industries', providing vital inputs to the economy, and at the centre of economic 
growth strategies; depending on the national context, these are also grouped together as 'resource 
industries'. Policy, planning and regulatory processes are not integrated. Policy decision-making 
is almost always made by separate policy communities on the basis of relatively simply demand 
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processes are generally situated in the industries themselves. Policy is geared mainly to 
expanding production to satisfy rapidly expanding demand in the most economical way, as a 
basic input to economic growth. 
1. Supply 
For the first time, 'energy' is deemed an important category in the economy, and in this context 
implies the energy sector. Governance institutions and policy pertaining to separate subsectors 
are integrated, and decision-making is based on an energy supply planning process, which is in 
turn based on a fairly simple demand-growth scenario related to broad economic trends (in 
essence, an amalgamation of separate planning processes developed in paradigm 0). At a 
minimum, the goal of policy is to ensure sufficient energy supplies; a more elaborate approach 
aims to optimise the cost to society of energy supplies. Thus, this paradigm requires two 
institutional developments: the first is the effective integration of policy and planning decision-
making in the energy sector, and the second is an organisational capacity in government to 
collect energy data and undertake a series of policymaking activities in terms of this data, 
including the setting up of an energy planning capacity. The sole focus of policy activity for this 
paradigm is the energy sector, consisting of energy supply industries; energy demand is given, 
and not amenable to policy intervention: demand can be temporarily contained or lowered by 
'energy conservation' measures, which entail a cutback in energy services, but the only lasting 
solution to supply crises is to increase energy supply. 
Energy modelling is based on econometric models linking demand growth to economic growth; 
the aim of energy policy is to ensure that growth in supply satisfies this demand (to avoid 
bottlenecks in the economy), and to counter rising energy prices by pursuing the most 
economically rational supply options. Importantly, information requirements are limited to 
energy supply industries and general trends in demand growth: energy demand is modelled, not 
researched, and little detailed information is gathered on disaggregated demand. 
2. Supply/Demand 
A new set of problems which did not exist in paradigm 1 form the basis of this paradigm. These 
include energy security and rising energy prices, related to the collapse of the pre-1973 cheap oil 
regime, a set of problems stemming from rapid (and accelerating) expansion of the energy 
supply system (including the exhaustion of economies of scale and massive financial 
requirements), and environmental problems. Thus, 
58 
" .. structural changes in the energy system were absolutely necessary in order to recover the 










which entails a broadening of energy policy focus from the energy sector to the energy system, a 
new concept which embraces not only energy supply, but also energy demand. The central 
feature of the energy system is not the production of a commodity ( energy supply), but a series 
of transformations, which culminate in an end-use. This series is referred to as an energy filiere, 
which is usually translated as 'chain'; this is less useful than the French term, which denotes 
'channel' or 'network,18: although the energy system comprises many 'energy chains', these 
converge and diverge at significant nodes, which is why the sense of a network is useful (see 
Figure 2.7 for a representation of the South African energy filiere). 
The substitution of the energy system for the energy sector as the basic delineation of the energy 
policy domain has various consequences: policy is no longer focused on supply only, but on any 
part of the energy filiere. Thus, demand is no longer given, but can be influenced by energy 
policies, which widens the scope of potential policy interventions significantly. Whereas demand 
could only be temporarily reduced through 'energy conservation' in paradigm 1 (which involves 
a lower consumption of energy services 19), in paradigm 2 energy efficiency (lowering energy 
inputs while maintaining consumption of energy services) is a key policy option for avoiding 
supply crises. 
There are two forms of this paradigm: a 'weak' form, in which demand is merely added to 
supply as a focus of policy intervention, and a 'strong' form, in which end use of energy is the 
starting point of policy-making; the aim of policy is then to derive the most efficient energy 
system capable of providing this end-use energy, which includes an efficient energy supply 
system, but also efficient intermediate and final energy technology. 
The institutional requirements for this paradigm are fundamentally different from previous 
paradigms: whereas the transition from paradigm 0 to paradigm 1 required a new capability 
(energy information and planning) which required some institutional development, on the whole 
the development of paradigm 1 institutions only involved the co-ordination and centralisation of 
already-existing institutions and policy-making capacity. By contrast, the transition to paradigm 
2 requires not only the extension of energy information and planning activities into a much more 
complex domain (energy demand, on which detailed information is required), but also the 
development of institutions capable of co-ordinating change in a very wide range of societal 
contexts, from appliance efficiency to building standards. In addition, many more areas of 
govemment become areas of potential policy intervention: whereas in paradigm 1, intervention 
was limited to the energy sector, involved forming relationships with a few stakeholders and co-
18 Translation from the Oxfurd French Minidictionary (1993) 
19 Amory Lovins, who is a passionate advocate of energy efficiency. derides energy conservation as 'freezing in the dark', based 
on President Carter's exhortations to Americans to counter the energy crises of the 1970s by taking cold showers, lowering their 











ordinating and/or influencing a few other policy domains (primarily industrial and resource 
policy), in paradigm 2, demand-side programmes involve interacting with thousands of 
stakeholders and intersecting with dozens of other policy domains, from transport to rural 
development. Energy policy problems can thus be addressed by a much broader range of 
strategies, but the institutional challenges of doing so are formidable, and a sustained programme 
of implementation thus requires more sustained political support (and bigger budgets) than in the 
case of paradigm 1; building a consensus amongst stakeholders is correspondingly difficult. 
3. Structural/Cultural 
This paradigm, unrealised as yet in any national energy policy regime, anticipates a more 
complex embrace of the energy system as a domain for energy policy. The problems which this 
paradigm aims to address are a new generation which have only been partially (or not at all) 
dealt with in previous paradigms, such as energy poverty, global warming, energy-related 
problems of the urban environment, and other enduring environmental crises, all of which are 
more pervasive, complex and have more connections with other policy problems than previous 
energy policy problems, and require more complex policy responses. 
The conceptual basis for this paradigm is the total 'energy lifestyle' of the society, rather than 
just the energy system. The central concept is that of 'energy services', which are services 
traditionally associated with the conversion of energy carriers: for instance, space heating (from 
an electric heater, a gas boiler or a wood fire): what is required is not electricity or wood or gas, 
but warmth. Since warmth can be delivered by non-energy supply measures (technical: energy 
efficient building construction and management practices, including insulation and passive solar 
heating; cultural: rethinking the built environment), the scope for solving 'energy services 
problems' extends beyond the energy system as defined in paradigm 2, and stretches on a 
continuum from technical solutions (energy supply, non-energy technical fixes) to societal and 
cultural change to the 'energy lifestyle' of the 'socio-culturallifeworld,2o, of which the economy 
is a subset. The nexus for policy intervention is the demand/or energy services, rather than the 
demand for energy, which flows from the socio-cultural lifeworld. This demand can be 
distributed in various ways, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
This paradigm obviously increases the scope for energy policy-related intervention dramatically, 
and requires even more detailed information and planning systems in order to investigate 
plausible alternatives. In addition, the paradigm represents a shift from a conceptual approach to 
energy policy primarily dominated by a technical approach (primarily engineering or economics) 
20 The concept of the socio-culturallifeworld has been adapted from Habennas (1995:136-137), to indicate the "totality ofsocio-
cultural facts" (Habennas 1995:136), which comprises both social structure. relationships and activities, and inter-subjective 











to 0I1e dominated by the design prof\-'Ssiom (an:hitccturc. small-scule cngin~ring. urban 
pl:llming. industrial design. etc.): whcre-.IS the energy sector is an epitome of tcchoological 
enterprises reaping the rcWilfds of cconomie~ of SCille (and tllus rcprcS<.'nting a higll dcgTl."C of 
centralisation). policy al!cm:u i\(~ in paradigm 3 would probably ~ a tl1lnsition to dt.~entrnliscd 
energy technologies socII as distributed gencmtion. but more significantly. would rely on design 
of IOC,11 systems ~nsitive 10 local conditions (the interaction of local resource nows. Ihe built 
l'lwironmcnt. ctc.). Eocrgy policy would thus involve a far closer integration of environmental. 
sodal (IIld CCQnomic factors tlian in previous paladigms, 
Th..'fC are two outcomes of this paradigm fot il~~tilulions. Fil1il, institutions and planning 
ptOC<!sscs would proliferate al non'l1:Itional1c\'cis. including global ifl.~titutions (to address tr.Jns, 
national elH .. ~y and T\"SOurte problems soch a; global wamling). and local institution.8 whicll 
t"Ould develop the rcquit(:d detail for locally-~nsitive design-ba<iCd solutions. Second. energy 
polky institutions would begin to mergc with others in a new SCT of related policy domaills such 
as water policy (I'<hkh shared almost idL'1Itical efficiency problems). Energy planning would b.: 
augmented by a mort complex fom1 of 'eocrgy serviccs' planning, which would be illll'grntcd 
with other funns of information and plannin~ (for instance. natural TC50urce planning, rurnl 
development planning. etc). 
Institutional Development and Paradigm Suocession 
Change bet",ecn paradigms outlined above involves a foml of inSTitutional succession. which is 
eumulativc, In paradigm O. illstiwlinnal capacities are built ,,"jthin the ~la!e tn mak!." and 
implemcnt policy scpaTllteiy in individwl cn~rgy industries. [n paradigm I. these c);isting 
capacitics form the institutional rt'SOUrceS from which an intcgOltcd approach to cnergy policy is 
d("\·clopcd. in addition to which a capacity 11M In be ereat!."d "ithin thc state to rc:t5On about 
energy policy altemathes. This capacity requircs a) the developmcnt of routines for the 
collection of rdcvant data. Md b) thc organisation oftMt dota into meaningful policy sec·narios. 
Th!." Jailer (letivity is gcnCT:llly tenncd 'cncrgy planning'. and is also usually developed on the 
basis of existing plannin;g and information coll~'Ction prnctitts within the state. A shift from 
parodigrn I to par;1digm 2 ""quires toc capacities developt."d for pamdigm I, plus th(" ahility to 
make and implement policy over a wider domain. "itich requires: a) the development nf an 
enllanc.."d cnergy plMning eapaciiy. and b) the extension of crn:''!!y policy to oth("r Ilf"as o f the 
economy. A shift to paradigm 3 n:quin:s the same cxpansions over a widcr arca. with a greater 
TCqui rement for possible institutional innovation. The implica1jon~ for this progTl."Sshe creation 
of energy policy institUlions is that , as obscn'cd in the pre\'ioU'l ch:Jptcr, a state's ability to 











mstitutiooal den·lopment. as well as tlte e)listcnee of significant political impetus to mobilis.: tlte 
required (political and liscal) resources for institutional integration and tlte creation of IICW 
tns utl,ltions. wllich 15 normally brought UboUI by some form of policy crisis. Paradism shill is 
usuall y II medium-Ierm process due 10 the time it takes for nev. institutions to dc,'clop and begin 
to function . Institution succession is IICcompani~-d by 3 pamllcl process ofoonccptual succession: 
the existence of parudigm 0 institutions and planninl; processes raises the possibilily of 
integration. alld this integr'Jtion in J'IIIf1Idigm I created the conditiOTU. and a1locatl-d the resources, 
for researching and e)ltendinl! lhe coneep! or the energy sector. and 10 forth. 
Classification of Concrete Energy Policy Paradigms 
rhe abstract energy policy paradigm fnuncv.urli: is outlined abo\e: v.hat remains is to relate this 
fromcwork to concrete energy policy par.tdigms in their historical context. II is not proposed here 
Ih:ot concrete energy policy paradigms occur only in the foUl variantS above, but onl y that they 
CIUI be fruitfully classified jnlO these calcl!ories. This classification is undertaken by considering 
the ·hmd.'leDpc· of tlte cllCl"gy policy en\' ironment as H whole. which is represented as D series of 
'frontiC1~' in Figure 2.3 bclov. 
Figure 2.3: Energy PoRcy Paradigm Frontiers .............................. , .................................................................. . -'-
• • ---- --
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The §lICcellSiou of policy paradigm ' Ievels' indicates the CU/lll,llalhe nature of institutiona! and 
conccptual development In p.uudiWn succession. AI the COl\' of the energy policy paradiwn !trC 
the tx'tlwllsl'd policl,'s. on which there is a consensus v. ithin the encrto' policy community. and 
v.hich arc wcll rt'!IOurced in terms of organisational c:apacity (both fOf policy·making and 
implementation), In the cumple abo\c. the 'frontier' for aclualised policies is parodigm I . The 
frontier for actual policy aitcmali\es is 5ltghtl} brooder. but faUs shon of the institutional and 
organi.<;ationai fronlief'. \\ hich .'leIS the limil (in terms of inSlitutklnal I\'sources and organisational 











energy policy framework is pushed out beyond this limit, into paradigm 2, since most policy 
frameworks contain non-actualised policies which would require institutional reform to 
implement. These non-actualised policies, for a variety of reasons, do not receive the required 
support from the energy policy community and the political elite, and are therefore maintained 
for other reasons. Beyond this, still in paradigm 2, is an 'information frontier', which represents 
the scope of the information-collection institutions and procedures in a specific national setting 
as these correspond to the requirements of different abstract energy policy paradigms. Thus, if 
only very aggregated information is available on the energy supply industry, it is only possible21 
to actualise paradigm 1 policies, whereas if more information is available on energy demand, 
paradigm 2 programmes can be considered. The 'information frontier' is also very important in 
influencing the level of political support specific policies might attract, since appropriate 
information is required not only for policy deliberation and formulation, but also for establishing 
the validity of a specific set of problems as an appropriate site for policy intervention. Beyond 
the 'information frontier', this is not really possible, which would drastically diminish the 
resources devoted to exploring certain policy alternatives. 
Beyond this lies the boundary of potential policy alternatives, not constrained by the consensus 
within the policy community. Unlike the actual policy alternatives, these lie slightly beyond the 
capacity of the information system, and could advocate significant changes to it, but whereas the 
actual policy alternatives are considered within the policy community and are well-resourced and 
backed by state agencies and power stakeholders, these potential alternatives are not, but might 
be advocated by groups marginal to or excluded from the energy policy community, who will 
inevitably be less well-resourced, and less able to sustain a presence in the policy environment, 
as well as having less access to policy-makers. Finally, a conceptual frontier, which extends 
considerably further, maps out the general capacity that the society as a whole possesses for 
conceiving energy policy strategies, but, although there might be intellectuals who approach 
energy policy from a paradigm 3 perspective, social resources are not dedicated to elaborating 
concrete policy alternatives on this basis. 
The point of these distinctions is to identifY the core elements of concrete energy policy 
paradigms, which in terms of Figure 2.3 and the criteria outlined in Chapter 1, comprise the inner 
three elements: actualised policies, actual policy alternatives, and institutional arrangements and 
capacity. Change in the concrete policy paradigm does not necessarily involve a change in the 
corresponding abstract paradigm: an energy policy paradigm might change within paradigm 1, 
for instance, since energy policy in a specific context might be (and usually is in part) structured 
21 While it is possible in theory to fonnulate and implement policies in a area about which one has no data. it would not be 











by non-energy factors (such as apartheid), a change in which would lead to a crisis in the policy 
community; however, the'type of core policies and institutions might still be classified in the 
same way. 
The nature of the non-core frontiers is not, however irrelevant, but illuminating by its contrast to 
the core. Policy frameworks which specify policies outside the core, or non-core groups, might 
raise problems or alternatives which are frequently 'translated' into the dominant conceptual 
framework. For instance, energy poverty problems might be raised in a paradigm 3 conceptual 
context by non-core intellectuals or groups, which would propose a set of complex solutions. If 
the problem is recognised by the core (assuming the core can be classified as paradigm 1), it will 
be recognised more narrowly as a supply problem (which corresponds to the policy paradigm, 
and to the available policy alternatives and institutional capacity), to which there will be a supply 
solution. 
The above framework will structure the exploration of the case study below, with the aim of 
explaining the way in which South African energy policy developed. Below, the development of 
the South African energy system will be outlined and placed in an international context, before 
proceeding to the case material in the next chapter. 
The Development of the South African Energy System 
The development of the South African energy system is remarkable in four respects. The first is 
its persistence in the use of coal as a primary energy source22, and the associated energy chains 
that have been built around it. The second is the extraordinary inequality in access to energy 
services between different sections of the population, and thus the persistence of energy carriers 
such as firewood and other fuels such as paraffin in a domestic context. The third is the relatively 
high consumption of electricity as a percentage of final energy demand, and the fourth is the 
geography of the South African energy system. Linked to these factors, as well as others, is the 
high energy intensity of the South African economy, which is in stark contrast to the useful 
energy available to the majority of the population for domestic purposes. Figure 2.4 below 
indicates the striking difference between South Africa's persistent dependence on coal as its 
main source of primary energy by comparison to' OECD or developing countries23• Figure 2.5 
22 Primary energy consumption is the total consumption of energy carriers by a national economy not produced by conversion of 
another energy carrier, most of which are consumed by the energy sector, which converts energy carriers from one form to 
another (e.g. coal into electricity) and transports these to final users. Final energy consumption is the consumption of energy 
carriers by consumers (not for conversion); since much energy is lost in the consumption process, total final energy requirements 
are usually considerably lower than primary energy requirements. Some energy carriers are not converted, but consumed directly 
by end-users (e.g. coal in some instances, and firewood), in which case these are classified as primary and final energy. These 
concepts are clearly illustrated in Figure 2.7 below. 
23 Data for coal as a percentage of primary energy is from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP 20(4); developing 
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abo'e comparct South Afriea·s final energy e(ll'LSlllnption1t with OECD nod non-OFCD 
countoes: what is nollIbie is tn.:, high us.: of ooa1 and eled.ricity 115 a proportion of final crlergy 
consumption. !he emire lack of process n.:,at. the small propOOLon of gas. and tile low'er 
pauntage of liquid fuels. which again .:mphasiscs the lack of complexity in tn.:, South African 
energy system. Figure 2.6 below pro,·ides a map of the COWltry·S energy infL1lSlnLClure, which is 
mainly COrICentmled in lhe region around Johannesburg. and FigLJre 2.7 below is II repre~nUllion 
of the South African energ} m~re. Othcf- than coal and crude oil, which together comprise 
IU'l)l,lnd 90". of primury energy coru;~ in SWth Africa, Ihe remaining to'"A. comprises 0 small 
share of rill clear eneril) (wuund 2·)%). and renewable cnel"ID'. comprising mainly fuelwood uscd 
by poor households (llrOUIId four fifths of this), and bagasse. However, the data for fuelwood i~ 
e.~tremcly unreliable. since I~ fiTS! studies of fuelwood use were done in the mid 19805. 
go'·emmo:nl did not lIlke an interest in the issLlll unl ilthe laic 1980sand carly 1990s.. and the data 
has 001 been regularly updated. 
In addition. due 10 ppllnheid, population ligurct tor block South Africans. and particularly ruml 
black South Africans.. are nOI accurole unli I 1996: therefo«: fuelwood LISC' estimates are not likel~ 
[0 be acCUJ1lte. Givell this. Figure 2.4 abo,c indicuto:s some remarkable dilTeTeIlce$ between tn.:, 
developmcnt of the South Afril:LLn energy system and others. From 1950 to 1973. in IOOst of the 
res! of the world. including dc~cloping COuntrlcs. there was a lrilnsition from coal as the main 
liOllrcC of primary energy 10 crude oil. The datu represented abo'e in FiSllre 2.4 for the OECD is 
from 1965 onwards. bul the trend fOl" the UK from 1950 to 1970. is indicathe of the rest of tile 
OECD (see fOl" inStu1lCe Chcsshire ellli 19n, Goldemburg et al 1988. SaumoolPuiscux 1978. 
Bupp 19711); developing countries. with a few exceptions (notable ones include China) followed 
the 53Il1e energy tnmsitiOfL. South Africa. 011 lho: other hand. saw a slight d«line in coal as 
percentage ofpnmaT)· energy until 1971, from whi,h tinte a combination of the dec line in the 
~w th o f liquid fuels consumption. !he expansion of the eleclricity system and !he del·eloflment 
of the synthetic fuels iOOLlSl!)' conlributed to lhe dc:cline in the rercenlDge shan: of oil. On the 
whole, crude oil did DOl replace coal as the main source of primary energy. but was itsdfn..>duccd 
by the t9801; to a relatively small pen:enta!,'C of South Africa's primary cnergy requirement. 
l"hcr1e ~ a number of reasons for this delelopment. which can be cxplained through the 
LnrKwlIt;'e coocept oh 'Minerals-Ent:rgy Complcx· (MEC). devdoped by Fine lind RU!;lomj« 
(1996) to explain the peculiar form of South African industrialisation. 'nlC MEC is Il 
C()nslellation of ecooomic actilities built arounll mining, par1icularly golt! mining, and energy 
industries. which halC lle,eloped symbiotically in South Africa in Ihe last century or ~. The 










bet .... 'tCn mining and industrial activities in the economy, and thus convey the impressiOI1 thai the 
imporumce of the mi1lel1lls sector has declined in SOUlh Africa in the past 50 year.> by 
companson to manufacturing and other activities. !lowe"cr, the many complex relationships 
bct\\'eCn mining and manufacturing activities renders this OOTIClusion somev.hat misleading. 
Much indu5trial activity involves basic benc:liei81ion ofmineruls. as well as ·OOckl ... ard linkages' 
.... hich provide commodities such as cxplosh'e$lIoo iron 1100 steel prOlluclS for mining activities. 
Fine and Rustomjce include the follu\\;ng Stt\ors in tllc MEC; 
~COII1. guld. diamond and <lIhce mining Kt;,itw,.: ckctricity. non·metallic minceal producIS; 
iron and Sleel b .... ie ;nd .... ~ oon·f~'1TOlIs Il'M:lals ba,ic ",dll:;l1';"''''; fc."i[i;r;cr.l, pe.\."(;d~ .. 
s)'mlM:tic reSIns. p~'cs. Ofher chemicals. hlUic chemical. and petroleum" (Fioo & 
R,,-~omJcc lY%:79J. 
115 well IlS olher related SC(!tOl'S. This classification reveals that. contrary to onhodox models, 
H • .I1>c lIfO"'th of the MEG has hce .. IICcompankd by st31ll1Ulion of the non-'-IEC 
mallufllCturing sector since 1960" (Fine & Ru~tomjC<.' 1996:32). 
rhus. a reclassification of economic data reveals that even thou!!h mining's share of nalional 
ecollomic IICtivity has dcclined. /I mining-industrial complex lies ut the hcan of the eountr} 's 
industrial s)stem. The classical assumption thllt South Afric.lIl industrial J1'Olicy has been 
dommated by impor1-subslilulioll·industrialisation is also called inlo question. even though the: 
estabJishmcm of industries soch as iron and 5teel can be understood as lmpon sub.stit ulioo, the 
process oceurred in reverse, with primary industries de"elopcU fim. More(wO'. much imJ1'On 
substitutIOn policy in the 197(k was primarily targcled at o"ercoming $IlIIclions and $8"ing 
foreign exchange, especially in the defence and ellCll',}' sa:tOfS (South Africa 1979). 
Inc core of the MEC is the imem-!ationshlp belween coal. eleetric,t) and gold mining. .... hich 
,,'1lS later expondcd imo mon:: 1:0000plex rel81 ionships bet .... "teI! mining. electricity. belleficiation 
and crude oil- and coal-based petrochemicals industries. These imerrelullonships were medlal1..'li 
by the peculiar features o f the oolonial and aparthe id sunes. .... meh included reliance on cheap 
black labour and conoomllant SOCial and economic inequality and political repressinn. as well as 
a collection of state -owned enterprises in electricity, iron and stcel, petrochemical nnd liquid 
fuels, and ioou$lrial financlllg and development ..... hieh played a key role in the development nf 
the MEt'. as weI! as the persistence of economic inequality. 
lbe: orillil1ll of the relationship betwccn coal urn! gold, as " "1: 11 :1S the binh of the modem South 
"frican economy. con he traced to thc beginning of the gold-mining industry in South Africa in 
lhe lulc 19'" ccntury, Gold '''os di scovered in what was then the independent South African 
Republic, or 'I rnllSvu.al . and the development of thl.> industry \cd to the Anglo·Boer War ( 1899-
(902), .... hich elltJed lhe independence of both the Tranmwl and the Orange Free Stale ("hieh 











Figure 2.6: Energy Supply Infrastructure in South Africa (1996) 
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fonn the Union of South Africa. Due to the nature of the geology of the gold deposits, gold 
mining in South Africa required large supplies of energy, as well as cheap labour. While labour 
was supplied through repressive colonial and then apartheid migrant labour systems, the energy 
problem of the gold mines was solved through the discovery of significant coal reserves, which 
were used as the basis for both a railway system and the establishment of an electricity system, 
initially under private and later under state ownership. 
The establishment of the state electricity utility, as well as the subsequent establishment of other 
key components of the MEC, was overseen by two figures who were at the centre of the 
development of a range of state structures which were key to the development of the MEC. The 
first of these was Hendrik van der Bijl, who was brought in by Jan Smuts25 to establish Escom, 
the state electricity utility, and later, Iscor, the state iron and steel manufacturer. His protege and 
successor, Hendrik Van Eck, was the head of the Industrial Development Corporation; he and 
the IDC played a key role in the development of Sasol, the synthetic fuels corporation, as well as 
in other energy-related developments, including the funding and development of the nuclear 
establishment and other mega-projects such as hydroelectric schemes. The IDC played a key role 
in the development of Sasol 2 and 3, as well as the energy-intensive beneficiation projects of the 
70s and 80s such as Alusaf (the initially state-owned aluminium smelter, built to use excess 
generating capacity and later privatised). These developments have been dealt with in Chapter 4 
in more detail. 
The focus of these strategies was to develop South Africa's indigenous resources in an integrated 
fashion. While the state played little direct role in the development of South Africa's coal 
resources, it played a key role in the development of both the electricity and liquid fuels 
industries, as well as the nuclear establishment. The electricity industry was developed from the 
1920s onwards, but came into its own after the second world war. The liquid fuels industry 
began with the importing of liquid fuels in the late 19th century, and a privately-owned refining 
industry was established only from the 1950s to the 1960s. At the same time, the state 
established Sasol in the late 194Os, a state-owned corporation to manufacture liquid fuels from 
coal using the Fischer-Tropsch process. The capacity of Sasol was massively expanded in the 
1970s in response to the oil embargo. The effect of this can be seen in the significant increase in 
consumption of 'coal for liquid fuels' in Figure 2.4 above at the time; the total share of primary 
energy consumption for liquid fuels manufacture thus comprises the crude oil total and a 
significant percentage of coal consumption. The synthetic fuels projects represented a higher 
degree of integration of the liquid fuels sector into the MEC: whereas the refinery industry was 
really only linked via the petrochemicals industry, Sasol used South African coal as a feedstock. 











Since around half the primary energy in the synthetic fuels process was used to manufacture a 
synthetic crude (which was then rermed), the process significantly increased the energy intensity 
of the economy; in the 1980s, around two thirds of the primary energy for liquid fuels went into 
the Sasol process, but it produced only around one third of the liquid fuels in the country. 
From the 1950s, the state also developed a significant nuclear establishment, which was initially 
seen as a potential extension of the MEC, based on local uranium rather than coal. The nuclear 
programme produced nuclear weapons as well as establishing a full nuclear fuel cycle by the end 
of the 1980s, but the contribution of nuclear energy to primary energy consumption was and is 
negligible; the country possesses only one nuclear power plant, and both the weapons 
programme and all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle were shut down during and immediately 
after the transition process in the 1990s. Eskom is currently involved in efforts to develop a new-
generation 'pebble-bed modular reactor' , but this remains several years away from 
commercialisation. 
The development of energy policy in South Africa occurred in several phases. Because of the 
ubiquity of cheap coal, as outlined above, the confluence and interpenetration of different 
elements of the energy sector did not take place in South Africa until the 1970s. Thus, the 
conditions of paradigm 0 apply until the early 1970s, when both the oil crisis and a reassessment 
of coal resources led to the possibility of developing a large-scale synthetic fuels industry. At 
this point, the state created an energy policy capacity in government, and attempted to develop 
an integrated energy policy framework along the lines of paradigm 1. This trend was reinforced 
by the 1979 crisis, which heightened the risk of a complete oil embargo against South Africa, by 
the creation of a separate Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs in 1980. Energy policy 
capacity was further expanded in 1987 with the formation of a National Energy Council; 
however, this was abolished in 1991, and its functions were reincorporated into the Department 
of Mineral and Energy Affairs, and energy policy capacity was significantly decreased. After a 
transition period, from 1992 to 1996, the post-apartheid government formulated a new energy 
policy framework, which is currently being implemented. Despite forays into paradigm 2- and 3-
type policies in the late 1980s, during the transition, and in the post-apartheid policy framework, 
energy policy has reverted to paradigm 1, for reasons which will be explored in the next five 
chapters. 
Thus to conclude, in terms of broad structural features underlying the development of South 
African energy policy, there are three which are particularly important. The first is the relatively 
simple structure of the South African energy system, in particular its overwhelming dependence 
on coal and the small number of primary energy sources, and the limited potential for 











of its close relationship with the energy system as a whole, but also because of an associated 
'industrial policy complex', which was very influential in the development of energy-related 
policies, and was focused on a minerals-based and energy-intensive form of industrial 
development. This industrial policy complex consisted of a number of overlapping policy 
networks focused on different sectors, and co-ordinated by what can be termed an 'industrial 
policy elite' concentrated in agencies such as the IDC and the state's economic planning 
machinery, with close connections to the political elite. The third feature was apartheid, which 
resulted in several factors crucial to the development of energy policy and the energy system. 
The first was the social, economic and political exclusion of the majority of the population, 
which resulted in extremely uneven infrastructure development focused only on the 'white' 
population of the country, and emphasised the industrial focus of energy policy. The second was 
the threat of sanctions (oil and nuclear - see Chapters 5 and 6), which provided a strong impetus 
for both energy policy-related institutional development, as well as for large-scale strategic 
investments in the energy sector. The third was the related culture of secrecy, combined with the 
impact on the policy system as a whole of the restrictions apartheid placed on political activity, 
which resulted in secretive and informal policy and regulatory processes, which exacerbated 
some of the lacunae of apartheid-era energy policy. These features will be discussed in the 












The Development of South African Coal Policy 
Overview 
Coal has been used in southern Africa on a very small scale by pre-industrial societies for 
hundreds and perhaps thousands of years; however, as in other parts of the world, the large-scale 
production and utilization of coal began with the development of industrial processes. In the 
South African case, it was the birth of the mining industry in the late 19th century which led to 
the industrial development of coal resources. The impetus for coal exploration and production 
began with diamond mining, but the main development of the modern industry occurred with the 
discovery of gold in the 1890s in the area around Johannesburg. The development of the two 
industries was very closely related: coal, and later coal-generated electricity, was required to 
provide energy for mining and minerals processing, as well as for the supporting infrastructure 
which developed around the mining economy (including the railways system), which formed the 
basis for the later development of South Africa's industrial economy. Since coal forms, and has 
formed, the basis of the South African energy system, the development and organisation of the 
industry, as well as the associated policies and institutions, provide a key to understanding the 
emergence and development of energy policy in South Africa; below, the nature of coal 
resources and the development of the coal industry and market are briefly outlined, before 
reviewing the development of coal policies and reiated institutions. 
Production, Coal Reserves, and the Coal Market 
Coalfields in South Africa are concentrated in four areas: in the Free State, Mpumalanga, 
Kwazulu-Natal and the Northern Province, with most production concentrated in the 
Mpumalanga region (see the map in Figure 2.6 for the location and extent of South African 
coalfields). The structure of the coal industry was divided geographically between producers in 
the pre-1994 provinces of Natal, and the Transvaal and elsewhere. Natal coal was of a higher 
average quality but more expensive to produce, and further from the key markets comprising the 
mining districts around Johannesburg; the small early ships' bunkers and export trade was based 











metallurgical coal deposits. South African coal is geologically distinct from coal elsewhere, 
especially in Europe and the USA; it tends to have a lower sulphur content but a higher ash 
content, and on average a much lower calorific value. In addition, the geology of South African 
coal seams is very favourable; these are generally thick and located near the surface, allowing 
relatively easy extraction, as well as the relatively easy introduction of advanced mechanisation 
and open-cast mining. 
Coal mining and processing technology developed in two phases. Before the 1970s, a relatively 
narrow spectrum of non-beneficiated26 products was produced by relatively non-mechanised 
mines, which had very low extraction rates27, whereas during and after the 1970s, a colossal 
wave of new investment in the industry introduced new technology, including beneficiation 
technology, which dramatically improved extraction rates and diversified the coal market 
considerably, including the development of a massive export market. Technology development 
was retarded by two factors. The first factor was cheap labour, which was one of the 
cornerstones of both colonial and apartheid-era policy. Wages were kept at very low levels by a 
range of coercive measures until the 1970S28, when international pressure29, combined with a 
newly-militant black labour movement, forced wages up. The second factor was the low 
regulated domestic market price of coal and the decline of the coal export market (see below); as 
a result, there was little incentive to invest in more mechanised forms of coal mining until the 
1970s, when a combination of government policy (which raised prices, promoted exports and 
promoted mechanisation), wage increases, the resurgence of the international coal market and 
the diversification of the local market (see below) provided the necessary incentive. The result of 
this technology revolution was a significant growth in coal reserve estimates, which will be 
discussed below, before a review of the development of the coal market. 
26 Coal beneficiation is the separation of different grades of coal from the general production stream from a mine, which is 
~enerally done by exploiting the different densities of different coal grades, to meet specifications of specific coal markets. 
7 An 'extraction rate' is the percentage of coal which is extracted from a given coal seam, which depends on the mining 
technology used. Old coal mining technology left a considerable proportion of the coal (up to 80%) in situ as 'pillars' to prevent 
the collapse of the ceiling, whereas other techniques (such as open-cast mining) extract up to 10004 of the coal. 
28 For a comprehensive economic discussion of the wages of black miners, and how these were kept at extremely low levels. see 
Wilson (1972). Wilson painstakingly establishes that black mineworkers' extremely low wage levels had little or nothing to do 
with a 'free market' in labour in southern Africa, and were mostly determined by the repressive and restrictive colonial and 
apartheid legal frameworks. which placed severe restrictions on labour mobility, protest and unionisation, while simultaneously 
forcing black South Africans out of other economic niches. and barring them from other significant economic opportunities. as 
well as barring black mineworkers from any jobs in the mining industry except the most unskilled ones; the others were reserved 
for white workers. In addition to this. labour recruitment was organised by the mining industry as a monopsony to prevent 
competition for labour pushing up wages. 
29 This included international pressure from unionised dock workers in the early 1970s. who refused to unload coal because black 
South African mineworkers were 'indentured labour' - in terms of apartheid legislation, this was substantially true, since 
(amongst other more general restrictive measures), it was a criminal offence for black mineworlcers to resign (or 'desert') until 











Coal Resources and Reserves30 
The historical development of infonnation on coal reserves is an excellent example of the 
relationship between the development of institutions and policy paradigms: a uniform method for 
assessing reserves and the development of appropriate institutions to do so only developed 
gradually during the 20th century with the development of coal policy. During the first half of the 
20th century, interest in coal reserves was minimal as it was assumed that coal deposits were 
effectively infinite. Interest in total available reserves began with a focus on metallurgical coal, 
which was thought to be scarce in South Africa, and expanded to coal in general only during the 
1960s. The political significance of resource and reserve estimates was based not only the 
available tonnage of coal, but on an assessment offuture coal consumption; this was a key focus 
of coal and energy policy only during the 1970s. 
The first official assessment of coal resources was made by the 1921 Coal Commission, which 
did not distinguish between resources and reserves, and reported that the total coal resources of 
the Union were 56 200 million short tOMB, or 44 960 million metric tons (1920-21 Coal 
Commission), a rough figure based on a partial survey of operating coalfields, which in terms of 
contemporary annual consumption of around 10 million tons per annum, meant that resources 
would be exhausted in around 5000 years; thus coal resources were regarded as inexhaustible. A 
note of unease was injected by the 1939 Committee of Inquiry into the Base Minerals of the 
Union which investigated the first potential coal scarcity problem in the Union: the adequacy of 
an indigenous supply of metallurgical coal for the newly-founded state-owned steel industry. The 
Committee conceded that " .. the extent of the Union's resources in coal of coking value is not at 
present known .. " (1939 Base Minerals Committee:42), and the outcome was the development of 
systematic processes for reser e assessment. These did not provide adequate data for the 1947 
Coal Commission, the main task of which was to provide an assessment of metallurgical coal 
reserves to determine whether conservation measures were necessary: the Commission 
developed its own methodology and gathered its own data (1946-47 Coal Commission:27), using 
for the first time a conceptual distinction between 'resources' and 'extractable coal' (under 
prevailing economic and technical constraints). Because of the Commission's methodology, it 
did not provide a total assessment of non-metallurgical coal: later analysts have compiled an 
estimate of 12 200 million tons of 'extractable' coal from the Report (1970-75 Coal 
30 The distinction between the two is generally considered vital for any form of resource planning (including investment in large 
projects). 'Resources' comprise the quantity of coal or other resource which it is feasible to extract technically, and is thus 
limited by the technology available at the time. whereas 'reserves' comprise the portion of resources which can be extracted 
economically, which is thus influenced by a range of factors. These include price (a higher price thus increases reserves), and in 
the case of coal and other non-uniform resources. product specification: thus, if for instance a market develops for very low-grade 
coal (which was previously not mined or discarded), then reserves increase accordingly, since although this category of coal 
could previously be extracted, it did not have any economic value and was thus excluded from an assessment of reserves. 











Commission:7). This basic methodology was revised and extended; in the 1950s, geologists 
estimated resources of 59 898 million tons (1952) and 63905 million tons (1959) (1970-75 Coal 
Commission: 7). The 1969 Coal Advisory Committee estimated 24 885 million tons of 
economically recoverable reserves of bituminous coal. After an exhaustive reassessment, again 
further developing the methodology of reserves estimation, the Petrick Commission reached a 
similar figure in 1975 of 24 915 million tons of economically recoverable bituminous coal, out 
of a total of 81 274 million tons of mineable bituminous coal resources (1970-75 Coal 
Commission:?). Given extraction technologies and coal prices at the time, these figures caused a 
policy crisis, and energy analysts suggested that the COWltry would have to seek alternative 
energy sources by 1990 (see below); however, partly as a result of the success of 1970s coal 
policy measures, new estimates in the 1980s were 121 218 million tons, of which 51 960 million 
were economically recoverable (South Africa Coal Statistics 1993:4), and the 2001 estimate for 
economically recoverable coal was 55 333 million tons (Department of Minerals and Energy 
2002a:50), which pushed back the possibility of real coal shortages to the last quarter of the 21st 
century. 
The Development of the Coal Market 
Up to the 1950s coal was mined on a relatively small scale, and was used directly;2 by the 
railways, mines, industries, and households, and for conversion into electricity by a largely 
decentralised electricity industry. Since 1950, coal use and production has been influenced 
primarily by four broad trends: no growth (and eventually a slow decline) in direct use of coal by 
consumers; a rapidly expanding coal-based electricity sector; the rapid development of the 
synthetic fuels industry during the 1970s; and the equally rapid development of a massive export 
industry from the early 1970s. These combined trends led to the doubling of coal production 
from its 1950 level by 1970, and an eightfold increase by 2000, illustrated by Figure 3.1 below. 
The evolution of the coal market occurred in three phases. In the first phase, from the inception 
of the industry Wltil the 1940s, the market consisted of consumers who used coal directly, 
including the railways, and a nascent electricity industry. There was a significant export trade; 
until the late 1940s, between Ih and IMh of the annual tonnage was exported (1946-47 Coal 
Commission:15-16), which dropped to aroWld 2% between the 1950s and 1970s (Department of 
Mineral and Energy Affairs 1995:13). Mining was largely labour-intensive, inefficient and 
tmSafe, with the gradual introduction of mechanisation. The state began to impose coal grading 
in the 19208, but the price was set by the market, subject to the behaviour of a number of cartels 
~2 'Direct' use of coal. which is referred to often below, is the use of coal by consumers themselves (primarily in industry), as 
opposed to its use by industries (electricity, synthetic fuels) which convert the coal to another energy carrier which is then used 
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pcriod wert' ·· .. tnc envy o f every \'isiting indusTrialisT.." (Lang 1995: 127). and some oftbe lowes! 
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very little differentiation of product and little beneficiation. Inflation in the 1960s, without 
concomitant price increases, meant that capital investment was at very low levels, and most 
production came from old mines. Expansion in the coal market was limited to new long-term 
contracts with Escom33, the state electricity utility, which were usually negotiated at significantly 
below the regulated wholesale price. 
The third phase, from the 1970s to the present, was a watershed for the coal industry. The change 
in policy engendered by the Petrick Report lead to significant real increases in the regulated 
domestic price, and an emphasis on increased extraction and utilization rates, which were 
conditions for the issuing of export permits. While the direct coal market remained static, the 
electricity industry launched a massive expansion programme during the 1970s, and a large-scale 
synthetic fuels industry was inaugurated from the late 1970s, which together dominated coal 
demand from the late 1970s onwards. An additional factor was the resurgence of the export 
market, which increased dramatically in the late 1970s as a result both of a resuscitation of the 
world coal market in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, and a change in government policy towards 
exports. The key factor in reviving the export industry was the development of the Richards Bay 
Coal Terminal in a deep-water port north of Durban, and an associated dedicated rail link from 
the most important coalfields to the port, which solved the logistical problems which had 
bedevilled the industry before the 1970s. The link between the railway system and the coal 
industry was thus largely broken by the 1980s, as most coal (for electricity, synthetic fuels and 
export) was either consumed at the mine mouth, or transported via the dedicated rail link to 
Richards Bay. 
Increased demand, higher regulated prices and the promise of the export market led to the 
transformation of the image of the industry in the eyes of investors: the coal industry of the 
1960s only had a market capitalisation of R175 million, and key figures in the mining industry 
talked publicly about the folly of investing in it (Financial Mail 27/11/1970). By the end of the 
1970s, revenue for the industry was over R2 billion, and the Financial Mail reported that 
"Coal shares are amongst the most expensive on the JSE; it's not difficult to see why .... the 
coal sector was the top performer on the JSE [in 1976/7]" (Financial Mail 22/4/1977). 
Capital flowed into the industry, in time to fund a significant expansion in production capacity, 
including a large number of new coal mines. Coal output more than doubled between 1970 and 
1980, and quadrupled by the end of the century. 
33 The Electricity Supply Commission, the name of which was changed to Eskom (not an acronym) in the 1980s. Unlike Escom, 
Eskom is not an acronym, but a combination of the English and Afrikaans acronyms: Escom and Evkom. These names will be 
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llte resurgence of the e~port industry changed the revenue Slructure of Ihe coal industry 
signiflcanlly. since export prices were significantly higher thun domestic prices, as illustrated by 
Figure 3.2 alxwe. 
1bc n:13Iionship bct .... -een domeSlic and export prices was IlOt stmighlforward. lor three reasons: 
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result !irst of government WdIltinll bclo",·inllation increases in the regulalcd price (early 1980s). 
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n:vmu~. At Ih~ beginning of the 19708. it had ~n th~ S(lun:e of9O¥. of Ire industry's R"\-'~nue 
(Chamber of Mines ofSoUlh AfriCli ZOOZ: IZ). 
Actors and Institutions 
1) The Coal Industry 
The Wily in "hich the c0.11 industry has bet:n invoh'cd in policy-making processes over the last 
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10 its own right (sec Figure 3.3). Up '0 
this point. 00.11 interests had been 
subordinatro to gold interrsts. hm from 
the 1980s. ,he industry underwent a 
r~'Stru:luring prlK:eS5 which oW' ere<! the 
relationship oc' .... et"n ~Id and cool. 
ntoC dcvcIOjlm,:nt of the siructure of tile 
indust!). and the rrprescnlmion of ilS collective intm:SIS in the policy proecs.~. occurred in thr • .", 
,,,,",,. 
The first phase. from an initial process of de~'CIopnlCr1t IIlId consolidation. lasted until the lote 
1960s. and WlIs chatxleriscd by a Joost' holdings strU:;IUI\' foc\JSI:d on prt)vidinl! coal fOT lho: 
domestic martC'!. lllc most impol1ant organisational struc tures ".::re II series of cartels. the first 
and subSlequently most successful and important being lhe TrJl1llvaal Coul Owners' Association 
(TCOA). '" hich was rormed in I90SJcI , the purpose or\\hi~h. in the ..... ords of the President of the 
then Transvaal Chamlln" of Mines. "'us - . .10 pullin end to ..... h~t ..... as cOll!lidcrcd in soUle Quarters 











thus to facilitate a "fair return" on behalf of investors (Lang 1995 :57); in other words, to control 
the coal market. 
Following this, a range of other cartels were formed on a similar basis, including several 
associations in Natal (of which the Natal Associated Collieries (NAC) was the most enduring 
and influential), the Anthracite Producers' Association (1962) and the Coke Producers Ltd 
(1925). The TCOA represented the vast majority of coal-mining activity in the country, and its 
involvement in policy-making, regulation and general interaction with the state was the most 
significant; it, along with the NAC, was represented on almost every influential advisory or 
statutory body which had a bearing on the coal industry, since the state regarded these bodies as 
representative of the coal industry as a whole. 
Collieries competed for long-term contracts with large customers such as Escom, but almost all 
other coal on the domestic or export markets was sold through the TCOA until the 1970s. 
Amongst its other roles, the TCOA also co-ordinated production between collieries for large 
export contracts, such as the early export contracts with Japan in the 1970s. Non-TCOA 
members were admitted to the cartel after they had demonstrated that they possessed significant 
market power, which was the case with the bloc of collieries owned by emerging 'Afrikaner 
capital,35 in the 1950s; these were, as with the other collieries at the time, incorporated into an 
'Afrikaner capital' gold-mining consortium. The gold-mining context was somewhat unusual, 
since the cartel was not successful in charging monopoly rents for coal, which was in fact 
underpriced for large periods of its existence. Christie (Christie 1984:41) suggests that gold-
mining interests undermined the cartel by owning collieries inside and outside it This might 
have been the case up to the 1920s, but the industry was almost completely owned by gold 
mining houses after that; thus, a more persuasive explanation lies in the amelioration of risk by 
the gold mining establishment. Two of the key risks for the mining establishment, in an 
environment where the geology of gold reserves required deeper and deeper mines36, was the 
possibility of spiralling energy costs, or even volatile energy markets, and competition for cheap 
labour. The function of the cartels in controlling the market was not to earn monopoly rents, but 
to prevent non-gold market participants from extracting rents, and from competing for labour 
(and thus increasing wages). The coal industry was mainly viewed by the gold industry (who 
3S A central policy of the National Party government (in power from 1948 to 1994), which was strongly Afrikaner nationalist, 
was to challenge the 'English' economic hegemony: in 1948, not only was the economy almost entirely owned by English-
speaking South Africans, but there was a significant difference in income levels between English-speaking and Afrikaans-
speaking white South Africans (O'Meara 1996:74). The govenunent sought to remedy this by promoting Afiikaner ownership of 
the economy, and particularly the mining industry, traditionally dominated by English-speaking South Africans with strong 
imperial connections. 
36 Deep-Ievel mines (from 500m to several kilometres) pose unique problems which usually require energy-intensive solutions, 
both for construction (shaft-sinking), transport, and most importantly, air conditioning, without which it is impossible to work at 
those depths, in addition to other more routine energy-intensive problems of hard-rock mining. This type of mining is also 











owned it) as a supplier of cheap energy for gold mining; thus, profits lost on coal could be 
recouped through cheap inputs to gold mining, as 
" .. some mining houses had a bigger interest in what they paid for energy than in what they 
earned from coal.." (Lang 1995: 147). 
Coal production costs, and labour competition problems, were controlled through the collieries 
joining the gold mining labour monopsony, the aim of which was to prevent competition 
between mines pushing up wages. To this end, members of the TCOA joined the Chamber of 
Mines, and formed a Chamber of Mines Collieries Committee, the functions of which 
"include all matters of mutual interest to its members and SO far as it is possible the 
formation of a common policy, particularly in respect of conditions of employment, both of 
Europeans and Natives, industrial relationships, etc." (1946-47 Coal Commission: 113), 
and also dealt with health and safety issues, policy issues, and co-operative arrangements within 
the industry such as co~ pooling arrangements. The Chamber was, from even before the 
founding of the Union, well-integrated into the governance of the mining industry; the Union's 
Department of Mines was essentially inherited from the Transvaal's Department of Mines, with 
which the Chamber had closely co-ordinated its activities. Thus the key features of this phase 
were a) the gold connection, b) the formation of cartels, and c) the dominant role played by the 
TCOA in controlling the market and pursuing the industry's interests with the state. 
The second phase, from 1970 to the mid-1980s, was characterised by several developments. 
First, diversification of the electricity market (primarily through the growth of energy-intensive 
industry in the 1960s, and the takeover by Escom of responsibility to supply future demand 
growth in local authorities) undermined the gold industry's interest in selling cheap coal to 
Escom or others, since they were no longer the prime beneficiaries. Initially, the quest for high 
prices was pursued through the TCOA, but later through support for deregulation, which led to 
the demise of the TCOA in the mid-1980s. Second, a process of restructuring within the industry 
took place during the 1970s, whereby collieries, which had operated more or less independently 
within the context of the gold mining houses, were consolidated into tightly-structured corporate 
subsidiaries, and set up their own local and overseas marketing operations in the wake of the 
gradual demise of the TCOA. In the same period, ownership reached its maximum degree of 
concentration - at the end of the 1970s, just two mining houses accounted for two-thirds of the 
coal output in the Republic (Lang 1995:177). This in turn undermined the role of the TCOA in 
the export boom, which it had pioneered; export permits were given to individual mining houses 
rather than the TCOA, and to other new independent collieries (particularly multinational oil 
companies). Third, the export boom coupled with the static nature of the direct coal market led to 











removed any rationale for its continued existence. Thus, by the end of this phase, the TCOA no 
longer existed, and the coal industry was represented in its interaction directly by individual 
companies, of which only two or three dominated the market. 
The last phase in the development of the coal industry, from the end of the 1980s to the present, 
began with the removal of the last vestiges of state control (exports). The end of apartheid 
brought about a swift internationalisation of the coal industry, which fmally divorced it from its 
traditional gold-mining roots. Resource multinationals specialising in base and energy minerals 
invested in the South African market, and dominant South African groups such as Gencor 
(subsequently Billeton (non-gold assets), and then BHP-Billeton) and Anglo-American began to 
diversify their assets internationally, which they had not been able to do under apartheid, and 
restructure their South African subsidiaries into international coal groups, thus structurally 
divorcing coal from gold interests. 
2) The State 
There have been four different types of institutional involvement in the coal sector by the South 
African state: regulation and governance of mining, regulation and governance of coal markets 
and exports, energy sector governance, and the involvement of the state in coal mining, 
marketing and consumption through state-owned enterprises, the most important of which were 
Sasol, Eskom, the railways and Iscor. At one point in the 1970s, although the state owned only a 
small part of the coal industry through Sasol and Iscor (now both privati sed), state-owned 
enterprises consumed the overwhelming majority of coal produced. 
Governance of the mining industry began in southern Africa with the Department of Mines in the 
Transvaal, which granted and policed mining rights and other mining-related regulatory 
processes. On the formation of the Union, the Transvaal mining bureaucracy was converted into 
a national department, and in 1912, was formed into the Department of Mines and Industries, 
which dealt with mining and resources, as well as issues arising from markets, trade and 
industrial development. The first state intervention in the industry was 1 the imposition of grading 
for export, and later for domestic consumption, which was vested initially in a Grading 
Committee based in the Department, and then in the newly-created Fuel Research Institute (FRI), 
which also fell under the control of the Department. In 1933, a separate Department of 
Commerce and Industry was created, and the FRI was placed under the new department 
(operationally but not formally). Since the Institute's activities spanned both the assessment of 
coal resources and coal production on the one hand, and research into applications for coal on the 
other, this was a controversial decision which symbolised in many ways the institutional 











The 1939 Committee of Inquiry into the Base Minerals Industry of the Union (1939 Base 
Minerals Committee) recommended that the FRI be transferred ~ack to the Department of Mines 
to facilitate its work on coal resources. The report also contains a dissenting opinion which 
emphasised the strong link between the FRI's work and industrial applications and markets. The 
FRI was not moved, and was formally transferred to Commerce and Industry at the end of the 
1940s, which was symbolic of the market-focused approach37 to coal policy at the time. Two 
other events led to the strategic marginalisation of the Department of Mines in relation to coal 
policy; the first was the government decision to regulate the domestic coal price, which fell 
under the Price Controller in the Department of Commerce and Industry, as well as the 
regulation of coal exports, which was done in terms of the Fuel Research and Coal Act, as well 
as the War Measures (in terms of which price regulation had been introduced). The second was 
the development of coal-based parastatals which reported to the Department of Commerce and 
Industry, especially S88Ol, which was established as part of the Industrial Development 
Corporation, also falling under the Department of Commerce and Industry, and a source of much 
of the state's strategic thinking on economic development from the 1950s onwards. 
Stakeholder forums on which industry representatives served included the Fuel Research Board, 
which oversaw the FRI, and the Coal Advisory Board (CAB), which was set up in the wake of 
the 1946 Commission to advise the Minister of Mines on coal exports, especially coking coal, 
and other coal industry matters. The Fuel Research Board consisted of one representative each 
from the Natal and Transvaal industries (in reality, the TCOA and the NAC), one expert on the 
utilization of coal, and a representative from the CSIR38. The CAB consisted of representatives 
from the TCOA and NAC, the FRI, the Department of Commerce and Industry, Iscor, and the 
Geological Survey, and was chaired by the Government Mining Engineer. As discussed above, 
" 
the FRI reported to the Department of Commerce and Industry, whereas the CAB reported to the 
Department of Mines, the institutional Significance of which will become apparent below. 
This institutional pattern lasted until the 1960s, when a sequence of coal policy-related 
institutional innovations began. The first of these was the Department of Planning, which was 
established in 1964 to facilitate the "co-ordination of economic and scientific planning in 
general" (Department of Planning Annual Report 1965: 1), as well as facilitating co-ordination 
between the public and private sectors in development planning. The Department was the centre 
ofa new planning process which produced, from 1964 to 1978, a detailed five-year 'Economic 
Development Programme', which was linked closely with the Economic Advisory Council, 
which advised the Prime Minister, headed by the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister. The 
37 By contrast to a resource-focused approach: thus coal policy was pursued through regulation of the market until the 1970s. 
when it was approached from a resource development perspective. 











Department of Planning also had responsibility for the CSIR and the Natural Resources 
Development Act, and specifically the Natural Resources Development Council, whose brief 
was 
" .. to promote the better and more effectively co-ordinated exploitation, development and 
utilisation of the country's natural resources" (Department of Planning Annual Report 
1965:7). 
By 1971, the Department had begun work on two related fields which intersected with natural 
resources and planning. The Natural Resources Division of the Department was undertaking 
work to 
" .. promote the optimum utilization of the Republic's mineral resources .... and to help 
formulate an integrated minerals policy for the country" (Department of Planning Annual 
Report 1972:7). 
The Department also acted as secretariat to the Planning Advisory Council's Subsidiary 
Committee for the Optimum Utilization of Mineral Resources. The other field was energy; 
initially also within the Natural Resources Division. The energy work culminated shortly 
afterwards in the establishment of a dedicated energy section, which became the secretariat to the 
Energy Policy Committee (EPC), formed in 1974 in the wake of the oil crisis, which played a 
key role in coal policy-making in the 1970s and early 1980s. Department of Planning staff were 
instrumental in both the CAB's report on coal resources and the resulting Petrick Commission, 
which placed coal at the centre of the new focus on energy policy, and provided impetus for the 
establishment in 1975 of the Minerals Bureau within the Department of Mines, which was a 
synthesis of a number of other related functions in other departments, including the Department 
of Planning's Natural Resources Division. The Minerals Bureau had a brief to formulate a 
strategic approach to minerals utilisation, and to pay particular attention to coal. 
This constellation of new institutional sites for coal policy was united in the 1980 civil service 
reorganisation into the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA), which took over 
responsibility of the regulatory functions of the Departments of Commerce and IndusnY9, thus 
centralising all the institutional elements of the new coal policy paradigm in one Department, 
until 1987, when the National Energy Council (NEC) was created, :and set up as a separate 
corporate-type organisation outside the formal civil service. The Fuel Research Institute was 
incorporated into the CSIR's energy research programmes in 1983, and these in turn were 
incorporated into the NEC in 1987. There was a concomitant shift in stakeholder forums. The 
new Coal Advisory Committee (CAC), created in 1985, broadened the traditional coal policy 
stakeholder forums from representation of the coal industry through the cartels to a group of 












'producer representatives' including the TCOA, independent producers (including multinational 
oil companies, who were represented separately) and the Chamber of Mines, 'exporter 
representatives', 'consumer representatives' and 'distributor representatives'; the first act of the 
CAC was to advocate deregulation (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 
1987:71). The coal industry was represented on the NEC itself by Anglo American, the largest 
coal producer, but not as an official representative of the industry. 
After deregulation, the state's coal policy activity was reduced to reserve estimates (carried out 
by the Minerals Bureau), and a massive research programme in the NEC, particularly on discard 
coal, which the export programme was producing in large quantities, but the state's withdrawal 
from the industry, the stagnation of the export industry in the late 1980s and the deregulation of 
exports in 1991 meant that the state had no context to implement any of the programmes, which 
were gradually scaled down and eliminated after the demise of the NEC in 1991. The intellectual 
property from the programmes was vested in a subsidiary of the Central Energy Fund 
(Enerkom), which was finally closed down in the early 2000s, after having failed to 
commercialise any of these technologies. As a result of deregulation and the shift in emphasis in 
energy policy away from coal, coal-related functions in the energy section of the DMEA were 
downgraded to a minor role. State coal-related policy activity in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
was limited to two areas: assessment of the coal industry and coal reserves by the Mineral 
Economics Directorate (the successor to the Minerals Bureau) of the DME, and as yet unfruitful 
attempts by the energy section of the DME to develop a coal discards and a low-smoke fuel40 
(for households) programme. 
The Development of Coal Policy 
The development of coal policy can be divided into four periods. The initial phase of the 
industry, roughly from the 1900s to the 1930s, was characterised by minimal state involvement, 
other than a role in promoting exports through imposing grading standards, as well as by the 
establishment of three of the four key parastatal consumers of coal: Escom, Iscor, and the state 
railways. The second phase, from the 1940s to the 1960s, was characterised by significant state 
regulation of the industry, specifically in terms of price and exports, and the beginning of 
concerns about the extent of coal reserves (initially for the steel industry), as well as the founding 
of Saso1. The third phase, the 1970s to the mid-1980s, begins with the release of a watershed 
report on coal reserves, which places coal policy in a different conceptual context; the regulatory 
system was significantly overhauled with a new set of aims in mind, and new institutions were 
40 To mitigate the negative health impacts of indoor coal use, as well as local air pollution, both of which are serious problems. 











created; the state's synthetic fuels industry was dramatically scaled up, and the coal industry 
went through an export-driven renaissance. The fourth phase, from the mid -1980s to the present, 
was characterised by the state's rapid withdrawal from regulation of the coal industry, until by 
the early 1990s the state's only involvement consisted of monitoring and evaluating reserves. 
The main events and phases can be seen in context on the timeline in Figure 3.4 below. 
Major developments in the state's coal policy framework occurred through a series of 
Commissions of Inquiry from 1920 to 1975. Commissions of inquiry perform a number of useful 
functions for the state; amongst these is the central one alluded to by Vickers (1995) as a form of 
'appreciative judgement', outside the usual context of the ordinary governance institutions, the 
outcome of which is usually a change not only in policy, but in the institutional framework for 
policymaking. Commissions were a favourite procedure for the South African state, and were 
applied when at least two conditions were met: 1) the state's interests would be furthered by 
public information gathering and consultation; and 2) existing state organisations were unable to 
accomplish the state's goals. 
In the case of coal policy, the Commissions were particularly significant in that the majority of 
them provided conceptual frameworks and information not available within the normal state 
institutions which dealt with coal, and were often foci of shifts in policy and institutional 
structure. The key Commissions were the 1920 Coal Commission, which reported in 1921, the 
1946 Coal Commission, which reported in 1947, and the 1970 Commission of inquiry into the 
Coal Resources of the Republic of South Africa (more commonly known as the Petrick 
Commission, after its Chairperson), which reported in 1975. Other inquiries which were 
important were the 1937 Committee of Enquiry into the Base Minerals Industry of the Union, 
half of which was devoted to coal, the 1951 Commission of Enquiry in regard to Coal Shortages, 
triggered by the coal shortages of the late 1940s, and a key report of the Coal Advisory Board, 
published in 1969, South Africa's Coal Resources, which led directly to the appointment of the 
Petrick Commission. These commissions, and particularly the key commissions referred to 
above, constituted important decision points in the evolution of coal policy. Unlike most other 
areas of the energy sector in South Africa, these were largely a matter of public record. 
1) 1900s to 1930s 
The first Commission, signalling the first interest in the governance of the coal industry as a 
whole by the Union government, was appointed in 1920, under the chairmanship of Robert 
Kotze, the Government Mining Engineer, who had previously held the same position in the 
Transvaal before unification. Kotze was also centrally involved in the decision, taken at around 











Figure 3.4: Key Policy-related Developments in the Coal Sector 
18005 to 19305 
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the first was to find ways of safeguarding the nascent export industry by finding ways to 
introduce coal grading for export coal (thus improving South Africa's reputation as a reliable 
supplier), and of improving logistical arrangements for coal pooling by mines to facilitate 
exporting and to prevent the export of low-grade coal (which the state saw as a threat to the 
credibility of the export trade). The second was to investigate ways in which the internal market 
could be assured of a reliable supply of coal, including state-run entities such as the railways, as 
well as municipalities and non-mining industries, since the logistical problems (mainly linked to 
mismatches between production, transport and demand) of the coal industry tended to produce 
periodical shortages (1920-21 Coal Commission: 1); thus, 
" .. when there is a shortage of trucks, it is more remunerative to the collieries to utilise the 
trucks for export coaL .. while there is a brisk business in export trade, there is little 
inducement to the collieries to cater for the less profitable portion of the trade, which is 
consequently liable to get somewhat short of supply" (1920-21 Coal Commission:28). 
The resulting legislation set in motion co-operation within the industry for pooling arrangements, 
established Grading Committees for export coal, and required that all coal for export and 
bunkering be graded. The Commission also noted that 
" .. should the occasion, however, arise, whether fiom some interruption in the normal output 
of the co1lieries or fiom the undue attention of the collieries to a profitable export trade, we 
think the Government should have the right to intervene by prohibiting or curtaiHng the 
shipment of coal so as to compel coal owners first to supply the internal requirements of the 
country" (1920-21 Coal Commission:24). 
This was a central feature of coal policy for the next 60 years. Legislation empowered the 
Minister of Mines and Industry to prohibit exports when there was a "real or apprehended 
scarcity" (Coal Act 2711922), as well as empowering the railways to commandeer coal supplies 
at an "arbitrated price" if they lacked locomotive coal. The grading process was placed on a 
more formal footing with the establishment of the Fuel Research Institute (FRI) in 1930, whose 
function was to 
"study and investigate the fuel resources of the Union, grade coal for export or bunkering, 
and to undertake scientific and technical research on all matters relating to fuels in geneml 
and to fuel by-products" (Fuel Research Institute and Coal Act, 3611930), 
which included taking over the grading functions of the committees. The Institute was governed 
by a Board, on which were represented Transvaal and Natal coal producers, and reported to the 
Department of Commerce and Industry (rather than the Department of Mines). 
An added complexity of the coal market in the 1930s, and the main source of the state's initial 
strategic interest in total available coal resources, was the establishment of a large-scale state-











sources of coking coal, which at the time was believed to be in short supply. The question of the 
absolute availability of coal resources, as opposed to the more predominant question of their 
efficient and equitable distribution, was raised in terms of coking coal only; the first government 
body to consider the question, the 1939 Committee tasked with reporting on the 'Base Mineral 
Industry of the Union', was disturbed to find that the question could not be answered (see 
above). A key turning point institutionally was the outcome of a debate in the Committee, which 
hinged on whether to locate the FRI in the Department of Mines or the Department of Commerce 
and Industry, as to whether coal policy should be developed in an industrial context 
(emphasising industrial development based on coal) or in a resource context: the outcome (with 
one dissenting opinion), was in favour of the industrial context. 
2) 1940s to 1960s 
Coal policy from the 1940s to the 1960s was dominated by a concern with the availability of 
cheap coal on the domestic market, as an input into the fairly rapid process of post-war 
industrialisation, also aided by the completion of the nationalisation of the electricity industry 
and various state-driven initiatives to expand the use of low-grade coal, primarily through the 
Industrial Development Corporation. The first step which was taken in this regard was the 
regulation of the coal supply chain, including a specified maximum price for coal at the pithead. 
This was done in 1942, initially as a war-time measure, which was later extended and entrenched 
in subsequent legislation. This approach to coal policy was accompanied by an institutional shift 
which effectively brought the industry under the control of the Department of Commerce and 
Industry. 
The 1946 Coal Commission 
The focus of this transition was the 1946 Coal Commission, which was given three broad goals. 
The first was to investigate the problem of coking coal, assess whether there was likely in fact to 
be a shortage of locally produced coking coal, and what should be done about this. The second 
was to investigate whether grading standards, which were compulsory for export coal but 
voluntary for the domestic market, should be altered to allow more coal to be sold, and the third 
was to report on 
"any further measures necessary to secure the greatest amount of utilisation of the coal 
resources of South Africa" (1946-47 Coal Commission: 1). 
The resolution of the coking coal problem required a considerable shift in thinking about coal 
resources, which in turn required the Commission to systematically assess the country's coal 
industry and resources as a whole. The Commission noted that their investigation would extend 











Coal Commission:27). In this context, the Commission built its conclusions concerning both 
coking coal and utilization of coal resources in general. Coking coal was not found to be in short 
supply; in this regard, the Commission recommended two measures. The first was a set of 
negotiated agreements between Iscor and coke producers41. The second was the establishment of 
a Coking Coal Advisory Board, to advise on coke exports42. The agreements were in fact 
concluded, and the Coal Advisory Board was set up to advise the Minister of Mines on a range 
of coal-related issues, including the export of coking coal (see above). 
As regards coal grading and marketing, the Commission pointed to a number of problems but did 
not see a need to address these problems through regulation or the extension of obligatory 
grading to domestic coal, strongly recommending that the industry be left to police itself inside 
the country in terms of structure and quality, which was not surprising, since the final report was 
apparently drafted by a senior figure in the industry (Lang 1995:129); the commission rejected 
any suggestions by some industry players that the industry structure was monopolistic. Another 
theme in the Commission's report was coal wastage caused by selective mining of high-grade 
coal and bad mining practices (1946-47 Coal Commission:97-106). 
The reason for these practices was the narrowly-specified grading criteria, making it worthwhile 
only to mine high-grade coal, therefore leading to the underutilisation of coal resources and the 
sterilisation of low-grade seams, as well as the dumping of low-grade coal for which there was 
no immediate market. The Commission did not regard these concerns as serious enough to 
warrant intervention, stating that 
" .. it has been shown that there is no cause for the least apprehension that reserves are 
insufficient to meet all probable future requirements for a very lengthy period of time" 
(1946-47 Coal Commission: 106). 
The solution was the exploration of further uses for low-grade coal, which was significantly 
underutilized at that point; the Commission wrote glowingly about the prospects for a synthetic 
fuels industry in South Africa (1946-47 Coal Commission:94-97); a state-owned synthetic fuel 
corporation was launched the following year under the auspices of the Industrial Development 
Corporation, which manufactured synthetic fuels on a relatively small scale, but making 
significant use of low-grade coal, and creating a technological precedent and capacity for a later 
large-scale project. 
Another area of policy which was addressed by the Commission was the question of coal 
exports. In the context of regulated domestic prices which were so low that these were " .. the 
envy of every visiting industrialist" (Lang 1995: 127), export prices, which were often several 
41 Iscor subsequently became involved in the coal industry itself. 











times higher, were an incentive to concentrate on the export trade to the detriment of the 
domestic market This meant in practice that there was a degree of cross-subsidisation between 
the export and domestic markets. As the Commission noted, 
" .. a further difficulty may present itself in the near future due to the possibility of some 
colliery companies concentrating on the shipment market only .. " (1946-47 Coal 
Commission: 130), 
thus undermining the cross-subsidy process, and disadvantaging collieries which produced for 
the local market at what was effectively a subsidised price. Thus, the Commission recommended 
that 
" .. in the event of collieries concentrating on the export market only whilst inland prices are 
controlled, action should be taken to regulate coal supplies for shipment purposes .. " (1946-
47 Coal Commission: 130). 
This recommendation the government accepted, and began using its powers to control coal 
exports from 1950 as a way of compelling coal companies to produce for the inland market 
(Financial Mail 2111211973). Exports of coking coal were generally prevented. Coal exports also 
suffered from severe transport bottlenecks, often leaving export orders unfilled (Lang 1995:133), 
and undermining South Africa's reputation as a reliable supplier. Transport bottlenecks also 
frequently resulted in domestic shortages, both for direct users and for power plants, which 
resulted in a 1951 Commission of Inquiry (1951 Coal Shortages Commission) to examine ways 
in which future supply problems could be resolved. A combination of these factors and the 
global substitution of oil for coal in the post-war decades led to a stagnation in the export trade 
until the early 19708. 
Price Regulation and the Domestic and Export Markets 
Because of the factors mentioned above, the regulated coal price in the 19508 and 1960s was 
extremely low. In addition, government sought to encourage industrial development through 
cheap inputs, and the Price Controller in particular saw price control as a way to combat inflation 
(Financial Mail 15112/1967), which became the dominant framework for considering price 
increase requests from industry in the 1960s. The low domestic price of coal was regulated 
according to a succession of rate-of-return formulae which were calculated without taking into 
account sufficiently the impact of inflation (Financial Mail 2711111970). Price increases were 
granted on an ad-hoc basis by the Price Controller, based in the Department of Commerce and 
Industry. While this system was tolerable to industry during the 19508, inflation, which had 
averaged 2% in the 1950s and 4% in the 1960s, began to erode profit margins significantly in the 
late 1960s, and particularly from the early 19708 on, when there was a massive increase in 
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In addition to the reasons outlined above, a central factor in inhibiting exports was government 
policy, which after 1950 had imposed significant controls on exports, for two reasons. The first 
was an attempt to conserve metallurgical coal resources43, and the second was based on supply 
concerns for the domestic market, since at that stage the domestic market overlapped 
considerably with the export market in terms of the kind of coal in demand. The domestic market 
was also growing at an alarming rate, since almost all the country's primary energy requirements 
were being met by coal (there was almost no substitution of coal by oil). Exports were subject to 
permits, and discouraged, as recommended by the 1946 Commission, unless collieries produced 
significant quantities for the domestic market; thus, dedicated export projects were eliminated, 
and the focus of the market turned inward. 
Thus by the end of the 1960s, coal policy was determined within a narrow framework focused 
conceptually on the domestic market, and institutionally based in the Department of Commerce 
and Industry, which regulated the domestic price, promoted industrialisation based on cheap 
coal, and controlled coal ~xports. The owners of the coal industry were no longer as interested in 
low coal prices as they had been in the 1950s, since gold mines formed a far smaller proportion 
of the direct or indirect coal market than they had in 1950. In addition, dramatic increases in the 
gold price in the early 1970s meant that rising input costs could be easily absorbed by them, but 
not by the coal mines. These changes formed part of a significant transformation in the coal 
industry, which began in the late 1960s with three developments. First, coal beneficiation was 
pioneered in the late 1960s, involving the processing and differentiation of a more complex 
range of coal products from each deposit; s~cond, on the basis of this, new internal and external 
markets were opened up, with huge potential earnings, and third, a gradual revolution in coal-
mining techniques was taking place. Traditionally, in common with most South African industry, 
coal mining was relatively labour-intensive on account of extremely low real wage levels until 
the 1970s, when both inflation and worker activism put upward pressure on wages. 
In this context, a committee operating under the auspices of the Coal Advisory Board produced a 
landmark report in 1969 which claimed that coal reserves in South Africa were not as extensive 
as traditionally imagined, and would be exhausted within a few decades (Coal Advisory Board 
1969). The committee actually formed part of the natural resources planning machinery of the 
Department of Planning, and its chair, Van Rensburg, was responsible for establishing both 
minerals and energy planning functions in the Department. This had several effects. Firstly, it 
caused significant alarm within government, which had since the early 1960s been very 
concerned with the possible strategic impact of an international oil embargo. The prospect of 
indigenous coal resources, the backbone of the energy economy which until then everyone had 











assumed were effectively limitless, running out in less than half a century was very disturbing, 
especially given the strategic option of dramatically scaling up the coal-based synthetic fuels 
programme. Secondly, and possibly more significantly, it placed coal policy debates in a 
completely different conceptual context, and shifted the fundamental focus from regulation of 
the internal market to the question of strategic resources. The sentiments of the report had been 
expressed the year before by the President of the Chamber of Mines, who had warned that 
" .. the controlled coal price in South Africa, possibly the lowest in the world, forced the 
industry to mine selectively; compelling a mining policy that was threatening the potential 
life of the country's coal reserves .. " (Lang 1995:150). 
This view was now endorsed by state officials. The coal industry wasted no time in perceiving 
the opportunities which would flow from this shift, for which they had begun to lobby. The 
chairperson of the TCOA commented that 
" .. this is an astonishing change of opinion for the country, a country which has met its great 
growth in demand for energy almost exclusively from its large coal.reserves .. " (quoted in 
Financial Mail 2411 011969). 
The Financial Mail expressed the hope that the Price Controller would 
" .. recognise the industry'S new 'scarce resource' and 'manufacturing' status, and allow it 
some extra reward in consequence .. " (Financial Mail 2411 011969). 
The shift in emphasis placed resource conservation, rather than cheap industry inputs, at the 
centre of coal policy, and began to place it in a broader energy context. Symbolically, this shift 
was expressed neatly by the chairman of Sasol, the effective centre of the state's strategic oil 
policy, who stated in 1970 that 
" . .it is time that we approached our coal reserves, not from the restricted viewpoint of a 
series of small mines, but from a broad national point of view .. " (quoted in Financial Mail 
19/611970). 
3) 1970s to mid-1980s 
The state, lacking the institutional capacity to develop a coal policy based on strategic resource 
use, and convinced by the CAB report that existing methods of estimating coal reserves and 
forecasting demand were inadequate, resorted to another Commission of Inquiry, which was 
appointed in 1970. 
The Petrick Commission 
The full title of the Commission was the "Commission of Inquiry into the Coal Resources of the 
Republic of South Africa", but it is better known by the name of its chairperson, Dr A.J. Petrick, 











Rensburg. The Commission was to consider, within the context of available energy resources, 
whether coal resources needed to be conserved, if necessary how this could best be brought 
about, and what controls would have to be placed on the industry to facilitate this (1970-75 Coal 
Commission: i). 
The Commission took around five years to complete its investigations, during which time the 
1973 oil crisis occurred, which drastically changed both the international energy environment 
and the local strategic outlook. Crude oil increased dramatically in price, and South Africa faced 
the threat of having its oil supplies cut off. The government took the decision to scale up the 
synthetic fuels programme, thus placing an addition demand on future coal reserves. The 
Commission's Report was novel in that it considered for the first time in South Africa the 
question of energy supply and demand as a whole in evaluating the potential demand for coal in 
the foreseeable future. 
This itself involved a number of conceptual innovations in calculating coal reserves, in particular 
a) drawing meaningful distinctions between resources (in situ coal), potential reserves and 
economically recoverable reserves of different classes of coal, b) standardising these definitions 
for different mines (which had not been done before, even in the 1969 report), and c) developing 
a reporting system and a data-processing system in order to accomplish this. In addition, the 
Report depended on a number of forecasting techniques which explored both technological and 
economic developments in the coal industry as well as models of future energy demand. Using 
these assumptions, the Report predicted that coal production would peak around 2025 and 
decline rapidly thereafter, implying that South Africa had a significant long-term energy problem 
(1970-75 Coal Commission:75). The report concluded that 
" . .it is therefore essential, in order to avoid a situation where South Africa might become 
largely dependent on imported energy-carriers early in the next century, that all possible 
steps be taken to conserve our coal" (1970-75 Coal Commission:79). 
These steps consisted of two main measures: 1) a change in government decision-making 
processes on energy-related policy issues, and 2) more efficient use of existing coal resources. 
The first significant recommendation regarded the establishment of an "Energy Planning and Co-
ordinating Board" to 
"advise on the detailed implementation of these recommendations. Its major objectives 
should be to advise on the supply, conversion and use of energy in the widest sense, with 












The Commission identified coal as the only significant long-term domestic energy source
44
• 
Thus, decision-making processes regarding coal policy should be shifted into a much broader 
energy policy framework. 
The second aim could be achieved by two methods. The first was to overcome the "cheap 
energy" paradigm which had underpinned the development of the South African economy, 
which would curtail demand, and included the advocacy of energy conservation, and the second 
was to investigate methods of improving the extremely low utilization rates of coal resources in 
South Africa, which consisted in encouraging or enforcing higher extraction rates: 
" .. the most significant loss of primary source energy in the Republic arises from the poor 
degree of recovery in mining coal from its seams" (1970-75 Coal Commission: 155). 
Another significant form of loss was inefficient coal processing or marketing, where high-ash, 
low-value coal was discarded, or high-grade coal from "captive collieries" (collieries where coal 
output is entirely fed into a mine-mouth plant) is fed into boilers or gassifiers with low-grade 
coal for which the plants are designed. The reason for this low recovery rate was identified by 
the Commission as " .. the present system of price control" (1970-75 Coal Commission:191), 
which 
"flows from the popular 'cheap energy' policy which, until recently was the fashion not only 
in South Africa but in most other industrial countries" (1970-75 Coal Commission: 191), 
which set the pithead price of coal too low to allow for new investment and higher extraction 
rates. The Commission recommended that in exchange for higher prices, 
" .. there should be a greater measure of Government control with regard to permissible 
mining practices, permission to open new mines, rationalisation of mining operations, 
reclamation of the surface, and control over the marketing of coal" (1970-75 Coal 
Commission: 191). 
The submission of the Chamber of Mines (published alone as an Annex to the report), at this 
point representing almost the whole coal industry, asserted that 
" .. the setting of the coal price was a fundamental and all-pervasive influence on the technical 
structure and development of this industry" (1970-75 Coal Commission: 199). 
They also asserted that inland price control and "co-operative selling" was necessary, since 
"free competition would tend to stimulate maximum production from the best quality and 
most cheaply mined coal seams first without regard to conservation" (1970-75 Coal 
Commission: 199), 
44 The Commission rejected uranium, which is found in South Africa in abundance but in relatively low-grade deposits, as too 











but required that the price-setting process be removed from the Price Controller, since the 
Department of Commerce lacked the necessary technical competence to evaluate the impact of 
pricing policies on mining practice. This technical competence 
"may be available in the Department of Mines [but] there is no evidence that this latter 
Department has been afforded the opportunity to make a meaningful contribution to the 
pricing of coal" (1970-75 Coal Commission:200). 
The Commission also took a stance against encouraging coal exports, regarding a large-scale 
export programme, particularly of metallurgical and high-grade steam coal, as counter to the 
national interest (I 970-75 Coal Commission: 191-192). 
The policy shifts which took place in the wake of the report, and set the tone for coal policy 
generally until the mid-1980s, can be classified into three interrelated areas: institutional changes 
and innovations, domestic market policy, and export policy. These developments, including high 
real price increases granted in the mid-1970s, coupled with the international revival of the coal 
industry in the wake of the oil crisis and the rapid development of the export industry turned the 
industry's fortunes around; the coal industry shifted from being "mining's Aunt Sally" (Financial 
Mail 2411011969), and a "Cinderella industry" (Financial Mail 2711111970) which even senior 
figures in the mining industry advised investors against investing in (Financial Mail 27/1111970), 
to being "the top performer on the JSE" in 1976 (Financial Mail 22/411976). George Clarke, later 
Chairman of General Mining, which with Anglo American in the 1970s dominated the coal 
industry, said in 1970 that 
" . .if our Cinderella industry gets half a chance to escape from the ugly sisters of excessive 
control and inadequate transport, it could have quite a ball" (Financial Mail 2711111970). 
This it proceeded to do. 
Institutional Changes and Innovations 
The Petrick Report contributed to a confluence of different developments in state thinking on 
South Africa's mineral resources, which centred on a broad state-driven energy-intensive 
beneficiation strategy, coupled with a new post-1973 strategic perspective on South Africa's 
position in the world minerals industry. The paradigm shift in coal policy, from a narrow concern 
with controlling the domestic coal market to assessing and managing coal reserves as a national 
resource, required a capacity which had been assembled for the purposes of the Petrick 
Commission, but was lacking in the state otherwise; in a similar fashion, it was lacking in other 
minerals industries. The Department of Mines was dominated by a narrow technical approach to 
mining, which lacked a broad policy function. While it contained expertise in fields such as 
occurrence of mineral resources (the Geological Survey), mining processes, and health and 











of the minerals industry was based in an embryonic unit in the Department of Planning and the 
Environment (the Natural Resources Division), as part of the general economic planning 
function which advised the C~binet. There was thus no institutional structure which could easily 
do the kinds of analyses which related mineral reserves to national and international markets and 
requirements, and attempted to develop appropriate strategies for these, as well as other national 
strategic goals. 
This changed in 1975 with the formation of the Minerals Bureau in the Department of Mines, 
headed by Dirk Neethling, later the state's chief energy bureaucrat, as head of the DMEA's 
Energy Branch, and subsequently the National Energy Council. The aim of the Bureau was to 
" .. advise on the fonnulation of realistic government policies to ensure optimum utilisation of 
South Africa's mineral resources" (Department of Mines Annual Report 1975:58). 
This strategic role strengthened towards the end of the 1970s, as the state began to see its 
position in the global minerals market as a form ofleverage against various forms of sanctions4S, 
as well as a valuable source of foreign exchange, especially as the rand began a steady decline 
against the dollar towards the end of the 1970s. In 1978, the Director of the Minerals Bureau 
reported that 
" . .it is evident that an appropriate mineral policy must not only provide for domestic self-
sufficiency and contribute to national economic and social development, but that it should 
also ensure that South Africa continues to be one of the leading mineral producing and 
exporting countries of the world. The international mineral trade has, however, become 
entangled in a web of political and strategic relationships, thus adding to the complexity of 
forecasting developments in the years ahead .. " (Department of Mines Annual Report 
1978:47). 
The way in which this was achieved was to assemble officials from a number of state agencies, 
including from the Economics and Costing Division of the National Institute for Metallurgy, the 
Geological Survey, the Government Mining Engineer's Office, and the Natural Resources 
Division of the Department of Planning and the Environment (Department of Mines Annual 
Report 1975:59), as well as creating extensive networks with state mining and planning agencies, 
and the mining industry, a procedure which was repeated with the formation of the Energy 
Branch of the DMEA by Neethling in 1980. 
In addition to this, the Bureau also put in place a network of overseas representatives in key 
locations, either in countries which were key trading partners or competitors (these included at 
different times Iran, Australia, Chile, Germany, Japan, the USA and others); Minerals Bureau 
45 The apartheid government sought to exercise pressure to prevent traditional Western allies (particularly the US and the UK) 
from taking hostile stances to apartheid by highlighting the extent of South Africa's reserves of strategic metals and other 











staff attended key international minerals conferences. Both these activities served as intelligence 
gathering exercises, as well as furthering another of the Bureau's aims, which was to promote 
South African minerals exports abroad, including coal. 
The Bureau was structured into separate clusters of minerals, including an Energy Mineral 
Division, which was responsible for "'the Minerals Bureau's contribution towards the 
formulation of national energy policies" (Department of Mines Annual Report 1975:61). In 
theory this included all "primary sources of energy", but as this and subsequent reports and other 
records of activities indicated, there was only one real focus, which was coal. Other primary 
energy minerals were actually responsibilities of other state agencies at the time; the Bureau was 
clear in its 1975 report that it would not be investigating uranium reserves and policy since this 
was the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Board (Department of Mines Annual Report 
1975:62). Similarly, the Bureau's activities as regards potential oil and gas resources were 
restricted to speculation based on reports from Soekor, the state's oil and gas exploration and 
licensing agency. 
The function of the Minerals Bureau in this· regard was to continue the work of the Petrick 
Commission on an ongoing basis, in compiling and analysing data on coal resources and 
reserves, production, demand and prices, and advise a range of state agencies on the 
development and implementation of coal policy, including a range of policy issues including 
energy policy issues, coal exports and market regulation. Their scope of activities included 
" .. aspects of coal economics such as coal mining methods and technology; the efficiencies of 
recovery in South African collieries; costs of coal production; labour, finance, equipment 
and infrastructure requirements for coal production; coal pricing and marketing policies; the 
preparation, transportation, distribution and utilization of coal; the effects of coal prices on 
the national economy, and the environmental effects of coal production" (Department of 
Mines Annual Report 1975:61). 
Between 1975 and 1980, the Minerals Bureau was involved in advising the Department of 
Commerce on (and liaising with private mining companies concerning) export quota allocations, 
promoting the growth of the coal export market, advising the Coal Allocation Committee which 
arose from the 1975 supply crunch, advising on coal price regulation, providing forecasts of coal 
production and demand, and interacting with the government's nascent energy planning 
processes then based in the Department of Planning and the Environment. In 1979, the Director 
stated that 
" .. the Minerals Bureau has, since its establishment in 1975, given priority to the creation of 
the necessary supporting structure to enable it to perform its primary function, viz. to advise 
the Government on the formation of an appropriate and feasible minerals policy" 











What was missing was a mechanism to interact with the private sector, which effectively 
controlled the minerals industry. The Bureau was thus instrumental in proposing and establishing 
the Minerals Policy Committee (MPC), officially appointed by Cabinet in 1980, an advisory 
body consisting of representatives of government and the mining industry, and functioned as its 
Secretariat, providing detailed support and policy input. The MPC was formed in the wake of the 
1979 'Carlton Conference46" the watershed summit between the newly-appointed premier P W 
Botha and South Africa's business elite which set the tone for a new pattern of governance and 
policymaking in the 1980s, and was echoed in the reformulation of the Energy Policy Committee 
at around the same time (see Chapter 7). The MPC's function was to 
" .. keep the Government infonned, and to advise it on all facets of the minerals industry, 
including the fonnulation of an appropriate minerals policy .. " (Minerals White Paper 
1986:2). 
Amongst other things, the MPC was tasked with the drafting of a Minerals White Paper, 
published in 1986, with secretariat and research services provided by the Minerals Bureau. The 
specific coal-related functions of the MPC stemmed from their focus on developing minerals 
exports; the MPC formed a central component in the process of formulating new export permit 
conditions for Phase N of the export programme in 1981 (Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs Annual Report 1981:64). 
The other pillar of the new energy policy system in the 1970s was the Energy Policy Committee 
(EPC - see Chapter 7), which was set up hastily following the oil crisis. The EPC was attached 
to the Department of Planning (which served as its secretariat), and advised a Cabinet Committee 
on energy policy issues. Amongst other issues, the EPC considered and advised on the Petrick 
Commission's Report, coal export allocations, and the decisions to scale up Sasol. Both the 
energy section of the Department of Planning and the Minerals Bureau were centralised in the 
civil service reorganisation of 1980 in the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs. The 
central rationale for the formation of the DMEA was an integrated approach to coal from an 
energy point of view; what it reflected was the completion of the shift from a regulation-based to 
a resource-based form ofpolicymaking. The new head of the Energy Branch, Dr DC Neethling 
(previously founding director of the Minerals Bureau) stated in the DMEA's first Annual Report 
that 
" .. for the flfSt time in the history of the public administrative system in South Africa all 
energy related functions are not only housed in one and the same department, but are housed 
in a department which is responsible for both the energy and the minerals policy of the 
46 Named after the Carlton Hotel where the conference was held, a central symbol of modernity in 1970s Johannesburg, and 












country. Since coal is South Africa's most important source of energy, for the present as well 
as for the foreseeable future, the combination of the energy and minerals functions is of great 
importance for effective determination of policy by the Government on a co-ordinated basis" 
(Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1980:71). 
Although the coal regulatory functions had been brought into the Energy Branch, the coal-related 
functions of the Minerals Bureau were not, which lent the Bureau a prominent role in coal policy 
for the next decade or so. 
Domestic Market Policy 
There were two aspects of coal policy as regards the domestic market in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The first concerned the regulation of the pithead price of coal, which affected the economics of 
the industry generally; the second concerned the regulation of the wholesale and retail industry, 
which affected only the market for direct coal use, and excluded large users which consumed 
over a certain tonnage (such as Escom). The wholesale and retail industry diminished in 
importance throughout this period in relation to the rest of the market. 
The state's rationale in the 1970s for the regulation of the wholesale and retail markets was 
based on security of supply concerns, the protection of certain classes of small consumers which 
coal merchants often found inconvenient to supply, and a policy of promoting the replacement of 
liquid fuels consumption in industrial applications with coal. The penetration of liquid fuels into 
the traditional coal market in the 1960s was not, as in other countries, driven by price (since coal 
was much cheaper), but by superior marketing and ease of use; thus, with the added price 
advantage of coal in the 1970s, the trend could be reversed by a} increasing the sophistication of 
the market, and b} enforcing quality standards in product, sales and service (Lang 1995:151,160), 
and thus contribute to 'de-oiling' the economy post-1973. 
Supply problems were generally caused by transport bottlenecks which had recurred periodically 
since the 1940s, and been partly alleviated in the 1960s by the introduction of road transport47, 
which involved a complicated cross-subsidy in the form of a 'Road Transport Levy' to 'level the 
playing fields' between coal producers which depended on road and those which depended on 
cheaper rail transport (Competition Board 1983:13, Financial Mail 19/1111965). The 1973 oil 
crisis also triggered a reverse of the substitution of fuel oil for coal which had occurred in the 
1960s, which added to the logistical problems. By 1975, there were significant winter coal 
shortages, as a result of the usual logistical problems as well as a real supply shortage, which was 
alleviated by significant investments in new capacity taking place at the time. 











The shortages were managed in two ways. A Coal Allocation Committee was established, 
consisting of representatives of industry and government, to identify bottlenecks and tackle them 
in advance; and a new 'rationalised' regulatory system was introduced for the domestic market, 
part of the aim of which was to combat what the state and the cartels saw as a form of market 
t 
failure: the lack of coal stockpiling facilities. The CAC was set up specifically to deal with the 
mid-70s shortages, while the rationalisation system was implemented gradually from the early 
1970s onwards. The rationalised supply chain would place obligations for stockpiling on various 
parts of the chain, thus avoiding supply problems which resulted from the mismatch between 
supply and demand inherent in the industry: 60% of coal demand occurred in only four winter 
months, thus, 
" .. mines would be unable to supply the right quality and size if industry had to be supplied 
only directly from the mines .. " (Competition Board 1983:5). 
The supply chain had since the 1940s been regulated at the pit-head and at the merchant level for 
coal with less than a certain calorific value; the state's and the industry's concern was that price 
control combined with "over-trading amongst coal merchants" (Competition Board 1983:13) had 
led to a decline in service levels from merchants to consum rs, which contributed to the switch 
to petroleum products (which had more sophisticated marketing operations) during the 1960s. 
This became a concern to the post-1973 apartheid state, eager to both provide energy security 
and minimise dependence on imported oil. The renaissance of coal use amongst small-scale 
users became another element in the apartheid state's attempts to de-oil the economy, and thus 
security of supply became paramount. 
The solution to these problems, which was implemented from 1973 onwards, was a two-
dimensional strategy. The first involved regulation of prices in the supply chain at four levels, 
namely producers, wholesale agents (who buy direct from producers), merchants (who buy from 
wholesalers and also retail to the general public) and dealers (small retailers who buy from 
merchants) (Competition Board 1983:16), and the second involved the reorganisation of the 
distribution industry, which was accomplished with the active involvement of the industry, 
notably the TCOA and NAC, who effectively merged their marketing operations for a period in 
the mid-70s. Although large consumers such as Eskom concluded long-term contracts directly 
with producers, these two marketing organisations comprised what was virtually a monopsony in 
the early 1970s. As a result, the state could utilise their role in the industry to effectively 
reorganise the whole supply chain for the domestic market. 












" .. the actual implementation of the plan was left to the marketing organisations which were 
actively backed by the Government" (Competition Board 1983: 14). 
The scheme consisted of a number of steps. The first was the consolidation of 'wholesaling', 
which was defined as selling coal in rail truck loads (excluding that sold by the TCOA or NAC). 
Wholesalers were able to add a commission per ton fixed by the Price Controller. Existing 
wholesale operations were grouped together into two entities having exclusive access to two 
regions excluding Natal (where the NAC effectively prevented wholesaling); the TCOA had 
significant shareholdings in both wholesalers. All consumers using less than 100 000 tons would 
be obliged to buy coal from the wholesalers (and thus to pay the commission) ("other than those 
companies that had affiliations with TCOA's mining-house members" (Competition Board 
1983:14)). At the retail level, the TCOA decided which marginal markets were "over traded". In 
these markets, the wholesalers' staff chose one or two "of the most promising" merchants, and 
supplied only them; other merchants were obliged to buy coal from these merchants. In areas 
with high levels of competition, government demarcated areas in which merchants could trade, 
in which they were given exclusive rights (Competition Board 1983: 15-16). 
The 'rationalisation' scheme was as a result implemented by a combination of regulation (prices) 
and a complex set of agreements with key players, as well as the crucial exercise of market 
power by the dominant suppliers (the TCOA and NAC). Much of the scheme was thus from a 
policy point of view implemented informally. These conditions began to break down towards the 
late 1970s, ironically because significant independent producers entered the domestic market as a 
result of having been allocated export tranches by government (which both provided them with 
the resources and productive capaCity to supply the domestic market, and placed certain 
obligations on them for domestic supply). As a result, the TCOA's ability to enforce the 
rationalisation process, largely based on their control of the market, waned, as independent 
producers made their own marketing arrangements. At the same time, the state had been unable 
fully to implement the rationalisation process, both in terms of control and in the face of 
significant legal challenges by excluded players. In addition, merchants with exclusive sales 
mandates were not all fulfilling their stockpiling and marketing functions. 
The cartels and the state responded differently. The TCOA's response was to introduce the 
"Approved Coal Distributors' Scheme" (ACDS) which involved the compliance of merchants 
with certain obligations (stockpiling, quality assurance, capacity to supply all consumers in a 
particular area), as well as a commitment only to buy coal from TCOA wholesalers, ostensibly to 
guarantee that ACDS certification would not be compromised by selling coal of unknown 
quality, but the effect was obviously to protect TCOA's market against independents 











account of the presence of independents (since the dominant role of the TCOA could no longer 
be justified by the state); in addition, the Competition Board was concurrently holding hearings 
into anti-competitive practices in the coal industry. The state's response was to issue new 
regulations in 1983 requiring all sellers of coal to be licensed by the DMEA, in an attempt to 
prevent players operating outside the rationalisation scheme. These regulations were to fulfil the 
function of the now-weakened TCOA cartel. 
In the early 1980s, another serious setback was the newly-established Competition Board's 
investigation into the domestic coal and anthracite markets, which fonned part of a significant 
ideological shift in the state's attitude to regulation and market forces, marked by the accession 
to power of P W Botha. The Board's conclusion on the Anthracite market was that it was anti-
competitive, both on account of the activities of the AP A and price control on coke and 
anthracite, which were removed by the DMEA on receiving the report. The AP A did not wait for 
the outcome of the report of the investigation, but dissolved in 1982 (Financial Mail 23/411982). 
Another investigation by the Board into the coal industry was slightly more equivocal on 
whether the existence of the TCOA was anti-competitive; however it concluded that the ACDS 
was definitely anti-competitive if it included the stipulation that merchants should source all their 
coal from the TCOA. Other anti-competitive practices included the shareholding of the TCOA in 
the wholesalers, the government's new licensing system for coal merchants, including the 
demarcation of exclusive territories, the agreement between government, the TCOA and the 
NAC that only the NAC would market coal in Natal, and the whole system of price control 
(Competition Board 1983:34). Not surprisingly, it concluded that 
.... the free market system does not exist in the supply and distribution of coal in South 
Africa" (Competition Board 1983:35), 
concluding that restrictive practices by the industry were partly responsible, but that the state 
itself was the main culprit: 
" .. the rationalisation scheme administered by Government, has been mainly responsible for 
the severe infringement on the rights of market parties to take market-related decisions. This 
has led to the Department48 becoming involved in the demarcation of sales areas, in the 
protection of existing merchants against new entrants into coal distribution and even to their 
interfering in such matters as tendering and the internal affairs of companies. Finally the 
Department reached a stage where it became necessary to give itself statutory power to deal 
with problems that could no longer be solved by negotiation and agreement" (Competition 
Board 1983:35). 











The Board m:ummendcd lhal Ihe coal marl:et be dcre~ulated. which included the n:moval of 
price conlrol and the removal of other conlrols on distribution and trading (Competition Board 
19113:36). The D~1EA accepted the: Board's rcpon. but Pllcmple:d to uddrcss Inc 3oard's 
OOllttms through an cwn more complex regulatOr) syste:m. nnd ~\'e the Minister extensive 
powers 10 ICgulau: the: industry through lhe Cool Resources Act of I '185. 
The Act began life as the Control of Coal Bill. which hinted UI ils ustcn:;i\"1; function. Pn:ssun: 
from sl:Ll..choldcrs. pending court cases against lhe D~1EA by coni troders. id~'()losielll pressure 
from other qu:u1elli of the state. and linally pn."'liSure from the new Coni Advisory Board. 
(established in ttTTllS of the Coal Resources Act) which the Minister \IllS ohli~l'll to consult 
before making decisions on regulatory issues. forced the DMCA to ubaooon aJi regulator)' 
measures in thc coal industry, including pri ce n:!!u l ~tion (retail alld wholesale price ""I!ulatiolls 
\1'1:1'1: scropped in 19H6: pithcadlproduccr price regulation WII$ scrupped in 1987), The hlst 
ekmrnt ofthe regulatory system, the comTOIs on coal expon s. was removed in 1991 
The TCOA did not last much longer tlllln regulalion. ami ceased its domestic marketing func:tions 
in 19H5. I\.·muinillg only as II ,'chide for expon oontr3Cl~, leaving mining houscs to organise their 
own marketinll oolllcsticully (Financial Mail Kl7I19118). The underlying economic reality \I"lU 
thlll tnc pcrecnl~~ of 10lld production whie:h was l1l:U"kctcd Ihroullh the TCOA II:Id shrunk 
drustica ll y from II dominant market position in the mid-21f century (the TCOA. the NAC and 
th~ Nmal Coal Owners' AS!IOCiution together marletcd &W. of the cool ~ in Soulh 
Africa; the o\e,whelminll share of this \IllS a) on the domestic mari<d, and b) through Inc TCOA 
(1946-47 Coal Commission 101». In 1986, ofa lObi of 173 million tons mined. 122 million IOns 
were sold OIl the domestic marh1; only 2J million \OIU \I",re sold outside lool!\-Ierm oontrnets 
with Iscor, Escom or Suo!. and of this tonnagc. 17 million toilS were sold throlJtth the T("OA 
(Financial Mail 21511986. IJ:'-'IE 1(95). This dominant shan;' of the domestic market \I"lI~ beinll 
eroded not only b> indcpendentmioc5. but by iodCJX'ndcnt wholesakrs and merchums \lho ~oold 
won. OtIIsuk the cartel" MOTl' importantl) , lhe structure of the industry had changed with a 
\\"31'e of CQnsolidations in the 19705 leading 10 IlCW cOllJOr3Ie structures su~h as Amcoal, \lhich 
\I-ere mdividually flU" more SlgIlitiClllll than the TCOA. E\'en the TCOA . S Temai IIi 1111 role, thaI of 
e.>(poctcr. chanlled from bcinllthc sole agem of Tr.msvlllli emIl exports in the early 1970s, to 
bt.-;ng a minor pln)'er hy thc tim~ the I'hnse 4 c){pon quotas \I-ere announced in the: early 1980s, 
with its iooividual member cOllJOrlltions and oth'T independent producers domilllltinlllhc lrade: 
c.>(pon revenue had by that lime exceeded doml'Slie revenue for coal producen. 
The scrapping uf the regolator) system \I"lIS [lIlrtly due 10 a lack of oonscnsus betwccn the coal 
industry and the .'lillIe 011 tI n~w rcgulplQry formula for selling the pithcad priCC' in Ilk' 1980$. 
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and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1986:68); the Department admitted that increases in the 1980s 
had not kept pace with rising costs. Various other pricing options were pursued by the DMEA, 
including investigating the possibility of lowering domestic coal prices by placing a levy on 
export coal (Department. of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1981:63), and price 
differentiation between different grades of coal, to encourage utilisation of underused coal 
grades; however, a committee which was set up consisting of industry and government 
representatives to draft a new price formula could not reach consensus. A new Coal Advisory 
Committee was appointed in terms of the Coal Resources Act in 1985, which the Minister was 
obliged to consult concerning coal regulation. The CAC, dominated by industry, took a strong 
line against regulation, as did the Competition Board, and regulation of the pithead price of coal 
was removed in 1987, which led to a short-term increase in the domestic price, before a decline 
in the real price set in as a result of stagnation in the export market. 
Export Policy 
Whereas coal policy from the 1950s to the 1960s was implacably opposed to coal exports, and 
discouraged them through a number of measures, a significant volte-face took place in the 1970s. 
The Petrick Commission opposed a large-scale export programme as being counter to a 
conservation-orientated coal policy (1970-75 Coal Commission: 191-192). This concern, 
however, was ignored and overridden by government, which began to see the export problem in 
a new light. There were two aspects to this abrupt change. The first was a strategic shift in 
industrial strategy in general, and particularly strategies for developing the export and 
beneficiation of base minerals, and the second was a complex policy stance developed as a 
response to a range of coal-related problems in the 1970s, particularly those raised by the Petrick 
Commission and the problem of domestic supply. 
The crux of the export programme was the Richards' Bay Coal Terminal, and equally important, 
the rail link between the eastern Transvaal (site of the major coalfields and other mineral 
producers), and the port at Richards' Bay. Without this co-ordinated transport and shipment 
arrangement, and a dedicated rail network for export, the coal industry would not have been able 
to overcome the traditional transport bottlenecks. In addition, a dedicated deep-water coal 
terminal and rail link would facilitate the swift handling of huge tonnages of coal, which could 
not be handled by existing infrastructure. 
Richards' Bay was identified as a site for a deep-water port in 1966 in a joint strategic initiative 
involving the South African Railways and Harbours, the IDC and private capital. Work began in 
the following years on a range of beneficiation projects in Richards Bay, including a giant 











import-substitution strategy. lbis type of strategic thinking in government was based in a web of 
institutions in the IDC, the Department of Planning (established in 1964), and ultimately the 
Minerals Bureau (1975); the first two organisations were well-integrated with the Cabinet via the 
Economic Advisory Committee. lbis shift was supported by the corporate restructuring of 
private minerals interests in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s which led, often with 
assistance from the IDC, to a number of export-oriented beneficiation industries (Fine & 
Rustomjee 1996: 172). The network of which the IDC formed a core, and in which its Chairman 
(until his death in the early 1970s) played a key role, constituted what will be referred to as the 
'industrial policy elite', and dominated much of South Africa's industrialisation planning in the 
latter half of the 20th century. 
The resources required to launch a significant export industry required extensive co-operation 
between key industry actors, as well as between them and the state. Negotiations with Japanese 
companies beginning in 1969 led the TCOA to open negotiations with government on two fronts. 
The first was to get approval in principle for coal exports totalling 12 million tons annually for 
30 years in 1969 (Lang 1995:159), and the second was to deal with the logistical problems 
involved in moving this coal to the coast and onto modern bulk coal carriers, which was resolved 
in a landmark public-private partnership in which the TCOA would construct the coal terminal, 
help finance the rail link, and guarantee adequate loads, which it was in a position to do on 
account of a pioneering contract concluded with Japanese steelmakers to provide blended coking 
coal. As Fine and Rustomjee observe, 
" .. the coal export industry could not have developed without closely co-ordinated policies 
which facilitated the pooling of large-scale resources.. ..the development of coal export 
policies resulted in enonnous state and private-sector capital investments" (Fine & 
Rustomjee 1996:169). 
The coal terminal and rail link opened for operation in 1976. To mark the occasion, the TCOA 
chartered the country's luxury Blue Train to transport coal executives and others to the terminal, 
at which they met the Prime Minister, who alighted from a Navy vessel to officially open the 
terminal (Lang 1995:160), signifying commitment by both the state and the private sector at the 
highest level to the project, which was seen as a flagship for a new era of minerals-based 
infrastructure development and industrialisation. 
With the infrastructure in place, the question of coal export policy needed to be resolved. In the 
wake of the Commission's negative remarks, the coal industry attempted to counter what 
appeared to be a common-sense-based approach to resource conservation by arguing that a) 
while there was an international renaissance of coal demand, a massive export programme 











to offset balance of trade problems due to increased oil import bills (Financial Mail 2712/1976), 
and c) that local demand consisted of, and would consist of (except for metallurgical coal) 
mainly low-grade coal, which it was not economic to export. In the meanwhile, the state had 
transferred the control of coal exports from the 1942 War Measure in terms of which they had 
originally been controlled, to the more formal Import and Export Control Act via a regulation 
(R2432/2433, Government Gazette 4013 14 December 1973), removed export control from the 
ambit of the Fuel Research and Coal Act (amendment 27/1973). The actual motivation for this, 
which in fact did not change the technical powers of the state to prohibit coal exports, was 
strategic; in the same Government Gazette (R2434/2435), the Minister of Economic Affairs also 
shifted similar controls on the export of petroleum products from War Measures to the Import 
and Export Control Act Both measures were taken in the light of the 1973 oil crisis, which 
meant that there was a confluence in strategic thinking between coal and oil policy. 
A further problem, created by both oil crises, was the trade balance, which the cost of crude oil 
was putting under pressure, particularly by the end of the 1970s. Persistent balance-of-payment 
problems were noted by in 1976-1981 Economic Development ProgrammeSO, " •• partly as a result 
of the adverse changes in the terms of trade which arose, inter alia, from the rise in the oil price 
relative to other prices" (South Africa 1976:28). The Programme went on to note that 
" .. finally, as regards foreign trade policy ... .it will only be possible to keep the deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments within reasonable limits if imports grow at a 
lower rate and exports (excluding gold) at a higher rate than in the recent past. Special 
attention will therefore have to be given to suitable measures to give further encouragement 
to import substitution and to promote exports" (South Africa 1976:29). 
Non-gold mining, and the Richards Bay coal export project, were singled out as promising areas 
of development in this regard (South Africa 1976:21). The 1978 Plan was more explicit; in 
drawing up different growth scenarios, the highest growth scenario was based on 
" .. a further intensification of South Africa's export drive, which was also the only way in 
which economic growth could be enhanced .. " (South Africa 1979a:33). 
Coal was optimistically singled out in this regard (South Africa 1979b:35-38), and the growth 
rate of the coal volume output was expected to double in the planning period (1978-87). The 
state's newly-created strategic minerals policy unit, the Minerals Bureau, had as one of its main 
aims not only the encouragement of exports, but also their direct promotion through an 
international network of officials in key foreign capitals of both potential markets and 
competitors - the Bureau not only advised regulators on the coal export programme, but 
facilitated applications from industry as well: 
so Economic Development Programmes were drafted and published by the Department of Planning in the 1960s and 1970s., under 











" .. miscellaneous activities include inter alia advice to the Department of Commerce and 
mining companies on applications for the export of coal; general coal export promotion 
activities .. " (Department of Mines Annual Report 1976:59), 
as well as periodically evaluating the competitiveness of South African coal exports, and 
attending international coal conferences. 
At the same time, the state had two further goals. The first was to address the problems raised by 
the Petrick Commission concerning extraction rates and efficient resources use generally, and the 
second was to address the problem of supply for the domestic market. With domestic demand 
expanding rapidly, especially for electricity generationSl (Escom was in the middle of a massive 
expansion programme - see Chapter 4), and possibly for further liquid fuels programmes, the 
broader considerations of the Commission, concerning end-use energy conservation and an end 
to cheap energy, were sidelined. 
While the Commission espoused the traditional view of coal exports, the state's policy solution 
comprised a paradigm shift: the solution arrived at was to launch a massively-expanded coal 
export programme, which would meet a nwnber of policy goals in one programme, as well as 
having the enthusiastic backing of the coal industry. Export permits would be issued to parties 
that were able to meet certain criteria, including supplying the domestic market and improving 
extraction rates, which, given the revenue resulting from exports, would provide the state with 
the necessary leverage to achieve its policy goals, including enhanced foreign exchange 
earnings, without regulating the industry directly. The first Director General of the DMEA stated 
that 
" . .it is well known that coal exports lead to enhanced earnings which in turn makes it 
possible to improve the extraction of available coal reserves .. " (quoted in Financial Mail 
5/3/1982). 
The high potential value of exports would allow coal companies to achieve high production and 
extraction rates while providing cheap (regulated) coal for the domestic market, which was still a 
central principle of South Africa energy policy. There was an additional policy goal which could 
be met through export tranches: multinational oil companies had taken an acute interest in coal 
since the oil crisis had brought about its renaissance, and had begun to invest in the international 
coal market, which provided additional leverage for the state to secure its oil supplies in the face 
of a worsening international situation which became acute after the fall of the Shah, as well as 
SI During the 197050 Sasol was also constructing a new massive synthetic fuels plant, and yet another was constructed at the end 
of the 1970s; however. both these plants used low-grade coal from Sasol's own captive colliery. Export ceilings were calculated 
using demand models which assumed that "all domestic liquid fuel needs wouldbe coal-based from the year 2000" (Dr Robert 
Scott, director of energy planning in the DMEA, quoted in Financial Mail 5/3/1982). which would have meant that the synthetic 











providing additional incentives to existing coal companies through the threat of allocating export 
permits elsewhere. 
The instrument for doing this was a series of export tranches, in which applications from 
potential exporters were evaluated, and maximum tonnages allocated according to how well the 
applicants met the specified criteria, or other policy goals. The export programme was stepped 
up in four phases, each phase consisting of a ceiling for total exports, divided amongst a number 
of coal producers. The conditions for export allocations were progressively refined. The first was 
granted in 1974, and was dominated by the TCOAINACs2 and APAs3, but also included small 
allocations for a few oil companies. The second, allocated in 1976, included a reduced role for 
the marketing associations, and the third allocation, in 1979 (after the second oil crisis) 
comprised a significant role for the oil multinationals, an enhanced role for the individual 
conglomerates, and a much lesser role for the cartels. The reason for this favourable 
accommodation of these relative newcomers to the industry was stated by Economic Affairs 
Minister Chris Heunis; the export allocations were subject to "the condition that they continue to 
fulfil their obligations in supplying liquid petroleum fuels in the country" (quoted in Financial 
Mail 18/5/1979), and added that the total oil companies' export allocation would "be reviewed 
should any of the oil companies no longer contribute towards the country's needs for petroleum 
products". 
The fourth phase, announced in several parts in the early 1980s, required applicants to 
demonstrate that they would be 
" .. first, ensuring optimal extraction of reserves and, secondly, and of equal importance, 
ensuring adequate supplies, in quantity as well as quality, of all the kinds of coal needed for 
local requirements" (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1980: 64). 
To these were added three more main conditions: 1) compliance with environmental standards in 
mining practice and rehabilitation; 2) observing international market prices for coal exports (to 
prevent discounting or transfer pricing to protect foreign exchange earnings), and 3) contributing 
to the maintenance and extension of coal export infrastructure, including rail links, coal terminal 
facilities etc. The head of the DMEA's Energy Branch commented in 1982 that 
''Coal export allocations are government's strongest tool for manipulating optimal reserve 
extraction and utilization of our coal resources" (quoted in Financial Mail 51311982). 
Export allocations would last for 30 years, and reach a total ceiling of 80 million tons/annum 
during this period; conditions could be modified, or allocations withdrawn in the face of non-
compliance. The phase 4 conditions were also tied to specific mines; thus 18% of phase 4A 
S2 The TCOA and the NAC fonned ajoint exporting body in the early 1970s, followed by the amalgamation of their marketing 
activities; however the two associations split again later in the decade. 











allocations were granted to mines where extraction needed to be 'optimised', 38% to mines in 
areas which were "regional development priorities", and 44% tied to mines supplying Escom. 
The aim of the latter allocation was to ameliorate the rise in electricity costs, shortly a subject of 
a Commission of Inquiry: 
" .. wherever possible, the aim was to facilitate the establishment of multi-product mines, 
where a better quality coal which can be exported at higher prices could be creamed off and 
thereby contribute to lower overall costs for electricity generation" (Department of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1982:6Si4• 
In reality, potential exporters were also limited by another factor, which was the ownership of 
export facilities. Small players effectively did not have access to Richards' Bay without the co-
operation of the major players; although coal was exported in small quantities through Maputo 
and Durban, this effectively restricted access to the market to major industry players. 
Coal export policy stayed roughly within this~ framework until 1991, when exports were 
deregulated. Exports grew throughout most of this period, until they began to stagnate in the late 
1980s due to international sanctions against South African coal, which received widespread 
support partly on account of a world glut at this time, as well as a drop in the oil price. In 1991, 
the Coal Advisory Committee concluded that policy goals of export control had been achieved, 
and that there was no longer any necessity to control exports; the Minister removed all controls 
on exports in March 1991 (National Energy Council Annual Report 199011991 :38), which ,ended 
not only export control, but state involvement in a whole range of other aspects of the coal 
industry. 
4) late 19805 to 2004 
There are three developments which mark the beginning of this phase. The first is the drafting 
and adoption of an Energy Policy White Paper from 1985 to 1986; the second is the phased 
deregulation of the coal industry, from 1986 to 1991, and the third is the creation and subsequent 
demise of the National Energy' Council (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the 
formation and demise of the NEC), followed by the transition process and the election of the first 
post-apartheid government. The period as a whole is characterised by ~a withdrawal by the state 
54 Fine and Rustomjee observe that this tie-in between Esc:om contracts and exports was a more long-tenn and pervasive 
influence on the structure of the industry. Aside from this obvious economic connection. Escom contracts, whicb expanded 
dramatically in the 19708, were used to a) encourage Afrikaner capital in the coal industry (" .. through the patronage of Escom 
contracts, Genmin's TNC bad become the largest single producer of coal in South Africa by the early 1970s .. "), and b) focus and 
restructure the fragmented coal industry of the early 1970s into a centralised, bigh-volume, export-oriented industry, wbicb 
earned precious foreign exchange wbile keeping domestic energy prices as low as possible; .... subsequent Escom contracts were 












from effective involvement of any kind in the coal industry; the post-apartheid era is notable for 
a conspicuous lack of interest, from an energy policy point of view, in the industry. 
The drafting of the Draft White Paper (1985) and the White Paper (1986) were officially 
overseen by the Energy Policy Committee; the White Paper itself is remarkably brief and 
contained almost no explicit mentions of coal, other than general commitment to 'market forces' , 
'optimal use of resources' and so forth. The Draft, however, contained as an addendum a number 
of energy 'plans' for different areas of policy, including coal, which contained, under a heading 
titled 'strategy', a range of ambitious goals and ongoing activities, including the continuous 
evaluation of South African coal reserves in terms of their geology, economics and applications, 
the "encouragement of tIie optimum recovery of mineable reserves" and the linking of mining 
development to other strategic and regional developmental goals, promoting the use of discard 
coal, researching more efficient coal conversion technologies, promoting optimum extraction 
rates, and ensuring security of supply for the inland market (including ensuring stockpiling, a 
national contingency plan and a pricing strategy which would guarantee adequate production 
capacity), while phasing out government involvement in coal markets (1985 Draft Energy Policy 
White Paper: 12). This would be underpinned by a "policy-based national coal research and 
development programme". 
In practice, state involvement in the inland market was terminated on the advice of the Coal 
Advisory Committee in 1986 and 1987, and all major decisions regarding the export programme 
had been made in the e8.!ly 1980s, except for the decision to deregulate exports in 1991. The 
remaining activity of the state in relation to coal between 1986 and 1991 (aside from being an 
important consumer through Escom) was research. State energy research functions had been 
increasingly centralised; in 1983, the FRI was merged into the CSIR's National Programme on 
Energy Research (NPER), and with the formation of the NEC, the NPER was brought under the 
NEC. A large-scale coal research programme was undertaken, covering mining and utilization, 
with a particular emphasis on discard coal which, a by-product of beneficiation (the largest 
tonnages begin produced by the export programme) was produced (and still is) in massive 
quantities. Current estimates from the DME's National Inventory of Discard and Duff Coal 
indicate that annual production of discard coal was estimated in 2001 to be 66.2 million tons, up 
from 43.6 million tons in 1985. According to the national inventory, a total of 1121 tons of 
discard coal is available ~n dumps adjacent to coal mines (Department of Minerals and Energy 
2001a:2-4)ss, representing a significant fraction of total annual production. Expenditure on coal 
SS Discard coal is produced as a by-product of coal beneficiation, and consists of coal which does not confonn to production 
specifications for specific uses, especially for export. It thus has quite a variable range of calorific values and ash and sulphur 
content; in addition to representing a wasted resource, it also poses an environmental hazard, from leaching and from 











research involved the majority of research expenditure during the NEC's existence (63% in 
1988/9 and 56% in 1990/1) (National Energy Council Annual Report 1991:7), but the 
programme was "extensively revised" in 1990 after "extensive consultation" with the "coal 
community" (National Energy Council Annual Report 1991:30), and scaled back significantly 
after the demise of the NEC. Planned demonstration projects, especially relating to coal discards, 
were cancelled (interview with J Basson), and the programme was effectively eliminated in 
1993, when the Cabinet apparently decided that research would be limited to policy issues 
(Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1993:57)~ The intellectual property 
was taken over by a CEF subsidiary, which, after unsuccessful attempts at commercialisation, 
was closed down in 2002. 
The CAC, the stakeholder advisory body, was abolished with the formal abolition of export 
controls in 1992 (with the repeal of the Coal Resources Act). State activity in relation to the coal 
sector was now limited to collecting and processing data on coal reserves and production, largely 
performed by the Minerals Bureau, and a few minor investigations into discard coal, low-smoke 
coal (for residential use), and more environmentally-benign coal technologies. This shift away 
from what had been, with petroleum imports, at the centre of the state's strategic energy policy 
thinking in the 1970s, was confirmed by a notable lack of interest during the· energy policy 
processes which characterised the transition, and in the formulation of the new White Paper from 
1995 to 1998. 
The ANC's 'Draft Minerals and Energy Policy Discussion Document' (ANC 1994a), deals with 
coal specifically only in reference to low-smoke coal, as does the RDP Base Document (ANC 
1994b). The 1995 Energy Policy Discussion Document formed the parameters for the White 
Paper process. The Document is revealing in that it is a synthesis of policy options, representing 
a combination of old-guard DMEA policy positions, and alternatives and others regarded as 
important by the new government56; as such it isa lengthy document. Of 75 pages dedicated to 
the energy supply sectors, the coal section, which begins with the observation that " .. three-
quarters of South Africa's primary energy is sourced from coal .. " (1995 Energy Policy 
Discussion Document:146), only takes up 2~ of these. The policy options are a scaled-down 
version of the coal policies of the 1986 White Paper; what remains are only three points: 
maintaining a coal reserves database, finding solutions to the discard coal problem, and 
investigating efficient coal use technologies. There is an additional proposal to tax coal, to 
encourage investment in energy-efficient end-use technology and diversify the energy supply 
base (1995 Energy Policy Discussion Document: 146-148). The final White Paper, which 
56 This co-existence was brought about a) by the persistence of the old energy bureaucracy post-1994, and b) the appointment of 
a Nationalist Minister of Minerals and Energy, as part of the National Party's allocation of Cabinet posts under the Government 











appeared in December 1998, opted for continued deregulation, maintaining a coal resource 
database, promoting low-smoke coal for households and the use of discard coals, promoting end-
use efficiency and clean-coal technologies, and investigating the use of coal-bed methane (1998 
Energy Policy White Paper:87-90), although in reality, aside from the resource database and 
other mining-related functions pursued by the mining bureaucracies, the maintenance of a coal 
discard inventory, and the recent release of a low-smoke fuels strategy document, there has been 
no state coal-related activity since the 1998 White Paper. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there were three phases of policy development: from the 1920s to the 1940s; from 
the late 1940s to the 1960s, and from the 1970s to the 1980s. During the first phase, basic 
institutions were put in place, and the policy framework for the second phase was derived. A 
policy network developed, consisting largely. of the coal industry, organised through industry 
associations (primarily the TCOA), government departments, and the FRI. Government 
involvement in the industry was initially conducted through the Department of Mines and 
Industry, in a mining policy context, both in terms of coal production, and as an important direct 
or indirect input to the mining industry. With the creation of a dedicated Department of 
Commerce and Industry in 1933, a rival policy context developed (industrial development) and 
the role of the Department of Mines was superseded by the Department of Commerce and 
Industry. There was a crucial choice at the end of the 1930s, laid out by the 1939 Base Minerals 
Committee as a choice between a resource-based approach to developing the coal industry, and 
an industry-based approach, centred on the institutional location of the FRI; in other words, t~ 
concentrate state resources on assessing and developing the coal resource, or on developing 
applications for coal in the developing industrial economy. The latter view prevailed, and coal 
policy was placed in an industrial policy context, and the state's mining bureaucracy was 
marginalised. The key policy issues during this period were related to problems in developing 
the coal market: developing quality standards for the export trade to promote South Africa's 
competitiveness as a coal supplier, and guaranteeing supplies to the inland market. The role of 
the state, which it undertook co-operatively with the coal industry associations, was to develop 
institutions to enforce grading standards (placed in the FRI), and to mediate the interests of 
domestic consumers: the railways, electricity producers and other consumers. At the beginning 
of this period, coal companies were owned by a number of interests, and attempts to form cartels 
were only partially successful: however, by the 1930s, coal interests had been consolidated, and 
became dominated by the gold industry. The role of the TCOA became central in liaising with 











the 1930s, with the establishment of Iscor, the state-owned iron and steel works, which raised the 
potential problem of a supply of metallurgical coal, However, in the 1930s, the state did not 
possess the institutions to investigate whether this posed a problem or not. 
The second phase of coal policy development, from the 1940s to the 1960s, was inaugurated by 
two significant events. The first was the introduction of price control as a war measure, and the 
second was the Coal Commission, which developed a consolidated regulatory system restricting 
coal exports and regulating the domestic coal price. Policymaking and regulatory authority 
shifted almost entirely to the Department of Commerce and Industry, and the Department of 
Mines had little or no influence during this phase. At the beginning of the 1950s, there was a 
strong consensus between government and the coal industry, and the latter played a key role in 
the Commission's report. In addition, the state pursued other policy goals, notably the promotion 
of Afrikaner mining capital through the coal industry, and new Afrikaner-owned coal companies 
were admitted to the TCOA, and used their coal interests to conclude their most significant 
acquisition in the 1960s: a large stake in the gold industry. The coal price was maintained at a 
very low level to encourage industrial development though cheap energy inputs, which was a 
policy goal endorsed by the owners of the coal industry, which had played a dominant role in the 
1946-47 Coal Commission. However, during the 1960s, this consensus was undermined by 
rising costs, which the regulatory system did not take into account, as well as a requirement for 
new investment, and the coal industry began calling for an end to price regulation, heralding an 
end to the tightly-structured policy community which had developed the 1950s policy 
framework. In addition, the coal industry's interests were increasingly independent of the gold 
industry's interests, since the industrialisation of the 1950s and 1960s had resulted in the gold 
industry consuming a significantly smaller proportion of the country's electricity. 
The third phase of policy development, from 1970 to 1991, began with a minor policy crisis in 
the form of a report from a committee operating under the auspices of the Coal Advisory Board, 
which suggested a new challenge for coal policy by arguing that coal resources as a whole would 
be exhausted in the medium term. The genesis of the report was very interesting; it was 
effectively undertaken by a new state agency, the Department of Planning, which seconded 
several staff to undertake it, who in a novel development had been tasked to assist the Planning 
Advisory Council in assessing the country's future energy requirements. Moreover, the 
institutional site which was chosen by the Department of Planning's leadership to undertake this 
work was also significant: the Coal Advisory Board's main function was to advise the Minister 
of Mines on the metallurgical coal resource, which was the only resource-based aspect of 1950s 











The effect of the report was highly significant: it led directly to the appointment of a 
Commission of Inquiry into the extent of coal resources, which reached substantially the same 
conclusions, and also coincided with the 1973 oil crisis; the coexistence of the inquiry and the oil 
crisis led to a full-blown policy crisis which in turn brought about significant policy change and 
institutional reform. The reason that this potential planning problem became a policy crisis was a 
combination of three factors. First, it suggested that the country was facing a looming 'energy 
crisis', probably in around 1990, which would necessitate the identification of another energy 
source: this perspective was eagerly supported by the nuclear establishment (and by the Minister 
of Mines in particular - see Chapter 5), who saw nuclear power as a replacement for coal as the 
country's primary energy commodity. More importantly, it raised the question of energy per se 
as a vital policy question, which had not been done before. Second, the strategic context was 
highly significant, and led to concentrated attention from the country's political leadership: at the 
time, the country was facing the threat of an oil embargo, and taking measures to counteract the 
threat. Previously, this had been seen as a limited threat (oil only), but the CAB report and the 
Commission highlighted the strategic problems the country would face if it could not depend on 
coal. This was connected to the third (and in many ways decisive) factor, which was the 
possibility of countering the embargo threat through the establishment of a large-scale synthetic 
fuels industry based on coal, which would provide a considerable proportion of the country's 
liquid fuels. While the existing synthetic fuels industry (Sasol, which also administered the 
state's existing oil security strategy projects) was at the time a minor coal consumer, it was a 
keen advocate of a change in coal policy paradigm (from one based on the lowest price to a 
resource-based policy involving a considerable price increaseS\ Shortly afterwards, the oil crisis 
created conditions where for strategic (a real threat) and economic (oil price increases made an 
expanded synthetic fuels industry economically feasible) reasons, a large synthetic fuels industry 
was a real possibility. This connected the domains of liquid fuels policy and coal policy into a 
more complex energy policy domain. 
The policy outcomes, however, while stimulated by the Petrick Commission, ignored its 
recommendations in one .vital respect: whereas the Commission urged caution in allowing coal 
exports, the state instead embarked on an aggressive scheme to promote exports. The new coal 
policy framework (outlined in detail above) which emerged was the outcome of a new policy 
consensus between various state agencies and the coal industry, around which a new policy 
community was established. The coal industry had pioneered a new export industry through their 
51 It is interesting that the leadership of what became of the biggest coal consumers in the country should have been advocating a 
coal price increase. Sasol produced its own coal for all its plants, and was thus not affected by regulated prices; however, it is 
interesting to note the national role that Sasol's leadership played when making such announcements, since they were very close 











contract with the Japanese in the late 1960s, due to come to fruition in the mid-1970s. Initially, 
this was brokered by the TCOA, but reorganisation of the coal industry into corporate groups, 
and the granting of export pennits to non-TCOA entities, as well as the decline in importance of 
the domestic market, led to a decline in influence of the TCOA, and its ultimate demise in the 
1980s. Instead, the main industry actors from the 1970s in the policy community were the major 
coal groups. 
The focus of their interest in coal policy was the export trade, and higher domestic prices, which 
were necessary in order to fund the investment required for new capacity and infrastructure for 
both the domestic and export trades. State agencies involved in coal policy had begun to change 
significantly as the policy consensus broke down. Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s, coal policy 
had been dominated by only one state agency, the regulators in the Department of Commerce, by 
the time of the Petrick Report several other agencies had eclipsed that Department. This was 
most clearly demonstrated by the subcommittee assembled by the EPC to consider the Petrick 
Report, which consisted of representatives from Sasol, Escom, Iscor, the Office of the 
Government Mining Engineer, the Geological Survey and the Minerals Bureau (the last three 
located in the Department of Mines), but notably without a representative from the Department 
of Commerce. As the Chamber of Mines pointed out, the Department of Commerce did not have 
any capacity to evaluate coal policy questions in tenns of the new framework (resources and 
extraction rates), and thus could not continue to make decisions about domestic price-setting 
based on criteria they were familiar with (for instance, combating inflation). Instead, there were 
three important groups within the state which detennined the new policy. First, there was the 
IDC, which had already begun to develop the Richards Bay project with the coal industry and 
other state agencies, and also many companion projects (including the Alusaf smelter); second, 
there were the new resource policy institutions, including the Minerals Bureau and the energy 
section in the Department of Planning; and third, there were economic policy agencies eager to 
address looming trade balance problems. These agencies were co-ordinated through the EPCand 
the PAC (of which the IDC was a member), and via these with the state's economic planning co-
ordinating processes in the Office of the Prime' Minister. The EPC played a central role in 
approving export permits. The development of a large export programme, coupled with a 
massive investment programme in new mines, fonned the core of the new consensus between 
these actors. Outside of this, the coal industry was prepared to trade off various additional state 
goals for increased export quotas and higher domestic prices. 
These developments led to considerable institutional innovations. Coal regulatory functions, in 
the Department of Commerce and presided over by the Price Controller, were demoted, and 











central role, through natural resources planning, through newly-created energy planning 
functions, and through its economic planning functions (via the Economic Development 
Programmes). The Department of Mines achieved new influence due to the importance of 
resources and extraction techniques, but primarily through the Minerals Bureau, a new agency 
which developed a capacity to evaluate coal resources on an ongoing basis, institutionalising and 
extending the processes developed in the Petrick Commission. In 1980, a new integrated state 
agency, the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, was created, with coal policy as the 
primary justification for the location of the enhanced energy policy function. 
There was a high level of interaction and co-ordination between these state agencies and the coal 
industry to bring about the transformation in the coal sector which occurred in the 1970s. The 
Richards Bay project involved such co-ordination, as did the massive investment programme in 
the 1970s in new mines to supply Escom's new power plants. In addition to this, other structures 
such as the Coal Allocation Committee were developed in the 1970s to address bottlenecks in the 
domestic market. 
The final chapter of this transformation occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s, which began with 
the deregulation of the domestic market. By the mid-1980s, several factors had changed to 
undermine the consensus on domestic regulation in the 1970s. The first-was the pricing regime, 
which was once again being used by the state to control inflation by granting below-inflation 
increases. As a result, relatively high pithead prices in the 1970s were eroded by inflation in the 
1980s, and a new basis for price-setting could not be agreed on between industry and the DMEA, 
and industry renewed its calls (last made in the early 1970s) for deregulation. The second was an 
ideological shift in both the state and the private sector towards deregulation and privatisation? 
which resulted in the establishment of a more powerful competition authority in the early 1980s, 
which produced a highly-critical report on the domestic coal market. The third was the waning 
influence of the TCOA, which lost its dominant position in the coal industry from the late 1970s. 
The TCOA was an essential part of the regulatory system, and the TCOA and the regulatory 
section of the DMEA (which had been transferred from the Department of Commerce) were by 
the mid-1980s the only advocates of regulation. The CAC, which made the fmal decision, placed 
domestic coal pricing policy into a broader context, since it contained a range of representatives, 
including independent producers and consumers. With the disappearance of the strategic 
imperative in 1990, the last form of regulation was removed with the lifting of export controls in 
1919. Although coal-based research formed a significant part of the NEC's research programme 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coal policy activity was minimal from 1991 onwards, and was 
limited to periodic assessment of reserves, and periodic deliberation on projects such as coal 











participation in coal policy was terminated with the abolishing of the Coal Advisory Committee 
after export restrictions were lifted. It is notable that the NEC could not reach consensus on its 
extensive list of proposed coal projects (see Chapter 7); the government lost interest with the 
decline in the security imperative, and the coal industry was not interested in projects which 
would have resulted in a fall in coal demand, since energy consumption growth rates had slowed 
considerably by the late 1980s. 
The lack of interest or activity around coal policy in the 1990s, and particularly during the 
transition, is notable, given the central place it occupied in 1970s energy policy. There are 
several reasons for this: the first was that the 1970s problems had been addressed through 
massive investment, improved extraction rates, improved domestic coal distribution 
infrastructure, and improved coal utilisation (reserves had doubled byI990); the second was that 
once the state had lost its leverage in the form of regulation (particularly export regulation), its 
'infrastructural power' in the coal industry declined, as well as its institutional infrastructure 
(developing coal policy outside a regulatory environment required different institutional 
resources); the third was that there was a general decline in interest in strategic resource use 
(with the end of apartheid), and a shift in energy policy from the coal-oil nexus (resource-based) 
to an electricity-liquid fuels nexus (market-based). The fourth reason was that the 1970s 
represented the high point of an investment cycle, which, given the absence of new power plants, 
has not recurred. A final and more interesting reason was that it was not defmed as a problem 
because of the way in which problem-defmition operated during the transition: this revolved 
around two central aspects: control of the state and state institutions, and extending the scope of 
energy policy to encompass the interests of black South Africans. Since coal was by then 
deregulated, and was a privately-owned industry, there was no state apparatus to gain control of 
(as there was in the oil industry); furthermore, the coal industry was almost entirely a primary 
industry, which sold most of its produce to other producers (Eskom, Sasol or exports). Thus, the 
old problems had been addressed, and there were no new ones to trigger the kind of interest 
shown in other energy sector industries. 
We are now in a position to place the development of coal policy in the energy policy paradigms 
framework developed in Chapter 2. The key point in this respect in coal policy development is 
1970. Before this, the characteristics of coal policy resembled closely the properties of paradigm 
O. Coal policy activity was not integrated with other energy sector policy activities: coal was 
regarded as a basic input into the economy, and priced as low as possible in a policy consensus 
(until the mid-1960s) between government and the coal industry, as a basis for industrial 











bottlenecks! in South Africa in the post-war period, and for various reasons coal was generally 
not replaced by liquid fuels in the economy in 1950s and 1960s. Paradigm 1 energy policy 
institutions were thus no.t developed in this period; neither the 'information frontier' nor the 
'institutional frontier' were developed to the point where energy policy questions could be 
addressed or policy alternatives formulated. 
However, with the CAB report, the Petrick Commission report, and the 1973 oil crisis, coal 
policy was placed in a new policy context, which was accompanied by significant institutional 
change and development. The new coal policy paradigm formed a basis for the development of 
an energy bureaucracy, a minerals policy agency, and a nexus between minerals policy, energy 
policy, and various components of the energy sector, including electricity and synthetic fuels. 
Coal policy activity was fully-integrated with the state's nascent energy policy processes - key 
coal policy decisions were all co-ordinated and ratified by the Energy Policy Committee. The 
types of policies adopted and the institutions developed all correspond with paradigm 1: primary 
goals ofpost-1970s coal policy were a) boosting production levels at an accelerated rate, and b) 
substituting coal for oil, which was a form of optimisation of the energy supply system in the 
peculiar conditions created by apartheid (the oil embargo), and c) maintaining a low domestic 
coal price. Decision-making was successfully shifted from a narrow focus on the domestic coal 
market, and placed into a broader strategic context, and was supported by a new expanded coal 
policy community. 
Institutional capacity, which did not exist before, was created to map coal resources in sufficient 
detail, as well as forecast coal demand, which was a central function of both the energy 
bureaucracy, and the Minerals Bureau, which pushed the 'information frontier' into paradigm 1, 
and allowed the development of resource-based coal-energy policies. However, consensus was 
not reached on extending the complexity and sophistication of this paradigm in the late 1980s in 
the NEC (for instance, the use of discard coal), and this combined with the disappearance of the 
strategic imperative led ultimately to deregulation and disengagement by the state from the coal 
sector in the early 1990s. As a result, coal played a minor role in post-apartheid energy policy as 
a new energy policy paradigm emerged; concern about coal reserves was limited in the 1990s to 
a small group of experts. 












The Development of South African Electricity 
Policy 
"In South Africa you can never plan too big." Hendrik van der Bijl, founding Chainnan of 
Escom (1947 - quoted in Christie 1984:150) 
Overview 
The electricity industry in South Africa has a nwnber of significant characteristics. The first is 
the relatively important role of electricity in the economy: whereas in the average lEA country in 
2002 electricity comprised 19% of final energy conswnption (www.iea.org: 3110/2005), in South 
Africa electricity comprised 26% (Department of Minerals and Energy 2002b). The reasons for 
this are related to two characteristics of the South African energy system: the first is the 
concentration of energy intensive industries, the economics of which are premised on cheap 
electricity, and the second is the distribution of income, which results in a relatively low 
domestic use of electricity, as well as a lower conswnption of liquid fuels due to relatively low 
car ownership. 
Electricity is at the crux of Fine and Rustomjee's 'Minerals-Energy Complex' (MEC - see 
Chapter 2), based primarily on coal, and providing inputs into other mining and energy-intensive 
industrial activities. South Africa's electricity system is based around a single technical-
economic system: the generation of electricity from low-grade coal, which has been developed to 
match South African conditions over the last 100 years. Almost all South Africa's electricity was 
generated from coal-fired plant until the 1980s, when a nuclear plant was commissioned: in 
2000, around 92% of sent-out electricity in South Africa was generated from coal, around 6% by 
nuclear power, and the rest from hydroelectricity and other sources (Eskom Annual Report 
2000). Thus, unlike other parts of the world, the role of oil is and has been almost negligible in 











Africa is limited to 342MW of peaking capacity out of a total installed capacity of around 
42000MW. 
The economics of electricity in South Africa were thus only indirectly influenced by world oil 
price fluctuations such as the 1973 oil crisis. This isolation was enhanced by the nature of the 
South African coal market: power station coal has generally been used at the mine mouth, and 
not been export quality, and therefore the price, usually determined by long-term contracts, was 
also only indirectly affected by international coal price fluctuations. The resulting economic 
independence of the South African electricity system from the world energy markets had several 
significant effects on institutional and policy development, which will be discussed below. 
The development of the electricity system unfolded in two main phases. During the first phase, 
electricity systems were developed regionally, and based largely in local authorities, with the 
exception of a privately-owned system developed to serve the emerging gold-mining region on 
the Witwatersrand. During this period, a state electricity utility was created (Escom), which 
developed regionally-based electricity systems for supplying local authorities, industry and 
mining. These regional systems were gradually integrated into a national grid. The second phase 
began with the completion of the national grid, which established the long-term institutional and 
technical pattern for the electricity industry in South Africa, which had several key features. The 
first was a division between the production and transmission of electricity, and its distribution: 
the state utility Escom owned and controlled the former (and made key decisions concerning 
expansion), while local authorities generally controlled the latter. The second was a historical 
anomaly, but a key component of the system: Eskom supplied electricity directly to mining and 
heavy industry, even if these industries were located inside the supply areas of local authority. 
The third was that the d~velopment of the distribution industry, because it was controlled by 
local authorities, was fundamentally affected by apartheid; white households were almost 
entirely electrified, whereas black households were largely not. During the transition to 
democracy, Eskom assumed a right of supply to many 'black' areas in order to electrify them, 
and thus developed a significant presence in the distribution industry. 
The two key policy-related characteristics which have featured prominently in the development 
of the electricity system are thus a) the key relationship between electricity and energy-intensive 
industries, in which Escom played a central role, and b) the influence of apartheid on the 
development of the distribution industry and its implications for energy poverty; these will form 
a key component of the discussion of the development of electricity policy, and its relation to 
broader energy policy issues and institutions, below. In order to place key policy developments 
in their political and economic context, a brief discussion of the development of the structure of 











the political economy of electricity production. Following this, the development of electricity 
policy will be discussed in depth, with particular reference to policy from the 1950s onwards, 
before concluding with remarks on the relationship between electricity policy and the broader 
energy policy context. 
Structure, Actors and Institutions 
a) Structure 
What follows in this section is a brief outline which will be expanded more fully when 
discussing specific actors. As alluded to above, the fundamental dichotomy in the South African 
electricity system was between its role as a supplier of bulk power to energy-intensive industry 
and as a supplier of 'civic power' to a wide range of households and other enterprises, 
particularly in urban areas. The development of the system occurred in six phases, which were 
significantly influenced by the geography of the country in three ways: the first was the relative 
isolation of the major centres of economic activity; the second was the focus of economic 
activity around the goldfields, initially developed on the Witwatersrand; and the third was the 
location of the main coalfields, which were mainly concentrated in an area east of Johannesburg. 
In phase 1, from the late-19th century to the 1900s, tiny electricity systems were established by 
civic authorities in larger South African cities, and small electricity systems, mostly self-
producers, were set up by the mines on the Witwatersrand. Phase 2 was inaugurated by the 
development of a private electricity generation monopoly on the Witwatersrand to provide 
electricity and compressed air to the rapidly-developing gold-mining industry in the late 1900s, 
the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company (VFTPC). The VFTPC rapidly became the 
largest electricity supplier in the country, as mine consumption dwarfed the consumption of 
cities. The third phase began with the fonnation of the state utility Escom, in the early 1920s. 
Escom developed a number of 'undertakings' aimed primarily at producing bulk electricity for 
sale to local authorities, the railways and mines. Escom had a complex co-existence agreement 
with the VFTPC, which ended in the late 1940s with the expropriation of the VFPTC's assets, 
which signalled the beginning of phase 4. The relative production and sales of local authorities 
and EscomIVFTPC are portrayed in Figure 4.1 below. 
Two things are immediately apparent: the dominant, but not yet monopoly role, of 
EscomIVFTPC in electricity generation, and the dominance of mining, both as a consumer, but 
also as Escom's dominant customer. During this phase of development, lasting until the early 
1990s, three notable developments took place. The first was the extension of Escom's supply 
areas, and the construction of the national grid in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This is 
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The second major dCI'clopmenl was the slutcmCni of a fonnal policy in the 1960s recognising the 
dil' ision of roles hclw.:-cn Esoom and local nuthori lies. whereby localnulhorilics well.' 10 confiroe 
Ihcrnsdves 10 distributing elC\':tricily within lilci r areas of supply: Escom "'(Iuld ho:nccfonh be 
responsiblc for funher dcn:lopment of b'Cncmtion capao:ilY. as well as providing dC\':tricily 
directly 10 energy·intensivc users_ TlJe Ihird major dcvelopment. "hich confirmed and 
entrenched trends in clC\':tricity infrastruo;turc dcl'dopment to thai point. was lhi; geographical 
division of urban lind roml a.fCas on II racial basis in lentls o f apanheid legislation. "hich dim:tly 
alf~'Ctcd !lel'c!opment of the distribution industry. As a result of the complet ion of d'lC grid. tm, 
inslimtional basis lo r the electricity sysu:m, the coocep! of ·undertaj., inj;S' (separate electrici t) 
s),stcms conlined to a specific geol:rophic area) Il'as replaced by a 1:10001 di~illCtion bct\llt'cn 
I:cncmlion. lransmisslon and distribution. 
Th.:- fifth phase commenced in the lotte 19805. lind consisted of t"O ckment5. !'irst. Eskom 
as~d control of moSl or the di stributioo areas in urban and ruml arc3s prcl'iousl)' cOlumlled 
by 'black local authorities' under apartheid. and thus became a signiticantllCtOf in the ele.: trici ty 
distribulioo industry. and second. an international electric;t} translTlIssion grid "";IS dcl'doped in 
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IUnwgnrn:nion of mallY local authorities, und the concornitnlll rt:ddin itioo of local authority 
diSlnbutiOll boundaries, The final pha.o;c wus inaugumtoo by the tmn$ilion proc~'SJ, alld inl'olvcd 
a llumOt.'r of ubonive I"I:structuring pmposllls for the cnli N system. but the future of these is 
cum.'!ltly IUlCenuin. The role of specific al10rs nlld illstitution~ within tbe system will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
B) Key Acto(s 
1) State Actors 
A) EscomlEskom 
Probably the most significant actor penainillg to electricity policy is the stme utility, the 
Electricity Supply Commission (Escom). unti l 1987. :md then renamed Eskom. F..scom wa~ 
established legally in terms of tho;: 1922 Electrici ty Act, und started opcr;1ting in 1923. Escom's 
role as spceifi~-d by the Act was both as II national electricity utility, which would supply 
electricity anywhcN it \\'lIS required, lIS well as an agency 10 promote electrification. lIS duti~ 
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the pnwisiM. "hen:ver required. of a cheap and abundant supply of ei«tricily- (Electric"y 
Act 4211922: C lausc:3 (b)). 
The way in which this role was interpreted through Eskom's 80-ycar history, by the utility and 
by the state. i~ surpnsingly consistenl. and is summ;,.'d up by a dlstlllCIion dr.lWll in the 1984 De 
Vi1li~rs CommissiOll n.:pon. bcIwccn II ··consumer-neutral" approach to clcruici ty supply. in 
which cl~ctncity "'liS vi~",ed in the same .... 'By !l!I OIhcr commodi ti~'S 111 tenTlS of pril."e and 
investment ( .... etjuaJ or tending to 101l1l·u:rm margiJ1llI costs-) and II -COI1sumcr·pril·ileged~ view. 
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would bI."I1Cfit if it were made available as chellply as jlQ5Siblc 10 COf\.SU11M:l'll and pru.spectil·e 
consumers" (1983-114 Ekclncily Comnlission:I92). The Jailer has coosislcnil) been subscribed 
\0 by !".scom and LIS supporters in go\,cmml.'Tlt and clsc ..... hen:. nus \'II,W w.u fil'Sl l-spoused br 
the founding Chaimlan ofEscom, Ilendn!. van der Ilijl, in the lirst Annual Kq1On: 
126 
h .. the Commi5~ teg.lrds dlCap power u an illlflOrUlll fa.;wr on pn:omoIonll industnal 
del"Ckipmc:m. and Iw. tt.cmore, devQlcd, and \\,11 ooruinuc 10 dcllOk, the closeJl Ittention 10 
th.s a<peet of Its dillies Ind ~;bllotle5 under lhe IJoc:mcit) ACI. It has had in It I view 
from the outset the possibility or IUlsting industries by _, of cheap po .... el. 8I1d lOoOo .. ntt 
that nId the desirabilily - 1P"a1 the nLICIcu« of 1 f'O"'.:I' to.d - of prodLICtlIlI power on a large: 
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fiy eomparisoJl, the 1984 Annual Report S1alL'(i thaI 
.. .. Escom·s objectIve is to provide: an ad,:quat<: supply of cieclricity. al cost price, to be uscd 
for the economic advaooemcnl of Sooth A frica~ (Escom Annual Rcp'''' 1084:8). 
Coupled with th is role was a/aciliralivc rule (spe ll oUI in Clause 3 of the original Act); umilthc 
19605, when Escom took ovcr planning for lhe Whole electricity system, the utility played a key 
role in IlCgotialing arrangements for expansion of thc electricity system. l11e 1943 Annual 
Report notes Ihal 
~ .. wh ile Ihe Commission's function in Ihis m;pe<.:1 is purel~ advi!iOl)'. il has. in a number or 
inslance!!, been lite: ml'llnS of bringing about aH:>rdinalion or cll'CIricily prodm:lion and 
supply., .Jhe trnns<;end'''G ,,,fluc-rlCe of thoe Commission 's acti~itics is nOliccabl" ihroughoul 
lhe Union, not only in its own areas or supply, ... hieh irIClude 018ny rural con,munities, 
hamlets and hundreds offann!!, 001 also in areas of utm,r supplic~ particularly in the field of 
pricc rcdl>Clion and lhe constituent and divcrse uli(: of clcclriciTy~ iEscorn Ann".1 Report 
1943:14). 
1Mis role rein forced l:.scom's role, nnd its self·image, a~ the elcctri ci ty agency of the country, 
assuming eL'II tral responsibility both (or its technical operation and expansion. and for the 
promOTion of opTimal solUTions to electricity problems n3!iol1lllly. The expropriaTion of the 
VFTPC in the lot;: 1t)40:s Hnd the subsequent development of the n31ional grid concretist'd 
Escom's control of the operation and development of the electricity supply industry as a whole; 
procc~scs to plnn gen;:nnion and tran~miSSion e~p3nsion for the whole coulILry were centralised 
in Escum by the early 1970:s, by which time Escom's direcl sales to large con sumc~ (excluding 
local authorities) were more Ihan double the c!e<,,1rieity di stri buted oy local authorities. 
From the lale 19110s on, partly in anticipation of the transition, Es./wm added to it~ traditional role 
of providing cheap electricity 10 industry a second mle of "c1ectricily for all", which involved 3 
massive electrification programme aimed pri mari ly at poor black households, as well as 
pioneering the development of a soutltcm African electriciTy grid. as a prelude to a larger 
continental grid. This new 'social' role, undertakcn on a liny scale previously through the 
elcctriJicalion of remute white farmhouses during apartheid, also involved as.~umingjurisdiction 
over around 40010 of thc elcctricity distrihution in the country. TIIUS, The 1987 Annual Report 
['(>rt" IYs electricity as 
~ .. a key factor in spurring economic de:\"j,lopment and improvinH the quality of life of all OUr 
people. rlSkom's aim is 10 eOSure ,hal Ck'ClricilY i5 affordable and. ultimately, avai lable to 
Ill" ( r:.s~om Annual Rcport 1987:covcr). 
This con: vision thrived in the post-apartheid slate. in the new eonTexI both of nalional 











the South African state, as having a central· role. In the 2002 Annual Report, the Chainnan of 
Eskom stated that Eskom's core mission was "contributing to continental reawakening": 
"At the core ofNEPAD and the African Renaissance vision is the acceptance that Africa's 
people and their institutions have the capacity and the responsibility to create, foster and 
maintain economic, political, social and moral processes and practices that define Africans 
as competent and proud citizens of the world, on par with the best. Our efforts are aimed at 
giving life to this belief." (Eskom Annual Report 2002:21). 
In pursuing this vision, Eskom has always had a high degree of autonomy. Governance took 
place in four spheres. The first was the Electricity Supply Commission itself, headed by the 
Chainnan of Escom, which oversaw Eskom from 1923 to 1985, and consisted of five people 
appointed by the state. This structure was replaced by a two-tier structure from 1985 to 2001: a 
Management Board dealt with the day-to-day running of the organisation, and an Electricity 
Council, the composition of which was specified by the Electricity Amendment Act (50/1985), 
which included a range of key government officials and stakeholder representatives representing 
key consumer groups. The Eskom Conversion Act (2001) abolished the two-tier structure and 
replaced it with an ordinary corporate governance structure. 
The second was its nominal oversight by a government department: first the Department of 
Mines and Industry, until the fonnation of the Department of Commerce and Industry in the 
1930s, the Department of Industry from the late 1960s, until 1980, when it came under the new 
Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs; at the end of the 1980s it was moved to the Office of 
Public Enterprise (OPE), which became a fully-fledged Department under the new government 
in 1994. In reality no departmental oversight was attempted until the late 1980s, when the 
Minister in charge of the OPE approved tariffs and other significant policy matters. From 1994 
to the present, Eskom was accountable to the DMEA for electricity and energy policy matters, 
and to the Department of Public Enterprises as its principle shareholder. For most of this history, 
no capacity existed in these departments to oversee Escom or develop electricity policy, until the 
late 1990s. 
The third sphere was regulation: Eskom's prices were not effectively regulated until the 
fonnation of the post-apartheid National Electricity Regulator in the 1990s; before this, 
regulators had very limited leeway to intervene in price-setting (see below). The fourth, and 
probably most important sphere, was an enduring relationship between Eskom and the political 
elite, both before, during and after apartheid. Since Eskom' s fonnation, its leadership has had 
ready access to the premier, and what might be tenned the 'industrial policy elite'. Key policy 











fonnal policy structures. After a brief period of uncertainty, these relationships have been re-
established with the post-apartheid political elite. 
B) Local Authorities 
There were two key processes which structured the relationship between the electricity system 
and local authorities: the first was the institutional development of the electricity system, which 
defined the limited role of local authorities within the system, and the second was the 
development of spatial apartheid, which determined patterns of electricity distribution 
infrastructure development in racial terms. 
Local authorities developed small electricity systems at the end of the 19th century: Kimberley in 
1890, Johannesburg in 1891, Pretoria in 1892, Cape Town in 1895, Durban in 1897, East 
London in 1899, Bloemfontein in 1900 and Port Elizabeth in 1906 (Board of Trade and 
Industries 1978a:3). Institutional arrangements recognised local authorities' rights of supply 
within their areas of jurisdiction, an enduring right which was entrenched in the post-apartheid 
constitution. An exception, which was entrenched from the founding of the industry, was the 
right of EscomIVFTPC to supply large consumers such as mines within these areas of 
jurisdiction (Mountain 1994:65). Initially, local authorities generated significant quantities of 
their own electricity: in 1940, 47 out of a total of 187 local authorities with electricity 
reticulation systems purchased electricity from Escom, another local authority or a private 
supplier, and the rest owned their own generating plant (South African Yearbook 1940:887-890) 
and generated around 20% of the South African total. At the time, Escom generated around 60%, 
and the remainder was generated by self-producers or private companies (South African 
Yearbooks 1939 and 1940). The percentage generated by local authorities reached a peak of 
around 26% as self-producers switched to public supplies in the 1950s, and municipal capacity 
was expanded, but declined steadily until 2002, when only 7 local authorities had licensed and 
operating generation plant, and only two of these produced significant amounts of electricity: 
local authorities only produced 0.7% of electricity in 2002 (National Electricity Regulator 2002). 
This trend was reinforced by two developments: the completion of the national grid, and a 
sequence of policy developments which discouraged local authorities from expanding their 
generation capacity and eventually (through the 1987 Electricity Act) granted Eskom a veto2 on 
the construction of new generation plant by local authorities. The impact of these developments 
was the centralisation of planning processes in Escom and the relegation of local authorities to a 
2 Previously, local authorities were required to apply to Provincial Administrators for pennission to expand their generation 
capacity, who in tum were obliged to consult Eskom, which gave Eskom an informal veto (which depended on the co-operation 
of the Provincial Administrator). The new legislation gave Eskom a direct, formal veto on any applications for new generation 











niche role in electricity policy processes, which was mainly aimed at protecting their ability to 
raise revenue through electricity sales. 
Racial zoning policies affected the electricity distribution industry in two ways. From 1913 
onwards, rural areas were segregated into white farming zones and black 'homelands', which 
were granted various levels of 'independence' under apartheid; three of the 'independent states', 
Transkei, Venda and Bophutatswana ('independence' in 1976, 1979 and 1977 respectively) set 
up independent utilities, whereas Ciskei ('independent' in 1981) and the other 'self-governing 
territories' (Gazankulu, KaNgwane, Lebowa, Kwazulu) established government departments to 
distribute electricity bought from Eskom. Financially most of the utilities were unviable, having 
an almost non-existent industrial and commercial base, and a potential consumer base mostly 
comprising the very poor, and in most cases subsidising prices. Revenue collection was also at 
very low levels; both these factors served further to undermine investment (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000:265, Davis 1997:125), which remained at very low levels until the end of 
apartheid. 
Urban areas developed the same disparities; 'black' South Africans were removed to their 
specific 'group areas' under the Group Areas Act of 1950. 'White' areas included the majority of 
developed urban space, as well as the CBDs and industrial areas of almost every urban area, 
which meant that the rates base for 'white' areas was very significant. By contrast, 'black' areas, 
populated by and large only by the poor, who worked in 'white' areas, had a minimal rates base. 
These areas were administered indirectly through 'Black Advisory Boards' by white local 
authorities, which were replaced in 1961 by 'Urban Bantu Councils' (Christopher 1994:53). 
Administration of 'black' areas was removed entirely from 'white' local government in 1971 and 
vested in 'Bantu Affairs Administration Boards', controlled directly by central government 
through the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, who also took over the 
'Urban Black Councils'. After 1976, the state sought to establish 'Community Councils' 
(Christopher 1994:55); in 1982 the government abolished these structures and replaced them 
with 'Black Local Authorities' (Horwitz 1994:33), both of which were 'representative' in some 
form. None of these structures attained any political legitimacy, and especially in the 1980s, 
political resistance, corruption, lack of capacity and lack of revenue rendered them ineffectual. In 
addition, during the period from the 1960s to the 1990s, urbanisation proceeded at a dramatic 
pace. In terms of apartheid legislation the conditions under which black South Africans could 
legally live in urban areas were tightly prescribed, so many new settlements were illegal, housing 
rudimentary and temporary, and infrastructure non-existent. A combination of neglect by white 
authorities, dysfunctional apartheid local government structures and lack of resources meant that 











electrified, whereas electrification rates in black urban areas were extremely low, and electricity 
infrastructure was correspondingly undeveloped. In addition, in most cases apartheid legislation 
required the separate development of infrastructure, which meant that distribution networks 
developed idiosyncratically in accordance with racial zoning in urban areas, with few 
interconnections (Horwitz 1994:7): 
" .. sometimes a new non-white supply authority was created simply by separating the 
electricity network of the new authority from that of the mother municipality of which it had 
been an integral part" (Horwitz 1994:33). 
Thus the development of both the urban and rural electricity distribution industries was 
profoundly influenced by apartheid, and led to massive disparities in infrastructure development 
and access to electricity. This affected not only households3, but also other social infrastructure 
such as schools and clinics, as well as the development of entrepreneurial activity in these areas. 
In the aftermath of apartheid, local and regional authorities were restructured. So-called 
'homelands' were reincorporated into a new regional structure of provinces, and the 
corresponding electricity distribution authorities were taken over by Eskom and merged into 
their own distribution system. Local authorities were merged into 'Transitional Councils', for 
which elections were held in 1995 and 1996. Final boundaries for post-apartheid local authorities 
were drawn in the late 1990s, and elections 'held for these new authorities in 2000. A 
simultaneous process of rationalising and licensing new local authority distribution areas and 
tariff structures was undertaken by the National Electricity Regulator. Because of the nature of 
the restructuring process, distribution areas do not coincide with local authority boundaries, and 
most local authority distributors only distribute electricity in parts of their areas of jurisdiction. 
During the early 1990s, Eskom took over the distribution of electricity in all 'homeland' areas 
and in many formerly 'black' local authorities. 
C) Regulatory Agencies, Government Departments and other State Agencies 
From the 1920s, there have been three regulatory regimes overseeing the electricity system. The 
first was established in terms of the 1922 Electricity Act, and took over the licensing system (and 
the licenses which had been issued) from the Transvaal Power Act. The 1922 Act established the 
Electricity Control Board (ECB), the regulatory powers of which extended to holders of licenses, 
which excluded local authorities, government departments, the railways or self-producers not 
selling electricity, but included Escom (which for the purposes of regulation and statistics was 
classified as a 'private' producer) (Electricity Act 4211922 Clause 19). Since in addition Escom 
had a legislative bar to setting an average price which made either a profit or a loss, and Escom' s 
3 Impacts of non-electrica1 fonns of energy (other than LPG) include health, safety. and security, as well as using up more 











spending was not under the control of the ECB, the ECB' s task, aside from approving tariff 
increases for the VFTPC (the only significant other licensed electricity undertaking) was limited 
to approving changes in Escom's tariff structure. In reality, the Board had almost no capacity 
(having 3 to 5 board members and one staff member) to undertake sophisticated economic 
regulation, and although no records of the activity of the Board could be found before 1978\ it 
seems that the Board's time was taken up playing a mediating and facilitative role in resolving 
disputes concerning rights to supply, holding hearings on land expropriation for electricity 
infrastructure, and addressing consumer grievances. 
The Board of Trade and Industries (BTl) report into electricity tariffs in 1977-8 resulted in an 
extension of the ECB's role, based on the BTl's conclusion that both Escom and local authorities 
were under-regulated, and that the ECB lacked sufficient capacity. The Electricity Amendment 
Act (11711979) enlarged the ECB from 5 to 7 persons, and its budget was increased. In addition, 
in line with BTl recommendations, it began a process of reviewing local authority tariff increases 
informally, which involved visiting major municipalities once a year and attempting to assess the 
levels of profit included in their electricity tariffs with the aim of limiting these to 10% 
(Interview with I Lambrechts); since the ECB could not direct local authorities to change their 
tariffs, 'excessive' tariff levels were noted and reported to the relevant Provincial Administrator, 
who could pressurise them to do so. Aside from the Board, the ECB had a staff of 1 Y25, which 
made economic regulation difficult, if not impossible. The ECB was not successful in exerting 
any further influence over Escom. 
The second regulatory regime was instituted in the wake of the De Villiers Commission, which 
reported in 1984. The Commission's briefhad been to investigate, amongst other things, the role 
of the ECB, but in fact the Commission concentrated solely on Eskom, did not consider local 
authorities, and advocated a new governance structure which sidelined the ECB. In place of a 
licensing system, Escom (senior staff of which assisted in drafting the new legislation) was given 
an automatic right of supply to the whole country (thus removing it from the regulatory process); 
the Commission commented further that the diminished functions of the ECB could probably be 
performed by the DMEA. The abandonment of the 'neither at a profit nor a loss' formula meant 
that previous criteria applied to price increases were no longer valid. The new Eskom 
governance structure stipulated an Electricity Council consisting of major consumer groups and 
senior government officials, which partly performed the function of a regulator in that it liaised 
with government and had a veto on price increases. Such increases in practice involved the 
approval of the relevant Minister, which only applied until 1991, when Eskom won agreement 
4 In 1978, the ECB was enlarged and given more support, but anecdotal accounts indicate that the scope of pre-1978 activities 
was similar. 











from the Cabinet for a 'price Compact' specifying fixed average increases for 5 years6• Thus the 
regulatory regime during this period involved a complex institutio~ network involving the 
Electricity Council, the ECB (which continued its informal regulation of local authorities), and 
the relevant Minister. 
The last (and current) regime began with the establishment of a National Electricity Regulator 
(NER) in 1995, a powerful independent regulator overseen by a Board, and financed through a 
levy on electricity. Unlike its predecessor, the ECB, it had a staff complement of around 100, 
which comprises the most significant body of expertise on the South African electricity system 
outside of Eskom. The regulator was established as part of a transitional negotiating process in 
the National Electrification Forum (1993-1995), and its function was seen as part economic 
regulation and part facilitation of a process of post-apartheid transformation within the industry. 
Through amendments to the Electricity Act (46/1994,60/1995), the ECB was renamed the NER, 
a levy was introduced to fund it, and licensing for all distribution, transmission and generation 
operations was made compulsory, which required the licensing of all existing distributors, as 
well as Eskom's operations. Initially, the regulator was staffed byex-Eskom employees, and 
headed by newly-retired Eskom CEO Ian McRae. The NER played a key role in both 
rationalising distribution tariffs (an ongoing process, which will probably culminate with the 
establishment of the REDs), and proposing and introducing a Wholesale Electricity Tariff 
pricing system, as well as a facilitation and monitoIing role in the electrification programme. The 
NER is in the process of being converted into a National Energy Regulator, which will regulate 
electricity, gas and petroleum pipeline tariffs, and ultimately liquid fuels prices. 
The Board of Trade and Industries' inquiry into the electricity industry in the 1970s made the 
salient point that there was no significant electricity policy-making capacity in the line 
department to which Escom reported (Board of Trade and Industries 1978a: 158); up to this point, 
government departments (primarily the Department of Industries or its predecessors) had not had 
any significant involvement in electricity issues. However, from the 1970s onwards, attempts 
were made to incorporate electricity issues into an energy policy framework (with limited 
success), notably in the DMEA and the NEC. A policy capacity was finally created (following 
from electrification) in the DMEA in the late 1990s. 
However, although electricity policy activity "was largely centred in Escom, there was 
considerable interaction with other policy domains, including Provincial Administrators (before 
and during apartheid), the nuclear establishment, and a constellation of elite networks and 
committees around the premier, including the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, various 
cabinet subcommittees connected with economic or industrial policy, and various 











interdepartmental committees dealing with economic and industrial strategy issues. Proto-
industrial strategy developed before the second world war under the auspices of van der Bijl, 
who also founded the state iron and steel enterprise Iscor, as well as the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC). The latter organisation, established in 1940 to finance industrialisation and 
headed for three decades by van der Bijl's protege Herman Van Eck, promoted a resource-
intensive programme of industrialisation in which electricity played a key role. Apart from gold-
mining, most other energy intensive projects during this period were associated with the IDC or 
VanEck himself, including Sasol 1, 2 and 3, the Namibian utility SWA WEK, the funding of 
Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, hydro projects within South Africa, as well as key energy-
intensive projects such as Alusaf and other energy-intensive smelting and minerals-processing 
projects. The extent to which Escom was integrated into these industrial policy neworks varied, 
and reached a crisis point in the late 1970s, which led ultimately to the De Villiers Commission. 
2) Consumers 
There are several identifiable groups of electricity consumers in South Africa, including 1) 
energy-intensive industries (including mining), 2) the railways, 3) local authorities, 4) white 
farmers/agricultural interests, 5) poor black households, and 6) local authority clients (including 
middle-class domestic users and commercial users). In terms of the criteria outlined in Chapter 1 
for assessing the boundaries of policy communities, only groups 1 and 3 have had a persistent 
relationship with Escom and other key actors: the railways' significance declined before 1950, 
groups 4,5 and 6 have exerted sporadic pressure (mainly through political parties), but the direct 
influence of small consumers has been insignificant (with the qualified exception of the 
electrification programme, which will be further discussed below). While local authorities have 
had a long co-operative relationship with Escom, their key focus has been the protection of their 
autonomy (which rests on the ability to tax local electricity sales), and forms a sub-domain of 
electricity policy. 
By contrast, Escom's relationship with energy-intensive industries is historically one of the main 
cores ofits raison d'etre. Direct electricity provision for mining and other industry dominated its 
history; sales to all other consumer types (including bulk sales to local authorities) comprised 
only around 25% in 1950, and only around 38% in 2000. In terms of the electricity system as a 
whole, the percentage of total sales to non-mining and non-industry consumers remained 
constant at around only 25% for the period 1950 to 2000. During this period, the electricity 
system, originally focused on providing bulk electricity for gold mining, formed the basis for the 
development of a cheap electricity-based industrial complex, at the heart of which were a small 











" .. customers for whom electricity is 'fundamental to both international competitiveness and 
survival'", and for whom " .. electricity represents a significant proportion of their input costs, 
often far in excess of 10% .. " (Duperrut 1998:1), 
were usually in industries involving mining, m!nerals processing or some form of mineral 
beneficiation. These were not only very price-sensitive because of the electricity-intensive nature 
of their industries, but also because of historically low South African electricity prices, have in 
many instances deployed more energy-intensive technologies than their competitors elsewhere 
(Duperrut 1998:8). The relationships between these and Escom have a number of relevant 
characteristics. First, because of the economic conditions under which these industries were 
developed (cheap electricity), there is a high degree of price sensitivity. Second, the close and 
continuous working relationship between Escom and these consumers was an important 
component of Escom's ability to manage the electricity system, as well as imparting a specific 
organisational culture to the utility. Ian McRae, head of generation in Escom in the 1970s and 
CEO in the 1980s and 1990s comments that: 
"If I go back right to my early days, the mining indusUy had a major impact .... they put a lot 
of pressure on Escom in ensuring good reliable supplies, the importance of this to the 
[mining] industry, both from an economic point of view, but also from a safety point of 
view, and there were liaison committees, and this all kept us up to scratch. I put a lot of 
emphasis, and gold stars if you like, in helping Escom to move into the kind of utility that it 
did. Then, behind that came the question of the other large industries, ferrochromes, 
chemical industries, a lot of the other big boys, and they too continued to put pressure on, 
also on tariffs; I think the mining industry and other industries did a lot through their 
pressure to ensure that we performed; but also helped us; I talked about this co-operation 
with load-shedding in that difficult period - it was wonderful" (Interview with I McRae). 
Steyn indicates the profou d impact on the organisational culture· of Escom that engineers who 
entered the organisation in the 1950s, during a supply crisis linked to the rapid expansion of gold 
mining, brought to the leadership of the organisation in the 1970s, prioritising reliability, high 
reserve margins and relentlessly optimistic expansion programmes (Steyn 2001:72-3). As 
intimated by McRae, this influence was on-going, and the constant addition of energy-intensive 
projects to the economy during the 1970s and 1980s maintained and enhanced this outlook, 
which was shared by the industrial policy elite in government. 
0) Research Centres 
Although energy policy-focused research centres in South Africa had close ties with Eskom 
(especially the Energy Research Institute at the University of Cape Town, whose founding 
director had previously founded Escom's research section), the only one which significantly 
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10 relatively few large en.:rgy-imcllsi\e indUSlriL""S'. Figuro.:s 4.5 wId 4.6 abow indicate tile 
~lructUIC ofth..: national d..:ctri city market in 19'18. 
Figure 4.5 portrays the percentage of electricity which is d istribUl~-d by Eskom and local 
authorities n:sll<:ctivciy to various dass<:$ of consumer. Since Eskom's domestic COnsUrnlT"> 
consist of primarily poor households. alld a large proportion are lOCale<! in rural an:as. the 
majority of electricity is distribll1ed to househulds by local authorities. Figure 4.61 portmys the 
average si7£ of Eskom and local authority's custom t."fs in different demand sectors; lhe average 
consumption of Eskom's domestic OOl15wncrs is small by comparison to those of local 
aUlhorities. Average consumption of agricultural consonll.T"> is al most the same fur bulh 
suppliers. although Es kom supplies a significantly high'-"1" proportion. Mining consumt:fS arc ~till 
(as they ha\'e been since the (9005) the domain of E.~kom. The supply of manufacturing 
ind ustries is splil more e\enly. bUI Ihe average size of these customers is an order of magnitude 
larger ill the case of £Skorn; commercial CUSIOmt.T:>' mainly si tua1ed in large local authorities. are 
supplied largely by local authorities. Thus. di ff~""Tenl conswner elasses have relationships wilh 
dincrent suppliers. whieh has il signitieanl impael on their involvement in electricity polic)' 
acti vity. which will be further dlscussed below. 
p"", 
The average COSI of electricily production in SOllth Africa. rcp~l1k-d rn.TC by Escom's n:1I1 
a\erage electricity price. is portrayed by Figure 4.7 below. There aTe three notable periods in this 
graph. During the first period. from 1950 10 [972. a major kochnical trunsfunnatiun OCClllTOO 
",; tb the completion of the transmission grid. which led to tv.'() linked de\'e!opmen!s: all new 
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plants were huilt ilL the pit head", thus elimin31ing cool railage, and plwns increased significantly 
in size. a process which continued until the 19805. Railage comprised a significullt addiliooal 
OOSI: in [930. 6Wo ofEscOlTl's cQIlI COSI was for tailage: in 1960 J5%. in 197020%, and in 1980 
only 6%. sirlCe by the end of the 1970s, the o\·t·rw~lming majority of I:scom power .... 'as 
gener.tk .... by pi ttlead power stations. W~as the real price of coal was relatively oon5lall1 
during this period (sec ChapleT 3), Escom's coal cost declined from around 1960. which 
combined with other lcclmical advooces and economies of scale 10 bring about II decline in costs. 
The second period, from 1973101986. sawn signiticant ,nereM<: in prices. due primarily 10 un 
merease in coal costs (brought ahoUI by II change in coal polk)'), and lhe capital requirements of 
II massive capital investment programme, \\hich .... as partly financed b) electrid ty consumers. 
Although Escom bought most of ils coal in terms of long-tc"" contrllClS. these wen: tied to 
~-ptC ilic power plants; since betwe.:n 1970 and 1982, Escom-s installed ~apacity had tripled 
(Escom Annual Reports 1970 and 1982). and new C(Hllmcts were concluded during this period 
for t .... o-thirds of Eseom's coal rcquircmcm. using tke higher rcgulated price as a reference: price. 
Until 1985. Escom .... as obliged !O a!1ocat.: coSlS so as to make: neither a profit nor a loss. and 
therefore the averoge ek't:tricity price closely resembled IICcumulated production coslS. 
Figure 4.8 below ponmys 11 brC3kdown of E.'lCom·s production cosls during this period; the 
intcroclion of 3 number of factors contributed to a Slcep rise in the real cJectricity price: from 
1975 to 1978. a consistently higher price from tllen until 1988.300 a steady decline from then 
unti l tbe prtSClll. There were a number of fa.;:tors which contributed 10 this pattern. The key 
factor was the huge expansion programme launched by Eseom in the early 19705. in the: 
<'x~tation of high growth rutes in electricity demand until the end of tbe c<'nlury. which 
requirro massive financial resources. As foreign lin:mcing ~ame more dillicuh to obtain. 
Escom utilised ils Capital Development Fund. a focility for financing expansion from current 
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salcs,n. rhe Fund \\'as f:xtensh'c) ' utilised from 1976 onwards, when the Svwcto Upnsing mude 
TlIi ~ing loons IIbroad much more dinicull. 
'!bere WIlli II sensc of utl;enc)' during the 1970s WId .. arl) 19SOS about expanding genenllion 
cllpocity fuelled by II number of mller foctal'S: Es..:om had become dcpcndem on Callom BaSSll II , 
\\hich WD.'I commlssioll<.--d late. pro, cd unrdiahle and was los! from lhe system in the ear» ) 980s 
due to sabolage, "hich deslabilis...-d the I: scom ~upply system. This was made worse by tec1hing 
problems in the new large coal planls built in Ihe 1970s. as well as an increase in lhe unit sb'£ of 
new p1U1ll. coupll-d "ith rupid industrial and mining d ... mand gro",h. rJl<..'S<' pressures fuelled 
Escom's cxponsion drive in clle 1970s and 19SOS. but by 1983 gro,,\h in demand had begun to 
s lo\\ signifiClllHly. and r..so::om ended up with H''I)' signitkanl u'er-capacit)', laq;el) paid fot by 
consumers in the 19705 and 19S0s. The real cost of coaJ surged during the same period. before 
d!:Clining in the IDle 1980s. Whi lc Escom's rcul coal COSIS ( which were ge"..raI1y s ignifiel1lltly 
below the regulated pithead price) da:lined sleadil ) from 1955 to 1970, mainly OIlBCCOUIlI of the 
shin 10 pithcad power plants whic h ehminaled the need for railage. the hike in coal prices and 
change in coal policy "hich followtd lhe Petrie!. Commission had a significant effcct on Escorn 
coal prices. Although r:.sl:OIIl prices wcrt' SCI b) Iong-tcnn COntrucl$. the regulated price was used 
as a reference priee. nnd the' II<.'W power 5tutiom ~uired the negotiation of ne" ~'(}ntracts 
(gencralJ) on a 'cost-plus' basis) \\hich contracled for coal produced using more capital-
,mensi'e mining I«hniqucs.. such as opcn-cast mining, In many instance$. Escom PfO"idcd pa" 
or all of the capital for these 00\\ mines, \\hich adlkd to the utility-s capital bunten. Another 
foctor behind the increase "'lIS an increase in Wll\:cs, paJ! icularly for blac~ workers. who had 
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begun to unionise again in th~ early 1970s and had successfully ..... on wage increases across a 
range ofindustrie:s; this trend continued into the I 99Os. 
The resuh of this overexpansion "'"dS a long period of relatively low capi!.ll eXlX'ndiwre, which 
led to a prolonged decl ine in elel;tril;ity prices in the third period, from the late 1980s to the 
present, aided by thc managerial reorganisation of £skom in the wake of the De Villiers 
Commission which significantly improved the financial perfonnance of tile utility_From a policy 
point or view. the second period is the most significant: dramatic price rises in the late 19705 and 
the early I 980s led to a series of policy crises. 
Until 1985 (under the 1922 and 1958 Eleclricity Acts). "::SCOrn's UIri ff slructure was restricted by 
the principk Ihaltariffs sllould be set so Ihm a) Esoom made neither a profit nor a loss, Hnd h) 
eross-subsidisation bel",.:.:n consumer classes was prohibited; tariffs were differentiated into 
only three classes (large, medium and small users) (Moumain 1994:76). From 1986, lhis 
relativcly simple system was replaced in the WlIke of the Dc Villicrs Commission with a pricing 
system which did away with Ihe 'ncilhcr at 3 profil or a loss' stipulation, and a range of 
innovmivc tarilTs wcre inuoduccd. including time-of-use tariffi; and cuslOmised tariffs for large 
users, which link pricing to commodily prices and oth('T ind icators, and often include 
arrdngements for load-shifting (Mountain 1994:115), Tht 1998 White raper on Energy 
estab1ish~d a policy goa] of cost-refl(.>(:tive energy pricing. and the NER is cumnlly inlroducing 
such a syslcm 10 promote transparency in elcctricity pricing. 
Electricity pricing by db1ributors has been much more complex and opaque, Before the 19905, 
the tariff stM.lclUre of Escom' s distribution bWliness W"dS regula(ed, but not the price itself. Local 
aUlhoritics w~re not regulated at all. although the EeD did evolve informal mt>(:hanisms for 
monitoring prices. The resuh was Ihm local aUlllorilies fealUred 
~ .. a mulliplicily of different lariffs wilh "S~ntially no justili.ble economic n:ason for the 
di fference ;n most of (iIe tariffs offered by the different distributo!"$., I"'hielll has led to l~ 
absurd 5illllliion where in ~me cases two adjacent cuSlOmers supplied by different 
distributor!; are forced 10 pay t<lmplclely different prices~ (M<lunta;n 1994: I sa). 
This situation ..... as also exacerbated b)' the significant varialion., in size. between local authorities ' 
supply ~reas, as well as the variation in the composi tion of their consumer basc.~. Two Oilier 
predominant features of local authorities' pricing strategies wen: the significant cross-subsidies 
which flowed from other consumers to domestic consumers. and lhe addition of a surplus to the 
electricity price, ..... hich was used 10 subsidise other municipal services, effectively subsidising 
local la.~es. which comprised a further trJnsfer from other consumers to (usu~lIy ..... hile) ll'SidelllS 
(Mountain 1994:118). Mountain quotes a ligure of Rl.27 billion for this surplus for 1992 











quott: a figure for 1997 of R2 billion (Barbenon &. Kcswcll 19911:42). which represented 4.6% of 
t01al revt:nue raised by local autooritic:s in that year ll. Although a majority of local alllhorities do 
cam significant revenue through elC(;tricity soles. a minority DctWllly make a significant loss on 
deetl';"it)' distribution. through inefficiencyand/or B lack or economy or scate or all 
unf"vO\.lruble local fuctor or demand profile. In addition. bcCllllse the distribution C05ts of local 
aUlllorities 3re somewhat opuquc. it is ollen dinieult for regulators (or anyone else) to make 
judgements concerning the actual level of the surplus (Interview with I Lambn:chts. board 
member of ECB and NF.R). siJtCe ItOn...,lectricity assets were onen illCl ud~'($ in the rate base. 
Since 1995, tnc NER h.1S regulated local authority prices and has had as one of its l'elltnd aims 
lhe rul ionol;3<1lion of the,,, tan ITs, .. taak which I""l been ~Iowe<l by the sig l'l; ficunl I'CQI-guni""liul'l 
of local authoritic.o; which took place in the lale 19')Os, and the ongoing reStructuring process in 
the distribution industry. 
The Development of Electricity Policy 
Electricity policy developed in South Africa in several distinct phases. In the first phase, from 
the carll' 1900s to the 19705. institutional arrangements were ~'St3blished aoo consolidated, from 
the implementation of basic regulatory structures in the separate provillCes !O the 1922 Electricity 
Act. which founded Esco rn . By lhe late 19405. wilh the expropriation of the only significant 
private produccr, the VFTPC. &com's po5iti()n at the core of the electricity system \\"35 
established: lhe completion of the nalional grid i~ the early 1970s consolidoted this position. and 
also placed Eseom al Ihe hean of decision-making p["(x:csscs within the electricity system as a 
whole. While tl\c aims of electricity policy (simple expansion of capacity to keep pace with 
denHtnd) were ill harmony wilh a broadr;,r policy contexl (industrial and economic policy). il was 
not contested in any sig ifkalll way pUlitically. l1owever. from the m;d-1970s. Eseom's 
exp;Ulsion pl'ogramme began to have significant impacts on the electricity price. on local capital 
and on South Africa's foreign borrowing Tt:quiremenls. 
This kd to 1\ series uf policy crises. which comprised the second phase of policy development. 
beginning witll a Board of Trade ami Industries (BTl) inquiry inlQ electri city tariffs, ami 
culminating wilh the De Villiers Cummission. Whereas the BTl inquiry had been framed in 
terms or tmditional electricity policy. Ihe Dc Villiers report phlCl-d electricity policy within u 
bro.1der energy policy COlllexl, and advocated an institutional structure aimed al intcgrating 
electricity policy-rolll1cd dt:dsion-rnaking processes il'110 a broader set of cnergy policy 
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institutions, The outcome, howe\"~'f, did nol lead \0 rurther integralion. but instead intcgrall'll 
Eskorn inlO a differenl policy domain. aimed al rerorming and privatiSing state i'ntCrpriSCS. 
In the Ihird phase. from lhe late 19805 to the laIC 1990:;, " transitional phase establishcd a 
super!;eial consensus on post.ap;lfIheid electricity policy, based 1m the cle<:lri/icalion 
programme. fi nalised jointly by Eskom and the ANC as pan of thc transitional negotiation 
process. and a progmmrnc of industry restructuring, linked concepulIIlly 10 the c!ccirifielliion 
programme_ The latc-1990s Energy Policy Whilc Paper espoused 0 policy conscnsus based on 
restructuring Eskom and the distribution industry. and introducing a competitive ckclricily 
markct. Ilowevcr. in the (shon) final founh phasc. this consensus collapSl.'Il. and guvemment 
announced thaI the restructuring process for gen~'Talion would he suspended indefinitely, and 
plans for dislribution restruClunng stalled. These phases. and their key corresponding c\"enls. arc 
ponraycd in Figure 4.9 below. 
1) 18805 to 19405 
The period before the Act of Union in 1910 saw the emergence of IWO key regulatory 
instruments. The firS! .... '115 a response to the establishment of ekctricity undcnnkings by local 
authorities in the l890s.;md took the form orJegisllllion based un Ihe Board ofTrode regUlations 
regulating municipal electricity supply in the United Kingdom, passed separalely in each 
province (thell separate British colonies) (MoWltain 1994:(2). wh iCh subjl'Ctcd tariff levels to 
colonial AdminiSlmtors' approval and recognised certain rights of supply within thcir areas of 
jurisdiction. The establishment oflhl' VFJ'PC, primarily 10 provide power to the mines on Ihe 
Witwatersrand, in the 1900s. led tu the first active state eoncem with electricity supply. and 
resulted in Ihe appointmt111 of a Power Companies Commission in the Transvaal in 1909, headed 
by Sir Thomas Price. General M~nager of thc railways in lhe Transvaal (Christie 19114:40-41). 
One of the commissiOners was the Go\'cmmem Mining EngiJK.'Cr in the Tr,lIIs\'1Ja1. Roben KOIzc. 
",111.1 would he inslrumental II dccadl.' I~tcr in thl.' cstublishment of l;.scom. The Commission's 
condusion ""as that a) there were signifiC3l11 advantagcs in large-scale production o f eleclricity. 
h) this could be facilil.ated by private in\"l:Stm~'ll. lind c) tha! 
~ .. sirn:c lloe supply or dectric power leads to the l"Slablisluncm of a "inual monopoly in a 
oornmooJity which has become praclically 8 necessily ofmodtn, civilisalion. it should, ... hile 
being left as far 3 ' possibk to private enterprise, at the sallie time be placed und.:r 
gO"cmment comro\ and subj~lcd to regulations which shall SC<:urc tile equil3ble supply of 
po .... er, lhe public safelY. and public inlerests genctally~ (fran Report (Jf Ihe Pov'cr 
Companies Commissioo, lIuacd in Christie 1984:42). 
The way in which this laSI SCI of dilemmas was worked OUI was Ihmugh the provisions of the 











Figure 4.9: Key Policy-related Developments in the Electricity Sector 
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amalgamated into the Unioo ofSuuth Africa; the Ael was R."Sponsible fur elL-clrieity regulation 
until 1922. and licenses and auached conditions gr.uttoo io temlS of il were effectively preserved 
Wlti l 199513. The Act provided for the establishment of the Power Undcrtaking Iloard. which 
wuuld licence and estoblish the boundaries ofclcctricity undcrtakinl:s; one of the conditions of 
liccosinll was thut unifonn r.lIes had to be charged to all customers. und undertakinlJS could be 
expropriated after 37 ycars (Conradic & Messerschmidt 2000:45). Loeal authorities would not 
have 10 apply for a license in their areas of jurisdiction; however, oIru:r partics (in the immediOie 
case, Ihe V~TrC) cuuld apply for /I license to est'lblish /I sepamte undertaking within a local 
Huthority's area of jurisdiction. suhjeet 10 the veto of that authority in question. In addition , 
Sect;OI1 5 of the Power Act csUlblished lhat eertain types of consumer were excluded from Ihe 
local authority' s jurisdictiOll, indodinl: minioll operntiOllS. railways :lI1d government 
departmenlS: thus applications for licenses to supply these conswners were not subject to local 
authority veto (1963 Local Golltlmrnent Committee:2). This provision gave the VFTI'C. and 
luter Eseom. aecess 10 its primary consumer base and established the basic institutioMI conlOurs 
of the South African electricity system. The principle of expropriation after a few decades was 
included, against vehement opposition from the electricity WId mininll compa!1ics (the buer saw 
expropriatioll as 8 disincentive to investtllCnt - Christie 1984:44) to keep the option of further 
state involvement in the industry open, whi!e guarnnwcing n return on investment io Ihe short 
term necessary 10 crlcourage inveslment on the seale required for the continuing "Iectrification of 
the mincs_ The VFTPC was granted licenses for a large arca of the Witwatersrand.. in which a 
significant c!cclTic;ty infmslructure, mainly for supply to mines.. was con~tructed in the following 
four decades. 
Following Union io 1910. there was !I series of key inquirie5lclding up to the next milestone in 
electrici ty legislation, the 1922 Electricity Act. which demon~trnted a series ufbroadcr concerns. 
The firsl of these 1'o'll5 concerned with the potCTItial for raiiway ekctrification. which was 
considered by the Railways Uoard for the first time in 1913. The chief context for this intere$! 
was in the connection betwCeIl the Natal coalfields and their two chief markets, the go!d-
producing aIL'll of the Transvaal , and Duman lInd the Natal cuast; however Ihe steep gmdicnt 
posed challenges for the Sleam traction then available (ChriSTie 1984:76). In 1917. William Iloy. 
Ihe General manager ur the SAR&I I, commissioned a report from Merz and McLellan. "clearly 
the most e.,perienc.:d railway electrical engineers in the English-speaking world"' (Christie 
1984: 78) on the possihility uf railway ekx:tri fication io South Africa. The firm completed its very 
posi til'e report io 1919 outlining many ndvll1ll311es includinll higher speeds (more tmins on each 
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route), less wear, less infrastructure, less risk of fire and lower labour requirements. Key routes 
were identified for electrification including suburban lines in Cape Town and the Transvaal, and 
coalfields-connected lines in Natal and the Transvaal. These recommendations in fact formed the 
basis for the non-Witwatersrand spatial expansion of Escom until 1945, and " . .laid the basis on 
which the provincial and national grids were built up" (Christie 1984:81), particularly given the 
sparse nature of South African settlements and urban centres. 
This spatial conception of a proposed electricity infrastructure led to a more general question 
concerning the development of the electricity industry in South Africa; clearly there were 
significant opportunities for broader electrification based on the railway infrastructure, and also 
potential economies of scale to be achieved in supplying both industry and the railways. In 
addition there was another set of beneficial economic relationships between coal, transport and 
electricity: since at the time electricity could only be transmitted economically over relatively 
short distances, a good transport infrastructure from mine to power plant was essential. On the 
same basis, other heavy industries relying on coal and electricity could be established; as van der 
Bijl wrote in 1921: 
" .. the electrification of the Union's railways .... can be made to be one of the most powerful 
factors in stimulating industrial development. ... by bringing together two of the most 
important requirements of most industrial undertakings, namely power and transport 
facilities" (quoted in Christie 1984:77). 
Smuts, the Prime Minister at the time, thus commissioned another report from Merz and 
McLellan on the question of the electricity industry generally, in 1919. 
The report rested on two main points: the first was the importance of electrification as a basis for 
industrialisation (Christie 1984:81), and the second was the necessity of a process of orderly 
development (national technical standards/compatibility) in the electricity industry, which would 
give South Africa a competitive advantage (Steyn 2001 :63). Merz concluded that 
" .. the adoption of a definite policy as regards electricity supply is second only in importance 
to the provision of proper transport facilities" (quoted in Christie 1984:81). 
Merz and McLellan's 1920 report thus proposed the establishment of a national regulatory 
agency to enforce national technical standards, regulate capital expenditure and prices, and direct 
new investment where required (Steyn 2001 :63). Their model for the development of the 
electricity industry was to set up a regulatory commission, and then encourage both public (at the 
time mainly local authorities) and private investment in new capacity, subject to national 











In response the government appointed a committee chaired by Robert Kotze, the Government 
Mining Engineer 14, to investigate what action should be taken. Also on this committee was 
Hendrik van der Bijl, appointed in 1920 as the Prime Minister's Scientific and Technical 
Advisor, later the first Chairman of the state utility, who had a strong vision of state-driven 
industrial development, in which cheap electricity would playa significant part. Van der Bijl was 
also instrumental in establishing the state iron and steel manufacturer Iscor. The committee 
recommended a more ambitious programme than the Merz report, the key feature of which was 
the establishment of a national electricity utility, with a separate regulatory board. This utility 
would promote national electrification, both through being a supplier itself and playing a 
facilitative role in the establishment of other electricity projects. 
The Electricity Act, which established both the regulatory authority, the Electricity Control 
Board (ECB), and the state electricity utility, the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom), was 
passed in 1922, and established the institutional framework for the electricity system for the next 
six decades. The ECB was tasked with licensing electricity undertakings; anyone supplying 
electricity except local authoritiesl5, the South African Railways and Harbours, a government 
department, or anyone generating electricity for their exclusive use would require a licence. As 
part of the licensing conditions, Clause 25(1) stated that 
"a licence shall contain a schedule of standard prices chargeable by the Iicencee for the 
supply of electricity to the various classes of consumers, and the board may provide for a 
periodic revision of such schedule" (Electricity Act 4211922). 
'Surplus profits' (defined in the Act) oflicencees other than the Commission should be returned 
to consumers, and licencees had an obligation to supply in their licensed areas. Thirty eight years 
after a licence was issued, the Governor General had the power, "after obtaining reports from the 
Commission and the Board", to 
" .. give to the licensee not less than two years' notice of his intention to expropriate the 
undertaking and, upon the expiry of that notice, shall authorise the commission to 
expropriate the undertaking" (Clauses 19-31, Electricity Act 4211922). 
The Act set out Escom's responsibilities, which were to promote the establishment of a cheap 
national supply of electricity by investigating the establishment of new or additional electricity 
supply in any area, "establishing and maintaining new supply undertakings with the purpose of 
ensuring a sufficient supply of electricity", "co-ordination and co-operation with existing 
undertakings to ensure cheap and sufficient supply of electricity" and advising Provincial 
Administrators on proposals from local authorities for new or expanded electricity supply, and 
14 The mining-related bureaucracy in the Union was adopted wholesale from that developed in the Transvaal up to 1910, which 
included the Government Mining Engineer. ' 











whether Escom would be better placed to provide electricity. Although local authorities were 
exempt from licensing, they had to apply to the Provincial Administrator for permission to 
establish or expand undertakings (Steyn 2001 :64-65), who then had to consult Escom 16. 
The basic pricing principle of the Commission was contained in Clause 10 (4): 
"It shall be a general principle of the commission that its undertakings shall, as far as 
practicable, be carried out neither at a profit or a loss, and that its charges shall be adjusted 
accordingly from time to time" (Electricity Act 42/1922). 
These prices should cover 
"(a) the cost of production, including distribution, maintenance and administration; (b) the 
amounts required for interest on money raised by way of loan .... (c) the amounts to be set 
aside under Section 917" (Clause 10(1), Electricity Act 42/1922». 
Thus, expansion would be financed only through loans. For the first seven years, Escom was 
allowed to borrow from the Treasury, but after that it had to raise its own loans (Davis 
1997:125). Undertakings were ring-fenced in terms of the 'neither profit nor loss' formula; 
cross-subsidies between undertakings was prohibited. 
The rationale behind these institutional arrangements, and Escom's role, was elaborated later by 
the utility's first chairman, van der Bijl: 
" .. the problem was to provide a cheap and efficient supply in a sparsely populated country, 
with small towns and villages many miles apart. Lack of capital was the biggest difficulty of 
all. No private company would supply electricity to all these isolated places without 
expecting a large profit, but if profits were to be allowed for, the price of electricity would be 
prohibitive either for domestic or industrial purposes. On the other hand, if government 
undertook the supply it would mean a monopoly and consequent loss of efficiency, and this 
would prevent municipal schemes from going ahead on their own" (quoted in Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000:71). 
Thus, Escom was to be a 'supplier of last resort', in any circumstance in which an undertaking 
would not run at a loss. From its outset, Escom was not regarded as a 'government' organisation, 
but an 'independent' one, which was forcefully restated by van der Bijl in the 1930s in response 
to queries concerning its autonomy from MPs: 
"Various sources provide a considerable amount of evidence as to the trend of opinion on the 
question of State versus private enterprise. During the past decade, however, a growing 
disposition is manifesting itself to consider the possibilities of combining the advantages of 
both systems while guarding against their respective disabilities, especially in the matter of 
public utilities such as water, electricity, transportation and intelligence communication 
16 In practice, this applied to generation, but not to distribution, since local authorities effectively had a veto on applications for 
distribution rights in their areas of jurisdiction. 











[telecommunications]. The South African Electricity Act is one of the foremost experiments 
having this objective .. " (quoted in Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:91). 
As the 1931 Annual Report stated: 
" .. the Commission operates strictly on business lines, is outside political control and, except 
in the matter of tariffs falling within the jurisdiction of the Electricity Control Board, is 
vested with complete responsibility for the conduct of its own affairs" (Escom Annual 
Report 1931 :8). 
Oversight of the organisation was carried out by a 'Commission' of around five people 
appointed by the Governor-GeneralIS (later the relevant Minister); this process of appointment 
constituted the only direct involvement by the government in Escom until the 1980s. As a result, 
Escom's role was delineated in largely technical terms, which were underpinned by a reverence 
for national economic development, and the vanguard role of electricity in this process. In his 
last report as Chairman, van der Bijl wrote in 1948: 
" .. our inspiration has derived from faith in the future of our country. Still a young and 
vigorous land in a world grown old and perhaps weary, South Africa possesses abundant 
resources which her virile people will not leave undeveloped .. " (Escom Annual Report 
1948:6). 
From the 1920s to the end of the 1940s, Escom negotiated a series of working arrangements with 
local authorities and the VFTPC, which were based on synergies between the requirements of 
local authorities, railway electrification, and mining. In order to prevent further entrenchment of 
the VFTPC in the most significant South African electricity market, Escom negotiated a complex 
arrangement whereby further plants built on the VFTPC's system would be owned by Escom but 
operated by the VFTPC (Christie 1984:87), since Escom itself only began to generate electricity 
in 1926 (Escom Annual Report 1926:1). 
By the end of the 1940s, a significant consensus had emerged in favour of expropriating the 
VFTPC's remaining assets (a minority of power plants, but an extensive distribution network), 
which was backed by three influential groups. The first was Escom itself, which had by then 
achieved a significant presence in the main electricity markets of the country. The second was 
the emerging industrial policy elite within the state, which had, since the early 1940s, begun to 
develop a vision for the country's broader industrialisation, since at the time the economy was 
based almost entirely on mining and agriculture. The industrialisation vision was based on the 
utilisation of natural resources and the development of a number of 'infrastructure industries' 
which would provide cheap industrial inputs to mining and secondary industry. The emerging 
18 Since South Africa was first part of the British Empire, and later the Commonwealth, the Governor-General was the British 
monarch's representative to the South African government, and had similar (if mainly formal) powers as the British monarch had 











focus for this industrialisation strategy was the Industrial Development Corporation, founded in 
1940 and chaired initially by van der Bijl (Christie 1984:123, 142). van der Bijl's protege, 
Herman Van Eck (who began his career at Escom), headed a 1940 Commission of Inquiry into 
'Industrial and Agricultural Requirements, which "established the fundamental industrialisation 
policy of the following decades" (Christie 1984: 123) based on the progressive development of 
primary industries and cheap labour largely driven by the state. The 'infrastructure industries', 
including transport, communications, iron and steel and electricity, would ideally be parastatals, 
which would have three advantages: first, they could operate without the investor-driven 
requirement for a market-related rate of return (essential to provide inputs for the economy at 
cost), second, they would make necessary high-risk, low-return investments, and third, multiple 
dimensions of the state's development policies could be pursued through them. The VFTPC was 
an obstacle to this at the heart of the electricity system (Christie 1984:143), the excess profits of 
which would hamper industrialisation. 
The third significant group was the gold-mining industry, which saw Escom's takeover of the 
VFTPC as immensely beneficial, since it would entail an almost immediate drop in electricity 
prices in an industry which was increasing its energy intensity every year. The expropriation 
negotiations were largely controlled by the 'Gold Producers' Committee' representing the gold 
mines, which although it 
" .. had no locus standi in the matter, insinuated itself completely into the negotiations, even 
to the point of issuing demands and ultimatums, and prescribing matters to the main 
negotiating partners .. " (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000: 101), 
in order to minimise the: price paid by the government for the utility to guarantee low future 
electricity prices (Christie 1984:144-5). The government approved Escom's offer of £14.5 
million, the biggest single transaction up to that time in South Africa. Escom's asset base grew 
from £29 million to £45 million, its staff complement grew from 2692 to 7850, and most 
significantly, it immediately became the dominant electricity producer in the country with a 
virtual monopoly on supply to the railways, the gold mines and other emerging heavy industry 
(Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:105). 
2) 19505 to 19805 
The period from the 1950s to the 1980s began with the expropriation of the VFTPC, which 
confirmed Escom's status as the core of the electricity supply system. Policy changes in the 
1960s enhanced this role by relegating the role of local authority electricity undertakings to 
distribution. This, and a simultaneous technical development, placed the institutional function of 











task during the period was to expand electricity supply as rapidly as possible. A number of 
factors, including declining growth rates in electricity consumption, concomitant recurrent 
recessions, obstacles to foreign borrowing, and an increase in coal costs and a related increase in 
electricity prices, led to a series of policy crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which led in 
turn to a series of significant institutional reforms. 
Escom Moves to Centre Stage 1950-1980 
The theme which dominated the electricity supply industry between 1950 and 1980 was how to 
increase supply fast enough: electricity demand grew at a rate of between 6% and 9% for the 
whole of these three decades. At the same time, growth of Escom's own output was at a much 
higher level, since Escom gradually took over most of the generation of electricity in South 
Africa during this period. In 1950, the percentage of total electricity sent out produced by Escom 
was 69%; by 1984, the same figure was 96% (Escom Annual Reports). This constant level of 
growth in electricity demand, consistently higher than the growth of the economy as a whole, 
and even higher in Escom's case, produced an organisational culture based on continuous 
expansion, which was inaugurated by a series of supply crises in the decade immediately 
following the war, and entrenched by two decades of stable economic growth. 
The decade following the war posed unique problems due to an international lack of capital 
equipment (due to post-war economic recovery), as well as unprecedented capital requirements. 
Escom and the South African government used various kinds of leverage in the early 1950s to 
prioritise equipment shipments, including loan agreements (Escom Annual Report 1950:6) and 
leverage through the Combined Development Agency19 (Escom Annual Report 1951 :6) to 
persuade the UK to prioritise electricity-related capital equipment used in 'uranium production'; 
since uranium was a by-product of gold mining, this applied to most capital equipment imported 
at the time. The late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s saw rapid expansion of gold mining with the 
opening up of new mining areas (the Free State) and new deep-level mines, all requiring 
considerable investment in infrastructure and rapidly-increasing demand. In the early 1950s, 
power shortages necessitated close co-operation with the gold industry (Christie 1984:155) to 
manage the electricity system, and the mining industry, and other energy-intensive industries 
afterwards, became an integral part of both Escom's planning system20 and the management of 
the electricity system, since they had the capacity to predict and if necessary shed load (unlike 
local authorities), and could, for safety and technical reasons, not afford unplanned loss of load. 
19 The Combined Development Agency was a joint US-UK initiative to source uranium for their respective weapons programmes 
from the 1940s to the 196080 and since South Africa was one of the main global producers at that stage, the CDA bought South 
Africa's entire production during this time. Since in South Africa uranium is a by-product of gold mining, electricity 
infrastructure for uranium production covered a large percentage of total electricity produced in the 1950s - see Chapter 5. 











At the same time, their requirements became one of the key drivers of Escom's organisational 
culture, and the concrete manifestation of Escom' s commitment to economic development; 
" . .it was understood that the mining industry was the prime driver behind the establishment 
of the ESI and it was therefore inconceivable that its development should ever be stunted by 
shortages or poor quality of supply. The importance of the gold mining industry was 
underscored by the many high level meetings that were held with them in the 1950s and 
1960s to discuss their needs." (Steyn 2001:72). 
In 1951 parliament passed the Electricity Supply Commission Loan Agreement Act (111951), 
and amended the Electricity Act (Electricity Amendment Act 6611952) the following year to 
allow Escom to borrow ,money from the World Bank (guaranteed by the state) to fund its 
expansion programmes, which formed part of a broader massive infrastructure development 
project associated with the development of the Free State goldfields (Fine & Rustomjee 
1996:155). Rapid expansion of Esc om's output was maintained at high levels from 1950 to 1984, 
averaging between 8%-10% until 1977, with very high periods in the early 1950s and early 
1970s between 9% and 12% (Escom Annual ~eports). 
A simultaneous development, which occurred mainly between 1960 and 1975 (Christie 
1984:163), was the integration of separate electricity undertakings into a national electricity 
system via the construction of a national grid by Escom; the core high-voltage transmission 
network was completed between 1969 and 1973 (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:135). The 
development of the national grid had a profound effect on the technical capacity of the electricity 
system: it led rapidly to the concentra ion of generation plant on the coal mines, and the 
concomitant achievement of significant economies of scale in generation. It also significantly 
changed the economics of electricity generation, since power from Escom's coal-fued plant on 
the coalfields could compete with local generation (which generally burned coal which had been 
transported from the same area). This development was accompanied by two policy changes. 
The fust was in the form of a report by the Borckenhagen Committee, appointed to inquire into 
the "Financial relations between the Central Government, the Provinces and the Local 
Authorities". The Fifth Interim Borckenhagen Report, tabled in 1963, included in its 
investigation "The supply of Electricity in Escom License Areas" (1963 Local Government 
Committee), the aim of which was to resolve questions of jurisdiction in electricity supply. The 
main question which was raised by local authorities concerned the right of Escom to extend its 
statutory right to supply mines, railways and government departments to the supply of industry 
in general. While the Committee concluded that 
" .. Escom should as far as possible confine its activities to that of producer and wholesaler of 
electric power leaving retail distribution to local authorities and similar bodies" (I963 Local 











it also insisted that " .. in all areas falling under a licence of Escom it should be regarded as the 
duty of Escom to afford protection to industrial consumers to the extent of Escom's applicable 
tariffs" (1963 Local Government Committee:18), thus entrenching Escom's right to supply 
energy-intensive industries directly. A second, and equally if not more significant outcome, was 
that the Committee found that 
" .. the main task of meeting the country's requirements of electricity should be undertaken 
by Escom, and that further expansion of municipal generating stations in areas which could 
be supplied by Escom be discouraged" (1963 Local Government Committee: 15). 
This was a reversal of the 'co-existence' policy of the 1920s and 1930s, and an affirmation of 
Escom's primary role in electricity supply. The Report was included in a White Paper tabled in 
1971, which effectively put an end to local authorities expanding their generation capacity. Thus, 
in 1968 and 1969, in what turned out to be a test case, Johannesburg applied to the Provincial 
Adminstrator to build a new power plant, and permission was refused three times on advice from 
Escom, and the city eventually concluded a bulk supply agreement with Escom in 1972 
(Financial Mail 191111968, Financial Mail 20/3170, Christie 1984:164). No further applications 
were made by local authorities, and no significant generation capacity was subsequently built by 
local authorities. The prospect of an 'Escom monopoly' aroused unease amongst the business 
press, who feared that Escom could be used to "further ideological economics" of the apartheid 
state (Financial Mail 19/1/1968). From an institutional point of view, this development divided 
the electricity system into two domains, one of which, occupied by Escom, became the central 
site for deliberation on electricity policy. The other, occupied by local authorities, did not form 
part of electricity policy deliberations until the 1980s, and its development was tied to the 
development of apartheid spatial policies. This separation 
" .. not only led to the proliferation of distribution authorities and tariffs, but also meant that 
domestic electricity supply became closely associated with apartheid policy" (Davis 
1997:125). 
The second policy change was an institutional reform which belatedly recognised the new reality 
of a centralised electricity system, in the form of the Electricity Amendment Act (49/1971), 
which promulgated a mechanism for electricity to be transferred from one undertaking to another 
(Electricity Amendment Act 49/1971), as well as for allocating costs from one undertaking to 
another. 
Escom swiftly established the Central Generating Undertaking (CGU), a separate 'undertaking' 
into which all generation assets was transferred. The CGU thus centralised both the operation of 
plant, which led to efficiencies by amalgamation of demand curves as well as by 'merit order' 
operation of plant (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000: 143), and the planning process for adding 











investment in generation capacity to meet the growth in demand of the country as a whole" 
(Steyn 2001 :72). The planning function, previously located in separate undertakings (and 
individual local authorities), was replaced by a generation and transmission planning unit based 
in the CGU (Interview with I McRae, head of the CGU in the 1970s). The CGU thus became the 
centre for " .. planning and control for Escom as a whole" (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:231), 
and the undertakings were relegated to a marginal role. 
In this context, Escom embarked on its most ambitious capacity expansion plan yet at the 
beginning of the 1970s. III 1969, the sent-out rating of Escom's plant was around 6500MW, and 
it had a further 3600MW under construction; in the decade from 1969 to 1979, Escom 
announced, began construction on and completed some of a capacity expansion programme to 
add nominal capacity of around 25 OOOMW, and in the following three years, another 
11 OOOMW was announced (Escom Annual Reports, Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:114). The 
US decision in the early 1970s to delink gold and the dollar led to a boom in the gold industry, 
and the ironic effect of the oil crisis was to strengthen gold demand and boost the global gold 
price, which led to a boom in gold production in South Africa. This involved considerable 
expansion in existing gold mines, which in tum led to a surge in electricity demand, putting 
pressure on the electricity system throughout the 1970s. In addition to this, a series of other 
energy-intensive projects were completed and commissioned from the late 1960s to the mid 
1980s, including minerals beneficiation, synthetic fuels production, uranium enrichment and 
processing, and expansions to the country's iron and steel production infrastructure. Some 
additional demand was also created by local authorities and others which relied on crude-based 
fuels switching to electricity (or buying power from Escom) after the oil crisis (Steyn 2001 :75). 
The expansion plans were primarily based on increasingly large pithead coal-fired plants, 
Escom's core technology, which had been progressively adapted for South African conditions in 
two ways: 'dry cooling' systems were introduced, which used far less water (which is a very 
scarce resource in South Africa, and a potential limit on power plant construction), and 
combustion technology was adapted to burn high-ash, low-calorific value coal, which was 
extremely cheap and abundant. A notable exception was one nuclear power plant, consisting of 
two French-built pressurised water reactors in the Western Cape (see below). 
The scale of the expansion programme posed significant financing challenges for Escom, which 
had begun to dominate the local capital markets, as well as foreign exchange markets. In 
addition, foreign banks were beginning to refuse to lend capital to South African companies 
because of apartheid. The solution to this problem proposed by Escom to the state was the 
formation of a Capital Development Fund (CDF) in 1971 (which was promulgated in terms of 











total revenue, which would buy Escom stocks, on which interest would be paid into the fund. 
This proposal was welcomed by the Treasury because of its potential to relieve pressure on the 
capital markets (Financial Mail 8/1171). While interest paid by Escom on the stocks to the CDF 
was an internal transfer, according to Escom's fund accounting system it constituted a cost and 
could be reflected in the tariff. Thus, if CDF contributions became significant, consumers would 
effectively be paying both the contribution and the interest on the contribution. The 1971 
Electricity Amendment Act in fact authorised the creation of such a fund, subject to a cap of 3% 
of outstanding loan debt per annum, and not exceeding a total of 15% oftotalloans (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000:142). This was later considerably extended by another Electricity 
Amendment Act (102/1977) to allow further internal financing after the Soweto uprising of 1976 
made foreign borrowing far more difficult. In the period after 1976, CDF contributions were 
increased significantly, until consumers were in effect paying more than one-fifth of their 
electricity bills towards future expansion (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:228). 
Linkages to Other Policy Contexts 
Although, as outlined above, Escom attained a high degree of decision-making autonomy in 
determining the future of the electricity supply system, the utility was not immune to influence 
from other policy domains; understanding the nature and extent of this influence is important in 
understanding Escom's relationship with the state during this period. Significant influence 
occurred in four different categories: the first consisted of apartheid-influenced social goals, 
specifically the electrification of 'white' rural areas; the second consisted of a sequence of 
industriallinfrastructural projects; the third consisted of a set of objectives associated with 
Escom's coal contracts, and the last consisted of Escom's complex relationship with the nuclear 
establishment. 
The electrification of 'white' rural areas (white-owned farms21 and small settlements) by Escom 
was partly the outcome of the institutional arrangements underpinning local government in the 
pre-1994 state: local authorities only hadjurisdicuon over urban areas, and were thus not obliged 
to supply power to areas further afield. Thus, rural areas were those areas which fell outside the 
area of a jurisdiction of a local authority; this distinction, which was the basis for much policy 
and social statistical analysis, was abolished by the post-apartheid government when local 
government was restructured in the late 1990s, and rural areas were all included in a local 
authority. 
Rural electrification was undertaken by Escom only if it would pay for itself (in terms of the 
Electricity Act), until 1947, when the farm lobby, which in South Africa was economically less 











important than it was politically influential22, pressured the government into passing an 
amendment to the Electricity Act (4411947), in tenns of which the relevant Minister could direct 
Escom to supply electricity below cost in certain areas; the difference was then paid to Escom 
from the fiscus (Le. a subsidy). 
The immediate basis for this Amendment, which opened the way for Escom's involvement in a 
range of government-backed regional rural development projects and drove much of the spatial 
expansion of Escom's supply areas between 1945 and 1985, was an alliance between farmers, 
businesspeople and the diamond miner De Beers in the 1940s, who organised themselves into the 
Northern Cape Development Association to lobby for an Escom undertaking in the northern 
Cape, which was duly established in 1951 (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000: 11 0, Christie 
1984:154). The process of electrifying farms and subsidising farm supplies accelerated 
significantly during the 1970s and 1980s (Christie 1984:184, Escom Annual Reports, Conradie 
& Messerschmidt 2000:286), given added impetus by the government's eagerness to electrify 
farms in border areas for strategic reasons. The refonns of the mid 1980s which abandoned the 
'neither profit nor loss' fonnula also did away with the prohibition on cross-subsidisation, 
although it is not clear whether in fact the additional cost of rural supply was funded by the 
fiscus in the 1970s and early 1980s; in 1982, the cost of this programme to Escom was quoted by 
a journalist as RIOO million per year (Financial Mail 5/3/1982). Connections to white farms were 
heavily subsidised by Escom in the 1980s, funded by cross-subsidisation from other consumers 
(Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:286). The sunk cost in rural electrification was such that 
Eskom started a marketing organisation in the late 1980s, Agrelek, to boost farm consumption of 
electricity to cover the cost of rural networks. 
The second category consisted of a series of infrastructural projects in which Escom was 
involved in the 1960s and 1970s. The common factor in these projects was the involvement of 
the industrial policy elite, the IDC, and the Chairman of the IDC, Hennann Van Eck, and 
Escom's involvement was usually brokered at Cabinet level. The IDC's relationship with Escom 
was legally promulgated in 1964 via the Electricity Amendment Act (10/1964), which created a 
"legal relationship between Escom and the Industrial Development Corporation", empowering 
Escom to 
"act as the agent of the Corporation [!DC] in any territory outside the Republic in regard to 
anything which the corporation may do in such territory in connection with the generation, 
supply or distribution of electricity" (Aims, Electricity Amendment Act 10/1964). 
22 White farmers not only formed an important political base for both the United Party (which governed up to 1948) and the 
National Party (which governed afterwards); they also had a disproportionate influence on the electoral process through the 
constituency system. since rural constituencies (before 1994) had on average fewer voters than urban ones. In addition, many pre-











The aim of this was to allow Escom to manage and operate the then South West African 
electricity utility SWA WEK23, a subsidiary of the IDC (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000: 139-
140), while also establishing the model for supplies to other apartheid entities (within South 
Africa's borders), as well as relationships with other projects such as Cahora Bassa. While the 
SW A WEK project had various advantages for Escom, a number of other subsequent projects did 
not. These included a series of dams on the Orange river, part of an ill-conceived regional 
development project in which Escom's participation was required to improve the legitimacy and 
economic feasibility of the project. The basis for the project was a messianic view of 'white' 
wealth and development in the region by the then Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd (quoted in 
Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000: 150). Although the associated hydroelectric schemes were 
usefully incorporated into Escom's regional electricity system, the economic and technical case 
for Esc~m's involvement was not strong at the time24, and their involvement was brokered once 
again by Van Eck (Christie 1984:167-8, Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:154): Escom, 
however, paid only for the installed equipment, and did not contribute to the cost of the dam. The 
other, more controversial project which Escom was pressured to take part in was the Cahora 
Bassa hydroelectric project in northern Mozambique. The project was proposed by the 
Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique in the early 1960s, and supported by the apartheid 
government as a strategic measure to bolster the colonial government, and thus maintain 
apartheid South Africa's cordon of settler-dominated states against the wave of independence 
movements sweeping the continent. Because of the lack of a significant industrial economy in 
Mozambique, the country lacked a market for a large hydroelectricity project, and the colonial 
government proposed that Escom agree to buy a considerable amount of the project's output 
(Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000: 170). The Cabinet agreed to the proposal as part of a broader 
southern African project also aimed at supporting the Smith regime in Rhodesia, in addition to 
boosting the South African construction industry (Christie 1984: 166). Escom initially demurred, 
but Cabinet pressure over a three-year period resulted in Escom agreeing to buying all Cahora 
Bassa's output by the end of the 1970s, and the project was built into its planning process; 
Escom also funded the South African leg of the DC transmission line, and the project itself 
received funding from the IDC (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000: 173). Since the colonial 
regime in Mozambique was overthrown in 1974, by the time that electricity began to flow south 
(at the end of the 1970s), the South African-backed rebel Renamo movement had begun to 
23 Afrikaans acronym for Suid-Wes Afrika Water en Elektrisiteitskorporasie (South West African Water and Electricity 
Corporation) 
24 Escom's official history argues that at the time, in the mid-60s, there was not a strong technical rationale for the projects, but 
that this improved significantly after the main transmission line to the Cape had been constructed at the beginning of the 1970s; 











sabotage the transmission lines, and by the early 1980s, no further electricity reached South 
Africa until the line was restored in the late 1990s. 
The third category of influence was exercised on the nature of long-term coal contracts, which 
were fundamental to Escom's operations, and also comprised the economic base of the coal 
industry: before the 1970s, Escom contracts comprised a high and growing proportion of the coal 
market (around 50%), and during the 1970s and after, export permits were in most cases linked 
to Escom contracts. This presented the state with an unprecedented opportunity, which was made 
use of in two phases. In the first phase, one of the key objectives of the post-1948 government 
(O'Meara 96:74-80) was the promotion of Afrikaner capital in an 'English' -dominated economy, 
and particularly in the mining sector, which was in the 1950s and 1960s still the core of the 
economy. New independent Afrikaner-owned collieries were given preferential access to rail 
transport during the shortages in the 1950s to supply Escom and export markets (Christie 
1984:154), which gave them enough leverage to be admitted to the TCOA cartel. Coal assets 
were then utilised to enter the gold industry, the key mining sector in South Africa until the 
1990s. In the 1960s, the key strategic acquisition for Afrikaner mining capital was the mining 
group Genmin25 by Federale Mynbou in 1964; the basis for Federale Mynbou's fmancial muscle 
in the 1960s was the awarding of four out of the five long-term Escom contracts in the 1960s to 
its consolidated coal group, TNC (Fine & Rustomjee 1996:160), which by 1962 was the second-
largest coal group in the country. 
In the second phase, in the post-Petrick coal policy framework, Escom coal contracts were tied to 
specific goals such as increased extraction rates. These were reinforced by giving preference in 
the issuing of export quotas to coal groups involved in long-term Escom contracts, which was 
simultaneously aimed at increasing the efficiency of coal resource use, as well as keeping 
Escom's coal prices down through exporting beneficiated coal (see previous chapter, DMEA 
Annual Reports 1980-1984). The coal mining revolution which accompanied these reforms was 
mutually beneficial, since dramatically-increased extraction rates combined with beneficiation 
and Escom's improved combustion technology significantly extended the lives of both coal 
reserves in general (by increasing extraction rates and using previously non-economic grades of 
coal which did not form part of the reserve calculations), and the lifetime of specific deposits, 
which extended the economic life of associated power plants. 
2S In the 1970s, Escom continued its traditions of' Afrikaner empowerment' by signing a contract with Gencor (the consolidated 
Genmin and Federale Mynbou) for the provision of natural uranium (to be enriched in the US as fuel for Koeberg), rather than 











The fInal category of influence concerns the commitment to invest in nuclear power, made by 
Escom in the late 1960s26, following a web of highly secretive decision-making processes and 
strategic manoeuvres. This involved the establishment of a nuclear engineering capacity within 
Escom, which ultimately led to a decision to build the Koeberg nuclear power plant in 1974 
(Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:205). Since these processes are discussed in detail in the next 
chapter, what follows is a brief precis of the relevant features. What the nuclear establishment 
proposed was a nuclear-industrial complex, including a large-scale enrichment facility and 
ultimately an indigenous reactor technology_ In the medium term, nuclear power would replace 
coal as the core technology of South Africa's electricity system. From the early 1960s, attempts 
were made to obtain commitment from Escom to a nuclear programme, without which these 
visions would lack legitimacy: these efforts, brokered again by VanEck and the nuclear policy 
advocates in the Cabinet, bore limited fruit at the end of the 1960s, but Escom limited its 
commitment to one power plant, and its expansion programme effectively ruled out more plants 
for at least two decades. The result, therefore, was a stalemate, and the nuclear establishment was 
limited to a (very expensive) small-scale fuel cycle, which effectively involved a significant 
subsidy from Escom until the early 1990s. 
There are several conclusions relevant to electricity policy processes which follow from the 
above narratives. The fIrst concerns the institutional and political status of Escom: because of its 
position in relation to the state, its relative autonomy and its relative prestige, influence was 
brought to bear on Escom in every case by an informal network consisting of a political and 
industrial elite, rather than through a line function. The second consists of an assessment of the 
extent of Escom's autonomy; during the 1960s and 1970s, the utility possessed a significant 
capacity to resist state initiatives, and where necessary to accommodate them on its own terms. 
The extent to which 'outside' policy initiatives were accommodated was different in different 
cases; this can be measured in terms of the impact of the proposed measure on Escom's 'core 
activity', the generation of low-cost coal-fIred power, and its ability to make autonomous 
decisions in that regard, which will be referred to below as Escom's 'core autonomy', which 
comprised the utility's ability to dominate or monopolise electricity policy processes. 
Electrification of rural areas was accommodated over a couple of decades, since the political 
benefit was high and the cost relatively low, with no impact on key decision-making processes. 
Coal policy initiatives were actively accommodated, since there were political benefits, and 
benefits to Escom's core activity; dam projects were resisted, but accommodated, since they 
intruded on Escom's planning autonomy, and the nuclear programme was accommodated but 
26 The exact point at which Escom committed itself to nuclear power is debatable, and around 1968 is the conclusion reached by 











sidelined. A strong nuclear programme would have threatened Escom's autonomy, but non-
involvement would potentially have threatened Escom's monopoly, a fear which the AEB 
exploited. What followed in the 1970s was a direct threat to Escom' s core autonomy by the state; 
Escom's resistance ultimately forced the state to resort to what Smith refers to as 'despotic 
power' (see Chapter 1), or a forceful reconstruction of the constellation of interests comprising a 
specific policy domain. 
Policy Crises and Reform, 1977-1985 
The above period encompasses one of the three most significant periods of electricity policy 
change in South Africa, the other two being the 1920s, when the basic institutional structure of 
the industry was established, and the transitional period during the 1990s. Events in this period 
are focused around two public inquiries: the first being an investigation of electricity tariffs by 
the Board of Trade and Industries, commissioned in 1977 and reporting in 1978, and the second 
being the De Villiers Commission, appointed in 1983, and reporting in 1984. Most literature on 
this period (Steyn 2001, Mountain 1994, Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000) emphasises the 
continuity between the two reports, in that there was significant common ground in their 
recommendations. The resulting narrative of the crisis is that it resulted from specific 
institutional arrangements in the electricity system, which led to a crisis which could be ignored 
in the late 1970s, but not by the early 1980s, primarily based on adherence to an outdated 
planning paradigm by Escom. While this is indisputable, from a policy point of view the way in 
which the separate crises were constituted and the way in which the inquiries were framed was 
significantly different, and indicated a considerable and important shift in the structure of the 
electricity policy environment. 
The widely-accepted image of Escom, which distinguished it from many other parastatals, was 
of a highly-successful technocratic enterprise at the vanguard of economic development in South 
Africa Media coverage of Escom in the early and mid 1970s was generally conducted in a faint 
tone of awe. The decade was begun with a piece in the Financial Mail headed "Future Belongs to 
Escom" (Financial Mail 20/3/1970); this and other subsequent stories emphasised the Herculean 
task faced by Escom in increasing its generating capacity to keep pace with economic growth, 
and the success, despite occasional blackouts, with which this task was being undertaken (the 
message of "Escom can Cope" (Financial Mail 22/211974) was that despite the size of the 
challenge, there would be no blackouts). By the mid-1970s, Escom's leadership began to 
emphasise in public that security of supply would come at a price, in the form of price hikes, 
which the economy must endure in order to maintain security of supply. What was required, 











plan boldly; he warned at a conference in 1975 that the days of super-cheap electricity were 
over; energy shortages in South Africa, he said, would not come from scarcity of resources, but 
from an unwillingness to bite the bullet, and fmance the infrastructure necessary to provide 
sufficient energy resources in the future (Financial Mail 27/6/1975). The broad acceptance of 
this dominant narrative was undermined by two factors which emerged from 1975 to 1977, and 
forced government to consider intervention. These were high annual increases in electricity 
prices, which had remained stable for around two decades, and Escom's increasing capital 
requirements, which had grown to such an extent that they began to affect local capital markets, 
as well as foreign markets to which South African enterprises had access, as well as the 
availability of foreign exchange. 
In the mid-1970s, elements within the state had become aware of the impact of Escom' s capital 
requirements, as its massive expansion programme began to dominate capital markets. As a 
percentage of gross domestic fixed investment, Escom's share of the South African total had 
risen from an average of 4% from 1968 to 1974, to 6% in 1975, t  8% in 1976 and to 12% in 
1977. Net inflows of foreign capital were also dominated by Escom, which consumed 20% of the 
net inflow in 1975, and 61.2% of the net inflow in 1976. In 1977, 
" • .Escom still had large net foreign borrowing receipts while the economy as a whole 
experienced a very large net outflow" (Board of Trade and Industries 1978a: 117-119). 
At the same time, other large capital-intensive strategic projects were in mid-construction, 
particularly Sasol 2 (with another Sasol pending), armaments projects, and a number of capital-
intensive export-orientated minerals beneficiation projects which the state had identified as key 
to addressing critical balance-of-payments problems. These projects were being pursued and co-
ordinated by a network centred on economic planning processes in the Department of Planning 
and the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister. Since domestic capital resources were scarce, 
and additional foreign borrowing had become more difficult or impossible in certain cases after 
1976, the Department of Finance established an Interdepartmental Committee for the 
Determination of Capital Investment Priorities, based in the Department of Finance. However 
the Committee had " .. insufficient powers to curb what they believe is an innate expansionist 
drive of the state utilities" (Financial Mail 7/3/80), including Escom. During the 1977 recession, 
government had forced Escom to scrap a proposed 3600MW power plant from their short-term 
planning horizon (Financial Mail 17/12/1982). 
This schism between Escom and state economic planners was augmented by mounting consumer 
pressure over sharp price increases. There had been, since 1975, a stark upward increase in real 
average electricity prices (see Figure 4.7 above), driven by inflation as well as a real increase in 











average electricity price increased in nominal tenns by 16% in 1975 and 30% in 1976 (against an 
inflation rate of around 12% for each year), which led to consumer protests, particularly by 
energy-intensive users and fanners. 
Government's response to these two problems was twofold. First, in early 1977, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs asked the Board of Trade and Industries (BTl) to investigate electricity tariff 
structures, the effect these had on the economy, the effect of regional tariff differentiation, the 
relationship between Escom and local authority tariffs, and 
" .. the adequacy of existing legal implications affecting the tariff policy and tariff structure in 
respect of the supply of electricity" (Board of Trade and Industries 1978a: 1). 
The BTl was the Department of Commerce's trade and competition institution, whose nonnal 
activities involved investigating applications for anti-dumping duties, and reporting on alleged 
monopoly practices in specific industries. The inquiry took around one year, and was the first 
independent investigation into the electricity system by an independent body since 1920. 
The state's second response was to pass the Electricity Amendment Act (10211977), which 
pennitted Escom to expand the CDF considerably, both as a solution to the capital problem, and 
as compensation for lack of availability of foreign loans in the wake of the 1976 Soweto 
uprising, which considerably increased foreign pressure on the apartheid state. Included in the 
1977 Amendment was a less-conspicuous clause (lOA) which authorised the Minister, after 
consulting the ECB, to direct that up to 3% of Escom's income be paid into a fund to subsidise 
energy-intensive users as part of an export-incentive scheme (Board of Trade and Industries 
1978a:28), which was partly aimed at protecting export-oriented energy intensive industries 
against electricity price increases. 
The Amendment resulted in a real increase of 255% in the CDF component of the electricity 
price, at which level it remained until it began to decline from 1981 to 1984, when the fund was 
abolished. However real total finance charges (fund contributions plus interest) remained at the 
same level throughout this period (Escom Annual Report 1985); thus, real finance costs declined 
from around 7 to 5 clkWh (real 2000 cents) from 1967 to 1976, and rose abruptly in 1977 to 
between 10 and 11 clk Wh from 1977 to 1986. The result was a series of staggering price 
increases, which were more dramatic given the inflationary climate at the time. Escom's average 
electricity price rose 48% in 1977 in nominal terms (inflation around 12%) during the BTl 
inquiry, which put government on the defensive politically since the Amendment had been 
defended in parliament against charges that it would lead to further dramatic price increases 
(Financial Mail 1617177). 
The Board's investigation drew on the services of an expert in corporate finance (professor I 











broader economic context, and specifically Escom's opaque accounting and operational system. 
The investigation was framed, like other BTl investigations, in terms of the internal dynamics of 
the electricity industry, and did not link electricity policy to a broader energy policy context. It 
produced a detailed set of recommendations, which included the following (Board of Trade and 
Industries 1978a:157-8): 
1. Escom's fund accounting system should be abolished, since it was not only 
misleading but also resulted in material inflation of costs through charging interest on 
internal funds as costs. 
2. There was a genera1lack of planning and control systems in Escom, and particularly 
financial planning and control; these should be put in place as soon as possible. 
3. Extreme caution should be exercised by Escom in detennining future reserve margins 
- if possible, better maintenance systems etc should be put in place instead of large 
reserve margins; future capital projects should be postponed or cancelled if possible. 
4. The CDF should be scrapped; instead, Escom should be able to eam a profit, and 
should not pay tax on this. The level of profitability should be regulated by the 
Department of Industries, as should the level of internal financing. 
5. A Capital Projects Evaluation Group should be established in the Department of 
Finance to consider all state corporations' capital projects, which should be subject to 
Cabinet approval. 
6. Further changes to the Electricity Act should be approved by the ECB. 
7. The ECB and the Department of Industries should be resourced so as to be able to 
effectively oversee Escom and the rest of the industry. 
8. Local Authorities should take over reticulation of Escom's small consumers if 
possible. 
9. Provincial Administrators should " .. control the electricity tariff levels in terms of 
profitability [of local authorities] to prevent excessive surpluses" - local authorities 
should also move to more transparent accounting systems (Board of Trade and 
Industries 1978a: 151). The Report also noted that " .. the average increases in the 
tariffs of the responding municipalities for the different consumer groups .... were 
higher than those of Esc om" (Board of Trade and Industries 1978a: 150). 
The Report thus posed significant challenges to the institutional autonomy of both Escom and 
local authorities, but particularly to Escom. Aside from criticising Escom's management 
procedures, it proposed that a range of oversight functions be put in place which would have 











strengthening of the ECB. However, other government policy priorities and the pre-emptive 
tactics of Esc om resulted in most of the Board's recommendations not being accepted in 1979. 
On the whole, government was not inclined to implement these recommendations, which was a 
symptom that the pro-reform faction in various state agencies had been sidelined by Escom's 
successful attempt to restore its tarnished credibility with the political elite. Escom was able to 
achieve this by a combination of strategies. The Board's recommendations on management 
changes (2i7 were implemented before the release of the Report (Conradie & Messerschmidt 
2000:231-2). Escom's two main strategies however, involved discrediting the main findings of 
the report by claiming that it had misunderstood its fund accounting system (Steyn 2001:93) (1), 
and by reducing the real price from 1979 onwards by offsetting the loss against the following 
year, as specified in the Electricity Act (Steyn 2001 :94). The government was in tum not 
prepared to scrap the CDP (4), and rejected the idea of a Capital Projects Evaluation Group (5) 
as political interference. 
Recommendations which were accepted included the strengthening of the ECB, and the 
monitoring of local authority tariff levels, which the ECB began to do from 1979 informally. 
Although they did not have the direct authority to do so, they began to consult with local 
authorities, and would make recommendations for action if necessary to Provincial 
Administrators. However, even the 'strengthened' E B only consisted of 7 members (including 
newly-appointed tariff experts), and a secretariat of 1 ~ staff. This, and the opacity of local 
authorities' cost accounting in their electricity undertakings, made effective regulation very 
difficult (interview with I Lambrechts, ECB member in the 1980s). No notable electricity policy 
capacity was created in the Department of Industries, and although the ECB' s mandate was 
extended informally, and better resourced, regulation was not placed on an improved 
institutional footing (6,7). 
The questions raised by the BTl, in very limited technical terms, concerning Escom' s reserve 
margin requirements (and thus the requirements and extent of its capital expenditure programme) 
were brushed aside by government on the advice of Escom. In 1979 the responsible Mininster 
accepted in parliament that government, rather than Escom, was primarily to blame for the steep 
nature of the tariff rise (due to the CDP amendment), and stated that 
" .. Escom has given me satisfactory proof that the reserve plant margin for future years will 
not be as high as is believed by the Board of Trade and Industries in its report" (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000:232). 
No significant action was taken as regards local authorities, even though the report had pointed 
out that local authority tariffs had risen more steeply than Escom's. There were three reasons for 











this: first, the most effective price pressure came from Escom's customers (energy~intensive 
industry, rural consumers); second, local authority fmances were beyond the scope of the BTl 
and the Department of Commerce, and in addition were not subject to any form of regulation or 
monitoring, and thus posed an information problem; and third, they benefited from the strong 
focus of attention on Escom, which had consigned them to a minor role in the electricity system 
in the past decades. 
Government's reaction to the BTl report was accompanied by several other developments which 
temporarily restored Escom's external credibility, and its internal determination to resist 
interference in its expansion programme, which had received a setback in 1977. External 
pressure was deferred by artificially low price increases from 1979 to 1982. Concerns outside 
Escom about 'reserve margins' and 'excessive expansion' were overridden by real supply crises 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which lasted sporadically until the late 1980s. These were 
caused by a number of factors: growth in demand remained high until the mid~ 1980s, after a 
temporary dip in 1977; the completion of Koeberg was delayed from the late 1970s until the 
mid-I 980s (and by one more year due to sabotage by ANC guerrillas); Cabora Bassa, which had 
become integral to the Escom system, was lost due to sabotage in the early I 980s, and lastly, the 
new generation of giant 'six_pack,28 power plants experienced significant teething problems, 
availability was low, and larger reserve margins were required due to the scale of the new plants. 
Reaction to criticism of the scale of the expansion programme, or to Escom's planning process, 
was swift and unapologetic. 
Escom's position on the expansion programme, which became particularly associated with Jan 
Smith, who was Escom's general manager during the 1970s and appointed Chairman in 1979, 
was that it was a programme of crucial national importance, it required bold vision to overcome 
the temptation to cut back spending in the short term to achieve short~term economic objectives, 
and that consumers should be prepared to weather the short burst of steep price increases which 
were necessary to complete the transition to internal financing. In response to tariff increases in 
1977, Escom's financial manager Len Te Groen remarked that 
" .. you can't have fancy projects like uranium enrichment plants, Sasol II, Richards Bay and 
Sishen-Saldhana without power. And we can't supply that power without installing 
expensive new plant ourselves to meet demand. That plant has to be funded and it's our 
prime function to provide the current the country demands. It's our duty in fact" (quoted in 
Financial Mail 23/9n7). 
The 1979 Annual Report admitted that Escom's constant need to expand, and the long-term 
planning necessary to take into account long lead times for new plant, 











" .. often leads to public concern over Escom spending, sometimes imagined as being 
grandiose .. " (Escom Annual Report 1979:12). 
Smith himself remarked in 1979 in an internal publication that 
" . .if Escom had acceded to pressures imposed upon it over the past few years to cut 
expansion programmes in order to avoid raising tariffs to help pay for these programmes, 
South Africa would by now find itself in a crisis situation not only as far as oil was 
concerned, but electricity as well" (quoted in Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:232). 
He commented in the 1980 Annual Report that 
and 
, 
" .. the present constraints on electricity supply can be attributed partly to the cautious 
economic thinking which emerged in the late 1960s and which was further influenced by the 
oil crisis in the early 1970s and the recession of the mid-1970s. As a result, Escom complied 
with a request made in the interests of the national economy to delay certain capital 
projects .. "(Escom Annual Report 1980:11); 
.... we have lost three to four years of generation expansion as a result of the cautious 
economic thinking which prevailed in this country during the 1970s.,". (Escom Annual 
Report 1981: 1 0). 
This was of course merely a continuation of Escom's view of their core mission, and common to 
most utilities until the mid-1970s; what is notable about its persistence in the late 1970s was that 
in other countries, growth rates in electricity demand had fallen off rapidly after the oil crisis due 
to the link between electricity prices and oil, whereas in South Africa, this had been postponed 
for around a decade, and the oil crisis had in fact led to an electricity boom of unprecedented 
proportions. As a result, Escom found itself virtually alone amongst world utilities in 
significantly expanding its generation capacity, which put it in a very favourable position in 
negotiating export credits with equipment-manufacturing countries (Steyn 2001:93i9• This was 
boosted by an engineering-based organisational culture, the leadership of which was reared on 
the 1950s supply crises (Steyn 2001:72). From 1978, other government agencies' projections for 
electricity demand growth began to diverge from those of Escom, but these concerns were 
sidelined by Escom' s leadership. 
The projections of Escom's planning process, based on a constant growth rate higher than GDP 
(diminishing slightly towards the end of the century), are illustrated In Figure 4.10 below. The 
red line indicates actual peak demand on Escom's system, plus a 17% reserve margin. The 
projections between 1974 and 1980 are roughly similar (only the 1974 prediction is shown here). 
29 Steyn adds that the South African Reserve Bank provided full forward cover on foreign currency-denominated loans for Escom 
and other parastataJs, which due to a weakening Rand in the 19808 resulted in a loss to the Reserve Bank of R 19.1 billion, much 
of which was attributable to Escom; this constitutes a hidden subsidy in South Africa's current world-beating' cheap electricity 
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Escom predictions for the total plant required by the end of the 20th century peaked in 1981, and 
declined rapidly after that to around half that level by 1990. The Department of Planning's 
Economic Development Plan for 1978-1987 (South Africa 1979a, 1979b) predicted a 
significantly lower requirement, as did the De Villiers Commission (1984), although both 
predictions were considerably higher than actual requirements. Politically, the significance of 
these forecasts is that Escom's forecasts (and its expansion plans) only began to diverge from 
actual peak demand in the early 1980s. By 1983, 
"Escom was foreseeing a capital expenditure programme of R65 billion, which would treble 
its capacity to 70 OOOMW by the end of the century ... .Escom had generating plant totalling 
22 260 MW under construction or on order", which was "equivalent to 97% of its total plant 
in commission" (Steyn 2001:79-80). 
Escom's hermetic planning process was painstakingly defended against state or other 
interference during this period. VariOllS energy planning exercises undertaken by state agencies 
provided strong indications that Escom's demand forecasts were wrong; however management 
chose to stick to their 7% demand growth assumption (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:238). In 
the light of public antagonism, Escom commissioned its own study by outside consultants, which 
pointed to basic flaws in Escom's projections, based on a halt in investment in new energy-
intensive projects after the 1977 price increases: management were advised to cut the expansion 











The scale of the expansion programme was the underlying cause of a second policy crisis in 
1983, which was caused by a succession of 'focusing events', including a series of price rises 
from 1982, when escalating costs forced the abandonment of the deferment strategy adopted in 
the late 1970s. In addition, power shortages created a strong public perception that Escom 
appeared to be spending public money on capacity it was not providing (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000:239). In addition to renewed consumer pressure, resulting from both high 
prices and the apparent failure of Escom to rein in price increases as soon as the transition to 
self-financing had been completed, there was a significant change in the alignment of state 
agencies: the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs had been created in 1980, and a new set 
of 'energy bureaucrats' combined with a more activist ECB (which reported to the DMEA's 
Energy Branch), bolstered the concerns of other state agencies about Escom's autonomy. The 
accession of PW Botha, and his new market-oriented approach to economic policy, foresaw a 
transformation of parastatals and their alignment with new government priorities to which 
Smith's intransigence was an obstacle. Unlike in 1977, the Prime Minister himself took charge 
of the appointment of a new inquiry. 
Escom's management were summoned in early 1983 to the Prime Minister's office to explain the 
reasons for the 1983 price hike; afterwards he took the unprecedented step of unilaterally 
announcing a lower price increase, and a week later, he appointed the De Villiers Commission of 
Inquiry to "inquire into ~d report on all aspects of the supply of electricity in the Republic of 
South Africa", with particular reference to the structure of the industry and Escom and the 
ECB's role specifically, and the 
" . .impact of capital formation, price determination, methods of financing and the existing 
tariff structure on the fmancial policy of the country with special reference to inflation, 
economic growth, the creation of infrastructure and decentralisation" (1983-84 Electricity 
Commission: 1-2). 
This relatively broad mandate was restricted at its first meeting to '~ .. an in-depth study of 
Escom's strategy" (1983-84 Electricity Commission:3), which excluded a consideration of the 
role of the ECB, the distribution industry, and nuclear power30; thus the target of the 
Commission was Escom alone. The composition of the Commission was significant: De Villiers 
was previously the head. of the major Afrikaner mining group, and other commissioners were 
seconded from the IDC. 
The Commission reported the following year, and recommended that: 
30 The Commission was requested to consider nuclear power as well, and submit its fmdings confidentially to the Prime Minister 
(1983-84 Electricity Commission:242). There is no record indicating whether this inquiry took place, but ifit did, it was probably 











1. A two-tier control structure be introduced, consisting of an Electricity Council of 
stakeholders to formulate general policy, and a Management Board to run the 
operational side of the utility. 
2. Escom should playa leading role in electricity conservation to maximise efficiency of 
resource use and minimise capital requirements. 
3. Escom should maximise availability of plant, and reassess safety and environmental 
standards to investigate cost-cutting measures. 
4. Escom should change its forecasting techniques, improve consultation with 
consumers about load growth, and develop more flexible expansion programmes 
which can be easily expanded or contracted. 
5. Abandonment of the 'neither at a profit nor a loss' principle, and the adoption of 
orthodox accounting principles. 
6. Abandonment of the concept of 'undertakings', and a concomitant diversification of 
cost-reflective tariff structures (1983-84 Electricity Commission: 15-18,200-202). 
Unlike the BTl inquiry, the Commission framed the inquiry in terms of general energy policy 
developments since the oil crisis, and identified Escom's planning process as the main problem, 
which ought to be addressed through institutional reform. The control structure recommended by 
the Commission consisted of a two-tier system based on the recommendations of a study of 
nationalised industries in the UK undertaken by the National Economic Development Office, on 
the basis that institutional models of state-owned enterprises in South Africa are based on UK 
models (the NEDO recommendations were not implemented in the UK) (1983-84 Electricity 
Commission:224-226). The Commission outlined an "analysis of the responsibility of the 
decision-making process required for Escom" in a complicated table, which allots decision-
making functions to different parts of government Notable categories are 'energy policy', 
'electricity supply policy', and 'corporate aims and objectives'. For energy policy matters, the 
Cabinet should decide, the two Escom boards, the Department of Finance, the Economic Advisor 
to the Prime Minister and the Economic Advisory Council should be consulted, the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy must agree, and other players should be informed. For electricity policy 
matters, Escom's Board of Control should decide, the DMEA should be consulted, the Minister 
of Minerals and Energy should agree, and a few other actors should be informed. For 'corporate 
aims' related decisions, the management board should decide, the control board should agree, 
and large customers should be informed (1983-84 Electricity Commission:232). The other major 
policy change that the Commission recommended was that Escom play a significant role in 











"South Africa's future opportunities and challenges .... under the present world economic 
conditions, depend on the success it achieves with an energy saving policy which, in 
accordance with the broad OECD guidelines, must be tackled with vision and drive .. 
.. although Escom was in the past mainly geared for the provision of an abundant supply of 
cheap electricity, and cheap electricity encouraged excessive consumption, Escom witt in 
future have to play almost the opposite role as its policy for the saving of electricity by 
consumers must be designed to serve the national interest' (1983-84 Electricity 
Commission:237). 
In fact, electricity conservation or efficiency programmes were not seriously undertaken by 
either Escom or the DMEA; when Escom started to experience over-capacity in the early 1990s, 
it began to actively explore new energy-intensive projects with the IDC. Government's response 
to the Commission's recommendation was to accept with some modifications the main 
recommendations on governance and institutional refonn, which were partly promulgated in 
1985 and 1986 amendments to the Electricity Act. The Electricity Council was given such wide 
powers to set policy that the drafters thought it prudent to include a clause (3(1 )3), which states 
that 
" .. the Minister may from time to time reserve matters, including matters relating to the 
fonnulation of a national policy in connection with the generating and supply of electricity in 
the Republic, in respect of which the Electricity Council shaH consult with the Minister 
before taking a decision in the matter" (Electricity Amendment Act 5011985). 
The 1986 amendment abolished the pricing principle of 'neither at a profit nor a loss', and 
replaced this with a procedure which set the prices in 1986 at the old level; any subsequent 
increases by Escom would then be published in the Government Gazette and local media, and 
objections would be heard by the Electricity Control Board and adjudicated on; in addition 
Escom no longer required its operations to be licensed (Clause 16, Electricity Amendment Act 
54/1986). In practice, Escom price increases from 1983 were approved by the relevant Minister 
on an annual basis. 
In 1987 two new pieces of legislation, the Electricity Act (4111987) and the Eskom Act 
(4011987), consolidated and entrenched the new institutional structure of the industry, and 
fonned the Commission into an entity called 'Eskom', a combination of the English Escom and 
the Afrikaans Evkom. The function of Eskom was ''to provide the system by which the 
electricity needs of the consumer may be satisfied in the most cost-effective manner" (Clause 3, 
Eskom Act 4011987). The Act also gave Eskom leeway to set prices as it saw fit, subject only to 
an appeal process (adjudicated by the ECB) in cases where tariff structures were altered (Clause 
15, Eskom Act 4011987); apparently Eskom's legal department played a "major role" in drafting 











themselves from regulatory oversight (Steyn 2001: 104). Clause 24 stipulated that (since Eskom 
would now conceivably make a profit) Eskom was exempt from any tax or dividend payment to 
the state. The significance of these changes was that the Electricity Council was effectively given 
the role of making electricity policy; in addition, Eskom was accountable to government through 
the Minister of Public Enterprise rather than the energy line function. In 1987 the two portfolios 
shared the same Minister; in 1990 Eskom was effectively removed from government's energy 
function and placed in a separate department, the Office of Public Enterprise, which removed it 
from the institutional context of energy policy into what was effectively a different policy 
domain, focused on commercialising and privatising state enterprises. While the outcome of the 
Commission resulted in a higher level of integration of electricity policy into other industrial and 
economic policy domains, it weakened its integration into the energy policy domain. 
The immediate practical outcome for Escom of the Inquiry was the replacement of Smith with a 
new leadership. Johan Maree was appointed to run the Council, and Ian McRae was appointed as 
CEO. Maree was chosen because of his background in finance rather than electricity or energy 
(Davis 1997: 138), and proceeded to transform the engineering-dominated management culture to 
a more commercially-oriented one. Changes in management and accounting practice, with other 
important factors such as the scaling back of investment and low capital requirements (because 
of overinvestment), led to a significant improvement in Eskom's finances during the 1990s 
(Davis 1997:143). Maree's background was as a senior figure in the new Afrikaner business 
elite, who had been seconded from the private-sector Barlow Rand industrial group in 1979 at 
P.W. Botha's request to place the state arms manufacturer Armscor on a commercial footing, and 
it was expected that he would do the same in Escom (he did), and later in the Atomic Energy 
Corporation (with less success). Botha's programme for parastatals included, where feasible, 
privatisation31 (without market reform Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:261), which was 
enthusiastically advocated by Maree and Eskom's senior management, but contested by the 
Electricity Council and large consumers (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:262-263). The exit of 
P.W. Botha from the presidency and his replacement by F.W. De Klerk, as well as the opening 
of secret negotiations with the ANC at this time, led to the proposal being shelved (Eberhard 
2003:7). 
By the end of the 1980s, Escom had lost its ability to make unilateral planning and price 
decisions, and Eskom's new leadership appraised the main challenge as how to "keep 
government out of the engine room" (Interview with I McRae), which involved two immediate 
strategies: the first involved a process of credible 'benchmarking' against other utilities 
31 The Botha-appointed De Villiers Commission also contained prominently in its tenns of rererence a directive to explore the 
potential role of the private sector in electricity supply in South Africa, but the Commission chose to confine itself to "an in-











internationally, and the other consisted of a 1991 'price compact' between Escom and the 
relevant line Minister, involving a 9"/0 price increase in 1991, followed by a commitment to 
reduce prices by a cumulative 20% over five years (Davis 1997:166, Conradie & Messerschmidt 
2000:281). Eskom's official history records this compact as 
"a brilliant stroke that was to keep the government out of the price increase debate - the 
engine room - on a detail level for at least five years" (Conradie & Messerschmidt 
2000:281). 
Since the transitional process had been set in motion, a greater challenge was to keep the 
government-in-waiting out of the engine room, which was the basis for much of Eskom's 
involvement in the transitional electricity policy process. 
3) 19808 to 2004 
From an electricity policy point of view, the main feature of the transitional period was the 
changed context for electricity policy: whereas since the 1960s, electricity policy had been 
narrowly focused on Escom and the electricity supply system and largely excluded local 
authorities, from the early 1990s electricity policy debates were widened to include the entire 
electricity system. The key policy issue became electrification, and supply issues disappeared 
from the agenda, partly because by the early 1990s Eskom had significant over-capacity, and no 
new decisions were required in terms of generating capacity until well into the next decade. 
Electrification gave rise to three other significant developments: the first was a concern with 
significant institutional reform, the outcome of which was the establishment of an independent 
regulatory with significant powers; the second was the inauguration of an industry restructuring 
process, which ended in a stalemate a decade later, and the third was a renewed attempt to place 
electricity policy in a broader energy policy context, which began at the household level, and 
was extrapolated to the energy system in general, and culminated in an Energy Policy White 
Paper. 
However, the fragile policy coalition which underpinned the commitment to the process of 
institutional reform was based on the requirements of the electrification programme; ironically, 
the coalition disintegrated with the success of the programme, and political support for 
institutional reform waned, abetted by opposition to restructuring from key constituencies, 
including Eskom and local authorities. By the end of the period, the structure of the electricity 
policy environment resembled a modified form of its pre-transition structure, with some notable 
differences, including a significantly-altered distribution industry, a relatively strong regulator 











government; however, despite this, planning for electricity supply reverted to Eskom, and occurs 
outside of a broad energy policy framework. 
Electrification and the National Electrification Forum 
As described above, the development of the South African electricity distribution sector was 
fundamentally influenced by apartheid; the remarkable lack of electricity infrastructure in areas 
designated 'black', even in large urban centres, was exacerbated by apartheid spatial and 
political developments during the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, significant areas of the country 
were separated off into 'homelands' with separate electricity distribution organisations; in the 
1980s, the three most significant developments were the attempt to establish Black Local 
Authorities in tenns of the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act to govern 'black' urban areas, the 
establishment of racially-distinct local authorities for 'coloureds' and 'indians' in terms of the 
tricameral parliament (Cameron 1995:403), and the establishment of a regional superstructure 
for distribution bulk services to all racially-zoned areas within a specific metropolitan area, the 
so-called 'Regional Services Councils' in terms of the 1985 Regional Services Council Act 
(Christopher 1994:53-55). 
The RSCs represented local authorities in proportion to their revenue bases, which meant that 
even though they 'represented' all racially-based authorities within a particular area, they were 
dominated and controlled by 'white' local authorities (Christopher 1994:55). The reason for their 
establishment was to transfer resources to Black Local Authorities as part of Botha's Total 
Strategy, which aimed through selective 'upgrading' of black townships to defuse what by then 
was an outright insurrection (Cameron 1995:4(5). Black Local Authorities were politically a 
failure, with a turnout of only 7% of potential voters in their first elections in 1983 (Christopher 
1994:55), and were also circumscribed severely in the scope of their activities by virtue of their 
control by the responsible (white) Minister, who could direct them to make by-laws, sack 
councillors, and prescribe service charges (Cameron 1995:407,4(9). The Minister did this on 
numerous occasions, further undermining the legitimacy of the BLAs and leading to widespread 
payment boycotts by residents, which further undermined the ability of BLAs to function 
effectively. 
White local authorities on the other hand benefited in a number of ways from their dominant 
position. Those BLAs which did implement limited electrification schemes were severely 
disadvantaged not only by lack of infrastructure and finance, but also by the resulting poor load 
profile, which being based almost solely on poor residential users, made their bulk supplies 
much more expensive and their systems much more problematic to manage; in 1989, for 











whereas BLAs supplied only I % (Horwitz 1994 :9i2, which effectively provided a significant 
subsidy to white authorities. Another disparity involved the bulk supply of electricity by white 
local authorities to BLAs, which was usually done on an industrial tariff containing a significant 
surplus component, which was then transferred to the white authority's general rates account 
(Horwitz 1994:9). It was common practice for white local authorities to generate income from 
water and electricity sales; a 1978 survey revealed that while rates provided 16.3% of current 
revenue of white local authorities, surpluses such on services such as water and electricity 
provided 55.9% of revenue (Cameron 1995:398). In 1989 40% of revenue of white local 
authorities was derived from electricity surpluses (Horwitz 1994:8). This was (and is33) in effect 
a way of keeping rates down, and since most electricity revenue is derived from industrial users, 
it constituted a subsidy on residential rates; thus ironically, 
" . .in many situations electrified black townships subsidise their nearby white municipal 
provider" (Horwitz 1994:9). 
By the end of the 1980s almost all BLAs were in crisis and a host of problems, including 
incompetence, financial mismanagement, payment boycotts, bulk disconnections, technical 
problems (including huge unaccounted electricity losses) and an overwhelming lack of political 
legitimacy, meant that electricity distribution was in crisis. The same problems applied to rural 
distributors in the 'homelands' and 'independent states'. These problems applied to areas where 
there was basic distribution infrastructure; however, mostly there was not: by comparison to 
other countries with similar income levels (Greece - 100%, Argentina - 88%, Venezuela - 86%, 
Costa Rica - 85%, Thailand 75%, Brazil- 65%), electrification rates for domestic households 
in South Africa were extremely low (35%) (Eberhard & Van Horen 1995:48) 
The disparity is very striking, and neither is the disparity due to income distribution, since Brazil 
and South Africa had at the time and still have very close Gini Coefficient values. There is some 
debate concerning the level of electrification in 1990. Early estimates range from 30-40% 
(Dingley 1987, 1990; Eberhard & Van Horen 1995) of the population having access to 
electricity; a figure derived from the NER connection rates for 1991 to 1994 and audited 
electrified households from 1995 onwards indicates a figure of around 43% of households were 
electrified. However, due to the increase in household membership from wealthy to poor 
households, it is likely that this figure represents significantly less than 43% of the population; it 
is thus likely that only around 35% of South Africans had access to electricity in 1990. In 
addition to a lack of access to electricity, those black South African households which were 
12 This reflects the number of consumers" not the quantity of electricity sold; black local authorities would almost certainly have 
supplied less than 1% of the electricity to these consumer classes. 
33 This is still a contentious issue in the ongoing debate about the restructuring of the electricity distribution industry; although 











connected to the grid suffered from erratic services and on occasions bulk disconnections 
(Horwitz 1994:9), and other effects stemming from incompetent and often corrupt management 
of local distributors. As a result, the majority of South African households in urban and rural 
areas depended on non-electric energy sources for heating, cooking and other energy services. In 
practice, this involved a range of fuels such as COal34, paraffm and various forms of biomass, 
which posed serious health and safety problems, as well as imposing various other costs such as 
labour time to collect firewood. The apartheid government made a much-publicised and not very 
successful attempt to electrify Soweto in the 1980s, but other than this, electrification of black 
households proceeded haphazardly, or was avoided on the basis that it was not 'economical'. 
From a policy and a conceptual point of view it is useful to draw a clear distinction between an 
interest in electrification by various actors, the involvement of organisations such as Eskom and 
local authorities in electrification projects in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the 'national 
accelerated electrification programme' which was an outcome of a negotiation process from 
1992 to 1994; a definitive decision was taken in 1994, and the parameters of the programme 
were delineated in the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme, published in that 
year. 
The key actors in the electrification decision-making process leading up to 1994 were Eskom on 
the one hand, and a group of 'energy policy activists' ('policy entrepeneurs' in Kingdon's terms) 
associated both with the ANC's Minerals and Energy Group (MEG - the ANC's minerals and 
energy policy forum), and with the Energy and Development Research Centre (EDRC), a 
university-based research group focused on energy poverty issues. Because the DMEA had no 
standing institutionally, and was initially prevented by their Minister from participating in the 
process, the state's energy bureaucracy was marginalised and did not playa significant role in 
the initial process. Traditionally, electrification was regarded by the DMEA as outside the scope 
of electricity policy (which for them meant only electricity supply), and solely within the 
jurisdiction of local authorities; similarly, energy poverty as an energy policy problem was 
equally foreign to the state energy bureaucracy during the 1980s (Interview with J Basson). In 
addition, the DMEA and its temporary successor, the NEC, had no real jurisdiction over 
electricity policy: for instance the 1986 White Paper on Energy Policy contained an electricity 
policy section which was merely a restatement of the conclusions of the De Villiers Commission. 
Research funding by the NEC began to create a space for investigating household energy issues 
from the end of the 1980s, but no concrete policies resulted from this. 
34 Coal is used in poor households in South Africa mostly in locations where it is cheaply and easily available, i.e. in the coal-











The development of electrification policy proposals by ANC-aligned energy policy activists was 
the result of a confluenc~ of two related lines of policy research which merged in 1991 at the 
University of Cape Town. The first developed from an initial focus on energy use by poor rural 
households to a more general focus on energy poverty, and began with the fonnation of the 
Centre for Research into Appropriate Energy Technology (CRAET), later renamed the Energy 
and Development Research Centre (EDRC)35 by its Director, Anton Eberhard. The EDRC 
focused on two areas : 1) energy demand by poor rural households, which was unresearched in 
South Africa at that point, and 2) small-scale non-grid technologies (including efficient wood 
stoves, photovoltaic systems, water pumps etc) for rural applications. The EDRC was an 
outcome of a peculiar match: it was staffed by energy policy researchers who were broadly 
sympathetic to the anti-apartheid movement, and in many cases actively involved in it, but was 
funded by the state, via the NEC. This was possible because the NEC was situated outside the 
orthodox civil service, and contained a large number of research personnel in decision-making 
positions recruited from the state scientific research organisation (the CSIR). Moreover, 'energy 
for development' was portrayed as a relatively apolitical area of research, since it applied to a set 
of problems which were located in a policy vacuum at the time. 
The second line of research was done in an electrical engineering context, primarily by Charles 
Dingley at the University of Cape Town, who began research on electrification from a supply-
side point of view in the mid-1980s, funded by Eskom, the NPER and later the NEC. Dingley 
also worked with the Association of Municipal Electrical Undertakings (AMEU), an influential 
technically-orientated organisation of municipal electrical engineers. In a 1987 paper presented 
to the SAIEE he proposed for the first time the establishment of a national electrification 
programme run by a 'national electrification commission', since 
" .. to impose upon Eskom the responsibility for a national electrification programme would 
create an organisation with two widely divergent roles" (Dingley 1987:7), 
and attempted to spell out what the implications for such a programme would be technically, 
financially and institutionally. In a 1990 paper published by UCT's Department of Electrical 
Engineering, Dingley laid out the parameters for a 'national electrification programme' (Dingley 
1990:10). He also raised the question of financing, which was one of the central dilemmas to be 
solved. There were two important questions: the first was whether potential consumers could pay 
for the capital costs of connection; and the second was whether electricity use levels would cover 
distribution costs. Dingley's work was linked in important ways to the demand-side work being 











done in the EDRC36, and both lines were united in a ground-breaking graduate thesis on urban 
electrification by Theron (Theron 1991), supervised jointly by Dingley and Eberhard. This 
synthesis had two outcomes. First, it placed the concept of electrification into a broader energy 
policy context based on a demand-side approach to energy poverty, which, secondly, placed the 
energy poverty question, which had previously been posed primarily in relation to rural energy 
issues (which required a 'development' response) into a political context, in that it posed 
significant challenges to existing institutions and resource allocation patterns. 
Electricity policy in the 1980s, established by the Borckenhagen Committee in the 1960s, and 
forcefully re-emphasised by the De Villiers Commission, was that Eskom should confme itself to 
generation and transmission activities only. To this end, Eskom had been disposing of 
distribution assets in 1985 and 1986, and only distributed to large users and white farmers 
directly. In 1987, Eskom only had 270 000 customers, 100000 of which were farmers, and the 
rest mining and industrial customers (Interview with A Morgan, Eskom CEO from 1994 to 
2000). In the late 1980s, Eskom's leadership made a decision to unilaterally reverse this policy, 
and to involve the utility in the distribution industry; thus, by 2002, Eskom had 3 447 834 
customers, of which 3 297 379 were households (National Electricity Regulator 2002), only 
slightly less than the total number of customers supplied by all local authorities combined. This 
fundamental change in policy solved the institutional problem outlined by Dingley and others, 
and established the potential that Eskom be the key agency in a national electrification 
programme. 
The way in which Eskom involved itself in the distribution industry was via the takeover of 
existing electricity systems administered by Black Local Authorities, which were generally in a 
state of chaos ( see above). The initial impetus to get involved in electricity distribution in these 
areas was because of a growing bulk debt crisis in the late 1980s, whereby BLAs, because of 
non-payment (partly the result of a politically-motivated boycott), corruption and 
mismanagement, were unable to pay Eskom for their bulk electricity supplies. After exploring 
various alternatives, Eskom negotiated with the (apartheid-era) local authorities of Soweto and 
Johannesburg (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:276) to take over the Soweto electricity supply, 
which ended in a stalemate. In the late 1980s, Eskom took the unusual step (for a state 
corporation) of negotiating with (anti-apartheid) grassroots community organisations instead, for 
which it came under severe pressure from the apartheid securitY establishment (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000:277). In the early 1990s, Eskom successfully used its leverage with 
bankrupt local authorities which owed huge sums to Eskom for bulk electricity supplies to 
36 In an interview, Dingley stated that Eberhard's work on energy demand in poor households had for the first time provided a 











conclude transactions whereby the debt would be written off in exchange for Eskom taking over 
electricity distribution in the authority's area of jurisdiction. In 1992 Eskom finally took over 
electricity supply in Soweto, as well as in 38 other local authorities on a similar basis, and 
eventually took over distribution networks in 130 townships (Conradie & Messerschmidt 
2000:280). Later, a National Electrification Forum recommendation to Cabinet in 1994 that 
Eskom take over the utilities of the formerly 'independent' states was approved; thus, by 1994, 
Eskom had distribution rights in both urban and rural areas where the majority of unelectrified 
households were located, which formed the basis for Eskom's dominant role in the programme. 
After a few trial projects in the late 19805, Eskom began to undertake electrification on a large 
scale, which caused considerable tension between the CEO and the management team, and the 
Electricity Council, for both political and financial reasons. Politically, Maree and the Council 
were far less keen to move ahead of the apartheid government, whereas McRae was keen to 
engage with the unfolding political and social reality, as described by an Eskom engineer: 
"What was happening was that McRae was opening up some space internally in the 
organisation, but at the level of Council it was a very firmly Naf7 thing, and they were not 
going to move ahead of the Nats, and so there was this constant tension between those two 
men .. " (Interview with M Pickering). 
Initial electrification rates were low, due to stringent financial criteria imposed by management, 
but these were gradually removed. There were two related motivations for Eskom's increasing 
involvement in electrification, both of which were closely associated with Eskom's CEO, Ian 
McRae. The first was a strategic motivation, which McRae also found instrumental in persuading 
the more recalcitrant elements on the Electricity Council to commit the organisation to 
electrification: 
" .. one of the threats [of the transitional process] was the government 'nationalising' Eskom, 
moving not only to ownership, but to severe control, particularly because of the possibility of 
a change of government at that time ... .1 needed to get an answer; the question was when, not 
if, the ANC came into power, would they in fact want to take control of Eskom, in addition 
to being the owner, 1 was getting this question from all over the organisation .... 1 managed to 
get a lunch with [Mandela] and Thabo [Mbeki]38, and I put that very question on the table to 
them, and quickly Thabo said no, he thought Eskom was doing a good job; we were busy 
with electrification, and were busy with what we called an equal opportunities programme at 
that time .... Mandela came in; he agree with Thabo, but what he wanted to say to me was that 
it didn't matter who the government was; if the people put pressure on the government, then 
37 'Nat' = National Party, the apartheid-era ruling party. 











in fact the government would have to take action .... that was exactly what my concern the 
year before had been" (Interview with I McRae). 
What is notable about this lengthy passage is, again, the easy familiarity that Eskom's leadership 
had with both the old and the new political elite, as well as the importance for Eskom of 
establishing new wound rules in the transition as soon as possible. The second motivation began 
as a personal conviction shared by Eskom's leadership concerning the social necessity of 
electrification as a partial antidote to years of apartheid-inspired oppression and neglect in black 
communities, experienced personally by senior management when they visited areas in which 
Eskom had takenover distribution systems: 
"What was initially a financial imperative turned to a social imperative, and guys like Ian 
McRae and others, and I was amongst that team, went into these areas, and what we saw was 
just damn well shocking, and that's when the whole concept of electrification for all came 
about, that we needed then as an organisation to get involved, and I often referred to this as 
the years when Eskom found its moral purpose .... this was something that gave meaning to 
the organisation in terms of really serving communities" (Interview with A Morgan, Eskom 
CEO 1994-2000). 
This was translated into the corporate slogan: 'electricity for all' in the late 1980s. A large-scale 
electrification programme would rest on three things: institutional authority, political legitimacy, 
and technical and financial capacity. These were co-ordinated through a negotiating process 
which began with a conference organised by researchers from the EDRC under the auspices of 
the ANC in Cape Town in 1992, which was the beginning of a process of synthesis between 
Eskom's and the government-in-waiting's electrification policies. Many researchers linked to the 
EDRC were also involved in the ANC's newly-established policymaking structures, including its 
Science and Technology Working Group and its Minerals and Energy Group. 
The decision to hold the conference under the banner of the ANC was a deliberate political move 
to place electrification on the policy agenda in the context of the transition (Interview with A 
Eberllard). The Conference was remarkably successful in bringing together a wide range of 
actors in the electricity industry, including representatives from the ANC, the South African 
Communist Party, the Democratic Party. civic organisations39, trade unions, deve10pment-
focused NGOs, local authorities, the AMEU, and Eskom (Theron 1992:209). Government denied 
permission to DMEA officials to attend (there was thus no government representation), and also 
attempted to prevent Eskom from attending. Eskom themselves were very wary; however they 
attended unofficially (Interviews with senior DMEA officials). The most important outcome of 
39 Civic organisations in 1992 were community-based anti-apartheid organisations. which were loosely organised into a national 
anti-apartheid alliance called the United Democratic Front, which was disbanded shortly ~ the unbanning of tile ANC, which 











the C(Jnferencc .... 'as an infonnal agtccmcntto <!Stublish a Nstional Electrificmion Forum (NELF); 
Eskom's lcadt'TShip 'vas persuaded from thc Conft'l'cne<:: to commit Ihcmselves to participate 
(Interview with A Eberhard). 
The cOre ofNI::l. F was a manallen'~~'l eommin"" con.i",;ng of tcprcs<'nl"l;"C~ of the "MEU. the 
ANC. the Chamber of Mines. the DMEA. Eskom, the Nmional Union of Mir\eworken> und the 
NUlional Union of Metalworker.; of South Africa (the two ANC-al illflcd unions who hurl slrong 
presences in l-::Skom). Ihc South Africa Agrieulturnl Union and local authorilies via Ih<' Unit~'tI 
MU llieipal ElI<.'CuliYe. The concrete work ill NI1LF .... 1IS done by eight working groups focusillg 
on regulatory strnctur" and policy; hum,," n:sourccs; supply tednology am! standards: data on 
ek>ctrilication levels and needs; li llanee and !Uri ITs: tmnsitional issucs; end-usc and environment, 
including appl iunccs and environmental issu<.'S; and a management working group to i11legmtc 
the other processes (Nulional Elcctrificmion Forum 1993:3). These groups addrcsS<.xl a multitude 
of linllncial. lechnical and illstitutional o.;hallenges 10 u lurge-scale elcctriliclition progrnmme. 
including lcchnical inoollalion, problems in electrifying info1l1Ul1 settlements. lurboe-scale dt.'bl. 
and linancing oplions. 
'111CI'\: were two primary outcomes from NELF. The first was a conscnsus thai an 'occelemted 
nalional eIectrificmion programme', on a much larger scalc Ihan Eskom's planned programme. 
was neccssary. The final dctails of the programme were agreed between Eskom and ANC-
aligned energy pol icy activisls in 1994. lind wri twn into the CI1ergy policy seclion oflhe ANC's 
Recon:.truction and Dcvclopmenl I'rogmrnmc ·base document ' . the ANC's general social and 
C(:onomic policy frnme ..... ork: 
"An acceleratcd and iiiUslsinable c\cclrifinlion programme mUSI provide access 10 ciedrlcily 
ror an addilional 2.5 mi ll ion households by the year 2000. Ihcn:by inen:asing the "-'vel of 
acceSs to cicctricity 10 aoo"t n rer celli of all houS<.i>olds (do"hlc \he pn:scn! "u".ber). iloilo 
Ilrid and non-grid powcr ~"n:~'"S (such as solar cells aflll generators) m"" he employed. All 
schools and clinic~ must he eleclrifled ss soon a~ possible. Communil;C> nlUSl he ilwol~cd;1\ 
Ihe planning and nccU1ion of th is program"",. Micro. small and mcd;um·si~ ... -d enterprises 
milS! he given 5UPjlOfl and shown prererence in tile tendering proc~'SS~ (ANe 199·1b:SI.'<.'I;0I. 
2.1.7). 
The rteJ\t point provided prt.'Cisc costs and linancing dhl.'Ct ives for the project, which would he 
around RI2 billion, which should be ~ .. linaneed rrom within.he industl)' as for as possible via 
cross·subsidies from other cleclrici ly consumers·' (ANC 1994b:Scction 2_7.8). The scope of the 
progrnmme. numerically and linaocially. was derived from I:DRC policy n:scarch, which 
outlined the maximum fensi blc s i?.c o f lhe programme in financial tcons. Figure 4.11 bclow 















.... _A_ .... ____ ..... 
, 
critical in establislling the feasibil ity 
of II much Iligher conneClioo rate. 
and the programme was sustain~>d lit 
tile higher level for the following 
five years. 
The ik:COnd outcnme from NEI.F 
was II consensus that II pTO<:ess of 
inst itut ional refoml nl'Cded to be 
undertaken in the elct:trieity industry 
b",nl"Tlllly. There were t'"'"O pri malY 
drivers for this consensus: tm: iirst 
was thallllJ'lr1lK.-id-('ra institutions n!X'dl..! to be lransfomloo. and n:ndcred more accountable to 
the society generally: and the scrond WIIS that existing institutional arrangements "~rc 
inadequate for tile clct:trification pro£fllmme 10 be carried out successfully. particularly in tile 
distribution sector. This set in motioo a complex process of institutional reform. which will be 
discUSS("(! below. 
Institutional probh:'ms with thc implemcntalion of the electrification programme were solved in u 
piecemeal fashion. "'ilh a prominent role bdng pla}ed by the newly-formed indelX'ndenl 
regu lator. tile Natiollil l Ele<:tricity Regulutor. The first problem which needed to be addressed 
was the re lationship betwecn Eskom and local authori ties. which still controlled large urban 
areas ,",here c!eclri licalion was requi red. II was thus necessary to divide the 2.5 million betwecn 
Es~om and local autlloritics. which F..skom did t.>y scUing its O"TI taf!:.'C1 of60% of the 10131. 
The programme "''as conccived in two phases. The lirst lasted until 1999. wilen the uim was to 
electrify the \arb"'! 2.5 million housello lds. and the second opcn-('nded phase. from 2000 
onw~nJs, at a lower rail' of around 250 000 Ilouseholds per year. aims to electrify around 80% of 
all households by 2010. ,",hich inclu~~ a small proponion of households which an: not 
C"ConomicaJ to eOlI.l1C"C\ to the grid being provided with solar I'V systems. Thc capital cost of the 
connection was aoo is subsidised. ",hieh entai ls ;I cost of arow,d R I oi Il ion per annum. During 
the lirst phase of the pfI.1!.ramme, lhe I."api lal cost for the emire programme was covered by 
Eskom. v;a an agn.'Cment with local authorities. whcre fWJds for local authori ty ek'(:trilieation 
projects were trnnsfcITl.'d from Eskom 10 local ~uthorities via an auditing proccs~ managed by Ihe 
NER. After tbe eorporatisation of Eskom in 2001. wilen thc utility began to JIl.Iy tax and 
dividends. electrification was funded directl y from the liscus through lhe DMF~ and co-
onJination of the programme W .. IS shifted from Eskom and the NER to ~ National EJcetrifieatiOIl 











government departments, funders and the South African Local Government Association, based 
in the DME. In 2001,"66% of the households in the country were electrified (National Electricity 
Regulator 2001). According to the 2001 Census, 70% of households used electricity for lighting. 
but only around 50% used electricity for heating and cooking (Statistics South Africa 2001); thus 
many households are still dependent on unsafe and unhealthy fuels such as paraffin 40. As a 
result, government is considering introducing free basic electricity of 50kWh per month, to 
encourage higher use of electricity, in the absence of an integrated household energy strategy. 
Institutional Reform and Restructuring 
As mentioned above, one of the outcomes of the NELF was a commitment to institutional 
reform. The actual form this would take, however, was unclear - there were three levels of 
consensus within the forum. First, there was a high level of consensus that a powerful 
independent regulator be established. to regulate all aspects of the electricity system. which was 
supported by both Eskom. who supported illl independent regulator as a guarantee against 
politically-influenced price setting. and a development supported by international trends, and by 
ANC-aligned delegates and unions, who saw a regulator as a counter-weight to Eskom's 
domination of the electricity industry (Interview with A Eberhard). As an interim measure, 
Eskom had in 1994 concluded a second 'compact' with the new government, which was 
negotiated partly with the ANC in the run-up to the elections (in a correct anticipation of an 
ANC victory), and partly in terms of a requirement of the new government that parastatals 
produce a list often 'RDP commitments' (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:325). Eskom's 1994 
'compact', in addition to another price compact (reducing the real price of electricity by 15%) 
involved achieving a new set of goals involving electrification (the Eskom share of the 2.5 
million households), affirmative action ("50% of management, professional and supervisory staff 
should be black South Africans"), training and skills development, contributing financially to the 
electrification of schools and clinics, and protecting the environment by the year 2000 (Davis 
1997: 167). This compact provided a degree of stability for a window period of around five years, 
while the new regulator established itself. 
Second, there was more limited consensus on the need to restructure the distribution industry, 
both to overcome the legacy of apartheid, as well as for practical reasons related to the 
electrification programme. There was, however less consensus on which form the industry 
should take; this was a question which was deferred to the NER Third, there was no consensus 
4(1 The discrepancy between the census data and the NER data is not easy to explain: census data is gathered by door-to-door 
surveys, whereas the NER data is from audited figures for electrification nationally. which is then used to calculate percentages 
of electrified households based on census data. Other more detailed studies (but more limited in scope) indicate that it is likely 
that of the 50% of households which use electricity for cooking, many of these only use it occasionally. and use other energy 











on the question of restructuring the electricity supply industry; although this was not extensively 
discussed, there was a division between unions, who advocated an integrated state-owned utility, 
and other ANC energy policy activists, who were in favour of market reform, and the 
introduction of competition. This debate was also deferred. 
Government accepted NELF's recommendation to establish a regulator in October 1994 
(Eberhard 2003:24). The new regulator was envisioned by NELF as performing not only a 
licensing and economic regulation function, but also the role of an 'honest broker' in the energy 
system, as outlined in the ANC's RDP document: 
" .. a powerful, independent, national electricity regulator must be established to enforce 
public policy, ensure long-term financial viability, assure environmental sustainability, and 
act as an ombudsman in the event of conflicts between consumers, government and the 
electricity industry." (African National Congress 1994b:Section 2.7.10). 
The establishment of the NER involved a complicated institutional transformation. The new 
powers of the NER, which would include licensing all aspects of the electricity industry, 
including those of local authorities, would in effect take over a collection of functions performed 
formally and informally by the ECB, Eskom's Electricity Council and Provincial 
Administrators41 , as well as line ministries, which post-1985 effectively had a power of veto on 
Eskom's tariff increases. There were, for example, several members of the Electricity Council 
who were also members of the ECB; this was not regarded as a conflict of interest under the 
post-1987 governance system (Interview with I Lambrechts). However, while this apartheid-era 
regulatory regime depended largely on an extended and uniform policy network within the 
apartheid establishment (which included the new leadership of Eskom), the political transition 
required the new Regulator to have a high degree of independence in order to achieve legitimacy 
with both the electricity industry and the new government. The regulator was established by 
amending the 1987 Electricity Act and renaming the Electricity Control Board the National 
Electricity Regulator. In terms of the amendments, all electricity undertakings, including those of 
Eskom and of local authorities, required a licence (Clause 5, Electricity Amendment Act 
46/1994), and were thus subject to price regulation. The 1995 amendment provides for the 
independent funding of the NER through a 'licence fee' paid as a levy on electricity "generated 
for supply by any licencee concerned during the year concerned" (Clause 5B(3)(c), Electricity 
Amendment Act 6011995). NELF was disbanded in February 1995, and the NER was established 
in April 1995, with a staff complement largely comprised ofex-Eskom personnel, and headed by 
Ian McRae, the retired Eskom CEO. 












The regulator played three distinct roles over the next ten years; the first was to form a focus for 
the restructuring process in the industry; the second was to oversee the electrification 
programme, and the third was to fulfil the orthodox :functions of an economic regulator. The key 
role of the NER as a facilitator in the electrification programme and the restructuring process 
declined as the new government developed policy capacity in these areas, towards the end of the 
1990s. The NER initially played a key co-ordinating role in the electrification programme, 
between Eskom and local authorities; the overall co-ordination of the programme was later 
moved to the DME, but the NER still plays a pivotal role in auditing electrification projects for 
the purposes of :funding the programme. The NER also took over the role, previously performed 
by Eskom, of collecting data on the electricity industry as a whole. The NER's role as a 
facilitator in the restructuring processes can be divided into a broad role relating to the structure 
of the industry, and a narrower more technical role relating to the pricing structure of the 
industry. The former role has declined as the post-apartheid government's policy capacity has 
increased in the DME and the Department of Public Enterprises; however the latter role is crucial 
as local authority tariffs are restructured, as well as the wholesale pricing system, as a prelude to 
market reform. Although a new wholesale pricing system has been introduced, market reform 
has been postponed indefinitely. 
State interest in restructuring the distribution industry began slightly before the transition, when 
the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs requested the NEC to undertake an investigation of 
the EDI in February 1991, which unsurprisingly 
" .. confirmed that a fragmented organisational structure had developed which had led to poor 
quality and expensive services in certain cases, a lack of specialisation and economics of 
scale in others. and a multiplicity of policies and tariff structures .. " (National Energy Council 
Annual Report 1992:26). 
Unfortunately, one of the main underlying problems in the industry was apartheid itself, which 
could not be addressed in this context; the NEC's concerns were superseded by the negotiation 
processes in NELF. There was some tension in NELF concerning its actual mandate, and 
whether the 'E' stood for electricity or electrification (Interview with A Eberhard). Although 
NELF failed to devise a comprehensive restructuring policy, two significant things were 
achieved. The first was the establishment of the NER, one of the aims of which was to play a 
significant role in facilitating and monitoring the restructuring process, and the other was the 
overseeing of Eskom's absorption of the remaining dys:functional local authority and 
'independent state'I'self-governing territory' distributors. Aside from comprising an important 
form of rationalisation (given the dys:functionality of these distributors), these areas represented 











important for the electrification programme. According to NELF reports, in TBVC states only 
8% of households were electrified, and in 'self-governing territories' only 17% of households 
were electrified (National Electrification Forum 1993:2). During this period, Eskom put forward 
its own distribution industry restructuring proposal, which was based originally on a model 
developed in 1988 at a workshop organised by Eskom's distribution division, related to 
electrification specifically as well as broader structural issues, particularly the complex and 
irrational structure of electricity tariffs operating in different distributors. In 1992, Eskom 
restructured their distribution operation into six regions, which was conceived and proposed as a 
general model for the whole country's distribution industry (possibly as a separate entity from 
Eskom), partly in order to solve the bulk debt problem faced by many local authorities. 
Consultants were contracted to examine ways in which local authorities could retain their 
surpluses, where these existed, but the proposal was rejected by local authorities in 1993 
(Interview with A Morgan; Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:312-313). 
Immediately following its formation, the NER established the Electricity Working Group 
(EWG), consisting of representatives from the NER, government, local authorities and Eskom, 
but excluding other stakeholders such as unions or civic organisations (Eberhard 2003:30). The 
EWG reported both to the Minister of Minerals and Energy, as well as to the Minister of 
Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development (which at the time dealt with local 
government), and made recommendations to Cabinet, which set up an internal government 
committee, the Electricity Restructuring Interdepartmental Committee (ERIC) (1998 Energy 
Policy White Paper:30). In 1997, Cabinet approved this committee's recommendations, which 
were to restructure the EDI into 'the maximum number of financially viable Regional Electricity 
Distributors (REDs)' (Eberhard 2003:31). 
Estimates for this number varied significantly between five and nine. After further 
investigations, Cabinet approved the transitional process between 1998 and 2001, which 
involved demarcating six Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs), and creating a holding 
company as a transitional measure (Eberhard 2003 :31). Implementation of the restructuring 
process has, for several reasons, stalled; part of the reason for this is that large local authorities 
derive a considerable surplus from electricity sales, which amounted in total in 1997 to R2 
billion (Barbeton & KeswellI998:42), or around 5.5% oftotallocal authority revenue (Barbeton 
& Keswell 1998:46). However this revenue is not evenly distributed; a few small authorities 
make massive surpluses on electricity trading; the top four surpluses (in absolute terms) are 
generated by local authorities which distribute 40% of the electricity of local authorities but 
generate 50010 of the surplus, and 99 municipalities (25% of local authority distributors) lose 











(Barbeton & Keswell 1998:46). In addition to this, local authorities were restructured in 2000, 
which reduced their number, and removed much of the fragmentation which had resulted from 
apartheid. Whereas during the transition the legitimacy of local authorities was weak, and there 
was a lack of national co-ordination between them on policy matters as a result of apartheid 
divisions, the new generation of local authorities have been able to fonn a coalition with other 
state agencies, notably the Treasury, to protect their electricity-derived revenue base by stalling 
the restructuring process. Another obstacle is the new constitution (1996), which states, under 
the heading "Powers and Functions of Municipalities", section 156(1), that 
"A municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to administer .. 
.. electricity and gas reticulation" (South Africa 1996:83, 144), 
which potentially gives local authorities the legal tools to prevent the alienation of their 
electricity assets.42 
The debate on restructuring of the electricity supply industry only really began in 1998 with the 
tabling of the Energy Policy White Paper, which spelt out a tentative programme for the 
restructuring of Eskom into separate generation, transmission and distribution entities, with a 
view to possible introduction of competition (1998 Energy Policy White Paper) as a way of 
improving economic efficiency and transparency. This proposal to introduce market refonns was 
novel in South Africa: previous proposals for privatisation had not involved restructuring the 
electricity generation market, which raises questions as to where it originated. The proposal 
developed in two phases. The first was in the White Paper; the electricity section was fonnulated 
by DME electricity section officials and a small group from the EDRC, without Eskom's 
participation, and the second was in a series of high-level ministerial workshops in 2000 where 
the same group made a case for restructuring on the basis of Eskom's investment history 
(Interview with A Eberhard). However, as Eberhard points out, 
" .. there has never been a single, powerful champion for reform, neither in government, nor 
amongstthe stakeho Iders .. ". (Eberhard 2003: 19). 
Although a series of processes were set in motion in state agencies to introduce market refonns, 
including a detailed plan for a market design, any move to a market structure involving the 
unbundling of Eskom was indefinitely postponed in 2004, on the grounds that it was too risky to 
restructure the market when new generation capacity was required (Interview with A Eberhard); 
the outcome was partly a result of Eskom's consistent and subtle lobbying against the 
proposalS.43 
42 The restructuring of the distribution process continued in a piecemeal fashion in 200.5: the Cabinet made a new decision to 
restructure the industry around six 'metro' REDs based on existing distribution assets of the largest South African cities. which 
supersedes previous decisions on the structure of the REDs (Anton Eberhard, personal communication). 
<43 This included the commissioning of a series of studies by the utility to demonstrate the efficiency of the 'single utility' model, 











In common with other state-owned enterprises, Eskom was corporatised in 2001 via the Eskom 
Conversion Act, which replaced the two-tier stakeholder governance structure introduced in the 
aftermath of the De Villiers Commission with an orthodox board of directors. The original policy 
framework has effectively been replaced by another approach favouring the maintenance of 
Eskom's dominant position. Two striking developments of the last few years have been 1) the 
reversion to Eskom of'electricity planning processes44, despite the state's development of an 
integrated energy planning capacity, and 2) the recreation in the context of the post-apartheid 
state of Eskom's elite network, both with the political elite, and with a new industrial policy 
elite. Evidence for this is the ease with which Eskom has elicited support and funding from the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department of Public Enterprises, for its nuclear 
reactor development project. Part of the reason for Eskom's success in this regard has been its 
alignment with the African Renaissance project (supported by its practical involvement during 
the 1990s in establishing the Southern African Power Pool), its success in internal transformation 
(training and promoting senior black management), and its outstanding technical capacity. 
Another more structural reason is the compatibility between Escom's core competency and 
industrial development strategies currently being pursued by the new government, based on 
minerals processing and beneficiation. 
Conclusion 
One of the central features of the development of electricity policy which sets it apart from the 
development of other policy domains is its unusual institutional structure: application of policy 
networks models thus requires careful thought, since the central actor in this development, 
Escom, was at the same time the key industry stakeholder and the state's primary electricity 
agency, which complicates the application of resource dependency. The main question here is 
not what the nature and extent of the electricity policy community was, but whether it existed at 
all, and why: given Escom's level of autonomy, did it feel it was necessary to participate in a 
policy community, and why? 
The basic answer to this question, which will be elaborated on below, is that Escom's 
participation was based on its primary desire for autonomy, or to keep the state "out of the 
engine room", rather than a desire to increase profitability, raise prices or extend its market 
44 The reversion to Eskom of the primary responsibility for electricity planning had several dimensions. First. it sidelined the 
integrated energy planning process, which could have provided other policy alternatives to expansion (or mitigated it) such as 
energy efficiency or demand-side management. Second. during the 199Os, the NER required Eskom to produce an Integrated 
Resource Plan for the electricity system, which involved a sophisticated assessment of probable demand growth linked to least-
cost interventions (including new plant). This in turn was based on Eskom's own Integrated Strategic Electricity Plan, which was 
drafted by the planning section in Eskom. The new development had two effects: it marginalised the role of the NER in 
overseeing the whole system, and also marginalised Eskom's own internal planning system - decisions on recently-announced 
expansion plans were made by the generation division, rather than the planning division (A Eberhard, personal communication), 











share, which might have characterised industry actors in other policy domains (although these 
might have been important secondary goals at .times). This was related to a wider ideology in 
Escom, consistent over the 80 years of its existence, which· specified its driving ethos, built 
around a sense of the vital significance of electricity for national development, and Eskom's vital 
and central role in promoting, developing and sustaining electricity use45• The post-apartheid era 
merely resulted in the extension of this driving ethos to social development (electrification of 
poor households), and to the development of the African continent as a whole; thus, not only did 
Escom's leadership strive to protect their bureaucratic autonomy and power by keeping the state 
out of the engine room, but more importantly they believed strongly that it was (and is) in the 
national interest to do so. Threats to this autonomy have come from several directions in the last 
80 years, including political interference, the threat of a hostile regulatory regime (one which did 
not share Escom's pricing policy), and the threat of market refonn. Escom's engagement with a 
policy network has consistently been contingent on the existence of these threats. 
The context in which these policy networks developed is very significant: in other words, the 
way in which the electricity policy domain has been defined, which, as pointed out above, was 
very closely related to the institutional development of the electricity sector. The initial policy 
process which resulted in the formation of Escom in the 1910s and 20s was situated within a 
small group of scientific and technical advisors close to the Union's political elite, and their 
intention in establishing Escom was to create both a national utility and a national electricity 
agency, which would oversee the process of electrifying the nation as a whole. Following the 
fonnation of Escom, there was a long period of policy consensus (around four decades) during 
which electricity policy was defined by an 'industrial policy elite' (the most important member 
of which was the Chairman of Escom for its first 25 years), and by interactions between Escom 
and energy-intensive users (in particular, the gold industry) 
DQring this period, a series of key developments established the basic institutional contours of 
the South African electricity system. The central development, brought about by the 
development of the national grid, and the relationship between Escom and energy-intensive 
electricity users, was the division between electricity supply and distribution. The outcome of the 
Borckenhagen Committee decision in the 1960s achieved two things: first, it centralised 
decision-making concerning both price and electricity planning in Escom, and second, it 
removed local authorities from the electricity policy domain. Planning was further centralised in 
Escom by the development of the COU in 1971. Since there was no other electricity policy 
4S Although it is common to regard these kinds of ethos in state and non-state organisation as merely 'ideological' (deployed with 
purely strategic aims in mind, which does frequently occur), it is very misleading to underestimate the role that these play in 
defining the goals and behaviour of organisations inside the organisations, and of their leadership. This is borne out in interviews 











capacity in government, Escom became the key policy agency, and was instrwnental in 
developing policy proposals and legislatioll; even in the aftennath of its biggest political defeat, 
the De Villiers Commission. Until the 1990s, the domain of electricity policy was occupied 
entirely by Escom, and local authorities were regarded as an autonomous (but subordinate) 
policy domain. The DMEA in the 1980s, for instance, regarded Escom as a 'law unto itself, 
which should be integrated into energy policy institutions, but regarded local authorities' 
electricity systems as a separate domain46 (Interview with J Basson). The consequence of this 
was that Escom's specific concerns and focus (electricity for industrial development) came to 
predominate over a more civically-focused view of the electricity system. 
The reason for this can be found in the way that the two domains were delimited. While local 
authorities were possessed of a level of autonomy which was dependent on other non-electricity 
or non-energy institutions, the way in which Escom was traditionally understood was in terms of 
industrial and economic development. An examination of other policy influences during the 
1950s and 1960s on Escom (and electricity policy) reveals, behind a high degree of consensus on 
Escom's central activity (the extension of the electricity supply system), a complex process of 
bargaining, amongst the political and industrial elite of the apartheid state. Again, the central 
motivation for its involvement in the nuclear establishment, with the IDC, and in other projects, 
was to maintain its autonomy, and to a certain extent, to extend its own 'infrastructural power'. 
The way in which this was achieved was through the development of a series of informal 
relationships with key elites within the state, which usually comprised two groups of people: 
first, the politic3.t elite, including key cabinet ministers and the premier, and second, an industrial 
policy elite. In practice, this involved a delicate process of bargaining and accommodation, and 
was supported by key economic interests, specifically mining and heavy industry, who added 
significantly to Escom's prestige and influence within the state. There was a high degree of 
consensus between Escom, the industrial policy elite and industry, and close collaboration on 
large energy-intensive development projects such as the Free State goldfields and other 1950s 
and 1960s energy-intensive industrial developments such as Richards Bay. There was less 
consensus, but significant strategic bargaining, between Escom and the industrial policy elite on 
Cahora Bassa, the nuclear issue, and the 19608 hydro projects. Examples of more peripheral but 
politically important elite pressure included the electrification of politically important rural areas, 
and electrification of white farmhouses: all these processes were kept within the policy 
community and not ·politicised'. 
46 The two exceptions to this were the abortive attempts in the late 1970s and late 1980s to involve local authority distributors in 











This consensus was disrupted from the mid-1970s by policy crises beginning in the late 1970s 
and continuing until the mid-1980s. Unlike similar events in the coal industry, the outcome of 
the crises was not a change in policy paradigm (cheap electricity for industrialisation), but its 
preservation: the aim of the state was to force Escom to participate in a policy community. In 
order to achieve this, it was necessary to threaten its autonomy at the highest level. 
In addition to the factors cited by Steyn, including structural factors (increases in coal prices, the 
CDF, an autarkic planning process, an expansionist organisational culture), a fundamental reason 
for the crises was that Escom refused to negotiate with state agencies or others about what it 
regarded as its core activity (its expansion programme); as Alan Morgan, Eskom CEO in the 
1990s reflected: 
" .. right from the days of Jan Smuts [the 1920s], Escom had a fair amount of autonomy. but 
was never a law unto itself, and I think when Escom started to ignore the politicians, we got 
the Wim De Villiers Commission .... (Interview with A Morgan). 
The reason for the breakdown was the non-integration of Eskom into a newly-emerged network 
of planning activities structured around strategic responses to the oil crisis, and focused on 
economic planning processes which integrated large projects such as synthetic fuels, armaments, 
and energy-intensive industries with macro-economic policies on problems such as foreign 
exchange and inflation, all within the strategic context of apartheid in the 1970s, which 
privileged projects with strategic significance such as Sasol. The way in which the crises 
unfolded is politically significant. During the first crisis, political pressure from outside the state 
expressed the problem as a price problem, which was dealt with by the state as such (through the 
BTl); the BTl inquiry was not designed specifically to bring about changes within Escom, and 
the utility managed to deflect criticism by state agencies by asserting the importance of its 
central mission (rapid expansion of the electricity supply system), and, more importantly, by 
building political alliances with the political elite (which defended Escom) and its key 
consumers, who were wary of too much state interference in Escom's investment behaviour. 
Thus, by making some concession. Escom succeeded in gaining the protection of the most 
powerful state institutions. By contrast, a key strategic aim of the second inquiry was to bring 
about a leadership change within Escom (Steyn 2001:95); by this stage, Escom's planning 
process was considered to be the problem, and was isolated by the 1983 Commission as the only 
focus of the inquiry. The outcome of the De Villiers Commission was the integration of Eskom 
into a new policy context (commercialisation and privatisation of state enterprises), which 
emphasised its fInancial performance, and ignored Commission recommendations concerning 
integration of electricity policy processes in broader energy policy frameworks, or its strong 











for Escom's autonomy: first, its prestige as a premier state agency was shattered, which 
decreased its political power within the state; second, its price-setting autonomy was removed, 
and it was obliged to gain ministerial approval for price increases annually; and third, the state 
created the Electricity Council, a stakeholder forum, to govern it. Eskom embarked on a 
concerted campaign to regain its prestige through international benchmarking, as well as 
significant restructuring, and removed the state from the price-setting process through the 1991 
price compact. 
The most significant challenge, however, to the basic institutional structure of the electricity 
system, and potentially to Eskom's autonomy, was the transition to a post-apartheid state in the 
early 1990s. The key issues of the transition, accountability and control of electricity institutions, 
and their social utility, were focused on a single practical issue, electrification, which 
significantly changed the boundaries of the electricity policy domain. The distribution industry, 
previously ring-fenced in a relatively autonomous policy domain, was viewed as one of the key 
areas of intervention in electricity policy by the new government-in-waiting. Policy consensus on 
the necessity for thoroughgoing institutional refonn in the electricity system was underpinned by 
universal support for the electrification programme; institutional refonn was seen as a major 
factor in the success of the programme, particularly of the fragmented distribution industry. 
These developments were underpinned by the collapse of the boundaries of the 1980s electricity 
policy community, allowing a number of additional participants into the policy process during 
the transition. The focus of electricity policy shifted from industrial policy to social policy and 
institutional refonn; this, however, was a temporary process which expired at the end of the 
transition, with only two pennanent outcomes: the electrification programme, and the NER. 
The process of institutional refonn began with the establishment of a National Electricity 
Regulator, but stalled after this. There are a number of reasons for this. The first, and possibly 
most significant, is the way in which the electrification programme was planned and 
implemented. First, electrification was the basis for a detente between Eskom and the new 
government: aside from other motives of Eskom's leadership, Eskom successfully traded its 
resources (finance, technical capacity, institutional resources) to both manage neglected 
distribution areas and to carry out mass electrification, for political legitimacy; in the process it 
developed a corporate ethos suited to the new political environment. Escom emerged from the 
process (and a process of internal transfonnation) not as an apartheid-era institution, but as a 
powerful state agency involved in mitigating the effects of apartheid. Second, the success of the 
electrification programme, and of the ad hoc institutional innovations which accompanied it, 
including Eskom's takeover of bankrupt distributors and the general rationalisation of local 











further institutional refonn appeared to be unnecessary to accomplish electrification, political 
interest dissipated, the policy window closed, and the only remaining advocates of reform were a 
few less-influential state agencies, including the DME's newly-created electricity section, and 
the NER, and other 'policy entrepreneurs' without a significant political base. Third, traditional 
policy communities within the electricity system were resuscitated in a modified form by the end 
of the 1990s, and further undermined reforms in the absence of a clear pro-restructuring 
coalition; the new government began to see Escom as a powerful agent in the African 
Renaissance, and appreciate it in its traditional industrial development role. Local authorities, 
badly-organised and lacking legitimacy (due to their apartheid inheritance) during the transition, 
were able to organise effectively and build alliances with relatively powerful state agencies such 
as the Treasury. Eskom, having re-established its network with the new political and industrial 
policy elite, was in a strong position to resist reforms aimed at reforming the electricity market, 
and breaking the utility up into competing units. 
The relationship between these key developments in electricity policy and the development of 
energy policy begins in the 1970s, with the oil crisis. Unlike the situation in other countries, the 
hermetic nature of the South African electricity system, with no dependence on liquid fuels, and 
with limited substitution possibilities of electricity for liquid fuels. in the economy, excluded 
electricity policy from the strategic considerations which were the one of the main drivers of the 
creation of energy policy institutions in the early 1970s, with the important exception of the co-
ordination of Escom's coal procurement processes with coal policy objectives. An additional 
factor was the institutional nature of the electricity system: unlike other areas of energy supply-
related policy, there was no existing electricity policy or regulatory capacity within government 
departments. While Escom was represented at the highest level in key energy policy-making 
bodies such as the Energy Policy Committee, key electricity policy decisions, such as planning 
processes, price-setting, and the launching of new projects, were in no way integrated into 
energy policy institutions or processes. At the same time, electricity policy was defined in terms 
of supply only47, both for institutional reasons, and because of the prevalent energy policy 
paradigm of the time; electricity demand was excluded from consideration, except for a brief 
period in the NEC in the 1980s. 
It was hoped by energy bureaucrats that the creation of the DMEA, and then the NEC, would be 
able to integrate Escom into energy policy processes and institutions further. The ECB was 
partially integrated into the DMEA in 1980, which added to pressure from state agencies 
resulting in the De Villiers Commission, since in the wake of the BTl's inquiry it had gained 











some capacity to assess Escom's perfonnance48• Although the Commission contained significant 
proposals for the integration of electricity policy into a broader energy policy framework, 
ironically, the outcome of the Commission had the opposite effect: the role of the ECB was 
curtailed further, and Eskom was shifted to another Department (The Office for Public 
Enterprise); in any case, overcapacity had deferred any further planning decisions for around two 
decades. The other key plank of the Commission's recommendationS, energy efficiency, was 
allocated to Eskom, and did not result in the Department developing its own electricity policy 
capacity. 
The radical (but temporary) openness of the transitional period held significant promise for 
further integration of electricity policy into a general energy policy context, especially one 
widely supported during the transition based on social, environmental and economic 
sustainability: however, this failed for both institutional and political reasons. Institutionally, the 
creation of the NER was a very significant milestone, and created a genuinely independent 
source of expertise on the electricity sector. The political consensus which created it was based 
on two different factions: ANC-aligned policy activists saw it as a bulwark against Eskom, 
which they did not trust at the time, and the electricity industry saw it as a bulwark against the 
new state. Although the ANC faction in NELF saw it as a key instrument in promoting 
institutional refonn in the electricity sector, its very independence compromised its ability to 
perfonn this role, which it handed back to the state early in the restructuring process. The general 
institutional reforms necessary to implement an integrated energy policy were lacking (especially 
on the demand side), and the integrated energy planning process, when it was implemented, was 
institutionally weak and ineffective as a means for integration. Although the DME created an 
electricity policy capacity (initially to house the electrification programme), it struggled to 
compete with the network of top-level interaction which Eskom developed with the new political 
and bureaucratic elite, which comprised a new electricity-industrial policy community. Another 
factor was the remarkable success of the electrification programme, which restored Eskom's 
prestige, and further undermined claims by energy policy activists during the transition that an 
integrated energy policy, especially for households, was a prerequisite for tackling energy 
poverty (see below). The crucial development, however, was that after the government 
suspended ESI market refonn in 2004, decision-making about future expansions to the electricity 
system reverted completely to Eskom, which removed it from an energy policy context This was 
the opposite of the scenario agreed to in the 1998 White Paper, which proposed market refonn 
which would have displaced the planning function from Eskom; the state would then have 
influenced market structure through electricity policy. 











The result of this non-integration was that the central electricity policy paradigm proved to be 
remarkably dumble: from the 1920s to the 2000s, electricity supply problems were solved 
primarily by expanding the electricity system. Other measures, including integrated energy 
planning, demand-side management, energy efficiency, and macro-economic or industrial 
strategies aimed at intervening in the growth of electricity demand, were applied only 
sporadically, or not at all: demand-side management was supported by Eskom briefly in the late 
1990s for strategic reasons, to delay the requirement for new capacity (which would in terms of 
policy at the time have been built by a private supplier as a prelude to the introduction of a 
competitive market); electricity conservation was supported sporadically (after pressure from the 
De Villiers Commission) in the late 1980s, partly to manage peak load problems, until 
overcapacity in the early 1990s caused Eskom to switch to promoting additional electricity-
intensive projects. During the same period, the DMEA has not developed any effective 
conservation or energy efficiency programmes. 
In terms of the paradigm framework outlined in Chapter 2, electricity policies fall clearly into 
paradigm 0 until the 1970s. Limited substitution, and the integration of electricity and coal 
policy in the 1970s resulted in a limited integration of some aspects of electricity policy into a 
broader energy policy framework, although there was almost no institutional or policy 
integration. Despite sporadic pressures for paradigm 2-type policies, the lack of institutional 
capacity and the way that the electricity policy domain was defined excluded these types of 
policy from elaboration or implementation. An interesting example is electrification, referred to 
above: while proponents of electrification in the early 1990s in organisations such as the EDRC 
were also proponents of integrated energy planning, and integrated demand-side solutions to 
problems such as energy poverty, institutional and political factors had by 1994 framed the 
energy poverty problem (a complex problem related to the lack of energy services) as an 
electrification problem (a lack of electricity). This was due to a) the openness of Eskom to 
address energy poverty through electrification (and to finance and co-ordinate it); b) the lack of 
the same kind of development in other supply sectors, particularly in the liquid fuels sector (see 
Chapter 6); and c) the failure of the new government to develop suitable policy capacity to 
achieve this. The success of the electrification programme (which did not adequately address the 
energy poverty problem) deferred the development of other policy responses, and removed the 












The Development of South African Nuclear 
Policy 
Overview 
The South African nuclear programme was characterised by the last apartheid president, FW De 
KIerk as 
" .. yet another major expense which we would never have undertaken had it not been for our 
growing isolation and sense of confrontation with the international community. Ultimately, it 
was yet another cost of apartheid and of sanctions" (quoted in Conradie & Messerschmidt 
2000:212). 
Of electricity sent out from South African power plants between 1970 and ·1998, around 4% was 
generated by the country's sole nuclear power plant, Koeberg. During the period when South 
Africa was manufacturing its own nuclear fuel, this process probably consumed around Y4 of 
electricity generated by Koeberg. However, even though the programme was insignificant in 
terms of its impact on the energy sy tem as a whole, it was significant for three reasons: first, 
between 1970 and 1999 it was allocated around R31 billion (2000 rands)49, a significant 
allocation of resources; second, it was regarded for a period as the medium-term successor to 
coal as the country's primary energy source; and third, because it is currently undergoing a 
renaissance in the form of the Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor, strongly backed by the current 
government. 
There are three distinct aspects to the South African nuclear sector. The first is the production of 
natural uranium (which is sold on the world market), mostly as a byproduct of gold mining, 
which is undertaken by the private sector. The second is the state nuclear programme, which has 
involved a range of research and manufacturing activities, including nuclear weapons and fuel. 
The history of this programme can be divided into six phases. 
The initial phase involved an agreement with the UK and USA to produce uranium (mostly as a 
by-product of gold mining) and sell it entirely to them for their weapons programmes, which 











lasted until 1970. In the second phase, a South African research programme was set up in the late 
1950s. By the end of the 1960s, the programme bad reached maturity, and the third phase was 
embarked on: construction of a pilot enrichment plant, as well as a nuclear weapons programme. 
The fourth phase, the most significant in terms of scale and resources, began in the late 1970s, 
when a decision was taken, based to some extent on South Africa's inability to buy nuclear fuel 
on the world market due to nuclear sanctions, to initiate a full fuel cycle, which began operating 
towards the end of the 1980s. The fifth phase, concurrent with the end of apartheid, saw the 
decommissioning of the fuel cycle plants, leaving only a range of peripheral activities, including 
the research reactor, SAFARI-I. The sixth phase could possibly involve a limited renaissance, 
based on fuel fabrication for the PBMR. 
The third aspect of the South African nuclear sector is the nuclear plant Koeberg, consisting of 
two 900MW French-built pressurised water reactors, the construction and operation of which has 
been relatively autonomous from the state's nuclear establishment, other than a period in the late 
80s and early 90s when Eskom was forced to buy fuel from it. Eskom is currently attempting to 
develop its own nuclear reactor technology. 
Actors and Institutions 
1) International Actors 
South Africa's long involvement in world nuclear affairs was an outcome of the discovery of 
uranium reserves in the 1940s, which was used as leverage by a series of South African prime 
ministers, beginning with Smuts in 1940, to gain access to nuclear technology and expertise. 
This integration into the weapons programmes of the UK and USA as one of the key uranium 
producers at the dawn of nuclear technology was facilitated via Jan Smuts' role (then Prime 
Minister) in Churchill's War Cabinet. Smuts not only realised the strategic importance of 
uranium, but was also personally an avid believer in the promise of the Nuclear Age; on meeting 
Niels Bohr in the 1940s, he commented: 
"This is tremendous, as though one is meeting Shakespeare or Napoleon - someone who is 
changing the hist01Y of the world" (Newby-Fraser 1979:20). 
Smuts performed a key role in an initial round of nuclear diplomacy, which culminated (after his 
death) in 1950 in an agreement with the Combined Development Agency, a co-operative 
uranium procurement agency set up by the USA and UK (Newby-Fraser 1979:24), to buy all 
South Africa's uranium production. In 1958, declining requirements by the CDA for uranium led 
to modifications to the agreement, which allowed South African producers to sell the surplus 
elsewhere. The final contracts of the agreement terminated in 1970 (Hofmanner 2002: 135). 











discovered; as a result South Africa was granted privileged access to both foreign nuclear 
expertise and to international nuclear forums. The CDA agreement 
" .. positioned [South Africa] as a leading uranium producer, and gave the country status in 
developing international atomic energy relations .... from 1953, South Africa supplied the US 
and Britain with huge amounts of uranium and this enabled her direct involvement with 
atomic energy authorities in both countries" (Hofmanner 2002: 135). 
The close ties to the UK and USA nuclear establishments allowed the South Africans to profit 
both through ties with specific programmes (and the acquisition of a research reactor from the 
USA through Eisenhower's 'Plowshares' programme) and concomitant technology transfers, and 
through participation in international nuclear organisations, initially participating in United 
Nations conferences on nuclear energy, before becoming one of the founder members of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. 
The country retained a seat on the IAEA's Board of Governors (ironically, as African 
representative) until 1976, when South Africa was removed because of international anti-
apartheid pressure (Newby-Fraser 1979:10-12). Following this, South Africa was gradually 
excluded from the international nuclear establishment, a process which was accelerated when it 
became plain in the late 1970s that South Africa possessed a nuclear weapons capability 
(Hofmanner 2002:138). South Africa's active involvement in the international nuclear 
establishment only commenced after its accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
in 1991, and the country began to play a significant role again in the late 1990s, and again has a 
seat on the IAEA's Board. 
2) The Nuclear Establishment 
The term 'nuclear establishment' is used in this context to refer to the collection of state agencies 
whose chief function was to develop and promote nuclear technology in South Africa. The initial 
aim of government nuclear institutions in South Africa was to oversee the uranium exploration 
and production process on behalf of the state. Initially this was done through a Uranium 
Research Committee set up in 1946 by Smuts, but this was succeeded in 1948 by the Atomic 
Energy Board, established in terms of the Atomic Energy Act (35/1948), which gave the board 
wide powers to control and oversee all aspects of uranium production, nuclear technology and 
nuclear power. 
In the 1950s, the AEB extended its functions from regulation to research, and initiated a research 
programme into various aspects of nuclear technology from the late 1950s. By the end of the 
1960s, research was focused on enrichment technology, and a separate subsidiary, the Uranium 
Enrichment Corporation (Ucor) was created, partly to separate the strategic elements of the 











to implement enrichment research in the construction of the so-called 'V-Plant', a pilot plant 
using the South African enrichment technology, which was extended in the mid-1970s to 
produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. Research was conducted on nuclear explosives, in the 
early 1970s allegedly for civilian applications (so-called 'peaceful nuclear explosives'), and from 
the late 1970s for military use (Hofmanner 2002:313). A relationship was developed in the late 
1970s with Armscor, the state weapons manufacturer, who took over the 'military' side of the 
nuclear weapons programme. In the late 1970s, work began on a scaled-up enrichment plant 
which would produce nuclear fuel for Eskom's new nuclear power plant. 
A restructuring process was undertaken in 1982, pursuant to a Cabinet-appointed inquiry, which 
resulted in the establishment of the Atomic Energy Corporation in terms of the Nuclear Energy 
Act (92/1982), a holding company for Ucor and the Nuclear Development Corporation (Nucor), 
a newly-created subsidiary comprising the non-Ucor functions of the AEB. In 1985, PW Botha 
ordered a halt on further development in nuclear weapons, and Ucor was merged into the rest of 
the AEC as part of a restructuring exercise which marginalised the strategic weapons-related 
aspects of the AEC's activity and centralised the nuclear fuel cycle elements. In 1989, President 
De Klerk ordered the dismantling of the weapons programme, and the Y -Plant was shut down in 
1990. The domestic fuel cycle reached its peak production in the early 1990s, and was 
sequentially shut down in. the mid-1990s, experimental enrichment programmes were terminated, 
and the AEC was restructured in 1999 as the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa 
(NECSA) in an effort to commercialise some of its remaining peripheral technologies, since by 
this point it did not have any programmes remaining which related directly to nuclear power. 
The new government was also keen to 'rebrand' the organisation to dissociate it from its 
apartheid past. Currently there is a possibility that NECSA will fabricate fuel for the PBMR, if it 
is commercialised. 
3) Regulatory Agencies 
The original institutional framework vested all regulatory powers pertaining to nuclear materials 
and technology in the AEB. In 1963, the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Security) Act 
(43/1963) was passed, which stipulated that all nuclear installations had to be licensed by the 
AEB (including the AEB's own installations). This self-regulation continued until 1982, when 
the Nuclear Energy Act (92/1982) created a quasi-independent Council For Nuclear Safety. In 
terms of the Act, the AEC still granted licenses for nuclear installations, but was obliged to 
consult the council. The Council's administrative functions were carried out by the AEC, the 
Council consisted mainly of personnel from the nuclear establishment, and the Minister could 











This pseudo-independent regulation continued until 1988, when the CNS was separated from the 
AEC, and given jurisdiction over the licensing process (Nuclear Energy Amendment Act 
56/1988), although still dependent on seconded AEC staff. The CNS was replaced in 1999 by a 
fully-independent National Nuclear Regulator in terms of the National Nuclear Regulator Act 
(47/1999). 
4) Other State Agencies and Structures 
The most significant agencies outside the nuclear establishment have been Eskom, Armscor, the 
IDC, and the PBMR project. Armscor's role was limited to the nuclear weapons programme 
from the late 1970s to its termination in the late 1980s, and involved the manufacture of nuclear 
explosives. 
Eskom was involved in a series of inquiries, . and represented on a series of committees, 
investigating the feasibility of nuclear power in South Africa from the late 1950s onwards, 
usually representing Escom, the nuclear establishment and the IDC; Escom was also represented 
on the AEB's board from 1958. Escom developed its own nuclear engineering division in 1969, 
as a prelude to the development of its limited nuclear power programme, which began with the 
construction of Koeberg power station in the 1970s. The involvement of the nuclear 
establishment in the operation of Koeberg has been limited to three areas: 1) licensing; 2) nuclear 
waste disposal, which is the statutory responsibility of the nuclear establishment; and 3) the 
development of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, which produced fuel for Koeberg from the late 
1980s to the early 1990s, after which it ceased production. Eskom's nuclear programme 
escalated during the 1990s through its involvement in the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor project, a 
high-temperature gas-cooled reactor concept, which had been developed by former AEC 
engineers; however, the project is still at a conceptual stage. 
The IDC's role, brokered by its chairman Van Eck, was significant in the 1950s and 1960s in 
exploring and developing common ground for the development of nuclear power in South Africa 
between Escom and the AEB, although available evidence indicates that its role decreased once 
the contours of the nuclear power programme had been established in the late 196Os. The IDC 
re-entered the nuclear arena in the late 19908, taking a significant stake in the PBMR project. 
Another key category of government structures consisted of government departments. The line 
department, under which authority the AEB nominally fell, was the Department of Mines, on 
account of the AEB's regulatory role in the uranium industry. This department subsequently 
became the DMEA in 1980. However, in reality very little interaction occurred between the 
Department and the nuclear establishment until the late 1990s. While the nuclear establishment 











develop any nuclear policy capacity. When the DMEA was created in 1980, unlike other energy 
functions and institutions, the nuclear establishment was not transferred to the Energy Branch, 
and aggressively protected its monopoly on nuclear policy activity: energy-related state agencies 
frequently used the term "non-nuclear" to emphasise that they were not trespassing in the 
AEB/AEC's domain. Until the DME created a nuclear energy section in the late 1990s, policy 
and legislation were developed by the nuclear establishment itself, which 
" .. had its own legal office and employed its own legal advisor .... and was directly involved in 
drafting legislation" (Hofmlinner 2002: 140). 
Policy initiatives, budget requests and large-scale programmes were usually approved by a select 
group of cabinet ministers, usually including the premier; from 1990 (the end of the nuclear 
establishment's strategic role) political access and influence declined considerably (Interviews 
with W Stumpf, A Jackson, W Grant, J Basson). 
5) Uranium Production 
Uranium production, an outcome of the CDA agreement, was begun by private mining houses in 
the 1950s, and has been marketed by a co-operative organisation called the Nuclear Fuels 
Corporation (Nufcor) since, owned and operated by the Chamber of Mines (Auf Der Heyde 
1993:33). South African production began in 1952, and peaked in 1980 at 7292 tons uranium 
oxide (DME 1994:9), before declining in the 1990s, partly as a result of declining world prices, 
and partly as a result of the decline of gold-mining, of which uranium production is a by-product. 
Most of the local production has been exported: of a total production (to the end of 1992) of 
94.184 kilotons of uranium, 4.774 kilotons have been sold locally (Auf Der Heyde 1993:33). 
Local sales began in 1980. 
There have been significant shifts in policy regarding the nature of the uranium resource; initial 
enthusiasm in the 1950s and the 1960s perceived local reserves as an indigenous source of 
energy and a raw mineral to which value could be added by beneficiation (conversion and 
enrichment); this was translated into esteem for the strategic value of indigenous resources in the 
1970s and 1980s. Initial plans for a large-scale conversion and enrichment plant were shelved in 
favour of a small-scale 'semi-commercial' plant, which produced enough fuel only for Koeberg. 
Enthusiasm for a local uranium fuel cycle waned sharply in the 1990s, as the massive cost of the 
fuel programme became apparent, and the transition coupled with South Africa's accession to 
the NPT gave Eskom unfettered access to the world nuclear fuel market. In addition, hostility by 
the new ANC government to the nuclear establishment limited any further ambitions concerning 











Local resources were put back on the map at the end of the 1990s by a combination of three 
things: the first was the enthusiasm for minerals beneficiation in South Afri~ which has again 
become an important plank in government's minerals policy; the second was the conceptual 
resurrection of uranium by the government's Integrated Energy Plan, which classed local 
uranium as a domestic energy resourceso, and the third related development was the ANC 
government's newly-found enthusiasm for nuclear power, and the PBMR project in particular. 
The media reported in 2005 that " .. government wants to establish nuclear energy as a major 
supplier of power in South Africa, and the country must be able to supply its own energy 
requirements"; the same report quoted a DME official as saying that consideration was once 
again being given to enrichment (Business Day 8/612005, titled "Government yokes glowing 
potential of uranium to SA's energy demands"). 
The Political Economy of Nuclear Power in South Africa 
Secrecy surrounding the nuclear programme renders attempts to delineate the real costs of the 
programme futile; however, there is some useful information in the public domain. From an 
energy policy point of view, there are two potential areas of interest. The first is the economics 
of the fuel cycleS 1 , and the second is the economics of the Koeberg nuclear power plant. Figure 
5.1 below represents real funding (from the fiscus) of the nuclear establishment from 1970 to 
1999, which amounted to a total of R30.8 billion (2000 rands) over this period. The aggregate 
figures presented here include the weapons programme, sundry research programmes, the capital 
and operating costs of the fuel cycle plants, and loan repayments, which, although the loans were 
incurred in the 1980s, continued into the new century. However, the trend clearly indicates the 
massive increase in funding necessary to implement the fuel cycle; by. comparison, the weapons 
programme, based on the V-plant, which was constructed from 1971 and commissioned in 1978, 
~ It might seem odd to claim that domestic uranium resources do not constitute a domestic energy resource; however, the nature 
of enrichment technology (massive economies of scale, combined with the fact that most of the cost of nuclear fuel is the 
processing rather than the uranium itself), the comparatively small amount of uranium which is required to produce nuclear 
power, and the concomitant ease with which it can be stockpiled, renders the provenance of the raw metal irrelevant, unless 
domestic resources have a high energy security value, as the South African ones did under apartheid in the context of the 
weapons programme. The French nuclear programme, for instance, was motivated by a significant energy security component, 
since even though very little uranium is produced in France, a number of years' fuel and raw materials supply can easily be 
stockpiled. The implication, therefore, of a synergy between uranium resources and the presence of an energy resource, is a 
paradigm 1 conceptual error, since energy resources are entirely defined by the presence of conversion technology, which in the 
case of uranium is not merely a set of power plants, but a whole fuel cycle. In the absence or unatTordability of this technology, 
natural resources cannot be referred to as energy resources; similarly hydrogen could be referred to as an indigenous energy 
resource if fusion technology was viable. 
Sl The nuclear fuel cycle consists of the series of stages involved in the production and use of nuclear fuel, which are 
considerably more elaborate than for conventional fuels, not least because of the htmIrdous nature of the material. Briefly the 
stages of the fuel cycle are as follows: uranium ore is mined (in other locations, from a dedicated uranium mine, but in South 
Africa uranium is extracted from gold-bearing ore once the gold has been removed), the uranium is extracted, which produces a 
concentrate ofU308, or 'yellowcake'. This is converted to a gas, UF6, so that it can be enriched (see footnote 12 below). Once it 
has been enriched, it is converted into U02 in the form of a powder. In the next phase, the fuel fabrication phase, it is 
manufactured into appropriate fuel assemblies (depending on reactor type). and placed in a nuclear reactor. When the fuel is 
exhausted, it is removed from the reactor, and either reprocessed (to reclaim unspent fuel or plutonium), or stored, and finally 
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unsustainability of the programme became apparent. A key development at the end of the 1990s 
was the embracing of nuclear power by the post-apartheid government as a potential future 
energy source. 
1) 1940s to 1950s 
Nuclear policy during this period developed i~ two phases: in the flrst, government control (and 
secrecy) was established over all nuclear-related activities through a range of measures 
culminating in the establishment of a separate nuclear institution. The second phase consisted of 
the launch of a government nuclear technology research programme, which was placed within 
this restrictive framework rather than within a more orthodox scientiflc or technical context. 
From 1945 to 1950, an institutional framework was established on the basis of an agreement 
between the South African government and the CDA to prospect for uranium and explore the 
prospect of South Africa supplying the USA's and UK's nuclear weapons programmes. To this 
end, government instituted War Measure No 70 of 1945, which vested in the state the sole right 
to explore for, produce or trade nuclear material, and War Measure No 11 of 1947, which vested 
the right to nuclear technology (including patents and nuclear energy technology) in the state 
(Hofinanner 2002:138). Further, Smuts established a Uranium Research Committee to oversee 
the investigation. These measures were put on a permanent footing by the Atomic Energy Act 
(35/1948), the aim of which was: 
" .. to provide for the control of prospecting and mining for and treatment of certain materials 
and of ores containing such materials, of the processing, concentration, purification and use 
of such materials, and of the production and use of atomic energy and radioactive isotopes, 
and for that purpose to establish an Atomic Energy Board and to define ~ts functions; and to 
provide for the control of certain patents and for other incidental matters." (Atomic Energy 
Act 35/1948: 'Aims'). 
The Board was given wide powers to enforce, control and oversee the extraction and processing 
of nuclear materials, and also the right to produce nuclear energy, which was at that time only a 
theoretical possibility. The Act also contained a stringent secrecy clause which stated that: 
''No person shall, without the consent in writing of the chairman or the deputy chairman of 
the Board, communicate, transmit or make known to any person, whether in or outside the 
Union, any information in regard to reserves of ores containing any prescribed material or 
the annual output of such material or ores by any person or the price paid to any person in 
respect of any such material or ores, or any information or particulars of any investigation or 
research or any discovery or invention relating to the processes or use of any prescribed 
material or the production of atomic energy, or any such investigation or research financed 











treatment of ores containing any prescribed material." (Atomic Energy Act 3511948:Clause 
28(1». 
The culmination of investigations in the 1940s into the presence of uranium in South Africa 
revealed that uranium could be produced as a by-product of gold mining, and two agreements 
were entered into: the first between the CDA and the South African government, whereby the 
CDA would fmance uranium processing plants at various gold mines, and would buy South 
Africa's entire production at a price which recognised the strategic nature54 of the commodity. 
Subsequent amendments to the agreement in 1958 and 1961, which lifted the restrictions on end-
use by the USA and UK (the original agreement specified military/strategic only, whereas by the 
1950s, civilian use became a possibility), and removed the limitation on selling to other parties, 
as well as "stretching out" the total amount contracted to 1970 (Hofmanner 2002: 135, Henshaw 
1989:317). The first uranium plant was opened by the Prime Minister, D F Malan, in 1952 
(Hofmanner 2002: 135). 
The 1950s was a period of exploration of the potential of nuclear technology for the network of 
South African government officials, scientists and engineers who were part of the embryonic 
nuclear establishment. This exploration was significantly aided by international linkages 
facilitated by the CDA agreement. The key event was a government-sponsored mission to 
Europe in 1955 which consisted of, amongst others, several key figures in the later development 
of the nuclear establishment: Dr H Van Eck55, prominent industrialist and chairman of the IDC; 
Dr J T Hattingh, chairman of Eskom; Dr M Naude, head of the CSIR and board member of the 
AEB; and Dr A Roux, later head of the AEB. The mission attended the First United Nations 
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva (Newby-Fraser 1979:31), as well 
as undertaking a study tour of the United Kingdom's nuclear technology programmes, which 
was undertaken as part of a series of negotiations then underway to amend the CDA treaty to 
permit the UK and USA to buy uranium at the "strategic" price for civilian use (Henshaw 
1989:318). The South African government, 
" .. in seeking to draw strength from the possession of uranium .... was undoubtedly aware that 
it was exceptionally well-placed to acquire the technology and the industrial capacity which 
would assure the Union ofa leading position in the atomic field .. " (Henshaw 1989:321-2). 
Sources differ on the mission's report: Henshaw asserts that the mission reported that nuclear 
energy was not yet economically viable, but that co-operation agreements should be concluded 
in this field with both the UK and USA; additionally, the production of heavy water should be 
54 "South Africa (along with other producing countries) had been asked to forgo additional financial advantages in the interests of 
Western security .. " (Henshaw 1989:316) 











explored in the Unions6 (Henshaw 1989:321); whereas Newby-Fraser concurs on the nuclear co-
operation recommendation, but adds a recommendation that nuclear scientists be trained in South 
Africa, and that a nuclear power plant should be constructed in Cape Town (Newby-Fraser 
1979:33). Although Henshaw is probably more reliables7, the difference is probably due to a split 
in the mission between pro- and anti-nuclear power factions: Hattingh, the chairperson of 
Eskom, was extremely sceptical about the application of nuclear power in South Africa, and 
apparently almost came to blows with Naude on the subject (Newby-Fraser 1979:32), whereas 
VanEck, Naude and Roux were enthusiastic supporters. 
The AEB utilised the political momentum of the mission to lobby for a commission of inquiry, 
and an AEB committee, jncluding Van Eck and Naude, drafted the terms of reference of the 
'Commission of Inquiry into the Application of Nuclear Power in South Africa', appointed in 
1956, and reporting in 1960. The Commission focused on the western Cape, and considered the 
issue from the point of view of future demand, impact on the railway system and coal producers, 
comparative costs of coal and nuclear energy, and "the distribution of extra costs, if any, of 
producing power from nuclear energy" (1956-60 Nuclear Power Commission:iii). The 
Commission included prominent figures in the coal industry, Escom, the railways, and also Roux 
and Naude. 
During the course of the Inquiry, a significant shift in the institutional nature of the AEB 
occurred, and the Commission's findings were an afterthought. The shift began by the signing of 
international nuclear technology co-operation agreements in 1957 with both the UK and USA, 
which provided for training of South African personnel, the exchange of information on nuclear 
technology, and the exchange of nuclear materials, which 
" .. enabled South Africa to fonnulate a research and development programme in 1958, in the 
confidence that it would receive assistance" (Hofinlinner 2002: 13 7). 
The same year, in spite of a growing hostility towards South Africa within the UN, South Africa 
became a founder member of the IAEA, with a permanent seat on the board (Henshaw 
1989:325). 
The key policy shift at the end of the 1950s was the adoption of a South African Nuclear Energy 
Research Programme in 1958. The choice :was made from two options: the first was put forward 
by Roux, whose suggestion was that the programme be carried out by the Board, and the second 
was proposed by Naude, head of the CSIR, who proposed that the programme be based in the 
CSIR (Hofmmmer 2002: 130-133). The significance of the choice was the institutional context: 
on the one hand, a relatively open research environment (the CSIR) more integrated with other 
50 The heavy water idea came initially from Van Eclc, the idea being to utilise the country's cheap electricity prices (Newby-
Fraser 1979:34). and it was investigated in the 19508, but was not further developed. 











research activities; and on the other a closed institutional environment designed for strategic 
purposes, and not accessible to the general scientific community, or anyone else
s8
• The Cabinet 
opted for the latter. The consequence was, as Hofnlanner observes, that: 
" .. the AEB managed to get a fmn hold of certain aspects relating to nuclear energy research, 
namely, its contribution to industrial development and national political strategy, and to 
advance this purpose in the form of scientific research.. ..the course of nuclear energy 
research would have been different had the national programme been allocated to the CSIR .. 
. .it seems likely that there would have not been the costs .... that have.burdened the country 
through the enrichment and weapons programmes .. " (Hofinanner 2002: 133). 
In other words, the institutional nature of the AEB, with its legislated culture of secrecy, its 
strategic aspects central to its functions, and the elite network of which key members formed a 
part, undermined its public scientific or technical character and hastened the adoption of 
technical-strategic goals heavily conditioned by the geo-political challenges facing the apartheid 
state, rather than pursuing a trajectory based purely on national development goals. This was 
done in terms of amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (27/1958, 35/1959), which established 
the necessary institutional parameters for the development of a research programme, as well as 
changing the composition of the Board to include Escom, representatives of uranium producers, 
representatives of industry, and senior bureaucrats from the Departments of Mines and Foreign 
Affairs (27/1958). At this point, the AEB found premises outside Pretoria and was transformed 
from a Board which regulated the nuclear industry into a large research and development 
organisation, and finally an industrial operation employing around 6000 people at its peak in the 
1980s. 
It was in this context that the Nuclear Power Commission reported its findings, which were 
negative about the immediate prospects of a nuclear power plant at the Cape, given the impact on 
the coal industry, the railways (which would both lose business), and the adequacy of current 
arrangements until the late 1960s (1956-60 Nuclear Power Commission:40). There were two 
notable conclusions, however: the first recommended that Escom, rather than a local authority or 
the AEB, build and operate a nuclear plant if one was built, and the second was that 
" .. there can be no doubt, however, that the advent of nuclear power in South Africa on an 
appreciable scale at some future date would certainly provide a stimulus not only to the 
expanding of existing industries, but to the establishment of new industries capable of 
applying skills, often of a highly specialised character, to the construction of an atomic 
power reactor, as well as to the production of the necessary materials and their fabrication 
into the innumerable components comprised in such a reactor. These industries would 
include those concerned with all branches of engineering, steel production and metallurgy, 











electronics. chemistry and mining. to mention but a few .. " (l956-60 Nuclear Power 
Commission:41 ). 
The vision contained in this fmding is of a large industrial complex. which would link naturally 
with the existing industrial structure of the country, and exhibit the same synergies existing in 
the then-emerging MEC; the existing coal-based energy supply paradigm would evolve into a 
nuclear-based energy supply paradigm, which would have enhanced industrial linkages with the 
rest of the MEC. 
In the light of Escom's apparent reticence, the Commission noted that Escom was obliged in 
terms of its mandate to continue investigating nuclear power, since the utility was. in tenns of 
the Electricity Act: 
.... charged with the duty to provide a cheap and ahundant supply of electricity within the area 
for which it is licensed. and these comprise most of the heavily industrialised areas of the 
country. Consequently. [Escom] is under a tacit obligation to investigate all methods of 
electricity production which might cheapen power supplies and ensure the adequacy thereof 
within [Escom' s] field of responsibility" (1956-60 Nuclear Power Commission:39). 
This would be achieved, the Commission noted, through the recently-established Nuclear Power 
Committee under the auspices of the AEB, which would bring about "co-ordination of research 
and other activity in the sphere of nuclear power", and which would have amongst its members 
representatives of Escom. coal producers, the IDC and uranium producers (1956-60 Nuclear 
Power Commission:39). The Committee continued to meet until Escom's nuclear power 
commitments in the late 1960s rendered it superfluous. 
2) 19605 to 19705 
The 1960s saw the development of a nuclear technology research programme which culminated 
in a series of decisions in the late 1960s committing the nuclear establishment and Escom to a 
specific technology path involving uranium enrichment, a weapons programme and a nuclear 
power programme. The decade began with the ordering of a US research reactor, Safari-I, under 
the American Atoms for Peace Programme, which was subjected, in terms of a USA-South 
African agreement, to IAEA safeguards. The decade also began with a significant change in 
leadership in Escom: Hattingh, who was very sceptical about nuclear power, retired and was 
replaced by Dr R L Straszacker, who was not only more favourably disposed to nuclear power, 
but also an acquaintance of Roux, who was appointed head of the AEB at the end of the 1950s; 
the two were for a time colleagues at Stellenbosch University (Newby-Fraser 1979:37), the 
intellectual centre of Afrikaner Nationalism. There was also a process of ~Afrikanerisation' 
inside the AEB, through the exclusion of personnel who were not part of the Nationalist political 











were members of the Broederbond; Straszacker was made a member in 1965, co-incidentally the 
year of the second and more decisive nuclear power investigation (Wilkins & Strydom 1979, 
Appendix 1, Interview with A Jackson). 
Research and Commitment: Escom and the AEC 1958-1969 
Research in the AEB from 1958 to 1969 covered a wide range of nuclear technology-related 
fields. However, there were two basic lines of technology development which were pursued by 
the AEB in the 1960s: the development of an indigenous reactor concept, and the development 
of a uranium enrichment process. From a nuclear power perspective, these two projects were 
technologically mutually exclusive, and represented the two basic technological approaches to 
nuclear power; countries such as Canada without access to military-based enrichment facilities 
had generally opted for natural uranium reactors, whereas countries such as the US, the UK and 
France, which had invested in weapons-related enrichment plants, opted for enriched uranium 
reactors. The technology choice in South Africa was overlaid by a strategic concern for self-
sufficiency, which grew stronger as international pressure against apartheid increased. The 
reactor concept, the 'Pelinduna' project, was conceived as a natural uranium reactor moderated 
by heavy waterS9, whereas the enrichment project was premised on construction of an enriched 
uranium60 reactor, or nuclear weapons. Both heavy water and enriched uranium require capital-
and energy-intensive manufacturing processes, and massive economies of scale, or have to be 
sourced from countries which have such facilities; concerns with nuclear technology dependence 
on foreign states became significant in decision-making from the mid-1960s. 
The AEB' s reasoning for deciding between these two research paths was that the organisation 
only had the capacity to pursue one of them to the next phase, a pilot plant (Newby-Fraser 
1979:125). In reality, there was a more complex decision-making process functioning along 
several different channels. Technically, the enrichment research was more promising (Interview 
with W Grant), but in addition to that, two other processes were unfolding. The first was the 
enrichment process itself, and the second was a decision-making process concerning the 
establishment of a nuclear power programme The second process was relatively open (by AEB 
standards), and engaged Escom and others, whereas the first was highly secretive, and research 
and decision-making was not extended beyond the immediate programme, a few trusted 
intermediaries such as VanEck, and the Prime Minister and a select few other ministers. The 
enrichment research and development process can be termed the "inner core" of decision-making 
59 Heavy water has the same chemical composition as normal water, but the hydrogen atoms are deuterium, an isotope of 
~drogen which contains a proton and a neutron in its nucleus (rather than just a proton). 
Natural uranium consists of two isotopes: primarily of U238' with less than a percent of U235• Enrichment is the process 











and development at the AEB, whereas the relationship with Escom, and involvement with 
reactor choice constituted an "outer core", which lagged behind decisions made in the "inner 
core" by a few years. 
The enrichment research programme was initiated in 1961, and conducted in an atmosphere of 
complete secrecy, initially in a laboratory hidden behind the f~ade of a motor workshop in 
Pretoria. The programme required significant extra funds in 1963 and in 1966, which were 
obtained by direct meetings between Roux, his colleagues and the Prime Ministers of the time. 
Other complementary research programmes such as uranium processing were continued, but the 
rest gradually shut down (Hoffinanner 2002:143-144). By 1966, the organisation was focused 
primarily on enrichment and related research avenues aimed ultimately at manufacturing 
enriched nuclear fue161 ; Hofinanner argues convincingly that this focus was inherent in Roux's 
original research proposal in 1958 (Hofinanner 2002: 145). The announcement made by Roux in 
1966 that other research avenues would be shut down was followed by a request to Cabinet for 
funding which was an order of magnitude greater than had been provided in the past, in order to 
construct a pilot plant. This development also represented another institutional shift: the AEB 
was changing from a research organisation to a proto-industrial complex. In 1967, a new Atomic 
Energy Act (90/1967) was passed to facilitate this transformation, which enabled the Board to 
incur loans which would be guaranteed by the state, and tightened the regulation of nuclear 
installations, which up to then had only consisted of uranium processing facilities. 
In order to persuade government to commit itself to funding the pilot enrichment plant, a "highly 
classified" report was compiled by Van Eck (and a small committee of 'independent' experts) 
for the AEB on the enrichment programme: 
" .. to draft an independent [sic] recommendation to the Cabinet regarding the future 
prosecution of uranium enrichment in South Africa" (Newby-Fraser 1979: 1 00), 
and to persuade them to spend public money on it, and found that 
" .. the South African process could be developed in a large-scale plant which would compare 
favourably with existing plants elsewhere in terms of both capital and operating costs" 
(Newby-Fraser 1979:101). 
The report was handed to the Minister of Mines by Van Eck personally. As a result, the Cabinet 
approved funds for a pilot enrichment plant in 1969. 
The decision process surrounding a potential nuclear power programme essentially involved a 
process of engagement with Escom, which began formally, as indicated above, with the 
establishment of a Nuclear Power Committee in 1960. Escom had also contributed R500 000 
(R17 million in 2000 rands) to the first five-year programme of the AEB under pressure from the 











government (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:196), and were asked to contribute R2.5 million 
(around R80 million in 2000 rands) to the second programme (from 1963-7), which required a 
change to the Electricity Act (3311963), allowing Escom to "undertake research". The nuclear 
establishment had expedited the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Security) Act (4311963) in 
preparation for the licensing of nuclear power plants, which placed Escom under a considerable 
amount of pressure (which was probably the AEB's intention). 
On the one hand, the Electricity Act effectively prevented Escom from investing in power plants 
which were not the most economical available, and their position was that if they were forced 
into investing in a nuclear plant, the state should subsidise the difference between the cost of 
nuclear electricity and the cheapest alternative (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000: 197). On the 
other hand, the utility had recently been granted an effective monopoly on the construction of 
new electricity plants, which they might lose in the event of a large nuclear power programme, 
since legally the AEB had sole jurisdiction over the construction and operation of nuclear plants, 
and could licence a local authority62 or other producer to produce nuclear power. The jurisdiction 
question was resolved through Clause 4 of the 1967 Atomic Energy Act (90/1967), which 
compelled the AEB to refuse an application to build a power plant anywhere that Escom wanted 
I 
to build one; if Escom did wish to do this, Escom would, 
" .. in collaboration with the [ABB] and within a period agreed on by the [ABB], undertake 
the construction of the necessary plant, and [Escom] shall thereafter operate such a plant.". 
(Clause 4, Atomic Energy Act (90/1967», 
which was clearly designed by the AEB to increase pressure on Escom to make a commitment to 
a nuclear power programme. 
Other types of pressure were put on Escom from the mid-1960s. Straszacker was made a 
member of the Broederbond in 1965, and the Minister of Mines commissioned a study from the 
AEB on the " .. Possible Introduction of Nuclear Power in South Africa" in the same year, which 
reported in 1968. The task of carrying out the investigation was handed to the Nuclear Power 
Committee, which at the time was chaired by Van Eck and included members from the AEB, 
uranium producers and Eskom. The work of the Committee was directed to' a much smaller sub-
committee headed by VanEck, and comprising only members from Eskom, the AEB, the 
railways, Genmin and two other government representatives. The report was (unsurprisingly) 
unequivocally in' favour of nuclear power being introduced into the South African electricity 
system at various time intervals, mainly on the coast, in the context of the planned national grid, 
62 The Cape Town municipality bad begun to speculate on the possibility of constructing its own nuclear power plant (Financial 
Mail 4/6/1965), while Escom was eager to prevent the construction of any new municipal generation plant Eskom bad what 
amounted to an informal veto on new municipal plants by the 1960s, but in the case of a nuclear power plant, political pressure 











and some of the key arguments of the report were framed in terms of national resource strategies 
(the extent and projected use of coal reserves), which were only developed in mainstream 
institutions from 1968 onwards. The report began to use computer-based planning 
methodologies which would become standard parts of the AEB's pro-nuclear arsenal, and were 
probably the first instance of an application of integrated resource planning in the country63 
(Nuclear Power Committee 1968:18-34): 
" .. [the] expected steady introduction of nuclear power will gradually reduce the rate of 
increase in demand for coal for electrification. More coal will become available as a source 
of liquid fuels and chemicals, and the lifetime of the country's coal reserves will be 
considerably extended" (Nuclear Power Committee 1968 Summary:5)64. 
The other two key areas of the report were an analysis of what kind of reactor would be suitable 
for South Africa, and the outline of "a tentative programme for the introduction of nuclear power 
stations in South Africa" (Nuclear Power Committee 1968:47-48). Only 'economically proven' 
reactors would be considered, which ruled out the AEB's reactor. The report was clear that: 
" .. because the continued and assured supply of ENRICHED uranium for a power reactor in 
this country is at present subject to grave doubts, only those types of power reactors capable 
of operating on a feed of natural uranium can be considered at the present time" (Nuclear 
Power Committee 1968:50). 
Enriched uranium reactors would only be considered if 
" .. at the time of placing the order, the uncertainties regarding an assured supply of enriched 
fuel have been resolved" (Nuclear Power Committee 1968:50). 
Again, the western Cape was the only economical candidate for a nuclear power plant; the most 
promising technology was the CANDU65 react~r. The summary report further noted that 
"South Africa could consider building her own enrichment plant, but. .. .it was considered 
unlikely that this cou try could contemplate either such vast capital expenditure, or the 
requisite enonnous technical effort, in the near future" (Nuclear Power Committee 1968 
Summary: I). 
The report on nuclear power, and the secret report on funding the enrichment programme, 
reached the Minister's desk at around the same time. 
The nuclear establishment successfully used the western Cape power debate to goad Escom into 
a commitment: in 1967, Jan Haak, the Minister of Mines66 announced that government had 
purchased Duinefontein, the future site of the Koeberg plant (Financial Mail 111811967), which 
63 In the 1970s, the ABB used energy modelling techniques, including MARKAL, the lEA's energy model, to demonstrate the 
feasibility of a large nuclear power programme, at the same time as similar models were being developed in other government 
:1encies for different purposes (ABB Annual Reports). 
Van Eck was during this period simultaneously advising the Cabinet on strategic responses to the growing oil embargo. 
65 A natural uranium-fuelled, heavy water-moderated Canadian reactor; the most feasible of the then available natural uranium 
reactors. 











had been identified as a suitable nuclear site by AEB personnel (Escom lacked any expertise in 
nuclear power at the time). Contrary to official Escom accounts, clearly Escom was not involved 
in this decision; however, it did force Escom's hand, and in June 1967, 
" .. out of the blue, Escom wrote to the Council asking for a joint discussion on the building of 
a nuclear power station in the Western Cape .. " (Financial Mail 111811967). 
The key point, however, was in 1969, when in response to the nuclear power report, Jan Haak, 
now Minister of Economic Affairs67, announced that the government would embark on a 
programme of building three nuclear power plants; one in the western Cape, one in the eastern 
Cape, and one in Natal (Financial Mail 28/311969); he made his comments at a conference at 
Potchefstroom University titled "Energy for the next Century", and placed them in an energy 
context, based on the recent revisions of South African coal reserves (in the recently-released 
CAB report). Since it seemed coal would now run out sooner than expected, " .. that leaves only 
atomic power to carry the bulk of the burden" (Financial Mail 28/311969). Haak's announcement 
was elaborated to the media by Roux; Escom was not represented. The report concluded 
optimistically that: 
"Escom needs to build up its generating capacity from its present 7000 MW to 62 000 MW 
by the tum of the century, and when new power stations are added, they will almost certainly 
be nuclear" (Financial Mail 28/311969). 
This initiative by the AEB almost certainly forced Escom's hand; in 1969, two key developments 
signalled Escom's definite commitment to a nuclear programme. The first was a protocol agreed 
between Escom and the AEB concerning jurisdiction in the nuclear power sphere in September 
1969, whereby Escom would build and operate nuclear power plants, and the AEB would license 
them to international standards, via a new division which later developed into the Council for 
Nuclear Safety (Newby-Fraser 1979: 128). At around the same time, Escom set up its own 
Nuclear Power Engineering Division in its Mechanical Engineering Department, which was, 
according to the 1969 Escom Annual Report, an outcome of the 1968 Report from the AEB' s 
Nuclear Power Committee (Escom Annual Report 1969: 19-20). The Division leader was a long-
standing AEB staff member who had been centrally involved in the Nuclear Power Committee 
and its Report (Eskom 1996:34); the rest of the staff were recruited from the UK, from either 
civilian or nuclear submarine projects (Eskom 1996:64). The strong position that the 1968 
Report took on natural uranium reactors and investment in enrichment facilities was rapidly 
overturned by a series of investigations by Escom's nuclear division, which settled on an 
enriched uranium reactor by 1969 (Eskom 1996:34). This resulted from a combination of techno-
economic reasoning from Escom engineers (most of whom were familiar with enriched uranium 











reactors), and strategic reasoning from the nuclear establishment and the state, which were keen 
to promote enrichment technology, to deploy a prominent civilian application, and to be 
reassured that South Africa could potentially be independent in its fuel requirements if 
necessary. 
After the commitment in principle to a nuclear power programme, Escom's nuclear division 
embarked on a decision-making process to choose a reactor model and appoint a contractor on a 
turn-key basis to construct the plant. The process was partly based on technology (operating 
performance), and partly on geopolitical factors: contractors (and associated technology) based 
in the US and certain other states were avoided because of the threat of nuclear sanctions, which 
forced Escom to abandon their commitment to their first technological choice, the Boiling Water 
Reactor (BWR). Finally in 1976, a contract was signed with a French consortium to construct 
two PWRs of around 900 MW each at Koeberg, as well as a safeguard agreement for the power 
plant, to which the South African and French governments and the IAEA were signatories 
(Eskom 1996:37); the deal included an R800 million export credit agreement with French banks 
(Financial Mail 17/12/1976). The construction process was delayed by sabotage by ANC 
guerrillas in the early 1980s, which delayed the commissioning of the plants by around a year. 
The first unit was commissioned in 1984, and the second in 1985. In spite of nuclear sanctions, 
Escom formed a close and enduring technical relationship with both the Framatome consortium 
and the French national utility EdF, which was partly facilitated by a secret68 training process 
organised by EdF to train South African operators in the 1970s: Eskom's official history states 
that 
"Koeberg is above all a French plant, and EdF always regarded its two units as an extension 
ofits own 36 units of similar design .. " (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:213). 
A significant question is whether Escom planned to construct more nuclear plants; this to a large 
extent defined the landscape on which nuclear policy decisions were made. At the beginning of 
the 1970s, it was commonly asserted by South African politicians that by the end of the century 
there would be up to 20 OOOMW of installed nuclear generating capacity; a 1975 report in the 
Natal Mercury claimed that 
" .. events are changing the energy picture so quickly that the already ambitious nuclear power 
programme mapped out for South Africa may prove too conservative" (Natal Mercury 
16/10/1975), 
citing an unnamed government report which claimed that by 2000, of a total installed capacity of 
64450 MW, 15 000 would be nuclear. The basis for these projections was an energy scenario 












vigorously promoted by the nuclear establishment, based on the new coal reserves paradigm 
pioneered by Van Rensburg in the CAB report, who stated in 1975 that " .. based on present usage 
concepts, South Africa will have to develop coal alternatives by 1990"'(quoted in Financial Mail 
5/3/1976), which in tum was based on electricity demand growth rates of the early 1970s. This 
was a view endorsed in 1977 by Jan Smith, then general manager of Escom and chairman in the 
early 1980s: 
" .. a series of large nuclear power stations dotting South Africa's coastline have been 
predicted by Mr Jan Smith, general manager of Esc om" (The Argus 14/7/1977). 
The practical timetable for the ordering of these nuclear stations, given Escom's existing 
programme, would have been from 1983 onwards. By late 1977, however, it became apparent 
that nuclear sanctions would make fuel procurement extremely difficult; by 1979, the Prime 
Minister had ordered the AEB to go ahead with a fuel cycle with only enough capacity to supply 
Koeberg, and by 1983, it was clear that new capacity would not be required for over a decade; by 
1990 it was clear that new capacity would probably not be required until 2005. During this 
period, the post-coal vision was maintained but pushed back until 2050: Eskom's deputy 
engineering manager stated in 1990 that 
" . .in all the planning done by Eskom and the AEC, a progressive changeover to nuclear 
power would have to occur some time towards the middle of the next century" (quoted in 
Financial Mail 13/4/1990). 
A submission to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Initiative by Eskom in 1995 indicated that it had no 
.. 
plans to order another nuclear power plant "within the next 25 to 30 years" or even after this 
(Nuclear Fuel Cycle Initiative Working Group 1995:5). Thus, by 1990, no nuclear expansion 
was contemplated for the foreseeable future. 
In the 1970s, a short- or medium-term switch to nuclear power was driven by several factors: a) 
continued high electricity demand growth; b) a medium-term coal scarcity scenario; and c) the 
availability of nuclear fuel (either imported or locally-produced). This trio of rationales collapsed 
by the end of the 1970s; government support for further nuclear plants disappeared in 1978, 
when the strategic problems associated with nuclear sanctions began to emerge, and the nuclear 
establishment was locked into commitment to a purely strategic fuel cycle with no spare 
capacity. 
Enrichment, Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Weapons - the 1970s 
The 1960s had ended for the nuclear establishment with political approval and backing for both 
the pilot enrichment plant and nuclear power. Once the technologies had been demonstrated to 
be viable, their ambition was to develop a 'nuclear-industrial complex', at the heart of which 











imported) uranium both for local use and for export. In 1970, only four countries in the world 
possessed nuclear enrichment capabilities (the US, UK, France and the USSR); the South 
African Prime Minister announced in parliament in July of that year that South Africa was about 
to join this exclusive club. He gave as the two primary reasons for developing an indigenous 
enrichment programme the desire to beneficiate South African uranium, and thus add value to 
South African exports, and that: 
"South Africa finds itself on the eve of a large nuclear power programme of its own - of the 
order of20 000 MW (electrical) by the end of the century. If such a programme can be based 
on enriched uranium, it will result in a very marked capital saving. However, such a course 
can only be followed if the supply of enriched uranium can be guaranteed, which, in the 
difficult world in which we live, implies own production." (quoted in Newby-Fraser 
1979:92). 
Escom's plans at the time only involved building a plant of around 350MW. The Prime Minister 
also expressed his reluctance to agree to any international non-proliferation safeguards which 
would compromise the secrecy of South Africa's 'unique process', and stressed that South 
Africa's " .. research and development programme in the field of nuclear energy is directed 
entirely towards peaceful purposes" (quoted in Newby-Fraser 1979:94). Following the Prime 
Minister's address, the Minister of Mines introduced a bill to establish a separate organisational 
entity to house the enrichment programme, passed as the Uranium Enrichment Act (33/1970). 
The purpose of the Act was to establish a Uranium Enrichment Corporation (Ucor6\ funded by 
the state via the state's purchase of 'shares' and exempt from any provisions of the Companies 
Act, to house all the enrichment-related activities and assets of the AEB. The motivation for this 
separation was in part commercial, since the beginning of the 1970s saw the beginning of a 
nuclear power boom, and expectations were that world demand for nuclear fuel would soar. 
However, the biggest reaSon was institutional; Waldo Stumpf, later CEO of the AEC commented 
that: 
"The old AEB was very much seen as a high-tech research organisation; no strategic 
projects, and that was one reason why the enrichment project was taken out of it - the 
thought at that point was that it would confuse some of the thinking inside the organisation" 
(Interview with W Stumpf). 
Thus the purpose of Ucor during the 1970s and early 1980s was to house 'strategic' projects, 
including the pilot enrichment plant, nuclear explosives and weapons research, and feasibility 
studies on the development of a large-scale enrichment plant, which effectively separated the 
core activity of the AEB from the rest of the organisation. The organisation had two key areas of 
69 Since the AEB and Ucor essentially had a shared leadership structure, unless Ucor is referred to specifically, references to the 











activity "during the 1970s: the development of the pilot enrichment programme, and the 
development of nuclear explosives. A third was added at the end of the 1970s in the form of the 
scaled-up enrichment plant and linked processing plants, the aims of which were to produce fuel 
for Koeberg. 
The enrichment programme in the 1970s was focused on the development of the South African 
enrichment technology. This took several forms: the first was the design, construction and testing 
of the Y-Plant, the small-scale pilot enrichment plant, which was completed in the late 1970s and 
produced the ftrst highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in 1979; the second was a series of activities 
aimed at getting political commitment to the grand projet of the nuclear establishment, a large-
scale enrichment plant, which involved a combination of publicity (a break with tradition for the 
nuclear establishment), international liaison and negotiations, and lobbying; and the third, at the 
end of the 1970s, was the development ofa scaled-down 'semi-commercial' plant. 
The Y-plant's central function, other than to test the enrichment technology, was to produce raw 
material for the weapons programme: 85% of its capacity was used t  produce HEU for weapons 
manufacture, and 15% was used to produce nuclear fuel for the SAF ARI-l research reactor, 
which required 85% enriched uranium (Interview with W Stmnpf; Liberman 2001 :55). It did this 
from around 1979 to 1990, when it was eventually shut down as part of the weapons 
decommissioning programme. 
The process of developing the enrichment process, and the Y-plant, was interspersed with a 
decision-making process which resulted in the manufacture of six small nuclear weapons70• 
Stmnpf described the programme as " .. a very small programme as far as this organisation was 
concerned .. " (Interview with W Stumpf), which was partly a reference to the small budget of the 
programme compared to later projects, and partly a reflection of the limited role of the nuclear 
establishment in the programme, which was taken over by Armscor in the late 1970s. The Y-
plant was not however a 'small' expense, involving a capital expenditure of R2.7 billion (2000 
rands), plus a signiftcant additional cost for operating expenditure (after Auf Der Heyde 
1993:24). There is some controversy about the date of the actual decision to develop nuclear 
weapons (Liberman 2001 :49); however the debate is clouded by some confusion surrounding the 
distinction between nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons and their concomitant policy 
contexts. 
70 The weapons progralnme will be considered here only insomr as it impacted on energy policy-related decisions. of which the 
key remaining decision was the decision to develop the full fuel cycle in the late 1970s. Liberman (2001) provides an excellent 












Pennission was given by the Minister of Mines in 1971 to begin a secret research programme on 
nuclear explosives, possibly utilising skills from the tenninated reactor projects 71, although 
engineers working on the Y -Plant design reported in interviews that the specifications given to 
the plant's designers in 1969 were for a plant which would enrich uranium to at least 80%: 
"I was the designer - 1 was given the instruction to do a process design of a plant to produce 
80% enriched material - now, from that 11l0ment, 1 assumed that it was a weapons-grade 
plant, that's what we designed for" (Interview with A Jackson). 
This specification came from the secret committee headed by VanEck which reported to Cabinet 
on the project in 1968. VanEck was apparently seriously interested in using nuclear explosives 
for engineering purposes. Two applications were considered: one was excavating a new harbour 
near Port Nolloth, and another was the creation of crude oil storage tanks underground72 
(Interview with W Grant); it thus seems that top nuclear and government bureaucrats considered 
the possibility of nuclear explosives from the late 1960s, and included it in their specifications 
for the plant. Thus, what was constant from the late 1960s was the intention of the nuclear 
establishment to develop nuclear explosives. What changed was the policy context in which this 
programme was situated. 
In 1974, Vorster gave the go-ahead to develop 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosives': since the first 
HEU was only produced in 1979, this research was entirely theoretical73• The decision to 
develop nuclear weapons seems to have been taken much later. Interviews indicate that the 
initiative came from within Ucor in around 1976, when the technical basis for both enrichment 
and explosives had been established; the weapons option was presented by Ucor to government 
at around this time (Interviews with W Grant, A Jackson, W Stumpf). The decision to develop 
deliverable nuclear weapons was apparently thus only taken sometime in 1977, when the PNE 74 
programme was stopped, and effort was transferred to military applications. From a policy point 
of view these decisions were confined to the nuclear establishment, the Prime Minister and one 
or two ministers. The military establishment was apparently only made aware of the existence of 
the nuclear weapons programme in 1974, when the AEB requested the use of a remote weapons 
testing range in the Kalahari desert, for a potential nuclear explosives test (Liberman 2001:52), 
and were only marginally involved in a technical capacity until 1978, when P.W. Botha 
succeeded Vorster as Prime Minister. At that point, the weapons programme was taken out of a 
71 Reactor physics and the physics of nuclear explosions are similar; thus reactor physicists can easily transfer their skills to 
nuclear explosives research. It is quite possible that the AEBI AEC managed the flow of skills from one activity to the other to 
preserve a skills base within the organisation, until the late 1980s, when this became unsustainable (Hofinlnner, personal 
communication) 
n Van Eck was also at the time (1965-70) in charge of an IDCISasol process of building up a strategic oil reserve, which 
included storing large amounts of crude oil. 
73 Since no nuclear explosive tests were carried out by the apartheid state, in a sense all explosive development was 'theoretical'. 
74 Peaceful Nuclear Explosives in theory (abandoned after the 1970s) nuclear explosives could be used for large civil 











purely nuclear policy context, and placed in a broader strategic context (which will be discussed 
below); until then, the weapons programme did not have any strategic raison d'etre, and was 
purely an outcome of the technical ambitions of key nuclear personnel combined with the allure 
that the prestige of nuclear weapons status exercised on the tiny group of political decision-
makers involved. 
Large-scale enrichment plant proposals were developed after initial successes with the South 
African enrichment process in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The scale of the proposed project 
(both in terms of funding and policy) required broader political support than previous 
developments; also, the nuclear establishment's most prominent and influential supporter, Van 
Eck, had died in the early 1970s. This requirement resulted in three interrelated strategies. The 
first was to develop a multi-dimensional policy context for the project: this was done by 
emphasising two aspects of the project The first aspect was its potential to supply South Africa 
with strategically secure nuclear fuel, which would only be required if it was necessary for the 
country to embark on a large nuclear power programme: to this end, the AEB developed its own 
energy modelling capacity. The second aspect was to place the project in a minerals 
beneficiation context: the project would potentially earn huge amounts of foreign exchange by 
beneficiating South African-produced uranium. Added to this was the second strategy, which 
was to achieve international validation for the technology, and if possible, international investor 
interest In the mid-1970s, Roux and Grant presented papers on the South African process to 
several international fora (Roux & Grant 1975), and interested a German nuclear technology 
firm in undertaking a techno-economic study in collaboration with Ucor in anticipation of a joint 
venture. The third strategy was to launch a publicity offensive in the local media, which, 
although this was new territory for the traditi6nally secretive nuclear establishment, Roux 
undertook brilliantly. 
The techno-economic study was based around a 5000tSWU/a plant (Interviews with Ucor 
engineers). The South African' process was very energy-intensive by comparison to other 
processes, but capital costs were significantly lower; thus the process was potentially competitive 
in an environment where capital was relatively scarce but electricity was extremely cheap (South 
Africa in the early 1970s). The proposed plant was thus premised on the same kind of economic 
linkages which had characterised most South African industrial development in the 1960s and 
1970s: raw material from the gold-coal complex (uranium and electricity), and the product partly 











through boosting electricity demand7s. A 5000tSWU/a or 7000tSWU/a plant would have 
required a higher annual feedstock of uranium than South Africa's contemporary production 
capacity (Financial Mail 28/6/1973), which would either require a significant increase in 
production infrastructure, or importing a considerable quantity each year. The capital cost of a 
5000tla plant was estimated at R650 million (R13.3 billion in 2000 rands), and it would produce 
enough fuel for 50 GW of nuclear generating capacity76. Given electricity growth rates in the 
1970s (as well as the huge increase in capacity required to provide electricity to the plant) and a 
sizeable nuclear programme, South Africa could have consumed half of this annually by 2010; 
thus an export industry would have formed a significant component of the project. The plant 
would have boosted electricity demand considerably, and would have required between 15 000 
and 30 000 GWh of electricity per annum, which would have required between 2300 and 4500 
MW of additional baseload capacity. This would have been required between 1980 and 1985, 
when total installed capacity was between 18 000 (1980) and 25 000 MW (1985) on Escom's 
system77. Thus, the implications for South Africa's industrial system were considerable. 
From around 1973, there were a string of optimistic announcements, usually by the relevant 
Minister, on the progress and prospects of the South African enrichment process, which was 
nevertheless shrouded in official secrecy, to which was added another layer of commercial 
secrecy, since it was made clear that there was a significant danger of industrial espionage. In 
1973, government announced that 
" .. progress at a RSO million78-plus pilot plant .... was encouraging enough to warrant 
preparations for a full-scale plant" (Financial Mail 28/6/1974). 
Piet Koornhof, Minister of Mines, announced in 1974 that the South African enrichment process 
''would be more valuable to South Africa than the discovery of diamonds" 79 (Financial Mail 
28/611974). In a press release, Koornhofannounced in 1975 that: 
" .. South Africa. as one of the few large uranium producers of the free world .... can make an 
extremely important contribution .... to assist in relieving the energy problems with which the 
world is faced .... By the commercial application of its enrichment prOcess, which promises to 
be competitive with existing processes, and by marketing at least a part of its uranium in its 
most refined fonn as enriched uranium, South Africa will be able to extend this contribution 
7S Enrichment is very electricity-intensive: for instance, the Tricastin nuclear industrial complex in France has four dedicated 
reactors together rated at 3000 MW(e), which mainly provide electricity for a 10 800 tSWU/a enrichment plant. In South Africa, 
in 1993, the AEC used ~ of Koeberg's output, mainly for their enrichment process. 
76 Estimated from (http://www.uic.com.au!nip33.htm); a rule of thumb in the nuclear industry is that roughly 100 OOOkgSWU are 
required per year for a 900 MW reactor (Interview with A Jackson) 
77 These calculations are based on the following assumptions: the enrichment plant would use the South African technique, which 
would have a minimum electricity consumption between 3000 and 6000 kWhlSWU. The generating plant would run 80% of the 
time. 
78 Rl.02 billion in 2000 rands. 
79 The discovery of diamonds in the 1870s signalled the beginning of South Africa's modern economic development the 











significantly and such a step wiIl be of exceptional value to the scientific, technological and 
industrial development of the country. Furthennore, it will enable the Republic, in due 
course, to itself produce the enriched uranium required for its own nuclear programme, 
rather than becoming dependent, in an unstable world, on foreign sources for its 
requirements. There can be no doubt that South Africa can develop its enrichment process 
further .... the Government has consequently decided that the construction of a commercial 
enrichment plant, to which it will give its full support, is to be proceeded with, but that a 
decision on the size of the plant will only be taken in 1978 ... .It is envisaged that the plant 
will come into operation in 1984 with full production in 1986" (Press Release on a 
Commercial Uranium Enrichment Plant in South Africa, by Dr The Honourable P.G.J. 
Koornhof, Minister of Mines). 
The Sunday Tribune reported that 
" .. the Government has also made known that the uranium enrichment process could earn 
South Africa about R250~miUion a year in foreign exchange" (Sunday Tribune 271711975). 
The Financial Mail, in the same year, speculated that 
" .. European interests may well be negotiating with South Africa at this moment to set up an 
international consortium based on South African technology .. " (Financial Mail 111411975)80. 
Koornhof announced in parliament in June 1975 that the government had created a subsidiary 
company to house such investment called ISASA81 , but the only recorded shareholders were 
Dcor and the IDe. The aim was to attract local shareholding as well so as to 
" .. make the first commercial enrichment plant in South Africa a venture in which a large 
segment of the South African economy will have a direct or indirect interest" (Barclays 
National Review, March 1976 (no page numbers». 
The last in a series of very enthusiastic articles on South Africa's enrichment programme, from 
1974 to 1976, was an interview with Roux, in which he claimed that feasibility studies 
" .. reinforce our original conclusion that an enrichment plant, based on the Ucor process, will 
be economically sound and competitive with overseas plants" (quoted in Financial Mail 
1711211976). 
The 1975 AEB Annual Report declared that the government had decided to go ahead with the 
large-scale plant, subject to a final decision on its scale in 1978 (Atomic Energy Board Annual 
Report 1975:4). However, between 1976 and 1978, a number of developments militated against 
the project. International interest faded away, primarily because of increasing international 
isolation of South Africa and its nuclear establishment due to apartheid, as well as because the 
mid-1970s rises in the electricity price rendered the energy-intensive South African process far 
less economically attractive. A large-scale nuclear power programme did not materialise, and 
80 This was partly true. 











less-risky, less capital-intensive export-oriented programmes were underway, including coal and 
steel. In addition, there was a new scarcity of capital due both to a 1977 recession, political 
obstacles to foreign capital markets, and competition from other mega-projects such as power 
plants (including Koeberg), coal mines, armaments and the Sasol projects. Media reports suggest 
that the project would have cost R2 billion (R23.8 billion82 in 2000 mnds) or more (Financial 
Mail 171211978). 
In 1978, government announced a radically scaled-back enrichment programme. The press was 
noticeably disappointed (stories had headlines like "Ucor's climbdown" (Financial Mail) and 
"Uranium: the drastic changes" (Sunday Tribune». 
"To curtail a project which could have earned over R250 million a year in foreign exchange 
and established South Africa as a major enriched uranium supplier, must have been a painful 
decision", 
reported the Financial Mail (Financial Mail 171211978), which was a testament to the nuclear 
establishment's success in the mid-1970s in promoting the project, which had not progressed 
beyond a techno-economic study. The lack of any reference to the project in the state's 
Economic Development Plans would seem to indicate that th  state's planning agencies took the 
project less seriously than the media did. 
The End of International Co-operation 
Since the 1960s, international pressure had been mounting against apartheid in international fora, 
including the IABA. Since South Africa was a founder member of a relatively small club of 
nuclear nations and also had a protected status as a uranium supplier to the UK and the US, it 
was protected in this context from international pressure until the 1970s, when outspokenly anti-
apartheid states such as India became members. The 1976 uprising heightened international 
political pressure against South Africa. In the nuclear sphere, both South Africa's 
acknowledgement that it had developed an enrichment process, and its refusal to sign the NPT or 
subject its nuclear facilities83 to IAEA inspections raised suspicions that it was developing 
nuclear weapons. 
The watershed came in 1977, when South Africa appeared to be making preparations for a 
nuclear test in the Kalahari84 (which in fact it was), which provoked a massive outcry from the 
world community, and South Africa's allies in particular; the tests were quietly shelved and 
assurances were given to a sceptical international nuclear community that South Africa had no 
intention of building or testing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, South Africa lost its seat on the 
82 The Z-Plant cost arOlmd R2.7 billion in 2000 rands (AufDer Heyde 1993). 
83 Apart from Koeberg and the SAFARI research reactor. 











IAEA's Board of Governors in 1977 (Liberman 2001:69), which was a serious blow to the 
prestige of the South African nuclear establishment; since the state had no independent nuclear 
policy capacity, South Africa's prominent role in international nuclear affairs had bolstered their 
credibility considerably. South Africa's exclusion also possessed ideological significance for the 
South African state: first because the IAEA was probably the last significant forum in which 
South Africa was a legitimate participant, and second, because the prestige of South Africa's 
nuclear technology capabilities was central to the peculiar brand of technocmtic modernism 
espoused by the apartheid state. 
The most significant pmctical outcome was the US Nuclear Non-Prolifemtion Act, passed in 
1978, which banned any technological collaboration or nuclear tmde between the US and non-
NPT -compliant states. This formed part of a larger package of nuclear sanctions against South 
Africa, which not only prevented South Africa sourcing nuclear fuel from the US, but also 
placed pressure on its European allies to follow suit, which threatened to deprive Koeberg of 
fuel. This international nuclear isolation hemlded a new period in South African nuclear policy. 
3) 1978 to 1988 
The most significant developments in nuclear policy in the late 1970s were tied to a change in 
national political leadership in 1978, which saw the accession to power ofP.W. Botha, formerly 
Minister of Defence. Botha embarked on a reorganisation of government, which brought about 
two significant changes: first, Cabinet ministers had less autonomy; and second, a 'presidential' 
process of policy co-ordination based on four permanent cabinet committees, one of which dealt 
with economic issues, which centralised and co-ordinated economic and industrial policy 
(O'Meam 1996:278, Davenport 1987:438). Since nuclear policy was determined by a tiny 
political and technocmtic elite, these changes had a significant impact on policy outcomes. 
The first significant change was that Botha took control of the nuclear weapons programme, 
which up to then had been managed entirely by the nuclear establishment, and placed it into a 
broader, military-dominated policy environment. Botha assembled a secret high-level committee 
(the Witvlei Committee) consisting of Botha, the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Mines, 
Finance and Armscor, the AEB and the South African Defence Force, which was given the 
responsibility of determining whether nuclear weapons had stmtegic value for the country, and if 
so, to develop a policy framework consisting of a programme for their development and a 
stmtegic framework for their potential use. The committee recommended in 1979 that 
delivemble nuclear devices be constructed as a "credible deterrent" and that overall 
responsibility for the programme be moved to Armscor, which had some expertise in designing 











an Annscor facility on the AEB site, and the nuclear establishment's role in the programme was 
limited to producing weapons-grade uranium, providing additional nuclear technology, 
theoretical work on more advanced nuclear devices, and the Erika reactor project85, the aim of 
which was to develop an indigenous PWR which could also be used for plutonium production, 
and to test fuel assemblies for Koeberg (Hofmllnner 2002:155,159). Further development of the 
weapons programme was halted by PW Botha in 1985, mainly because it would not increase the 
programme's strategic utility, since it was practically no more than a "diplomatic deterrent" 
(Liberman 2001 :59). 
The second significant change which Botha brought about in the nuclear establishment was a 
change in leadership: the nuclear establishment's programme had up to then been masterminded 
by two people: Roux, and Dr W.L. Grant86, a brilliant engineer who had pioneered all the major 
research projects in the AEB and Uoor, notably including nuclear explosives and enrichment, 
and was a single-minded proponent of nuclear technology. He, Roux and Van Eck formed the 
ideological core of the 1960s and 70s nuclear establishment's vision of a nuclear industrial 
complex in South Africa. Roux was encouraged to retire, which he did, and Grant, at the time 
general manager of Ucor, was sidelined in favour of Dr J.W.L. De Villiers, Grant's deputy at 
Ucor. De Villiers was well-connected with the new political leadership, and in particular with the 
new Minister of Mines, F.W. De Klerk. Whereas Roux, and Grant in particular, were nuclear 
fundamentalists, De Villiers was regarded by the fundamentalists as being a sceptic (Interviews 
with W Grant, A Jackson), less prone to grandiose visions for nuclear power in South Africa, and 
more attuned to the strategic requirements of the new political elite. His appoin1ment coincided 
with a shift in organisational culture in the nuclear establishment from a pioneering research 
culture to that of a strategic-industrial complex with more limited goals. 
Whereas previous ministers had been the nuclear establishment's chief public spokespersons. De 
Klerk and his successors were more cautious, which the old guard found frustrating: 
"The minister of mines at the time was De Klerk .... he was the most incompetent minister I'd 
ever had, and I've had many of them. He just could not decide. People were sitting there; 
"should we go?", and they said, "he's still thinking", and he takes three months to think .. 
.. I'm sorry, I do not think Mr De Klerk was a very good administrator. He was nowhere near 
as good as Piet Koornhof1, who was also our minister. Ou Piet was a nice minister! Ou Piet 
would come to you, and he said, "now what do you think?". I said, ''well, I think it will 
IS This came to nothing, since neither Annscor nor Eskom were interested in the project; however, engineers who had worked on 
the project were later instrumental in developing the PBMR project (Hofinlnner 2002: 1 55). 
86 In addition to being a brilliant nuclear engineer who was well-known in international nuclear circles, he was also a single-
minded proponent of apartheid, and attributed its demise to ''white selfishness" (Interview). 
87 Koornhof had been the responsible minister in the early to mid-1970s, and had been a vociferous supporter of the nuclear 











work" - he says, "right, sign!" We got going very fast when Piet was boss .. " (Interview with 
WGrant). 
A 'nice' minister meant a co-operative minister, who gave the nuclear establishment carte 
blanche and did not resort to a broader decision-making process; under the Botha regime, 
nuclear policy was subjected to closer scrutiny, and more integrated into strategic context. The 
leadership change was linked to a longer process of restructuring involving the institutional 
transformation of the nuclear establishment, extending the corporate structure of Ucor to the 
whole organisation. These changes were the result of an inquiry appointed in 1980, chaired by 
Roux, which resulted in the Nuclear Energy Act (9211982), which effected three significant 
changes. The first was a restructuring of Ucor and the AEB, which involved transforming the 
AEB into a corporate entity (called Nucor), and placing Ucor and Nucor under a new entity, the 
Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), which was a new Botha-era entity, representing a 
corporation in style and concept, but state-owned and exempt from any provision of the 
Companies Act (or any other legislation) that the Minister saw fit (Clause 18). The second 
change was an extension of the secrecy provisions contained in previous Acts, and the third was 
the creation of the Council for Nuclear Safety (see above). The nuclear establishment was again 
reorganised in 1985; the separate components of the AEC (Nucor and Ucor) were merged into a 
single organisation (Hofmlinner 2002: 146), to integrate the fuel production process, which was 
divided between Ucor (enrichment) and Nucor (conversion and fuel fabrication): fuel production 
had become the nuclear establishment's core function with the decline in research activities and 
weapons development in the 1980s. 
The decision to go ahead with the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel capability was 
linked directly to the isolation of the South African nuclear establishment after the 1977 nuclear 
test fiasco. In the same year, the AEB was directed by government to draw up contingency plans 
for a fuel production capacity capable of fuelling Koeberg (AufDer Heyde 1993:38). The final 
decision was directly related to barriers Escom encountered procuring fuel for Koeberg: Escom's 
strategy for acquiring nuclear fuel involved several phases. The first phase consisted of an 
agreement with South African mining conglomerate Gencor88 in the early 1970s brokered 
through the Chamber of Mines, whereby Escom would loan Gencor RSO million to finance the 
opening of a new uranium production operation in exchange for an exclusive supply of uranium 
at 5% below world prices (Eskom 1996:55) via Nufcor. The second phase involved delivering 
the uranium to France where it would be converted into VF6 and transferred to the US, where 











Escom had concluded a contract with Westinghouse89 in 1974 to enrich it (Interviews). The third 
phase consisted of transferring the enriched uranium back to France, where under the 1976 
Koeberg contact, Framatome would fabricate the fuel (Eskom 1996: 54-56). 
The US began stalling on nuclear fuel-related contracts (both for Escom and for the SAFARI 
reactor, for which the AEB had a fuel contract with the US) on non-proliferation grounds from 
around 1975 (Liberman 2001:69), and the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act prevented the US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission from granting a licence for the"export of the enriched uranium; 
however, Escom was still contractually obliged to supply the uranium (or suffer a stiff penalty 
clause in their contract with Westinghouse), leaving it trapped in the US. In addition, the US was 
putting pressure on its allies not to supply nuclear fuel to South Africa, which meant that it 
would be difficult to source enriched uranium elsewhere. This was the defining event in late 
1978 which led directly to P.W. Botha's decision to order the AEB to build the 'Z-Planf, the 
'semi-commercial' enrichment plant, and a matching conversion plant with the necessary 
capacity. A senior engineer in Ucor recalls that, in the wake of the Escom fuel fiasco: 
"P.W. Botha then said, there is no way that Koeberg is going to close, because that would be 
the piece de resistance of the success of sanctions, so he in effect ordered us now to build the 
Z-plant" (Interview with A Jackson). 
Whereas Botha was primarily responsible for the Z-Plant decision, and guaranteed that Escom 
would buy all its output, Escom itself requested the AEB to build a fuel fabrication plant, and 
partially financed it (providing just under half the capital) at around the same time: 
"Escom probably had a role to play in t~e [Z-Plant] decision, but they never formally 
approached us - it went via government, and government said to the old Ucor, build the Z-
plant, and Escom will take off the product, [whereas for the BEVA plant], there, Escom 
formally wrote us a letter and said build the BEV A plant, we need you, and they also helped 
to fund the plant; they gave us RIOO million, which we repaid through product delivery" 
(Interview with W Stumpf). 
Since Koeberg was scheduled to be commissioned before the AEC had commissioned the fuel 
plants (the former planned in 1983, but delayed until 1984 (unit 1) and 1985 (unit 2), the latter in 
1987), Escom had to source the first few fuel loads elsewhere, as well as resolving the problem 
of the trapped uranium in the US. As a result, a number of high-level meetings were held 
between the US and South African.representatives in 1981, including the heads of Escom and the 
AEB, and a secret agreement was reached, whereby the US would resolve the matter of Escom's 
uranium (by allowing it to be sold in the US), and allow Escom to source fuel from its allies in 
Europe, in exchange for a) the South African government entering into negotiations on the 
89 At the time, the US was virtually the only country supplying commercial enrichment services; they were joined by others from 











Namibian situation, and b) the South African government allowing a US inspection team to 
inspect the enrichment facilities in South Africa90 (Eskom 1996:58-9). The agreement allowed 
Escom to source alternative enriched uranium from a Swiss nuclear technology corporation (The 
Star 1011211981), which was then fabricated into fuel elements in France to supply Koeberg for a 
few years, following which Eskom was supplied with fuel from the ABC until 1996, when the 
last consignment was delivered and the process was shut down (see below). 
Both the motivation for the final Z-Plant decision, and the high-level diplomatic tradeofIs, 
indicate the broader non-energy-related strategic motivations for the government's commitment 
to indigenous fuel production. Koeberg and the enrichment process had a significant prestige 
value for the apartheid state, especially in the face of sanctions91• This context is brought into 
starker relief if one examines the nature of the programme itself. The Z-Plant was sized precisely 
to fuel Koeberg's two reactors only ("30OtSWU only - two reactors and a spare" (Interview with 
A Jackson», and eventually had a capacity of275tSWU/a (AufDer Heyde 1993:25), and thus to 
fulfil a limited strategic function only. This was clearly not a choice made by the nuclear 
establishment itself, which still had ambitions for a larger project, and was well aware of the 
economic limitations of such a small plant. 
One of the many inefficiencies of the Z-Plant resulted from a decision to design the plant for 
later expansion, which led to a sub-optimal arrangement of the sequential enrichment stages 
(Interview with A Jackson). Repeated attempts I were made to scale up the plant, including 
negotiating with the Taiwanese to supply fuel for their nuclear programme in the mid-1980s, but 
the economics of the plant were unfavourable: allegedly, one of the factors in favour of the plant 
was the extremely high SWU price in the late 1970s (at around US$250 per SWU), at which 
level the Z-Plant would allegedly have been profitable (Interview with W Stumpf). This declined 
90 This implausible-soWlding narrative is from only one written source, an official Eskom accoWlt of its nuclear programme 
(Eskom 1996:54-59); however, the US inspection of the enrichment pIant was verified by an interview with Dr Wally Grant, 
head of the enrichment programme during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as by interviews with several other senior AEC 
personnel. According to Dr Grant, at the beginning of the 1980s, a high-level meeting was held between the South African 
nuclear establishment and a high-ranking US delegation, including US Secretary of State General Haig; the US also sent an 
inspection team to examine the enrichment fucilities. The South Africans apparently showed them the pilot plant and told them 
that they could only enrich to 40%, inadequate for a nuclear device. One of the reasons that the South Africans were willing to go 
this far was that Reagan had recently replaced Carter in the White House, and had a far more favourable attitude to apartheid 
South Africa, which included a policy of 'constructive engagement' and covert military assistance, and it was felt expedient to 
alleviate tensions with the US in the light of the alleged 'total onslaught' in southern Africa. The diplomatic conditions attached 
to the deal by the US raise more questions, and have not been verified. If the account is accurate, it suggests that the South 
African government attached a high value to the operation of Koeberg unrelated to any "cover story" to conceal a weapons 
programme. Not being able to source fuel elsewhere might have meant a delay in commissioning Koeberg of aroWld 4 years, 
since in 1981 development of the fuel cycle had commenced. The technical consequences fur the electricity system of Koeberg's 
start-up being delayed by 4 years would have probably created a short-term lack of peak power in winter, but in that year 
Escom's expansion programme was postponed for the first time, and the overambitious nature of Escom's expansion programme 
was beginning to emerge. However, other interviews highlight the immense strategic importance attached to the successful 
fuelling of Koeberg as a symbol that sanctions had failed by PW Bollia, as well as the prestige of a functional nuclear power 
programme. What this incident does highlight is the non-economic value of both Koeberg and the fuel cycle to the apartheid state 
in the 1980s. ' 
91 Koeberg: "South Africa wanted to say in that regard; we have got the capability to handle something as advanced as this" 











steadily during the 1980s and the 1990s, both as a result of a slow-down in reactor orders and an 
increase in enrichment capacity internationally, and because of the offloading of inventory at the 
end of the Cold War, leading to prices in 2000 of between US$80 and US$100 per SWU. 
However, in 1993, by which time costs/SWU had stabilised for the AEC (after being initially 
very high), the AEC sold enrichment services at the equivalent of US$189 per SWU, but their 
costs were in the order ofUS$440 per SWU (after AufDer Heyde 1993:27). At the same time, 
the AEC was still carrying out enrichment-oriented research, primarily aimed at developing 
another enrichment process which would be less electricity-intensive: R400 million (nominal) 
was spent during the late 1980s and early 1990s on developing the Molecular Laser Isotope 
Separation technique92, but lack of progress led to the termination of the programme in the 
1990s. 
An additional cost for the BEV A plant, and the whole indigenous fuel cycle, was the requirement 
that the fuel be certified by the French reactor firm Framatome, which added significantly to the 
cost of the indigenous process. The whole fuel cycle project lasted from the late 1970s until it 
was shut down in the 1990s. The timing of the key components, including the Y-Plant, is 
portrayed in Figure 5.3 below. 
Figure 5.3: Lifespan of South African Nuclear Fuel Cycle Plants 
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station for comparison. 
92 In the mid-1980s, the AEC made a choice between developing the MLIS technique, an unproven and technically challenging 
technology, or a centrifuge technology, of which there were variants already in use, and with which the AEC was familiar, as the 
basis for a future large-scale enrichment facility. After a heated controversy, the MLIS technique was chosen. precisely because 
of the scope for innovation that the technology offered; the fact that the centrifuge technique was already in use in a commercial 
enrichment plant was considered a disadvantage by the nuclear fundamentalists; broader techno-economic issues, including an 
assessment of the AEC's core competencies (which were far better suited to the centrifuge technology) were given a very low 
priority (Interview with A Jackson). This episode is indicative of two things: 1) the extremely narrow context of decision-rnaldng 
within the nuclear establishment; and 2) how this decision-making context gave free rein to the nal've technological fascination of 












The next milestone in nuclear policy was precipitated by the accession of F.W. De Klerk to the 
premiership, which brought about two immediate changes in nuclear policy: one of De Klerk's 
frrst acts was to order the dismantling of the weapons programme, and in order to achieve this, 
he imposed another change in the nuclear establishment's leadership, appointing Dr Waldo 
Stumpf as CEO of the AEC and Johann Maree (then Chairman of the Electricity Council) as 
chairman of the board. The most important outcome, however, was that the accession of the new 
political leadership spelt the end of the nuclear establishment's privileged relationship with the 
political elite: from the time when De Klerk took over, the strategic imperative (the weapons and 
the strategic imperative which drove investment in the fuel cycle) disappeared, nuclear power no 
longer had the prestige it had in the 1970s, and the nuclear establishment suffered a precipitous 
decline in prestige, and with it the loss of access to the political elite. Whereas the weapons 
programme had been a symbol of South Africa's defiance of world opinion during apartheid, in 
the context of De Klerk's reformist agenda (which sought to normalise relationships with the 
international community as soon as possible), it became a serious liability. 
The new leadership oversaw a long process of scaling down and restructuring, which left the 
nuclear establishment a shadow of its former self by the end of the 1990s. The brief which the 
new leadership had was frrst to dismantle the weapons programme and prepare the organisation 
for the signing of the NPT, and second to oversee the transformation of the AEC from an 
organisation shrouded in secrecy with a primarily strategic raison d'etre, to a primarily 
commercial organisation. What followed was a commercialisation programme (AEC 2000 Plus), 
and a restructuring process which resulted in a drop in staff numbers from a peak of 8166, to 
1578 in 1999 (Hofrni1nner 2002:147). This precipitous decline was a result of the organisation's 
loss of its two key strategic roles from 1991 to 1998: the weapons programme, and the fuel 
cycle, leaving only a handful of nuclear technology-related programmes, a few research 
programmes (including the SAF ARl research reactor, which was partially used for the 
production of commercial isotopes, and also recognised as a 'national research facility' in the 
late 1990s), and a number of statutory obligations, including decommissioning apartheid-era 
nuclear facilities and overSC?eing the disposal of radioactive waste93, leaving the organisation 
without any programmes directly related to nuclear energy. Nuclear energy-related research and 
development shifted instead to Eskom's PBMR programme. 
93 For reasons of space, the development of radioactive waste policy will not be dealt with in detail here; like other nuclear states. 
South Africa disposes of low-level and intermediate-level waste in long-term storage, but had not adopted a solution to the long-
term storage of high-level waste. Briefly, a policy framework was developed, but only after the DME had developed its own 
nuclear policy capacity after 2000. The two main problems were the decommissioning and decontamination of the AEC's 
weapons and fuel facilities. which is ongoing, and the long-term storage of the high-level waste from Koeberg. The framework 











As soon as Stumpf took over, De Klerk summoned him and requested him to draw up a plan 
terminating the weapons programme and decommissioning the existing weapons, as a prelude to 
South Africa's accession to the NPT, and the ending of its nuclear isolation. By November 1989, 
a plan was approved, which took a year to execute: the last weapons-grade uranium was brought 
back to the AEC in June 1991, and South Africa signed the NPT94 in, July 1991. The 
decommissioning included the demolition of the Y -Plant and the destruction of all information 
relating to its construction (Interview with W, Stumpf). De Klerk only officially announced the 
existence of the weapons programme to the South African (and international) public, as well as 
its subsequent termination and the country's accession to the NPT, in 1993. 
The fuel cycle was shut down over a much longer period. The continued operation of the plants 
was contingent on either selling fuel to Eskom, finding an alternative market, or receiving a 
larger subsidy from the state. The last two options were not available: the post-apartheid state did 
not have a strategic commitment to indigenous fuel production, and the South African process 
was not internationally competitive, and could not cover its short-run marginal costs at 
international prices. Eskom was obliged, through a combination of political and regulatory 
pressure, to buy fuel from the AEC, and did so until the last consignment was delivered in 199695 
(Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology 1998:49). There were direct economic 
benefits in Eskom purchasing fuel on the international market (see above). Although Escom 
renegotiated its contract with the AEC each year (AufDer Heyde 1993:29), it required a licence 
to import nuclear fuel from the AEC, which was also, under the 1982 and 1993 Nuclear Energy 
Acts, the regulator. As the transitional process progressed in the 1990s and sanctions were 
progressively lifted, the collegial relationship between the AEC and Eskom " .. started to sour 
when Eskom was becoming the main source of subsidising the AEC" through fuel purchases. 
The AEC was playing the role of "gamekeeper and poacher at the same time"; Morgan, CEO of 
Eskom during the mid-I990s, claimed that Eskom could have obtained fuel on the open market 
during the late 1980s (Interview with A Morgan), although this was a risk which the apartheid 
government was not prepared to take. Thus, in 1993, Eskom began holding discussions with the 
AEC and the Minister of Minerals and Energy in 1993/4 aimed at getting permission to import 
nuclear fuel (AufDer Heyde 2000:19). 
This process was superseded at the end of 1994 by another process - the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Initiative (NFCI), the aim of which was firstly to resolve the growing tension between Eskom 
94 South Africa's signing of the NPT was the first (and so far, only) instance of a nuclear weapons state (a small one - South 
Africa only possessed a maximum of six devices) ending its weapons programme and then signing the agreement Because this 
was unprecedented, the South African government was unsure of how to proceed - whether to start the inspection process 
immediately, or first unilaterally terminate the programme and then accede. The latter option was chosen, probably heavily 
influenced by strategic factors. 











and the AEC, and secondly to resolve pressing policy issues raised by the transition and which 
were not being resolved by the DMEA, which lacked any nuclear policy capacity until the late 
1990s. The NFCI included the DMEA, the AEC, Eskom and also the MEPC, an ANC-aligned 
minerals and energy policy think-tank. The NFCI submitted a report in 1996, recommending that 
the conversion plant be given two years to prove itself commercially viable, and that the BEY A 
plant be closed (the AEC had already closed the Z-Plant themselves). They also recommended 
that a radioactive waste policy be developed, and that key nuclear legislation be redrafted to 
reflect post-apartheid realities (Auf Der Heyde 2000:20). The BEY A plant stopped operating in 
1996, and the AEC took a unilateral decision to close the conversion plant themselves in 1998. 
This process was accompanied in the period from 1993 to 2000 by a process of institutional 
reform, and the development and elaboration of a post-apartheid nuclear policy. A new actor in 
the transition period was the ANC, and in common with its position on most other areas of 
policy, it sought to delineate a policy position on the nuclear industry. ANC-aligned positions on 
the South African nuclear establishment in the early 1990s represented a broad coalition of three 
groups, which were well-represented at a 1994 conference organised jointly by the ANC 
Western Cape Science and Technology Group and the Environmental Monitoring Group (The 
Nuclear Debate 1994). This included representatives of the nuclear establishment, Eskom and 
others from the nuclear industry elsewhere, as well as ANC-aligned organisations, 
environmentalist and local and foreign academics; there were notably no representatives from 
government departments. The conference record (The Nuclear Debate 1994) reflects the 
diversity of opinions within this coalition. The ANC's traditional position on South African 
nuclear policy had been based on a critique of the secretive and strategic nature the South 
African programme; a key conference paper stated: 
" .. the ANC has a long and important history of questioning and criticising apartheid's 
commitment to the nuclear industry. For almost three decades the ANC has alleged that the 
underlying motive for this industry was the manufacture and potential deployment of nuclear 
weapons .. "(Fig 1994:19). 
The approach to nuclear policy of ANC-aligned groups at the conference can be divided into 
three trends. The first consisted of environmental groups, such as Koeberg Alert96 and others, 
who had been active in the 1980s protesting against nuclear installations, and who were 
implacably opposed to nuclear power, both for its strategic associations and for its potentially 
severe environmental impacts. 
96 Fonned in the early 1980s in the Cape ro protest against the construction and operation ofKoeberg; the group was treated as a 











The second consisted of anti-apartheid activists whose approach to the nuclear establishment was 
that it was primarily a strategic programme built around weapons manufacture, characterised by 
secrecy, and that it would probably not outlast apartheid, since it had been tarnished from its 
association with the strategic aims of apartheid. Both these groups had a similar set of 
preferences, which involved a) introducing transparency, and b) closing most or all of the 
nuclear industry down. For instance, Earthlife Africa asserted that: 
" .. we believe that nuclear power is uneconomical, unnecessmy, and irrelevant. It is 
characterised by danger and deceit, and is inextricably linked to militarism and 
unrepresentative government.." (Earthlife Africa 1994:195). 
A group called Eco-Programme asserted that: 
"Apartheid had to go - Nuclear must go too. Apartheid in its statut~ form is well on its 
way out. Like apartheid, nuclear power and its twin, nuclear weapons, are a cancer in our 
social body" (Eco-Prograrnme 1994:197). 
Dennis Goldberg, a senior ANC cadre, gave a paper which concluded that: 
" .. our civilian policy should be: .. to close down our existing nuclear power production 
facilities; not to construct any further nuclear facilities" (Goldberg 1994:228). 
There were two further strong underlying themes. The first was uncontested, which was that 
there should be strong, independent regulatory authorities, and the swift introduction of 
transparent decision-making. The second theme, which was not universal, was that nuclear 
research should be continued, with its cloak of secrecy removed. Generally speaking, ANC-
affiliated critics of nuclear power supported some fonn of nuclear research, and the maintenance 
of the skills base built up in the nuclear establishment (and its possible transfer into other tasks 
such as renewables research), wh reas environmental groups opposed its continuation: 
" .. nuclear research is inappropriate in Africa, and we believe that the money allocated to this 
would be better spent researching sustainable energy options" (Earthlife Africa 1994: 195). 
The third group was a small group of energy analysts affiliated to the EDRC and the ANC 
Science and Technology Group, as well as the ANC's Minerals and Energy Group, which 
developed a more nuanced position, based on an attempt to situate nuclear policy within a 
comprehensive energy policy framework, and develop a framework aimed at evaluating its 
consistency with a newly-emerging post-apartheid energy policy paradigm. Eberhard's paper, 
titled 'Where does the Nuclear Industry Fit In?', attempted to place nuclear policy in this 
context: 
"Decisions whether to build further nuclear power stations, and/or to maintain an indigenous 
nuclear fuels industry, will, in the future, be based on rational analysis derived through 
integrated energy planning within a policy framework which seeks to advance social equity, 











Work on nuclear policy by this group was built into a broader project on industrial strategy, 
which included an energy component, commissioned by the ANC-aligned Macro-Economic 
Research Group (MERG). The MERG work comprised a report by Auf Der Heyde (1993), on 
the fuel cycle, which ANC-aligned policy researchers had identified as a key issue, since this 
was the only continuing large-scale activity of the AEC. The report (Auf Der Heyde 1993) was 
commissioned in 1993, and published by the EDRC. It investigated the fuel cycle, and raised 
questions about the basic economic viability of the whole fuel programme, as well as about the 
viability of the AEC's MLIS97 research programme, and most of its conclusions were fed into 
the ANC's 1994 Draft Minerals and Energy Policy Document (African National Congress 
1994a). The report's most ground-breaking quality was that it placed in the public domain, in a 
form accessible to policy analysts, information unavailable until then concerning the nuclear 
fuels programme. 
The first and second groups outlined above were swiftly marginalised, since they did not possess 
the resources required by the ANC for the development of a nuclear policy framework, which 
required the development of a policy capacity capable of making sense of the nuclear 
establishment; it was not clear that nuclear installations could simply be shut down, which in any 
case would be a complex and expensive undertaking, requiring the kind of expertise which only 
the nuclear establishment possessed within South Africa. There was an additional problem, 
which was that there was no nuclear policy capacity in government aside from the nuclear 
establishment itself. During apartheid, not only did the nuclear establishment make policy, but 
key legislation was 'written by it as well, in its own legal department. Not only was there a 
"policy vacuum" during the transition (Auf Der Heyde 2000:24), but also an institutional 
vacuum. Until 1998, 
.... the DME employed no experienced, dedicated official tasked with developing strategic 
responses and policy for the nuclear industry" (AufDer Heyde 2000: 19) . 
.. In other words, there was no government machinery which had been created to develop and 
analyse nuclear policy in a broader context. The process was delayed further by the appointment 
in 1994 of a Nationalist Minister of Minerals and Energy, who had historical ties with the 
nuclear establishment and was strongly pro-nuclear, and obstructed institutional reform. 
The outcome was that post-apartheid nuclear policy developed in two phases. The first phase 
involved a process of institutional reform, which ultimately resulted in the establishment of an 
independent nuclear regulator at the end of the decade. The White Paper on Energy Policy in 
1998 committed government to create robust nuclear institutions, including the incorporation of 
the nuclear sector into broader energy planning processes, the separation of "nuclear energy 











matters from other matters relating to the nuclear sector" (1998 Energy Policy White Paper:69), 
as well as ensuring that: 
" .. decisions to construct new nuclear power stations are taken within the context of an 
integrated energy policy planning process with due consideration given to all relevant 
legislation, and the process subject to structured participation and consultation with all 
stakeholders" (1998 Energy Policy White Paper:69). 
The government would also investigate Koeberg's "economic and technical performance" to 
determine the "optimal period for operating the plant,,98. This signalled the end of the first phase, 
and as the White Paper was being published, it was being superseded by the second phase, which 
was inaugurated by an unexpected event, namely the decision by Eskom to develop its own 
nuclear reactor, the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). 
The origins of the PBMR lie in the ABC's Erika project in the 1980s. When this project was shut 
down, the engineering staff were recruited by 1ST, one of the private sector companies peripheral 
to the South African arms industry in the 1980s (HofmAnner 2002:128).99 The concept was sold 
to Eskom in the period from 1993 to 1995, during which period it had won converts inside 
Eskom's nuclear division, as well as doing well in Eskom's internal electricity scenario planning 
processes (HofmAnner 2002:129). The project was 'hosted' by 1ST until 1999 when it was 
transferred into a separate company (the PBMR company) housed inside Eskom Enterprises, the 
unregulated holding company consisting of Eskom's non-core assets. Eskom currently owns 
around 50% of the venture after the pull-out of the US investor Exelon; the other shares are 
owned by the IDC (25% j, and British Nuclear Fuels (22%). The technology has been hailed by 
Eskom and other nuclear professionals in the country and elsewhere as the next generation of 
nuclear technology which resolves some of the traditional problems of nuclear reactors, and is 
thus being promoted as a competitive energy supply solution. However, independent analysts 
have been sceptical about its technological and economic merits, and Eskom has been unable to 
find significant international investors 100. The aim of the project, like the 1970s large-scale 
98 The EDRC in fact jumped the gun by commissioning their own study of the performance and viability of Koeberg in J 996 
(Thomas 1996). The study was quite negative about the plant's operating record, and Eskom moved to quell any further debate 
on the subject. and launched a very glossy brochure titled Koeherg: Eskom's nuclear success story (1996), for which they 
commissioned one of the most prestigious South African photographers (David Goldblatt) in order to separate themselves from 
the apartheid-era connotations of nuclear 'white elephants', although curiously the publication also contains a defence of the 
nuclear weapons programme. The publication is written in a 'triumpb of technology' vein, and symbolised the end of serious 
debate during the transition on the future of Koeberg. Initiatives such as the EDRC's were sidelined from then on, and no 
independent assessment of Koeberg was undertaken: for Eskom, it was vital that their existing nuclear programme be seen in a 
successful light in view of the proposed PBMR programme. 1996 was also the last significant attempt by the EDRC to intervene 
in the nuclear debate. 
99 The central concept. based on a German high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, uses fuel in the form of graphite spheres around 
the size of a tennis ball with embedded enriched uranium particles, can be fuelled online, and will be implemented in relatively 
small modules (I lOW each). In addition the simpler design (no secondary circuit) and its limited size mean that it is not 
susceptible to the same safety hazards as conventional reactors, and thus cheaper to build and operate (see www.pbmr.co.za). 
100 The best independent critique of the project is Auf Der Heyde & Thomas (2002). Thomas has recently completed another 
review of the technology which, based on more recent economic data, is even more sceptical about the economic merits of the 











enrichment proposal, is to provide a basis for a post-coal energy system in South Africa, as well 
as to form the basis of a large-scale export industry. 
Eskom began to seek government's support for the project in 1997; the Cabinet's response was 
that they would support it, conditional on public acceptance (Interview with A Morgan). Since 
then, the DME, in an attempt to evaluate the project from an energy policy standpoint, had 
overseen a number of evaluation processes, none of which have been made public. From 2000 
on, the Cabinet, and the president, have been firm supporters of the project. The project has also 
enhanced South Africa's international standing in the nuclear community, since pebble-bed 
technology is seen by the industry worldwide (and particularly in the US) as a potential source of 
a nuclear revival. However, the PBMR is only one of three pebble-bed technologies currently 
being developed. Another outcome of this development is that NECSA (the successor to the 
AEC) is currently planning to re-enter the fuel fabrication business making fuel for the PBMR. 
Thus, although the South African government has not yet committed itself to building more 
nuclear reactors 1 01 , it fmds itself once again actively supporting a process of nuclear power-
related technology development. This support is not limited to approval, but involves a) support 
in developing nuclear-related skills from the Department of Science and Technology; b) 
fmancial support from the Department of Trade and Industry (a RSOO million grant), c) 
regulatory support from the National Nuclear Regulator; and d) political and other support from 
the Departments of Minerals and Energy and Public Enterprises. 
Government initiatives in the second phase were primarily directed at achieving a level of 
'ownership' of the nuclear establishment, which was achieved through two developments: the 
'rebranding' and restructuring of the AEC, and the development of nuclear policy capacity in the 
DME. A watershed was a review carried out in 1998 by a team of independent experts appointed 
by the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology to review the operations of the 
AEC (Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology 1998), which was highly critical of 
the commercialisation process, which had made little progress. The leadership of the AEC 
described the review as ''vicious'' (Interview with W Stumpf), and managed to mitigate its 
effects through commissioning several further reviews which were less critical. Nevertheless, the 
state imposed several significant changes: statutory and research functions were strictly 
separated from commercial functions (mainly functions in the process of being commercialised) 
as a prelude to several significant institutional reforms (see below). The old leadership was 
replaced, and the AEC was renamed the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) 
in 1999 in terms of the Nuclear Energy Act (4611999), with the intent to remove the negative 
101 However, Eskom is currently in the last phases of seeking approval for the construction of a prototype PBMR (with an output 












apartheid-era connotations of the AEC. Nuclear safety functions were removed from the ambit of 
the nuclear establishment altogether, and the Committee for Nuclear Safety was replaced by the 
National Nuclear Regulator in term of the National Nuclear Regulator Act (47/1999). 
The DME has since 2000 developed a small nuclear policy division, which has three functions: 
1) assessing and promoting the PBMR; 2) deVeloping a nuclear waste policy, and monitoring the 
decommissioning processes of apartheid-era plants; and 3) overseeing South Africa's 
involvement in international nuclear bodies and processes: South Africa now plays a key role in 
African nuclear affairs on; behalf of the IAEA. Although there has been considerable institutional 
reform, South Africa is in the process of making a commitment to a new generation of nuclear 
power plants without a public process of consultation, and outside of the context of an integrated 
energy planning process: the government's 2003 Integrated Energy Plan contains no nuclear 
capacity in two out of the four modelled scenarios (the less expensive 'optimised' scenarios), and 
only the potential for nuclear power in the other two scenarios (Department of Minerals and 
Energy 2003:16). 
Conclusion 
As can be seen from the above discussion, nuclear policy-making from its inception in the 1940s 
until the end of apartheid in 1994 moved through several distinct phases in which it became 
increasingly secretive, and increasingly isolated from other parts of the state, which was one of 
the reasons for its spectacular failure to contribute meaningfully to the energy supply of the 
country. In this respect, the 1950s were a decisive turning-point which set the institutional 
parameters of the nuclear establishment for the next decade. In several important senses, the 
1950s were a relatively open decade for debate in South Africa on nuclear policy issues. 
Internationally, the strategic associations which nuclear technology had developed in the wake of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki dissipated as non-military applications developed, primarily involving 
nuclear power. In South Africa, there were several nuclear technology research initiatives in 
public institutions, study groups of key South African officials visited Europe to assess the 
potential benefits of nuclear power for South Africa, and differences in the industrial policy elite 
on the application of nuclear power were resolved through a public Commission of Inquiry, 
which openly considered. the views of a wide range of stakeholders in the electricity system, 
including the coal industry and the railways. There was no clear 'ownership' of nuclear policy, 
and the future of nuclear technology and research in the country was contested by a small issue 












The key turning point, however, was Cabinet's decision to accept Roux's research proposal and 
institutional recommendations at the end of the 1950s, which had the effect of uniting the 
existing highly secretive nuclear institutions (having been designed in the strategic context of the 
post-war Cold War environment), with a programme of nuclear research, which was completely 
removed from the normal context for scientific and technical research in South Africa (the 
Council for Scientific Research or the universities). The AEB became the primary state nuclear 
institution avenues for nuclear research were closed off elsewhere, and nuclear policy decision-
making devolved to a tiny policy community consisting of the leadership of the nuclear 
establishment, the political leadership, Escom and a few others. In terms of the criteria in 
Chapter 1, the resource exchange relationships were somewhat unusual, but they did exist. 
Although the nuclear establishment was given carte blanche for large parts of its history, from 
1970 it required significant political support for its large projects. The nuclear establishment was 
very adept at building elite political networks, usually with the premier and one or two ministers 
(including the Minister of Mines, several of which played a vocal advocacy role for the nuclear 
establishment in the 1960s and 1970s), but were less adept at building broader support within the 
state for the nuclear agenda. Equally importantly, the nuclear establishment required the co-
operation of Escom, without whose acquiescence there would be no rationale for a nuclear-
industrial complex. The basis of Escom's participation, on the other had, was to defend its 
autonomy against potential encroachment by the AEB. For the political elite, what the nuclear 
establishment provided was prestige; the existence of uranium in South Africa, and the country's 
integration into the supply system for the US and UK nuclear weapons programmes, and later 
the international nuclear establishment, had provided significant prestige to a state obsessed with 
technocratic modernity and beginning to feel the effects of international isolation. The apartheid 
state was anxious to demonstrate that South Africa was not a 'third world' country, but a 
'European102, one, which had the ability to deploy the most advanced technology successfully. 
Other members of the policy community, such as the coal industry, which had been involved in 
the 1950s and early 1960s in decision-making processes concerning the applicability of nuclear 
power, were progressively marginalised as the nuclear establishment developed. 
The policy community consisted of a core, which comprised the nuclear establishment's 
leadership, the premier, and one or two cabinet ministers, and a periphery, consisting of other 
officials, Escom and others. From the 1958 decision, two corresponding decision streams 
emerge. The first was driven by a core group of what could be termed nuclear visionaries, such 
102 Meaning part of the 'international white community', since in terms of apartheid ideology, a society's level of economic and 
technological development was directly related to race. 'Non-white' societies were therefore expected to be technologically 
backward. South African trains and other public amenities were often racially classified by signs which read 'Europeans' and 
'non-Europeans' (rather than white and black), which famously caused confrontations between black visitors from European 











as VanEck, Roux and Grant, whose tendency was to think in grandiose tenns about the future of 
nuclear technology in South Africa; the central principle of this decision stream was the ideal of 
nuclear technology. Their vision placed South Africa in the forefront of nuclear technology 
development, and foresaw the development of a nuclear-industrial complex which would rival 
the coal-industrial complex which was constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. This vision was 
underpinned by an exaggerated fonn of apartheid-era modernism, which deified technological 
progress and had an unshakeable faith in technological rationality. Their ambition was to 
develop the full spectrum of nuclear technology in South Africa, including explosives, reactors 
and an enrichment process, which was driven both by a mid-20th century deification of 
technology and a real concern with future energy resources: nuclear technology, and especially 
seemingly promising technologies such as breeder reactors, seemed to promise limitless 
quantities of cheap energy, unlike fossil fuels, which were demonstrably fmite103• The core of 
this nuclear vision was the process of enrichment, which was the nuclear technology. As one of 
the chief designers of the enrichment plant explained, the enrichment project was " .. the 
technological project in the country .. " (Interview with A Jackson). Aside from any other factors, 
enrichment stood at the nexus of a number of different nuclear technologies, and was also itself 
probably the most challenging frontier of nuclear technology. Thus, the ambition to develop and 
establish an indigenous enrichment process was the key goal of this decision process, which was 
inherent in Roux's 1958 research programme. The programme was conducted in absolute 
secrecy from its inception, and Roux and Grant, the technical leader of the project, personally 
reported on its progress to, and applied for more funding from, both Verwoerdi04 and VorsterlOS• 
Their meetings were never attended by more than a handful of select Cabinet ministers. The key 
decision of the 1960s, whether to fund a pilot enrichment plant or not, was taken (in secret) 
independently of another decision-making process which would detennine whether South Africa 
would in fact need an enrichment capability. 
The second decision stream was concerned with the application of nuclear technology, and 
involved a less-defmed groups of participants, including several spheres of government; the 
nuclear establishment's aim in engaging in this decision stream was the continual search for a 
context for nuclear technology. The key context was obviously energy, with nuclear explosives 
and weapons fonning a lesser secondary context. In the 1950s a number of schemes were 
investigated including heavy water production; however the key use for nuclear technology was 
nuclear power. Pressure from the nuclear establishment and the government, culminating in the 
103 Dr Wally Grant described in an interview how the realisation of the finiteness of fossil fuels gave him sleepless nights until he 
read about nuclear energy, after which he dedicated his life to developing nuclear technology. 
104 Prime Minister 1958 to 1966. 











1965-1968 Committee, persuaded Escom by 1969 to commit to a nuclear power plant using 
enriched uranium, and to develop a nuclear engineering capacity 'of its own. This was very 
important, since it established the start of a credible path for nuclear technology development, 
which swiftly led to a third context - a large-scale enrichment plant, which would form the basis 
of the nuclear power programme as well as the basis for a minerals-beneficiation and export 
programme, utilising the South African advantage of cheap power. Even after these hopes had 
been dashed by the final decision on the Z-Plant, engineers in the enrichment programme 
sacrificed some efficiencies in the plant by designing it so that it could later be expanded into a 
large-scale plant. The decision-making process concerning a nuclear power programme was 
quite open in the 1950s, after which it was transferred to the Nuclear Power Committee, where it 
was more restricted (but still involved a representative from the coal industry). By the end of the 
1960s, however, involvement was strictly limited to Escom, the nuclear establishment and the 
political elite. 
Contrary to the international experience, the 1970s was not a watershed for the South African 
nuclear establishment, but in many ways the Waterloo of its more elaborate ambitions. Several 
factors combined to derail both its vision of a large enrichment plant, and an extensive nuclear 
power programme. The former was undermined by high electricity price increases in the mid-
1970s, and the latter was finally thwarted by a fall-off in the growth rate of electricity in the 
1980s, which put a halt to any further expansion to the electricity system until 2007. As a result, 
the late 1970s represented a turning point for the nuclear policy community. The visionaries 
were sidelined by the new political leadership, and the nuclear establishment was confined to a 
narrow set of strategic goals, which could not be sustained in an environment not driven almost 
solely by strategic imperatives. By the end of the 1970s it was clear that Escom was not going to 
order more nuclear power plants, weapons research was attenuated during the 1980s, and effort 
was concentrated on developing the fuel cycle on a non-economic scale. 
Aside from the economic problems106 which the nuclear establishment faced, and the Escom 
problem, the most striking problem was failure of the nuclear establishment to build a broad 
coalition within the state in favour of its nuclear-industrial complex in the 1970s, for which there 
were three reasons. First, the secretiveness of the nuclear establishment, which was so useful for 
maintaining its autonomy, also limited its interaction with other state agencies involved in 
economic and industrial policy; thus there appears to have been a large degree of indifference to 
the nuclear establishment's broader ambitions amongst the state's economic planning agencies. 
106 The poor economic characteristics of the proposed South African nuclear complex were a deterrent, but could have been 
overridden if the political will had existed (probably with disastrous economic consequences), and might have been in a more 
extreme scenario involving a Security Council-sanctioned oil embargo, in which coal resources were conserved extremely 











Second, the sheer success of the leadership of the nuclear establishment in lobbying the political 
elite in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the exclusiveness of nuclear policy decision-making 
processes did not equip the nuclear establishment (in tenns of organisational capacity) for the 
more complicated process of policy contestation in the state at large, which was not helped by 
their habit of ignoring government departments; their exclusiveness meant that there was no 
other state agency which would be a natural ally within the broader policy system. Finally, the 
relative autonomy of ministries and non-civil service agencies during the V orster era was 
replaced by a far greater degree of centralisation during the Botha era (see Chapter 7). 
When the fuel cycle was complete, the nuclear establishment began a decline which only halted 
in the late 1990s, reducing a nuclear power programme to a hypothesis at best. The dream of 
developing an indigenous enrichment industry was kept alive with the MLIS project, but this was 
closed down in 1998, thus ending the AEC's key activities in nuclear technology development, 
leaving only subsidiary capacities not directly related to nuclear power. The long decline of the 
nuclear establishment was halted at around that time by Eskom's PBMR programme, which 
shifted the focus of nuclear technology development from the traditional nuclear establishment 
to Eskom, which has be,(ome its chief advocate. Again, the main characteristic of the PBMR 
programme is not a commitment by Eskom to order nuclear power plants (yet), but the 
development of nuclear technology. Another key fact of the programme is that it represents a 
direct continuation of the nuclear technology development processes in the 1980s nuclear 
establishment. Politically, it would not have been possible for the AEC to house the programme. 
Eskom, on the other hand, was able to house it with relative ease in Eskom Enterprises, and 
provide the necessary capital, given the political space provided by the electrification 
programme, the economic space provided by its lack of capital requirements, and the 
institutional space provided by the restructuring of Eskom in the late 1990s. The significance of 
this development is that the nuclear establishment is strongly dependent on its relationship with 
Eskom for its future prospects, and has thus largely been integrated into the electricity policy 
community in a subordinate role. 
Despite the lack of any obvious role in the energy sector, the nuclear establishment managed to 
sustain high levels of state funding in the post-apartheid era, which can be explained in tenns of 
several factors. First, and probably most importantly, the nuclear establishment was very careful 
to position itself as an irreplaceable asset, in the fonn of a technology skills base, and shift its 
policy context from energy to science and technology;· thus, the post-apartheid Department of 
Arts, Culture, Science and Technology has played a major role in promoting continued support 
for the nuclear establishment. Second, the concept of a nuclear-industrial complex has significant 











play a significant role in the international nuclear establishment again (including regaining its 
seat on the IAEA), particularly in regard to Africa, which is a source of significant international 
prestige. With this in mind, key decisions in the nuclear policy sphere can be contextualised in 
terms of the paradigms outlined in Chapter 2. The key decision moments in this regard are: 
• the 1959 research programme 
• the decision to build a pilot enrichment plant in the late 1960s 
• the decision process relating to the large-scale enrichment plant in the mid-1970s 
• the decision to develop the local fuel cycle~ in the late 1970s 
• the decision to begin a nuclear power programme in the late 1960s, and the subsequent 
decision to build Koeberg in 1974 
• the closure of the fuel cycle, mid 90s 
• the decision by Eskom to develop the PBMR (around 1995), and the decision to endorse 
this programme by the Cabinet, in the late 1990s 
Given that the central relationship between nuclear technology and energy supply hinges on the 
existence of nuclear power plants, the relationship between these key decisions and the actual or 
planned erection of nuclear power plants is a key factor. This relationship exists on two levels. 
The first is on the simple level of nuclear plants themselves, and the associated decision-making 
and planning processes. The second level involves the whole nuclear energy complex, including 
plants and fuel cycle. This in turn is a subset of a nuclear-industrial complex, which could 
include a range of other subsidiary functions, such as nuclear explosives manufacture; from the 
1950s to the 1970s, the promise of nuclear technology was broader than it is today. 
From 1958 until 1976, the clear desire of the South African nuclear establishment was to develop 
a nuclear-industrial complex. The initial decision in 1958 to found a research programme 
focused in one institution was primarily concerned with this aim, and Roux's programme was 
designed with that end in mind. The model for the nuclear-industrial complex was probably the 
Sasol project, with which VanEck was intimately involved: a unique combination of ground-
breaking technical innovation, industrial development, indigenous resource development and 
strategic thinking. 
Thus the decision to embark on a nuclear programme, essentially made in the late 1960s, is 
particularly significant. To recap: Escom's initial commitment was to a reactor in the Cape of 
350MW; this was later scaled up to two reactors of 900MW each (with the completion of the 
grid), which turned out to be the only nuclear plant. The Government (and by proxy the nuclear 
establishment) had more ambitious plans: by 1970s, the Prime Minister announced a 20 OOOMW 
programme. The report on which this was based, the 1965-1968 AEB report, considered the 











argument for nuclear power was that it would conserve coal resources for liquid fuels and 
chemicals plants, which was the beginning of a common theme from the 1960s onwards: that 
uranium would take over from coal as the chief primary energy source in South Africa, after a 
long period of co-existence. This view was approached with more reluctance at the time by 
Escom, whose planning system managed to accommodate only one nuclear power plant; the 
relative independence of Escom directly contributed to the frustration of a more ambitious 
programme in the 1970s. The aim of the Report was to undermine the credibility of Escom' s 
resistance to nuclear power, and it succeeded in placing enough pressure on Escom to produce 
the required result. As a result, the process of analysis rests mainly on an assessment of orthodox 
criteria applied to electricity planning; however, an important plank of the analysis rested on a 
discussion on the impact on the country's coal resources. 
Between the 1955 Commission report and the 1965 committee, there was an interesting shift. 
The 1955 report's main concern regarding coal was not related to its utilisation as a national 
resource, but the (negative) impact on the coal industry; in other words, a trade-off between 
separate industrial sectors. The 1965 Report on the other hand was concerned with the coal 
resource as a whole; thus the decision process as regards nuclear power can be considered as 
proto-paradigm 1 energy policy, although it was not expressed in those terms. It was also not 
integrated, either then or afterwards, into any kind of state energy policy institution, and did not 
form part of any state energy planning process. In any case, state energy planning processes and 
policy had 'solved' the coal problem by the late 1970s, which involved a massive increase in 
coal production. It was, however, integrated with a more exclusive decision-making process, 
which pertained to the development of enrichment technology. 
The high point in the development of enrichment technology in South Africa was from 1969, 
when government approved funds for the construction of the V-plant, to the mid-1970s, when it 
seemed as if the large-scale plant would go ahead 107. The decision to build the V-Plant was 
motivated by one non-energy-related concern, which was the desire to develop a capacity to 
develop nuclear explosives, and one energy-related concern, which was part of the project for 
which the construction of a large-scale plant was the ultimate aim. The key rationale for the large 
enrichment plant was industrial development and beneficiation; since the plant would have 
massively increased the load on the electricity system, it would have led to a very significant 
increase in the consumption of coal. Cheap coal-fired electricity was essential to the economics 
of the plant, and thus a large nuclear power programme would have rendered it uneconomical 
until decades later. The consideration of the plant was related to indigenous energy requirements 
107 Given the secretiveness of the process, and the lack of independent reviews, it is not clear how viable a large plant based OIl 











only in the long tenn; its short-tenn goals were linked to the ambitions of the nuclear 
establishment to establish a nuclear-industrial complex, and linked into state industrialisation and 
beneficiation/export policies. Thus the decision not to go ahead with the plant was a result of 
international isolation, competition for capital (for more pressing megaprojects) and a rise in 
electricity prices (rendering the plant less internationally competitive) rather than a rejection of 
nuclear power. 
The next key decision, the decision to implement a full fuel cycle, was taken for purely strategic 
reasons. The whole project was designed with one aim in mind, which was to provide fuel for 
Koeberg, which is reflected in the design of the plant. From an energy planning point of view, 
the impact of Koeberg not operating consistently or at all could have been alleviated by one of 
two options: the coal-fired plant Escom cancelled in the 1970s could have been reinstated, and 
would have had a shorter lead time than the fuel cycle plants, or Renamo could have been 
directed by the South African military108 not to sabotage the Cahora Bassa transmission lines. 
Contrary to reasoning put forward by the nuclear establishment, the Z-plant could not have made 
a profit if the SWU price had remained high, nor could it have run at greater capacity (if Escom 
had built more reactors). The final decisions concerning the closing down of the fuel cycle were 
made by the AEC with limited consultation, mainly on account of the irrelevance of the fuel 
cycle to the energy system; however, it was not made within an energy policy framework. 
The final significant decision-making process, surrounding the PBMR, again involved a 
commitment to a specific technology development programme rather than the actual acquisition 
of power plants. Eskom's decision-making process was based initially on the success of the 
PBMR in an Eskom scenario process as part of its internal electricity planning process 
(Hofmibmer 2002:129); howe er. the project was sold to government primarily as an export-
oriented industrial project rather than because of its future role in the energy system. The 
government's 2003 Integrated Energy Plan contains no nuclear capacity in two out of the four 
modelled scenarios (the less expensive 'optimised' scenarios), and only the potential for nuclear 
in the other two scenarios (Department of Minerals and Energy 2003: 16). 
Thus, nuclear policy. has consistently developed outside of an energy policy framework. even 
though energy provision has served as one of the long-standing rationales of the nuclear research 
establishment. Institutional choices made in the 1950s. coupled with an increasingly strategic 
role. made it impossible to integrate nuclear policymaking into a broader energy policy 
framework. Despite significant institutional refonn. this trend has survived the end of apartheid 
and the process of democratisation. 
108 The South African military "took over" Renamo ~ the Rhodesian intelligence agency after Zimbabwean independence in 












The Development of South African Liquid Fuels 
Policy 
Overview 
The lEA's 1996 Review of South African energy policy notes that the liquid fuels industry, 
" .. from exploration through to retailing, was enveloped in a complicated web of inter-
dependent policies, informal arrangements, market sharing agreements, trade restrictions and 
pricing controls (only some of which were/are subject to 'regulation' in the strict sense of the 
term)" (lEA 1996b:171). 
This accurate assessment of liquid fuels institutions reflected the reality of decades of secrecy 
and lack of transparency in the liquid fuels industry. A history of the liquid fuels industry in 
South Africa is complicated by three limitations on information. The first is the official secrecy 
surrounding the industry, informally from the 1960s and formally from the 1970s, until the end 
of apartheid. The second is the partly-related culture of secrecy of major oil companies, and the 
third is the lack of comprehensive records on important aspects of the industry; thus, much of the 
data presented here is incomplete, or extracted from possibly unreliable sources. A thorough 
history of the liquid fuels industry in South Africa remains to be written. 
South Africa has no significant indigenous crude oil resources); thus the development of the 
liquid fuels industry proceeded along the same path as that of other oil-importing countries from 
the first importation of illuminating paraffin2 (1884) through the 1950s, when market conditions 
made it possible for oil companies to invest in refineries, to the 1970s, when a unique feature of 
the South African industry developed: a synthetic fuels industry. Up to this point, the oil industry 
in South Africa was dominated by four multinational oil companies, two of which operated in a 
partial partnership; thus three refineries were built in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, 
cutting imported liquid fuels to a minimum. 
I Apart from two tiny oilfields off the southern Cape coast, which only started producing crude oil in the last seven years. and 
will not produce more than 5-10% of South Africa's annual requirement. 
2 A note on terminology: liquid fuels products have a variety of often confusing names in different countries. Here I will use 
names typically used in South Africa. These relate to the lEA (lEA 2004:181,185-192) terms as follows (South African term 
first): LPG=LPG, avgaslaviation gasoline=aviation gasoline. petrol =motor gasoline/mogas, jet fuel=aviation turbine fuel/jet 











The synthetic fuels industry began on a negligible scale with the construction by state-owned 
company Sasol of a synthetic fuels plant in the 1950s, manufacturing liquid fuels from coal. This 
technology might not have been developed further, but for the growing threat to the apartheid 
state of an oil embargo; the embargo was first mooted in the 1960s, and became effective only at 
the end of the 1970s. The reaction of the state was to launch a range of countermeasures, which 
involved billions of rands of capital expenditure and subsidies (mainly derived from fuel levies), 
and changed the structure of the industry significantly, as well as cloaking it in a veil of secrecy 
from which it is only now emerging. 
The key state strategies consisted of a huge expansion of the state synthetic fuels industry, a 
programme of exploration activity· aimed at finding indigenous oil resources, a large-scale 
strategic stocks programme, the construction of a further state-owned refinery, and the takeover 
by the state of a large proportion of crude oil procurement for the privately-owned refining 
industry. A complicated set of arrangements was concluded with the oil multinationals to 
accommodate the synthetic fuels industry in the liquid fuels market, as well as to induce them to 
continue to operate in South Africa. Most of these arrangements, and much of the regulatory 
system, consisted of informal agreements between government, the oil majors, and the synthetic 
fuels industry. These retarded the development of the regulatory system (thus protecting the oil 
industry), prolonged the exemption of the industry from scrutiny by the competition authorities, 
and prevented the development of a safe and affordable market in liquid fuels for poor 
households. 
After the end of apartheid, most policy activity has been concentrated on formalising and 
overhauling the regulatory system, dismantling (and attempting to introducing transparency to) 
the state strategic oil infrastructure, and addressing issues of racial equity in ownership and 
management of the industry. 
Infrastructure 
1) Exploration and Resources 
South Africa has only very limited oil resources, and only slightly more significant natural gas 
resources; natural gas fields currently exploited are concentrated off the southern Cape coast near 
Mossel Bay. Exploration has been extensively undertaken by both the state entity Soekor and 
private companies; consensus is that there are no promising terrestrial oil or gas fields, but 
exploration is continuing sporadically offshore, particularly off the west and southern coasts. 
Natural gas and condensate are pumped ashore and converted into liquid fuels in the Mossgas 











PmductlOn from three reillullely small oilfield;; in the ~e area has also recently commenced. 
Around 25 000 barrel5lday ha\e been produeed since 1997 rrom the Oryx lind Oribi field!. 
"hieh contain around 25 million oolTCls of reco\'erable oil in total. and around 30-40 000 
hands/day ilfl"C been proouct'd rrom lhe newly-delleloped Sahle field sina' 2003. 1997 crude 
requiremenls were "round 444 000 barrel5l'dar (Lloyd 20(1): during the perioo 1995-2003, 
South Africlln sources halle prollided nn IIvcrdb'C of 3. 14% of tOlal crude requirements (South 
Ali-iell I'clrolcum lildustry Associmion Annual Report 20(4) - the rest is exported. since it is a 
high va lue light crude which comnumds a premium on the international market from refineries in 
countrieli "hieh hUllc tighter environmental regUlations lhan South Africa. 
Crude oil has been imported into the country since 1954. when the first large·scale refincr) W'IS 
buill, and was primarily .sourced in Ihe Mid<.l~ East. A statc·!O-state oi l agreement with Iran in 
the late 19605 hooSllod the quantity sourced from that coontry. WId after the 1973 oi l crisis. Arab 
states imposed lin oil cmOOrgo on South Africa: thus. during the 1970s, South Africa was heavily 
depcndl'l1t on Iroln (which had declined to I'I1forcc Ihe embargo) for crud<.> supplies (91". in 
19791. After the Iranian !'C,·olution. Inmian supplies were cut 01T. and lhe procurement of crude 
was takcn O\Cr by the state's SITUI~-gie Fuel Fund (SFF). I'ohich procured it from secret sources lit 
II pn:mium, and sold II at internatIOnal market niles to the relining companies. With the cod of 
lhe embargo, oil has bc.-en proeun.>d primarily from Iran. and more recently from S;ludi Ambia. 
whi~h is cuncntly the larb'Cst supplier to South Afriean refineries. The SrF also presidi>d o\,l'r a 
massl,e stralegic oil stock. sufficient at its height to co\'er two ycllf'S of crude supply to South 
African refineries: Ihis was mainwncd from the 19605 to the mid-l990s. when it was dmwn 
down to orthodox le\els of lU'ound 90 da)S of supply. The other key primary resource is coal. 
\Oohich is lhe feedstock for the Secunda planl, owned by Sasol. Sasol prodllCe!i and IIliCS arollnd 
JQ% of lotalllnnual domCSlie coal producuon (Ocpartnt<''flt of Mine roll md Energy Arrairs 1995). 
2) Marketing and Refining 
The central ~truclutal fealllre of the liquid fuels industry (with the exception of Sasol Mining) is 
thus the manuffICluring lind markeung industries ..... hieh have been conditioned by four faclors. 
The first is the g<.'Ographical distriblllion of economic aclivity. and thus demllnd for liquid fuels. 
\Oo'hich is co/lCCotrlltcd on the WitWlllersrand, the historical centre of mini ng actillity. with tenm:s 
ofsttondary importance atthc coast, nOlllbly 81 Cape Town and Durban. The Durban·interior 
corridor emerged as tile key fUCll~ of ,he industry: crude rcfinerit'li were built at eitllo;or ends of the 
corridor, cOImcctcd hy pipeline intmslnlcture. 
' tN<:'~ ,t.: . 11P',r"lIIl' ,.,1< ~rlll< O)",Ile .. < n.t1.11I<l""l. lh .. """,. ",Ile<l~" ""It.: liquid f""t. K<J",,,,,,,,,n" orn .. roun,,,. . 











The second is tile conSlr.lint on competition: competition from re fineries in other cOllntries was 
limited by distance but largely eliminated by !leavily protectionist policies. and competition 
.... 
.....,. -, ... , . ..... ,,,.,,. 
._ .... -. -"'-'-
between refiners was 
limited by regulation and 
the eff~"(:t ive operation of 
a state· sanctioned cartel 
for much of tile industry's 
history. The third. and 
p:rhaps most signi lieaDt . 
is the histolj' of apartheid 
and the oil ..,mbargo. 
which resulted in SC~CntJ 
l ey d':"clopmenlS uniql.lC 
to South Africa. including 
...... :="" __ ,_, a synthetic fuels industf). 
;;=;"~h<";' fuel plants produce a 
significllntly different product mix from onhodo~ cl"l.l(k refinerics. TIK: fourth is South Africa's 
relatively mild climate combiood wi th the abundnnce of ch.:ap cool. "hieh in combination 
eliminated allY sigllifieant demand for fuel oil or heating oil: dlus refineries" en: designed to run 
light erudes. and to produce more high-value products. The geography of the basic infrastructure 
of the industry is illustrated 011 the map abow in Figure 6.1 . 
The indigenous production of liquid fuels ill South Africa began with a tiny privately-owned 
rcfincT) constructed in Ihe 19JOs. the SA TMAR planl.. to distil oil shale in the Transvaal. "hich 
was later conv ... ned into a liny crude rcfil"lCl)·. Tile industry proper b.!gan in the 19S0s. with the 
commissioning of a relincry in Durban owned by Mobil (Enrel). The folio"ing year. SII.SOI. the 
state-own ... d symllClk fuels company. opened its first small p lant. Sasol I. which p!"oduced oil 
from t<)"-grade coal. During the 19605. two other refineries were commissioned: the Caltex 
refinery in Cape Town (Calrel). lind IInOlOCr refinery in Durban. jointly owned by Shell lUId 131' 
(Saprel). 
ripclines were built in the 1960s from Durban to the imerior. "here the key market was located. 
by the siatc railways. The 1960s also saw the beginning of international pressun: 10 institute lUI 
oi l embargo against South Africa. " hich led the Sout h African government to devise II system or 
oil storage facilities linked to 111'1 inland n:!ir'<' ry lit Sasolburg (NUl reI). N31ref was completed in 
1971. and wa~ owned joiolly by Sasol. TOIaI and the Iranian National Oil Company. which later 
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Durban to Natrc[ and to strategic storage facijlics in a diSUS«! coal mine QI O~ics. The ley 
stmtegic dcwlopm ... nt. howe'cr. WaS the: buildirg ofSasol2 (completed in 1980) in the wake of 
the first oil crisis in 1973. and the dolvelopment of Sasol 3 (completed in 1982 an identical 
pram \0 Sasol 2) [n the wake or lite second. as a nlcans of lessening SOllth Africiln dependence on 
foreign oiL Crude oil rcllnc~ c!.pacily. reflttkd in Figun: 6.2 abo\"e', ellpanded significBmly 
during the r960s and 1970$. but W\IS halted b) the commi:>siomng of the Sasol plants, which 
tiispiaced " significant proportion of rcfiOCT) j'FOdUO:lion; refiners agreed 10 m()thbaH some of 
Iht:-ir capacity in exchange for compens:ttion (n>rn the stale. In the early 1990s. demand increased 
enough for the refiners \0 dc-mothball this capacily and to expand the capacity of their refincriC5.. 
In addition, Mossgas. a furti1cr synthetic flK'ls project. WID completed in 1992. based on the 
liquefaction of II.IItUlllI gas. 
roc wholcs.1lc strucmre of (he South African liquid fuels martel is dominated by the oil majOfS. 
Sao;ol was unlil2()()4 excluded from the wholesale market by an aW'-.... rnem ~ipulating that the oil 
majors would buy all Sasors production in exchange for SU5QI IIO! cnt~rinl:\ the wholesale 
market: the II.greemcm e~pired in 2~. The oil majors do not rul'·C directllCccss: to the retail 
• The: ..... I •• .....,.,..... or ..... r""" .....".01 ~ ........... 1)0 ........ ~_ ...,..... l<fII by II>< Qa iJod~ . • 101ch 
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market: oil eomparucs may own retai l sites, but ~r.tlC "nly a very small number thcmsc:lvei for 
[mining purposes. 
Production and Demand 
As a result of the aforemCnlionc<l factO]"$, the profile of liquid fuels produCl-d by the Soulh 
African industry is somewhat different from those e lsewhere in Ihl\:e ways, which are illustrll1ed 
by Figure~ 6.3 and 6.4 below. Figure 6.3 shows the product prolile of irKIividual South African 
refineries and symhctic fuel plams (in 1997), :md Figure 6.4 dcmonslrltlcs Ihe prodUel ratios of 
South African crode refineries and synthctic fJet plants (again 1997 figures), com pared to 
aggregaTe prodoction of liquid fue ls in DECD wtd non-DECO countries (both :lCcording 10 mass 
ralher than volume). "mmged IICcording to pcrcenl4ge of l iFO produced 
.Jb\: fi rst ill uminaTing comp:1rison is the diffe~ncc between OECD, non-DECO, Illld South 
African coastal refineries: Ihe laner arc most simi lar TO IIOn-OECD refineries in their product ion 
profile. cxeeptthm they produce less diesel and LPG. Illld more petrol. which is an ou tcome of 
Ihe Soulh African market profi le as il has developed in the lasTthrec rn.'cades. Most of the HFD 
produced by coastal refineries is sold as ships' bunkers or used as refinery fuel. In the 1970s. 
Sout h. African refineries v.'eJ"I: upgraded to run lighter crude alld produce less liFO (Lloyd 
2001:9). but havc IlOt been significantly upgmdro since in this regard, and arc thus on averngc 
less complex than OECD refineries. The second signiliclllll differencc is in the cost structUTC and 
product profile 0 r NalfC:( the inllUld refillCry, which on account of its location (in the coal fields) 
hi'S no natural milrket for fuel oil; thus il is a considernbly more complell refinery thllll Ihe 
coastal rclillt.'ries. and produces ~cry liUle HFO. Itlllso produces higher qua nlities of jel fuel to 
supply South Africa's main inTernat ional airpon ncar 10hanne,burg (Lloyd 2001 :9). 
The th ird, and most signi ficam differenee. is bel wcen the product profi Ics of Ihe crude rcfi ncries 
and Ihe symhClic fuels plams!, which. produce only negligible quantiTies of heavy oi ls by 
comparison to erode refineries. and produce a significantly larger proponion of petrol Ihan 
conventional refmerics. Whereas crude refinerie~ are constrnirn.-d by Ihe composi ti on of crude 
oil,lInd can only produc~ 7"/. more pcirolthan diesel. the synfuels plan Is. b~'Clluse oflhe synfuels 
process, produce ISO% more petrol than diese l (Lloyd 2001:9), which. is signi fi cant in the 
cunle)ll uf the demand proftle uf the South African markcT. On Ihc other hand, Ihe nature oflhe 
synfuds process is innexible in lerms uf [lrOIluet nuios; unl ike crude refineries. the product ratios 
'.I"h< .)"(,,<1. pt .. !/. .... boonl on lh< l'i"" ..... ·r""'sdt ~ ~!<id't .y',,",,";_ hy ... .....m..n. from. oool· ...... .,....&&> 
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of the synfuels planls cannot easi ly be adjusted. The other kl")' difference i5 in primar)' energy 
ooTl'\umplion. due 10 Ihe CTlCrgy imensily oflhe synfucls p1OCl'55, ,ignHit:lUllly more l'Tlergy per unit 
of liquid fuels output is ~uired than fUr a crude refinery. which has significantly increased the 
mer&) intensity of the South Afncan economy. The synfuels process :II.'lO produces II number of 
unusUilI pctrochcmicals oot produced by onhodox refincri~ ",hich adds significantly 10 Ihe \~Iue 
of tnc process. and mahs it more difficuh to compare IhI.> economics of synfuel production 10 
onhodox refining. The Sasol proo::c51J also involves a ''Cry largc-sc:lle coal mining proc:css. 
Aggregali' demand for liquid fuels in South Africa has gro"l1 consistently ovcr lhe last SO years as 
illustmted in Figure 6.5 3lxwc, "'llh the exception ofa period of disruption from the first oil erisiJ to 
the mid-1980s. when the price of liquid fuels underwent steep rcallncreascs, not only bccau", of 
the oil criSl.'S of the 19705 and tnc conoomitanl increased in ltv: crude pocO.', bUI also because of 
premiums includI'd in ttv: petrol price during lhis period, bolh to fund the Sasol rrojl!Cls Il.'I "I'll as 
10 cover premiums on crude sourced s<-'Crei!y on lhe ml"mallonnl market . 
The ~troch.re of demand in South Afriell is unusual In severul ~'CUl. The first i~ ttv: ~illmficanl 
dcclim.', in both reilitenns and relati.'e to tOlalliquid fucl use, of liquid foc i use in industry as a 
result oflhe tWO oil shocks, WI demonslrated by Figure 6.6 below, 1'8(1ly for economic T'Cu.sollS, lind 
partly lIS IlII outcOrTll' of CO\'l'fTlm('nt policy, II FO usc " -dS sign.ficantly allenuall'([ In South Africa in 
the "like of thl' oil crisis, which led crude rcfinl';cs to invest significantly in additionlll plant to 
incrc-.Ise their Ylclds of ' white product' Win:tncilll Mail 16/12/1977). In additlOll, as mentioned 
ubove, thete is no sillni ficllnt usc of liquid fuds for ekelricity iteneruuon; the perccnl.:lgc of sent-<lut 
clectrieity gene rated from liquid fuels reueh~'([ a peak of o.mw. on l!.'iCom's sysu.'m in 1978, before 
declining to 0.002"10 in 1992 (Department of MinellI] and Energy AlTairs 1995:31). The second is 
th~ ....-1;11 ivdy hillh u~e of illuminating paraffin by households: in most middle· Income eoulllric ... , 1 r 
(which is unS:lfe and unhealthy) h<t1l been replaced hy U'G. 'll1e Ihird is the high usall" of petrol in 
transport instelld of diese l, for which there are two impo"ullt historical rell$Ons: government 
di!ICollIUg~-d the uSc of diesd in varioU!l WilY' for Sl rllte!,:ic reasons (to free up supplies for the 
militlU)') lind f")m the 1980:; onwards. a public transport industry arosc based on minibuses, "'hieh 
arc pctrol-dri~en vehicles. l11b trcnd was ~xacerbal.ed by a fan in militury demand, as the war in 
NlIITlibih ended in the mid-1980:s (lloyd 2001: II. Interview with senior OME official). The way in 
"hich the limitation on dil'SCl ool\StJmption was IIChie\lt.'d W.lS Ihrough tllXation of diesel vehicles. as 
\\'('11 :1.'1 a priein& 5tr.ttellY which did I'IOt differentiute between pclml and diesel. lIS most counlries 
00. ·1111' botsls for price regulation did not permit l'rodLICers 10 discount diesel to encourage its 
cortSlimplio n. The key factor for the apartheId gov~'fTlmcnt ho"c'·er WIIS that the synfuels process 
product'S rcl.l1jvdy small quantilll,'!l of diCSC'l; in the 19H(}.;. "hen SlI$Ol's sharc of total liquid fuels 
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domestic market was at its peak, S:lSOI had tlK' capllcity to supply over 50-10 of tnc cOIJ nl ry', petrol 
requirements. but only a maximum of 30-;. of its diesel requirements. Uohich would possibly have 
led 10 II supply crisis if the oil embargo had succeeded "nd the Wllr in 50uthem Africa hlld eSClllaled. 
Annther factor drivinl; petrol demand in South Africa is the- social and spatial structure of South 
African cities. .... hich han:' n:lati'o'cly dispersed scnlemcnt panems em account of apartheid spatial 
planning: thus poor commuter.; trllvd large distances to work in petrol-driven vchiclC"S. Wealthier 
commuters IIlmost exclusively tr.Ivel by rri''lIle car: public transport. Uohieh is inadequate and 
unsafe. is genenslly lI,oided b) Uo"CallJtier commule~ 
"The n: lationship bi.'twt."en produclion and demand in Sooth Africa is tlOI siraightforward. since tnc 
indigenous induslI) s upplies the whole 50uthcm Africwt regiem. and refinery capacity is planned 
accml'ngJy. lbe ncuvy petrol bias of the economy is pIlftly catered for by the synfuels industry 
(which produces Ii far higher mtio of po..'trol). which obviates the nccd to import either pelrol or 
sii:Jlificantly latger quantities of crude oil. and thus having to export the r.:suhan! non-peltol 
prodUCts (Lloyd 2001: I I J. although if tit<' industry had not fulfilled tMt role. it is arguable that 
policies restricting the uS<' of diesel might not Mve been pur.;ued. The p!"oduct demand profiles of 
OECD countries. non-OECD countries. and South Africa are portroyed in Figure 6.7 3b()\'\:. as well 
as the a.ctual producuon profile of Sooth African refineries: columns 3 and " an- in tnc same scale. 
and the comparison thus indicatcs the proportion of surplus fuels cxporll.-rl_ Panicularly tlOIabic is 










demalld for petrol and kerosene, and the lack of demand for LPG and fuel oil. sctthc Soutl! African 
pmlileapan. 
Actors and Institutions 
1) Key Industry Actors 
The key industry actors in the liquid fuels industry are tlie five oil majors and Sawl. who between 
them dominated almust the entire relining and marketing illdustrics. witl! Mossgas playing a lesser 
and nlOr.: recent role. Four oftl!csc fivc key oil multinationals, Ill', Shell, Caltex and Mobil (called 
the .I;t .~mlnrtl V~<;uun' nil ('/,mpany befure lhe t9~0s). h',,1 an c~rly presence in South Africn .~. 
imponers lind marketers of liquid fuels before 1950. Tntal enteTCd the market in the 1950.. and 
other smaller companies. including an • Afrikaner empowerment' company Trek (owned by Genmin 
and a consor1ium of oi l majors, iocluding the IDC). and Sonarep. a Portugu~'Se marketing company. 
entered the murh1 in tlie 1960s. Ill' and She-II, a.~ pllr1 OCan agrt.'t:mcnt whicl! dividt-d Afrka illlO 
'spheres of inllucl1\:c'. opcmted in South Africa in n joint holding company. the Consol idated 
l' elroleum Company. which developed the Sapref relinery. although th~'Y marketed product a.. 
sepamtc hrand~. This Ilmlngement was lermir13tcd in 1975, although lhe refmery is still jointly 
O\\1lcd and operated (Financial Mail 27f6/1975). TOlal gained a share in the refining industry in the 
Ime 1%Os via p.1rtieipmion in Nmref. which was o"ned jointly by Sasol (52.5%), the National 
Iranian Oil Company (17.5%) and Tutal (30"/. ) (Financial Mail 71611968): the Ir..tn;an stake wus 
sold ill the 19805. (Uld Total's stake incr~a~cd to 33.3%. Sasol Iiolding tlie rcmaind~r. Trek held the 
licence 10 build the ncxt refinery io the 19105. which was planned ror Rieharo.!s' Bay. a developing 
induSlrial hub, which also had a deep-water port which could potentially offload large crude carriers 
(Financial Mail 5131 1911): Iiowcvcr tnc oil crisis l'nd the Sasol project scuppL!red the plan. and no 
new crude refincri('S have since been built. III Inc laIC 19110s. Mnbil disinwstoo undcr pressure from 
the US. and sold its South African interl.'S\S 10 Gencor (successor 10 Genmin). which consolidated 
Mobil·s. Trek ' s and Sonarep's assets into (I rocw oil company callL-d Engen. a majority stake in 
which wa~ sold 10 the Malaysian state oil ~'Ompany I'ctr(lllas ill die mid-I990s. Talks are currently 
underway 10 merge Engen (Uld Sa.~ol , a merger which is opposed by thc other oil companies on 
competition grounds_ 
Sasol Wi!-'l founded in the early 19505 as 0 wholly stale·owned com]Xll1y (owncd by the IDC). aftcr 0 
privalc partncr.ship failed to devise a viable eoal·to-oil proj~'Ct. ruMI conslructed SIISOI I, a relatively 
small synthetic fuels pJ3nt, in 1955. Sa.'101 subsequenl ly look a dominant stake in Natrer, buill 
adjacent to Sasol I us pllr1 of a strn!cgic oil sopply stl'lllegy. TIll.: company nchic\'ed a dominant 
posi tion in production, however. with tlie construction of Sasol 2 and 3. producing a significant 











refineries expanded in the early 1990s. Sasol was privatised from 1979 in a gradual process lasting 
around a decade, primarily in order to fund Sasol 3. Sasol has significant interests not only in 
refining and synthetic fuels, but also in coal mining and petrochemicals, which contribute 
significantly to the group's profitability. Mossgas, still state-owned, was built in the late 1980s in 
order to maintain a threshold of synfuels production as a strategic measure, and is now integrated 
into the newly-formed state oil company PetroSA, together with the assets of Soekor, the state-
owned exploration company. 
Marketing of liquid fuels has been dominated by the majors, with a few minor players entering and 
exiting in the last half-century. Sasol and Mossgas had no marketing bodies of their own, and the 
overwhelming majority of their product was marketed through the oil majors via an 'uplift' 
agreement (The Crude Refiners' Agreement), whereby the oil companies would buy all of Sasol's 
output at a regulated price and market it. The agreement was initially drawn up between Sasol and 
the oil industry (with government backing) to accommodate production from Natref in the 1960s, 
and later extended to cover Sasol 2 and 3. The agreement expired in 2003, and Sasol entered the 
retail market in 2004. Product from the Mossgas plant is still marketed through the oil majors. 
Because of the structure of the industry, the regulatory system and the immunity accorded to the 
industry from competition legislation on account of its strategic status, there has always been a high 
degree of co-operation amongst oil majors. Gathering of data, determination of market share, and 
conducting relationships with the state were undertaken collectively; this was enhanced by the high 
degree of co-operation with the state which became necessary during the oil embargo (Interview 
with senior oil industry executive). The oil majors had excellent access to government during the 
apartheid era, and subsequently. Sasol was even much more closely integrated with government 
agencies, through shareholding and governance relationships, its role in the strategic stocks 
programme, and through elite networks, since its leadership was strongly aligned with the 
Nationalist leadership of the apartheid government and were in most cases members of the 
Broederbond (Wilkins & Strydom 1979: 428, Appendix 1). 
The oil majors and the synfuels companies comprised two distinct centres of influence in the 
industry until the late 1990s, when Sasol joined the industry body, the South African Petroleum 
Industry Association (SAPIA). SAPIA was formed in 1994, and plays a significant role in policy 
processes and regulation on behalf of industry. A third centre of influence arose in the 1990s, 
comprising a new generation of black-owned marketing companies, which were in almost all cases 
integrated into the majors or Sasol as part of a Liquid Fuels Charter agreed between the companies 
and government by 2002; a key role was played by the African Minerals and Energy Forum, formed 











structure of the industry by encouraging the transfer of equity to black participants rather than 
conceding market share to new entrants. 
A key state entity involved in the liquid fuels industry is the state transport parastatal Transnet 
(previously South African Railways and Harbours), which played two key roles. The first was the 
transport of liquid fuels by train from importers, or later the coastal refmeries, to inland depots and 
other points of consumption. From the 1 960s, pipelines were constructed for the same pwpose, also 
owned and operated by SAR and Hffransnet, through a subsidiary Petronet, which from the late 
1960s also transported crude oil to inland strategic storage points as well as to Natref. The second 
was the setting of railway and pipeline tariffs, which were unregulated and had a significant impact 
on the price of liquid fuels, since the regulated price contained a transport element which reflected 
this administered price. Since the pipeline network and the rail network were monopolies, rail and 
pipeline prices were and are an unavoidable element in liquid fuels price structures. The post-
apartheid government has recently established an independent Pipelines Regulator to approve 
pipelines prices. 
Two other key industry groups which have played a significant role in policy processes are the 
industry organisations of the retail trade, representing service station owners, and trade unions. The 
Motor Traders Association (MTA) was replaced by the Motor Industries Federation (MIF) in the 
latter part of the century. These associations played a key role in regulating the retail trade through 
their involvement in the Joint Petrol Advisory Committees (JPACs) and later the Rationalisation 
Plans, both of which regulated service station numbers, locations, service levels and business 
affiliations, as well as representing the retail trade in negotiating retail margin increases. 
The role of trade unions, particUlarly the COSATU-affiliated unions involved in the oil industry, the 
Chemical Workers' Industrial Union and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, was 
particularly significant during the transitional policy-making process in the Liquid Fuels Industry 
Task Force, as well as contributing significantly to the ANC's energy policy. Groups external to the 
industry, such as the Automobile Association, chambers of commerce and industry, minibus taxi 
associations, and agricultural unions, provided significant short-tenn political pressure on the 
government to address concerns relating to the petrol price, but were relatively ineffectual in 
lobbying for significant policy change. 
2) Government Departments and other State Agencies 
The role of government departments in the liquid fuels policy process has been threefold. The first 
role was regulation of liquid fuels prices and other aspects of the industry such as service levels and 
importing; these were based in the Department of Commerce and Industry from the 1930s, and then 











Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs when it was fonned in 1980, with one exception; the 
regulation of upstream exploration and production licensing, which was delegated to Soekor in the 
1960s, but in the 1990s was removed and placed in a separate agency, the Petroleum Agency. 
Stakeholders, including the oil industry and the MIF were directly involved in the regulatory 
process through a web of infonnal agreements and processes overseen by the departments, related 
to the regulation of prices, service station location, refining and importing and exporting crude oil 
and liquid fuels. 
The second role was policymaking, which was based in the same departments mentioned above; 
however, policy concerning indigenous development of refining and the synthetic fuels industry 
was based in the industry section of the Department of Commerce and Industry. Significant roles in 
the policymaking process were also played by other non-departmental state agencies, notably the 
Industrial Development Corporation, which played a lead role in the development of the state's 
crude refining assets (Natret), strategic stocks, and synthetic fuels industry, as well as in the 
policymaking process. Another key entity was the Energy Policy Committee, which took key 
decisions concerning the state's oil security strategy in the 1970s and early 1 980s; unlike in other 
major parts of the energy sector, the EPC was centrally involved in decision-making processes in 
this case. 
The third key role comprised direct involvement in the industry itself, which was focused on the 
state's oil 'security strategy. Given the secrecy of the decision-making process, it is difficult to 
separate direct state activity in this regard from policymaking, since most key decisions were taken 
or fully fonned inside what might be tenned the state's 'oil security elite', which comprised a set of 
state and private organisations articulated by the oil security strategy. The main actors were a small 
elite of politicians, bureaucrats from the Departments of Commerce and Industry and the DMEA, 
the IDC, Sasol (until its privatisation, when its involvement was curtailed), and the oil majors, 
whose co-operation was a vital element of the strategy, but who were not involved in major 
decision-making processes. 
The security strategy originated in the 1960s, and initially involved the stockpiling of oil, for which 
purpose the Strategic Fuel Fund was established in 1964 by the IDC. This was linked to the 
development of an inland refinery adjacent to Sasol I, Natref, as well as a network of crude oil 
pipelines which could pump oil to Natref as well as to or from the strategic stockpile, or from the 
strategic stockpile to the coastal refineries if necessary. In the 1970s, Sasol 2 and 3 were constructed 
through the IDC. To fund the capital cost, as well as establish a financial instrument to deal with 
various other aspects of the synthetic fuels programme, a State Oil Fund was established in 1977, 











company, the Central Energy Fund Pty (Ltd), which housed the state's remaining oil assets, 
including Soekor and the SFF, and later Mossgas; CEF played a central role in the Mossgas project. 
Another crucial development in the early 1980s was the centralisation of oil trading on behalf of the 
oil majors in the SFF, which assumed the role of procuring oil for most of the refining industry to 
circumvent the oil embargo. This required the collaboration of the oil majors, both in co-ordinating 
the acquisition of crude oil and in strategic planning for the future of the industry, which could not 
be done through the normal policy channels because of the extreme levels of secrecy; even 
relatively senior energy bureaucrats did not have access to key information concerning crude 
importation or liquid fuels demand (Interview with J Basson). The other purpose of CEF was to act 
as a funding conduit for energy policy activities generally, and the National Energy Council 
specifically; however, this ceased with the demise of the NEC. 
Price and the Regulatory System 
Since key aspects of the industry (including price) have been regulated by a host of formal and 
informal arrangements since the 1930s, an understanding of the dynamics of liquid fuels prices 
primarily involves an understanding of the development of the regulatory system, which in turn was 
significantly influenced by the state's oil security programme. A central feature of the system was 
that the price of synthetic fuels was, and is, linked directly to the price of crude-derived fuels, even 
though the cost structures of the two industries are different. The regulatory system consists of what 
the Department of Minerals and Energy's chief liquid fuels bureaucrat referred to in 2002 as a 
'spider's web,6 consisting of import control, regulation of service station numbers and location, and 
price regulation. 
One of the reasons for the complexity and non-transparency of the system was its informal nature, 
which from the development of the service station industry in the 1930s was comprised of a series 
of 'agreements' between different industry actors, and between industry and government. Price-
setting and other co-operative arrangements between industry players were endorsed by 
government, and enforced by control of the supply chain by the oil industry, and only formalised 
over a long period beginning with the second world war and ending with the post-apartheid 
government. This informal characteristic makes it hard to identify concrete regulatory processes, 
which in the case of price regulation, were only placed on a solid statutory footing in 1977 via the 
Petroleum Products Act. Before that, price regulation was carried out by a series of measures 
including 'gentlemen's agreements', various War Measures (renewed until the 1960s), and the Price 
Control Act (from the 1960s), in terms of which liquid fuels fell into a category in which 
government did not prescribe prices, but an 'agreement' with the industry concerned stipulated that 











prices would not be raised without government consent. After 1977 other regulatory aspects of the 
system were still conducted infonnally until after the end of apartheid. However, regardless of the 
mechanism which was used by the state, price setting was undertaken by industry from the 1930s, 
and prices were effectively set by government from the 1940s. 
The development of the regulatory system occurred in several phases. The historical foundation of 
the system was the regulation of the retail industry, which before the development of an indigenous 
refIning industry, was based entirely on imported fuel; during this phase, regulation was carried out 
by the industry itself: which controlled the retail 'price and entry to the market by denying supply to 
offenders. In phase 2, the state took control of the price-setting process for retail petrol sales, and 
wholesale margins were regulated from 1946, but the watershed was phase 3, which began with the 
development of an indigenous refIning industry. Refmery gate prices were regulated, and imports 
restricted. Wholesale, retail and refInery gate prices were regulated through the Price Control Act 
from the 1960s. Phase 4 began in the 1970s with the development of the synthetic fuels industry 
and the oil embargo, which required various modifIcations to the system to accommodate 
requirements of the state's oil security strategy, and phase 5 consisted of the 're-regulation' of the 
system following the demise of apartheid, which fInally formalised the whole regulatory system, 
although its essential elements still remain in place. 
Evolution of the regulation of the supply chain 
All liquid fuels except HFO were and are regulated at the refInery gate, petrol, diesel and 
illuminating paraffin are regulated at wholesale level, and petrol is regulated at the retail level. The 
structure of the petrol price has remained essentially the same since the 1950s, and consists of the 
following components: a basic fuel cost, which is based on a theoretical price of importing fuel, a 
transport component, reflecting the cost of transporting fuel to a specifIc location within the 
country; a tax component, comprising various government levies; a wholesale margin, and a retail 
margin. Other insignificant elements have been added and removed from time to time. The liquid 
fuels market (and the price in the long run) is also influenced by other fonns of regulation, 
including import and export control and regulation of non-price aspects of the retail trade, which 
will also be reviewed below. 
Regulation of the Retail Trade: the origins of regulation 
The objectives of retail price regulation have been traditionally integrated with two other objectives: 
the maintenance of standards of service at retail outlets (service stations) in related services such as 
car sales and maintenance, and the maintenance of levels of profItability of retail outlets; thus retail 
price regulation processes have in South Africa involved close co-operation between service station 











the development of the pricing regime, which was initially based on petrol, which was largely 
distributed through retail channels. Diesel, on the other hand was largely distributed through 
wholesalers to large-scale buyers, with only a small fraction being distributed through service 
stations. 
Liquid fuels were first imported into South Africa in 1884, mainly in the fonn of IP (Lloyd, Rukato 
& Swanepoel 1999:2). From then until 1954, all7 liquid fuels were imported into South Africa by 
four companies - BP, Shell, Mobil! and Caltex - who marketed products locally. Initially, liquid 
fuels were distributed by general dealers; however as volumes increased, and the primary products 
sold shifted from IP to petrol and diesel (for transport rather than illumination), the liquid fuels 
trade became increasingly dominated by 'service stations' dedicated to supplying motor vehicles; 
service stations installed pumping equipment and could thus deliver high quantities of petrol and 
diesel. Prices were fixed in agreement between the companies and the service station owners' 
interest group, initially the Motor Traders Association (MTA) and later the Motor Industries 
Federation (MIF), with the aim of limiting competition between service station sites and brands. 
After initial opposition, the state endorsed the system in 1937, and a system was set up for the 
control of the service station industry, at the centre of which were Joint Petrol Advisory Committees 
(JPACs), with representatives from companies and the MTA (Van den Berg 1993:6); petrol sale by 
general dealers was also discontinued (companies ceased supplying them) except where there was 
no service station in the area. The aim of these committees was to rationalise the geographic 
distribution of service stations and set prices, and thus improve profitability of individual service 
stations, thus establishing three traditions in the industry: 'resale price maintenance', a high degree 
of collaboration amongst key actors (resulting in limited competition), and the circumscribed role of 
the market. During the second world war, the state took over the role of price-setting, which 
continued afterwards in terms ofa series of 'gentlemen's agreements' with industry. 
Aside from a freeze during the second world war (when the committees came under the control of 
the National Supplies Control Board), these arrangements led to significant barriers to market entry, 
since entrance to the market was effectively controlled by the JPACS, and via these, the MTA 
(Trollip 1996:4-30) and the oil companies. After several abortive attempts by the state (and in 
particular by the BTl) to challenge the control of the industry by the JP ACs, the system was semi-
fonnalised by the establishment of the Rationalisation Plan (referred to as the 'Ratplan') in 1960, 
which was a " .. gentleman's agreement between Government, the oil companies and the 
(MTAlMIF]" (Van den Berg 1993:18), and was not formalised in either legislation or regulation. 
The formal purpose of the Ratplan was to ensure service standards and 'rational use of resources' to 
7 Except for a tiny quantity produced from oil shale by the SATMAR plant from the 1930s. 











guarantee profitability of service stations (by concentrating throughput), and " .. to provide fuel 
nationally at a reasonable price by maintaining a countrywide network of viable petrol outlets" (Van 
den Berg 1993: 17). Informally, a central function it performed was to divide the retail market 
amongst oil companies, which was thus effectively done by companies themselves. Because the 
Ratplan had no official status, it was enforced by the oil companies through the threat of 
withholding supply. A series of Ratplans performed this function until 2002, when the Petroleum 
Products Amendment Act imposed a licensing process on the retail industry, and vested this process 
in the Department of Minerals and Energy. 
The Basic Fuel Cost 
The regulatory innovation of the 1950s was the regulation of refinery gate prices, which was 
introduced with the construc~ion of the first crude refinery in South Africa, and Sasoll, which came 
on-stream in 1954 and 1955 respectively. Government aims in this regard were to encourage import 
substitution and industrialisation, and oil companies wanted a guaranteed return on investment, 
given the small size of the market and the distance to other markets. The agreed basis for regulation 
was an import~parity pricing system referred to as the Steyn formula (Interview with T Burger), 
named after its originator, J.G.G.F. Steyn, later Secretary of Trade and Industry and also Price 
Controller in terms of the Price Control Act (1964). The formula calculated an In-Bond Landed 
Cost (mLC), which consisted of a number of elements. 
The key element was an international product price (for example 93-octane leaded petrol), 
calculated as an average ofa basket of FOB9 posted prices from four international refineries. To this 
was added hypothetical freight, insurance, leakage, and landing charges for a South African port, to 
derive the IBLC. If the refinery was at the coast, then the IBLC was the refinery gate price. If the 
refinery was inland (Sasoll, 2,3; Natref), then a premium was added in the form of a hypothetical 
transport cost (as if the product had been shipped inland to the refinery gate). 
The mLC was initially based on the posted prices of four refineries selling products on the 
international market, which were owned by multinational oil companieslO• The reference refineries 
were nationalised in 1973 with other oil company assets in the Middle East, at which time Arab 
governments began to set product prices at their refineries. Because prices from these refineries 
were thus no longer 'market prices', the South African government changed the basis for the IBLC 
to the posted prices of three refineries in Singapore and one in Bahrain (VanDen Berg 1993 :27), 
which were owned and operated by the 'big four' oil majors operating in South Africall . These 
9 Free On Board 
10 There is no indication as to which oil companies these were, although it is probable, given later developments, that these were the 
four majors operating in South Africa at the time. 











were maintained until the transition, when the Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force recommended 
changing the reference refineries, and adding a fifth element, a Platt's spot assessment. In addition, 
while previously the mLC had been calculated infrequently to avoid small changes in the petrol 
price (a 'slate' mechanism was devised to compensate for 'over-recovery' or 'under-recovery' by 
the refining companies), the LFITF recommended that the petrol price change once a month: these 
changes were adopted in 199412• The IBLC was finally replaced by the new government in 2002 by 
a Basic Fuel Price, also calculated on an import parity basis 13 , using an average of daily spot prices 
from three destinations (Singapore, Mediterranean (Italy) and the Arab Gulf) to calculate a monthly 
product price for each product class. Freight, insurance and wharfage are calculated in the same 
way, but another element has been added at the request of the oil industry to simulate the true cost 
of importing product, consisting of two components, a 'coastal storage cost', to reflect the 
hypothetical cost of using coastal storage facilities· if large amounts of product were imported, and a 
'stock finance cost', to cover finance charges related to stock acquisition. The government's stated 
aim in detennining this formula was to "represent the realistic, market-related costs of importing a 
substantial portion of South Africa's liquid fuels requirements"; thus 
" . .it is therefore deemed that such supplies are sourced from overseas refming centres capable of 
meeting South Africa's requirements in tenns of both product quality and sustained supply 
considemtions" (www.dme.gov.zal111012004). 
The freight component of the mLC was also subject to scrutiny by the LFITF, since when the 
formula was devised, average tanker size was small. The tanker size used in the calculation 
remained constant until the 1990s, even though the average tanker size used for transporting liquid 
fuels had grown considerably larger, which had considerably lowered the cost per unit. Thus the 
LFITF recommended that the basis for calculating transport costs be altered as well, using realistic 
contemporary vessel sizes, which was also accepted by government in 1994. The remaining 
element, the inland transport cost (in the case of inland refineries) was calculated from the railage 
rates, and later the pipeline tariffs, of the state transport company Transnet l4• These tariffs were not 
regulated until the beginning of the 21 st century. 
The IBLC mechanism has given South African refiners an economic advantage in a number of 
ways, given the bar on importing fuel (see below). The concept of import parity pricing conveys an 
obvious inherent advantage; in addition to this, key elements of the IBLC have been singled out as 
12 The new refineries were the Mobil refmery in Singapore, the Esso refinery in Singapore, the Singapore Petroleum Company 
refinery, and the Caltex refinery in Bahrain; since Mobil had disinvested, this list included only one refinery owned by a company 
operating in South Africa. Platt's issues a series oftey publications on the oil industry, including regular price information, which is 
widely used in the oil industry for reference purposes. . 
13 The fullowing account of the current pricing system is a SllIIlIl18l')' and does not deal with some of the more technical issues, which 
include deriving prices fur non-listed South African products, a 'slate' mechanism to allow fur daily price movements while 
changing the fuel price only once a month, and other technical issues such as sources of information. See Department of Minerals 
and Energy website www.dme.gov.za for more details) 











conferring further advantages at various times, resulting in a price significantly above import parity. 
Three elements of the pricing system have been singled out by critics. The first was the choice, 
post-1973, of a majority of Singapore refineries as reference refineries, which had three inflating 
effects on the IBLC. The first was that 
" .. there is a clear price differential between Singapore and the [Arab] Gulf of about USS2.80 per 
barrel.. . .indeed, Singapore turns out to be one of the most expensive refining areas from which 
to buy fuel (Lloyd 2001: 17), 
which translated into a difference of around 13cll in 1997. The second effect was that since 
Singapore is considerably further from Durban than the Arab Gulf or the Mediterranean, the 
shipping element in the mLC was considerably higher, which added around 2cll (1997) (Lloyd 
2001:18). The third objection to Singapore reference prices was that the refining industry in 
Singapore is based on diesel rather than petrol, for which the market is less-well developed and less 
fluid (and therefore prices are higher), whereas petrol was and is the most important aspect of the 
South African market (CS). 
The second element was the use of posted prices (100% pre-1994, 80% 1994-2002, and none 
thereafter), as opposed to spot prices. Posted prices were the standard pricing mechanism for export 
refineries from the 1950s to the 1970s, when a spot market in liquid fuels was established: posted 
prices thereafter more accurately reflected offering prices from refineries, rather than selling prices, 
and most sales were conducted at spot prices. As a result, posted prices were on average 10cll 
higher than spot prices in 1997 in the Singapore market (Lloyd 2001: 1 7), and around 12cll higher in 
the Arab gulf market (CS15), which comprised around 13% of the IBLC at the time, or around 6% 
of the retail petrol price. Together, these premiums comprised one third of the IBLC, or around 12% 
of the retail petrol price. The third critique of the IBLC was directed at the freight rates, which were 
based on vessels of less than 25 000 tons, which were widely used in the 1950s for transporting 
liquid fuels, but phased out in favour of larger vessels from the 1960s onwards. From 1994 on, rates 
applicable to vessels between 25 000 and 50 000 tons were used, which is closer to the vessel size 
which would actually be used to import liquid fuels, given the economies of scale and 
characteristics of South African ports; this change decreased the IBLC by around 5cll (Lloyd 
2001:18). 
The history of the IBLC at the height of the oil embargo (from 1978 to 1991) is more obscure. 
Davie suggests that the non-transparency of pricing mechanisms was exploited in the 1980s to boost 
the profitability of Sasol when crude prices were low, quoting premiums of up to $lllbarrel over 
15 Confidential Source. The author has taken steps to verity the reliability of the infonnation attributed as CS, but the source is not in 











Rotterdam prices, or an average of $5.80 (1991 prices) higher during the 1980s (Davie 1995:245), 
which is an average premium of20cll in 2000 cents, or an average of 6% of the retail petrol price. 
The above comparisons are of little statistical value because they are derived from a small set of 
points in a complex and fluctuating market; nevertheless, they would seem to indicate that the 
~;refining industry in South Africa has been very profitable since its inception. Although a thorough 
fmancial analysis would be necessary to confirm this, it was an opinion widely held by interviewees 
• from both the oil industry and by senior bureaucrats who were involved in regulating the industry in 
I the 1970s and 1980s, who repeatedly made the point that the industry was able to make significant 
. profits when the international refining industry was operating at a loss, which indicated that refmery 
returns were significantly higher in South Africa than elsewhere. This was confirmed by 
government studies in the 1990s, which reported that South African refinery margins were 
consistently higher than elsewhere (CS). The lEA observed in its report on South African energy 
policy that the non-tax component of the South African petrol price was exceeded in the OECD by 
only three countries (lEA 1996b: 195), although this figure includes wholesale and retail margins as 
well. 
Transport and Pipeline Tariffs 
The transport element in liquid fuels prices is calculated by dividing the country into a number of 
zones. A transport cost is then worked out for each zone, on the assumption that all liquid fuels are 
transported from one of several large ports, using a mixture of rail and pipeline tariffs, which were 
set by the state railway and pipeline parastatals. For several decades these transport rates were 
inflated, and the surplus used to cross-subsidise other railway services (Lloyd 2001 :25, Interview 
with S. Van Den Berg). Given the importance of the pipeline network, tariff levels had a significant 
impact on liquid fuels prices. From the late 1960s, when the pipeline network began operating, it 
earned massive profits; a Board of Trade and Industry inquiry into the petrol price in 1977 noted 
that 
" . .it was clear from the evidence that roughly two-thirds of the price differential between the 
Transvaal and the coast can be attributed to the marked difference between Railway pipeline 
tariffs for oil fuels and the actual cost of conveyance by pipeline:." (Board of Trade and 
Industries 1978b: 14). 
Pipeline revenue for 1976 and 1977 is recorded as R71.6 million and R88 million respectively, 
whereas expenditure, including interest, depreciation and operating expenses, was a mere RIO 
million and R14 million respectively, implying a profit margin of between 600% and 700%. The 
BTl noted that the transport element in fuel prices was the only element which was not in any way 
market-related. After the 1970s, there is no reliaple information on pipeline profits. The DMEA 











without success (Interview with S Van Den Berg). Van Den Berg explained the cause of high tariffs 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s in tenns of the social role that the railways played in limiting white 
unemployment; as a result, the pipeline network was the only profitable part of Transnet. When 
Transnet was restructured in the early 1990s, it incurred massive pension liabilities, at which time 
the pipeline network became a crucial source of revenue. From the early 1970s to 1998, transport 
costs comprised around 10% of the petrol price. If one assumes that 80% of this consists of pipeline 
charges (given the structure of the market, and the inclusion of a transport element in the refinery 
gate price of the inland producers), a reduction of profit margins to a more reasonable 20% would 
involve a drop in tariffs of around 80% (based on the 1970s figures quoted above), which would 
have implied a 6% average drop in liquid fuels prices. Currently a new Pipelines Regulator is being 
established to regulate pipeline charges. 
Import Restrictions, 'Tariff Protection' and Subsidies, and Taxes and Levies 
Protection in various fonns has been a central feature of liquid fuels policy, and has its roots in the 
1930s, when 'tariff protection' was granted to the SATMAR plant, at the time the only source of 
domestically-manufactured liquid fuels; this consisted of a reduction in excise duty (payable on 
imported fuel) paid by SATMAR to the state, which was effectively a fonn of import duty on liquid 
fuels, or 'tariff protection' (Van den Berg 1993:44). Similar protection was afforded to Sasol 1 
when it began operations in the 1950s, and a lower rate of protection was applied to local refineries. 
Control over the import and. export of both crude oil and refined products via a permit system was 
introduced during the second world war in terms of War Measures 14611942, the War Measures 
Continuation Act (1956), and entrenched in tenns of the Import and Export Control Act (45/1963), 
which in tenns of regulations pertaining to the liquid fuels industry, required a p~nnit to be issued 
for the import or export of any crude oil or liquid fuel. From the 1960s onwards, stringent 
conditions were imposed on the granting of import pennits, which were linked from the late 1970s 
to the 'upliftment' of the production of the synthetic fuels industry; companies not party to 
'upliftment' agreements were excluded from importing liquid fuels; thus only a limited number of 
companies directly involved in the liquid fuels industry were eligible. Liquid fuels could only be 
imported if locally refmed/produced liquid fuels were not available (Department of Minerals and 
Energy 1999:2). Thus, access to the international liquid fuels market was limited to existing refining 
and marketing companies (and included the synthetic fuels industry), and competition from 
imported fuels was thus prevented, which the state rationalised in tenns of the regulatory system. 
As a DME internal policy document stated in 1999: " .. the entire current regulatory system is 
dependent on effective import control" (Department of Minerals and Energy 1999: 1). These import 











the synthetic fuels industry effectively became a subsidy, since the 'tariff protection' did not 
primarily differentiate the synthetic fuels industry's product from imported product, but from 
locally-refined product (since by 1966, imported product comprised a tiny proportion of the liquid 
fuels market). The case for considering subsidy payments in this way was that these were funded 
from a levy, the 'equalisation levy'; however the actual mechanism involved exempting Sasol 
products from this levy to the amount of the subsidy, thus allowing Sasol to recover the subsidy 
through premiums gained by selling liquid fuels to marketers at the ordinary taxed rate, which is 
economically equivalent to a subsidy being paid directly from the Equalisation Fund, which is in 
tum funded by consumers of liquid fuels. Thus the subsidy was paid by liquid fuels consumers to 
Sasol, and had a direct effect on prices. This impact was negligible when it only applied to Sasol 1, 
which represented a small fraction of fuels sold on the local market (a maximum of 4% by 1970), 
but became very significant when the subsidy was extended to Sasol2 and 3. 
The subsidy was allocated as a fixed sum per litre of product (except for a period in 1985-86 when 
the oil price was too high to justify a subsidy), until 1989, when a new mechanism was put in place 
to cater for oil price fluctuations: a 'derived crude price' per barrel was calculated from the IBLC, 
and a 'floor price' of $23 per barrel was set; if the 'derived crude price' dropped below the floor 
price, Sasol received a subsidy, which was then calcul ted to compensate Sasol for the difference 
between the IBLC price and a theoretical IBLC price which would result from a crude price of $23 
per barrel (Van den Berg 1993:44, Arthur Andersen 1995:37-8). In exchange for this subsidy, in 
theory Sasol was required to pay a portion of its profits back to the suite if the derived crude price 
rose above $28 a barrel; however, following a decision in 1995, the floor price was reduced to $16 
over a four-year period, and was phased out by 1999. The implication of this subsidy formula was 
that Sasol sold its liquid fuels products for a .... reasonably constant price [in US cll].. ..which 
corresponds to the crude oil floor price" (Arthur Andersen 1995:37). From 1980 to 1994, Sasol 
- ~ / 
;r- received a total subsidy ofR14.l billion in 2000 rands (calculated from Trollip 1996:4-28). 
,j 
There were in addition a number of informal subsidies of which Sasol was a beneficiary because of 
the structure of the regulatory system. The key benefit came from the structure of the IBLC, which 
involved adding a transport element to the IBLC for Sasol's and Natrefs product, as if it were 
imported from the coast Since this was linked to pipeline tariffs, maintaining high pipeline tariffs 
was an additional way of subsidising both Sasol's synfuels and ordinary production, since 
marketers were obliged in terms of the Crude Refiners' Agreement to buy Sasol's product, and at 
the regulated price. Another informal subsidy ofNatrefs production took place through the 'Natref 
Neutrality' principle for pipeline tariffs, whereby pipeline rates for crude oil transport inland (to 











Subsidies wen: part of a complicated lax 5ystem .... hich evolved considembly from the: 19SOS to the: 
rod of the century. and included a shiftiog 5e1 of levies. funds and laxes: these included tax 
oompoocnts ~hich ... ·cot to the general fiso::us (nOl being enefgy policy-related). which will not be: 
discussed hcR'. except 10 nou~ thai South African liquid fuels taxes are relalively low by 
international standards. aod tMlgel1CTllltwccs on liquid fuelS were relalhcly CQOStanL The elle.gy 
policy-related I~ .... ;cs wl:re all relaled to lhe slate ' s oi I securily slrategy. and were first imposed in the 
1%Os. and finally witkdrnwn in the 19905. 
The C3.iiesl way to und~'"tlllld the development ()f these 1axC5 and levies which fomlcd part of 
liquid fuels prices is in tcons of three levds. i'be first level consists of n series ()f dedicated levies 
l\dtk'(llo the fuet price Pt various times. The second level consists of the way io which the levies 
wen: added to the fuel pricc, and the third le"cl consists of n number of fiOllllCIOI in~ln.lments 
through which the levies ... ere chanoelled. For instance, the 5tmlegk stach levy (level I) was 
collected through cus tOnl!l Illld excise laxCll (level 2). and eh:mnelled through the Strntegic Fuel 
Fund (kvel 3). Fil;ure 6.11 below indicules the dale of inception and duration of each Icvy (te\'d I). 
The fi rst levy to be imposed in 1964 WQ:> to fund a strategic crude stock. which was partly funded 
by parliamentary grants and partly from fuel levies via cxeise laxes. a portion of wh ich was paid 
inlO the SH . Due 10 $CCrecy provisions. it is not dear .... hal it coot. IUId how this (':05t WIIS divided 
between the fiscus and liquid fuels tonsumel'5. Du;og the IX'riod 1988-1995, stods .... ert' gmdu~lI)' 
nm down from around 20 momhs' ro.'quiremelll.'l Ie) around 4. 'The peak value in 2000 runds of the 
strategic 510ckpile during this period was Rl7 billion (caleolated from Trollip 1996;4-18. usin!; 
Brent crude priecs). Levies ceased in 1993 wilen tile oil embntgo was lifted. 
Th<' second levy to be imposed from 1975. initially through excise taxes and then through 8 
dedicated Stale Oil Fund (SOF) and later Central Energy Fund (CEF) levy. financed J'IIln of thl' 
capital costs of Sasol 2 and 3 and I\ l ossga.~ through these Funds. 'The financing for Sasol2 consisted 
of (in nomill3J rands) R492 million from expon m:dits. RJOO million from parliamentary grunts, 
IUId R 1711 million from the State Oil Fund. and hr Sasel 3 R65S million 10 apon eredits. RS2S 
million from t~ privatisation ofSasol I, and R1096 million from patliamenUlt) grunts and the SOl.' 
-----
F'oqur~ 6.8: SLlt~ Oil Sec:uriry SlIategy-Re\.ltecl Levies Added to liqUid fuels Prices 










(00 infommtion on how this was divided) (Financial Mail 16111 / (979). Government granlS and 
SOF muocy were aUegt.'dly in the form of sol\ loons. which were repaid partially through a 
privalisatiun process (Van den Berg 1993:37-38); interest rates fur the remaining loans wcre linked 
inlcr.;cly to thc 'dcri~ed CT\Jdc' price ancr 1989 (Anh"r Andersen 1995:35-38). Similarly. Mossgas 
was financed largely by !be CEF. which provided around R7A billion (nominal) of an estimated 
total of RI I billion (Financial Mail 3/11 1992). Levies ceased around 1995. 
The third levy 10 be impose<l from 1979 was 10 fund Ihc 'A~quisi ti on Equalisation Fund ' (later tile 
Equalisation Fund). to co'·\. .. thc premium on crude oil acquisition Ihm Inc cuuntry was forced to 
pay aner the 1979 oil crisis (Fin:lncial Mail 2211211978). It was levied through an Equalisation 
Fund Icvy. Ulld paid into the F..qualisation Fund. In thi s year, the state took o,'cr the acquisition of 
crude oil 16 on beilalf ortne refining industry. bought crude m the loweS! price possible (usually al a 
significant premium: estimates rage from $5 10 $20 in the early 1980s (Davie 1995:249-50).und 
::iOld it to refiners a1 an average international price. P.W. Botha claimed in 1986 that crude oil 
acquisition had !;osl thc country R22 billion (R89 bill ion in 2000 rdll!h;) more than it would if it had 
been acquired in thc normal way (Hengeveld & Rodenburg 1995a:202). which comprised the 
premium which the slme fund..-d from the Equalisation Fund. and possibly includes premiums paid 
on slrntegk stocks purchases. Assuming the premiums bo..--gan in 1979. and that the crude put~ha.ws 
co~ered all rl'quifcments ~nd two years' strategic stocks. Ihis figure would imply an avcrage 
pl"I.'mium ofSl9 per barrel ~t contemporary c."\change rates; although this is plausible. il seems high 
even under the circumstances lhcn prevailing. Towards the end of the 19S0s. the premium dcdined 
as lhe embargo became less effb::tive. thc world I11IItket developed a glul, prices fell. and the SFF 
traders developed beller ac:qllisition strategics. Levies eea.wt.I at the end of the oil cmbargo, wocn 
procurcment rcvcned to tbe state. 
The founh and sixth levies. from 19S0 und 1992 rcspcctivdy. comprised subsidies to Sasol and 
Mossgas. which were colh:ctcd and paid through the Equalis.1tion Fund (Trollip 1'196;4-29). 80th 
subsidies ceased in 2000. The fifth levy was imposed 10 fund payments made tu refiners to 
compensate them for the loss of refining capacity mothballed as a result of Sasol 2 and 3. which 
begun around 1984. and ended around 10 years later; paymems were funded from a fuel levy. WId 
totalled RL267 billion in 1993 {in JlOm inal mOOs - Van den Berg 1993:41}. or R4.47 billion in 
2000 rands 11. Tho.: colleeti \'C impact of these levies tan be dearly secn in Figure 6.9 below 
" With ,he ~-""<Jllion of OIK" rrtina. ~hi<h ""t"imI <N<k- t"'''''~" lnIom .. 1onat sub>idiar)-
" Ib .. ""kul .. ion .......... ,ba1 'Il< Wtol WI1I .... dbtri ... u-.l ~ "'" [><I1<'d "",01,,,,,,,,,- .. d <lo<:linod thfOllEhout ... d<mond 











The rcgullllion of "hole~le maJ"Kins in South Africa began in 1946. when fuel "IllS imponcd lit 
rclllll"cl), rued pn~"CS, 1II0lltion .... "lIS 10 .... . nnd !her. was long-lem1 stnbilit} in the oil price. It was 
Im~d 111 IClmS uf War Mcasur\'ll ",9 or 19.f6 10 control Cl(ceS/i profits by the oil companies in the-
.... '!de orthe war. The repelll ofthcsc:- measures shortly aftt:TWlll"ds led to II ··sentlI.'mWI'S agreement'· 
between irKlusn), and go\"Crnment. in remlS or "hieh tI fixed margin was specificd on diffcrent 
products (Vnn den Iltrg 1993:28). This W!IS m3i~tained almost unchanged umil 1964, wht:n the 
price' control s)stcm was fonnllli!iCd in tCIlll.'l oflhe rrie ... Control Act. 
The II)lC WIIS intei"'ted ..... ith the .... holcsalc Imlrjin from 1984 ...... hen II new Petrolcum Activities 
Return (PAR) mechanism was impiclTK'nted ...... hereb)' II margin was SCI on a r!ltc-of·return basis fOf 
both refining and ..... holesalc IICtw;ties togcltJer; thU5 the wholcsale price was SCI so that oil 
l"Ompanics ..... ould cllrn II return of 15"1. on both their refining and man.cting assets. In 1991. al the 
rcqllC$1 of lhe oil companies. refiner)' murgins were 'deregulmed', and a new i\1ark<'ling Petroleum 
Acti, itiC'!; Return ( '-WAR) mtx:honism was introd~cd, .... hich colculated a margin based on a rc!Urn 
on IlUIrkcling a.~Si'ts only. ItlSO uimed III lIivinll eompnnies a 15"1. return. The rate of return is 
calculated on the combined assets oflhc "hole indllStT)'. 
The Retail Maf9/f1 
Tlu:- retail margin is calculuted on u simil3f basis in negotiation "ith the MIF. and applies only to 
petrol. 
Hisloricallmpact 01 Price Elements 
Siocc Ilk' basic fuel COSt (lBlC) in the petrol price is tied to OUl:tUlltions in cl(temal inOucnces 
(int~maliolllll oil price W1d the rnndIdolhlf e:o;chanl!t" rute), pricc mO\'emenLS are better lIIlaI)scd by 
scparn1ing tbis element from otlk'r clements Iktennincd tlOrtll:SlitIlJl} ...... bich !\:is ~n done in 
Figure 6.9 abu\c. which reOct1s real \olues ofpelrol price elements from 1971 to Iml'. lIS weJl :IS 
the Im.c and the crude price. boih in South African cum:ocy. Chanb'CS in the IBLC obviOUliI)' 
follow the utnds orthe oil price19. 
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The most striking oon-IBLC component of the pnce is the government tax component. This 
increased dramatically in reallemlS from the IiI'lU to the sa:ond oil cri sis. and doubled in 1979: Ihis 
rapid increase was rdmed both to the funding l'l!quircmenlS ofSasol. and 10 the need 10 fund crude 
oil premiums ..... hich arose abruptly in 1979. as Jran SlOp ed providing oil \0 SOUlb Africa in Ihe 
wake of the overthrow of llle Shah. Other notable trends are the decline of the wholesale margin 
from 197 1 10 1991 ..... ften the PAR mechanism was I'l'Jllaced by the MPAR mechanism. and the 
d«lirn: in trUnspor1l3fifTs from 1991 10 1998. This does 1101 imply Ihal oil illdUSlry margins oclually 
decreased during Ihis period. since in 1984 a lower margin increase was accepted by lhe oil indllSlf)' 
in exchallJ::c for the mothb.1Ued capacil)' payments. 
The Development of Liquid Fuels Policy 
The development of liquid fueb policy in South Africa ean be divided into three overlapping 
phas<:'S: lilt: key policy developments and associated events an: por1rayed in Fi1.\ure 6.10 below. The 
first, from the 19205 to tlte early 19705. saw the establishment of the regulatory framework and the 
development of a privately-o"lIed refining and marketing industry and a small-seak slale-owned 
liquid fuel s industry. In the seeo!ld phase. from the 19605 to the 199()s, the tllreat ofan oil embargo 
led the state to develop an oi l security strategy. "hich involved significant involvemem by state 
agencies in th~ liquid fuds industry, including the development of a large-scale synthetic fuels 
industry. a st.ate-o"nM inland refinery, on<! the takeover of oil procuremem for the refining 
industry. Thesc developments required considernblc regulatory innovation. which nc\"cnheless 
oo;,:eurr~'!I witllin the previou.~ regulatory rramework. as well as a significant in~lilutionai 
trnnsform3lion. The m!wly·f0J1lled nexus between coal and liquid fuels. via tile ~1'nthelic fuels 














Figure 6.10: Key Policy-related Developments in the Liquid Fuels Sector 
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placed liquid fuels policy in a nc .... ly-dcvdoped energy policy context. Decision·mllkin!;: ,,"lIS shifted 
from its previous policy context to an energy policy context, :u:companicd by a process of 
bureaucratic reorganisation. 
11M: end of apan~id hcraldcd IIv:: third phase. which b\.'t8n wilh the cessation of the oil embargo 
and the 1nln~itional negotiation procc ...... roliey-mllking WM aimed ehicfly "' promotin~ ...c iul 
cquit)· in o,,"nen;hip and control of IIv:: industry. and HI Ihe fOl111.llliSHtion of toc apanheid-c:ra 
regulatory fTUlIlc,,"ort.:: t~ basic regulatory principles were maintained. but tlv:: "eb of informal 
agrecmcms "hieh had fonned tllc basis ofthc regulatory syStem was dismantled. 
1) 1920s to 1970s 
["11m: wcre two strands in the: slatc's liquid fuels policy from 1910 to the l%Os.. The Jirst was tIM: 
regulntion of the retail trade. and the sa:orld \\OllS the promotion of industrial dcn:lopmcnt in the 
liquid fuels SI:ctor. which included the sponsori ng of a syntllctil: [irIs industry. The n:tail trade Willi 
n:gul:II.:d With the aim of promoting a low lind st~blc petrol price l:Oupled with high te\'CI$ of 
Sl:rvicc and a~ailability, and tOC state "'a.~ prepared forego the benefits of a competiti\e market to 
achieve tht"llC goals. The n:gulation of the manufacturing indU!\tric::s .... "lIS based on enoournglllg 
industrialisation and uti li$lltion of indigenous resources. aod was developed ,,"jlhin the conte.lC\ of 
the c"i~ting retail regulatory sYStem. Together. these elcments contributed 10 tho: !Ic\'dopmcnt of a 
rcgulatory fTUmework which was fully elaborated by the 1960s, and included as its main features 
I'C'gulution of the "hole value chain. u raft of protectionist measures rOT both I~ mali:Cling and 
n::fining mdustries, and II high dCJ:rt:e of CD-OpctlItion amongst industry OCtolS.. and bctwco.:n Industry 
Ilnd government. Thi s rcgulut()ry fTUmcwork set the basic pammctcrs for the !Ic\'elopment of the 
SlaIC 'S oil security strategy. as well us for post-apartheid liquid fuels policy, ... /lieh /las as )et not 
challenged its basic parameters. 
The roots of regulation relail regulation from the 305 10 the 7~ 
Regulution of tIM: service Slut ion industry has bc:cn the l)ftwioce of the IJrcpanmeot of Commerce 
ond Industry . and specifically by the branch ofihe CkPlinment that dealt with tnlde. eommerce and 
price rcgulution. with 0 significant role plu)'ed by the lloard of Trude and Industry. from 1933; from 
1967 to 1980 il WItS rcgulUlI.-d by the DePllt1mCm of Commerce. and from 19&0 onwards by the 
Ikp:lnmcnt of MillCl1ll and Energy A!Tairs. 'The: key feature of retail regulation of petroleum 
produel'l was u process, beginning 10 the 1930s and culminatiOJ: in the Rationalisation Plans 
beginni,,!; in the 1960:>. of gramml; petrol retailing a special statUS ... ithin the c:cooomy. governed by 
. 'n.. h'''I>I) or,,,,, oarIr ,,",.,' 1 .... ..,. molt IrI<k: _IM_ IS .... <ly _ "" Ii .. 0... r~ Wl'IJt "hic~ .......... ly "":c,,,ly 











a web of informal agreements with industry. The main characteristic of this status was the 
suspension of competition law or principles, and the co-operative relationship of the main industry 
players. While this was common in the South African economy in various industries in its early 
phases, the outstanding characteristic of the liquid fuels industry is the duration of this status, which 
for various reasons exempted the industry from competition legislation until the late 1990s. 
The key impetus for this process was the state's quest to promote a viable service station industry 
which provided both high levels of service (both in respect of providing liquid fuels and in 
providing other car-related services, including sales and repairs), and a low and stable petrol price; 
thus, until the 1950s, liquid fuels regulation was subsumed into regulation of the service station 
industry. Thus, the source of the industry's special status, and the focus of early policy 
development, was the unique properties of petrol as a commodity: it was difficult and unsafe to 
handle, and was a low-value, high-volume commodity, and thus entering the market entailed a 
relatively high capital cost (for storage and pumping equipment). The early industry solved these 
problems by fixing prices, the outcome of a co-operative arrangement between service station 
operators (organised into the MT A) and the oil m~ ors, which was sanctioned by the state's nascent 
competition authority, the Board of Trade and Industries, in a 1923 report (BTl report 14, 1923, 
Van den Berg 1993 :6) 
Under new competition legislation (the Unlawful Determination of Prices Act, 1931), the state 
outlawed petrol price setting, and competition ensued. Competition led to the closure of service 
stations and declining levels of service to motorists, and another two BTl investigations followed 
(157/1933,204/1936), which emphasised the negative effects of price competition and allowed the 
oil companies and the MT A to set prices again, as well as determine the number and location of 
services stations, enforced through the supply chain by the oil companies, which cut supplies to 
non-conforming outlets (Van den Berg 1993:6). Price control and service station location was 
controlled through Joint Petrol Advisory Committees (JP ACS), consisting of oil industry and MT A 
representatives. The tight control of the industry by the JP ACs led to the appointment of a National 
Appeals Board in 1947, which was ineffective, and public pressure triggered another BTl 
investigation, which submitted its report in 1950 (BTl 31611950), and rejected the need for control 
of service station locations and numbers. 
The BTl's recommendations were implemented in terms of regulations under the Undue Restraint 
of Trade Act (1950), which replaced the JP ACs with a set of standards to be complied with by 
service stations (Van den Berg 1993:8). The regulations were found to be 'inflexible' and 
withdrawn later in 1950. Instead, the oil companies (who could control new entrants through 
supply) undertook to implement the 'spirit' of the regulations. The other key innovation of the 











number of different oil companies' products on their forecourts; from the 1950s onwards, each 
service station sold only one oil company's liquid fuels, which cut distribution and capital costs, but 
necessitated the allocation of service station sites between companies. Although companies owned 
many sites, they were prevented from operating more than a handful of sites for training purposes. 
The 'single-brand' system was endorsed by another BTl report tabled in 1958. 
The proliferation of service stations (under the infonnally implemented UROTA regulations) posed 
a problem for the oil companies (who had agreed to install pumping equipment at any qualifying 
service station), and the MTA (proliferation caused throughput to fall, thus leading to uneconomic 
sites). Thus the Department of Commerce and Industry, the oil companies and the MTA pioneered a 
Rationalisation Plan in 1960. A new plan was agreed and approved periodically, usually every 4 to 
5 years, until the 1990s. The fonnal function of the 'Ratplans' was to rationalise service station 
numbers and location by agreement between the oil industry, the Department of Commerce and 
Industry, and the MT NMIF, to maintain national accessibility to fuel while maintaining service 
station standards and economies of scale (Van den Berg 1993:17-21). The actual activity carried out 
under the plan was to institute a set of procedures for allocating service stations, and thus market 
share, between oil majors involved in marketing, by awarding each company a 'quota' of sites, and 
to guarantee individual sites a high throughput. The pl n was not fonnalised through regulation or 
legislation, and compliance was enforced through the threat of non-supply. At the same time, new 
entrants to the market (after 1960, Sonarep, Trek and Esso, and others in the 1990s) could gain sites 
either from government or oil industry patronage, given the constantly expanding market. 
The control of the retail price was first undertaken by the industry itself, and then, after regulation 
of the wholesale and retail price during the second world war through various War Measures, 
through a series of 'arrangements' between government and the oil industry (Financial Mail 
10112/1976, Van den Berg 1993:28). Since 1964 prices were regulated in tenns of the Price Control 
Act, in tenns of which, instead of stipulating prices legislatively or by regulations, the Price 
Controller concluded 
" .. an agreement with a specific manufacturer or a group of manufacturers of an industly in 
terms of which the manufacturer or industry undertakes not to increase his or its prices without 
the prior approval of the Price Controller" (Financial Mail 10/1211976), 
which was the case with petrol and other liquid fuels. From 1977, price control was administered in 
tenns of the Petroleum Products Act (12011977), which will be discussed further below. The only 
serious challenge to the web of informal relationships which regulated the retail industry was in 
1970, when the BTl launched a wide-ranging inquiry into 'resale price maintenance' in a spread of 
industries across the economy, and recommended to the Minister that the MIF's application for 











and rejected the recommendation (Financial Mail 28/8/1970), on grounds which included concerns 
that abolition of price control would jeopardise the functioning of the Ratplan. The liquid fuels 
industry was thus excluded from a shift in general competition and regulation policy, and removed 
from the BTl's and subsequent competition authorities' influence. Whereas the industry's early 
'special' status had developed in the context of the economic challenges posed by the early 
development of the industry, from the late 1960s,this was augmented by an acute awareness within 
the state that the industry distributed a strategic commodity. 
Refining, Synthetic Fuels and Regulation 
State interest in indigenous liquid fuels production in South Africa followed three different paths. 
The fIrst, and oldest, was an interest in developing an industry which would use local raw materials 
to develop liquid fuels. The second was a keen interest in encouraging oil majors to establish 
refmeries in South Africa, and the third was to encourage the development of an indigenous (and 
preferably Afrikaans-dominated) integrated oil company. 
Interest by private capital in various production processes utilising South African raw materials 
began before the Act of Union, with the establishment of the Natal Mineral Oil Company, which 
aimed to extract illuminating paraffm from torbanite. The 1910s saw the development of oil shale 
mining (but no processing) in Natal and the Transvaal (Fine & Rustomjee 1996:140). The state's 
interest in producing liquid fuels from indigenous resources can be traced to the appointment of a 
committee in 1922, consisting of, amongst others, the Government Mining Engineer Robert Kotze 
and chairman of Escom, Hendrik Van Der Bijl (later head of the IDC and Escom), which was 
tasked with investigating " .. the possibility of carboni sing South African coal for the production of 
motor fuels" (South African Yearbook 1925:533), as well as investigating th~ possibility for 
manufacturing liquid fuels from South African deposits of oil shale. The Committee reported in 
192521 that South Africa possessed a signifIcant coal and oil shale resource, and that a South 
African industry could be established with government assistance, given its proximity to a potential 
inland market by comparison to imported fuels (South African Yearbook 1925:533). 
A large mining house, Anglovaal, did in fact establish an oil-shale mining and refIning venture in 
1934, the South African Torbanite Mining and RefIning Company (SATMAR), which distilled a 
synthetic crude from oil shale, and refIned it and crude oil in a small refInery (Fine & Rustomjee 
1996: 140), and received a subsidy in the form of 'tariff protection' of around 20% of the sale price 
of the fuel (Van Den Berg 1993:45). After the second world war, enthusiasm for a larger synthetic 
fuels programme was kindled in government, fuelled from two sources. The fIrst was a post-war 
21 Various sources report that a White Paper on synthetic fuels was tabled in 1927, written by a Dr Meyer; however there is no 
official record of such a White Paper being tabled in parliament. In addition Dr Meyer was allegedly an advisor to the Department of 











industrialisation strategy led by the IDC and based on import substitution-industrialisation (Clark 
1994:160-1), and the second was a recommendation from the 1946-7 Coal Commission, whose 
brief, aside from the key task of investigating coking coal resources, was to 
" .. marshal and report upon .. any further measures necessary to secure the greatest amount of 
utilisation of the coal resources of the Union of South Africa" (1946-47 Coal Commission: 1). 
One of the Commission's key concerns was the under-utilisation of the massive reserves of low-
grade coal in South Africa, and the Report observed that 
" .... coal-oil plants would form a use for much of the low-grade coal now left behind in many of 
the collieries, and for the large reserves of low-grade coal in the Union" (1946-47 Coal 
Commission:94), 
and noted in its conclusions and recommendations that a synthetic fuels industry 
" .. will therefore contribute substantially to the, utilisation of low-grade coal in the Union of 
South Africa, of which there are colossal reserves" (1946-47 Coal Commission: 144). 
While the Commission was sitting, parliament passed the Liquid Fuel and Oil Act (49/1947), the 
aim of which was to " .. regulate and control the manufacture of liquid fuel from coal" (Liquid Fuel 
and Oil Act 49/1947:Aims), which included the granting of extensive powers to the Minister of 
Economic Affairs to prescribe various aspects of the operation, including maximum price, product 
mix, and the type of coal used. Most importantly, parties wishing to develop synthetic fuels 
businesses needed a licence from the Minister. 
Clark has perceptively suggested that the brief history of the development of the synthetic fuels 
industry in South Africa, from the Act to the establishment of Sasol, followed a similar course to 
the development of Iscor (Clark 1994:160). The original intention of the Smuts government was to 
license a private entrepreneur to undertake the initial project; the potential entrepreneur in the shape 
of Anglovaal, was granted a license in 1949, but a combination of factors, including capital 
requirements for the development of the new Free State gold fields, the refusal of the state to 
guarantee loans, and the devaluation of the South African Pound22 in 1949 (which in turn boosted 
returns on gold) led Anglovaal to abandon the venture (Collings 2002:16). By this time the 
Nationalist government had come to power, with a stronger ideological commitnlent to self-
sufficiency and state-led development. Although as late as 1950, the Minister of Economic Affairs 
was still recommending that the state raise a loan on behalf of Anglovaal, the proposal was dropped 
because of potential parliamentary opposition (from his own party - Clark 1994:161). A committee 
of inquiry was established which went on a study tour of Europe to assess the appropriateness of 
various synthetic fuels technologies, and recommended to government that a state-owned company 
be formed to develop a synthetic fuels industry (C611ings 2002:16-17). 
22 The South African Pound was the official South African currency until 1961, when South Africa switched to the rand, which was 











The company, the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol for short) was fonned in 
1950, and funded by the state via the IDC, to avoid the problems which Iscor had experienced in its 
development phase, involving large interest payments before its production reached economic 
levels. In the case of Sasol, this was an even greater problem, since 
" .. neither the IDC nor the government's technical advisors had a clear idea of exactly how much 
capital would be necessary to get the operation going on a sound basis, and none knew what sort 
ofa profit could be expected" (Clark 1994:161). 
The project's cost escalated from an original 18 million South African pounds to 33 million pounds 
in 1953 (R1.6 billion, and R2.6 billion in 2000 rands), to which the Finance Minister remarked that 
he would have turned the scheme down ifhe had assessed it on the higher figure (Clark 1994:162). 
The total output of Sasol was insignificant: its initial capacity was equivalent to 5000 barrels/day, 
and later expanded to 10000 barrels/day in the 1960s, whereas consumption of liquid fuels in South 
Africa required a refining capacity of around 80 000 barrels/day in 1955, and 320 000 barrels/day in 
1973. Thus, Sasol's output represented around 6% oflocal requirements in 1955, and around 3% in 
197323• The motivation to construct Sasol 1 was thus not based on oil security considerations, but 
rather a number of other factors, including coal and industrial policy, as well as an assessment of 
world oil reserves (which were thought to be scarcer), the lack of other refineries in the country at 
the time (although Enrefwas completed in 1954), and the advantage of the plant's location adjacent 
to the major South African market. Sasol received the same subsidy as SATMAR production (2 
pence per gallon) but lack of pricing data makes it difficult to assess the impact of the subsidy. The 
company began to make a profit in the 1960s, and diversified into petrochemicals, a high-value 
market for Sasol on account of the unique properties of the synthetic fuels process. In 1990, with 
Sasol 2 and 3 fully operational, and with a potential end to the oil embargo in sight, Sasol 1 was 
converted into a petrochemicals plant. 
The marketing arrangement which Sasol made with the oil majors (the 'Blue Pump' agreement) was 
that one Sasol pump would be placed on each service station within a specific geographical area, 
through which Sasol would market its product. The agreement was embedded in the new 'single 
brand' system, at government's insistence, in the mid-1950s, and persisted until the 1980s. 
The crude refining industry developed from the 1950s, as outlined above, with the erection of three 
refineries (Enref 1954, Sapref 1964, Calref 1966) in the 1950s and 1960s (the fourth crude refinery, 
Natref (1971) has been dealt with in the next section). The development of the refming industry 
continued from the 1950s to the 1970s, with major expansions in capacity in 1970 (Calref, Enref), 
lJ Figures for demand of refining capacity are based on Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (1995) figures for crude oil 











1971 (Sapref), 1973 (Sapref), 1975 (Enref), 1976 (Natref), 1977 (Sapref) and 1978 (CaJref)24. 
Policy towards the reftning industry was very favourable, for a number of different reasons. In the 
1950s, the development of reftneries promoted industrial development goals of import-substitution, 
as well as having very positive linkages with other industrial sectors such as chemicals; thus the 
i original regulatory regime for setting refinery gate prices was based on three principles: the fIrst 
t: j was import substitution on very favourable tenns, via the IDLC fonnula outlined above; the second 
d' 'i 
was import restrictions, also outlined above, which were also rigidly applied to only allow imports 
by oil majors, and only when there was a demonstrable shortage of local production, as well as a 
preferential tariff on locally-reftned fuel~s; and the third was a restriction on the construction and 
expansion of refineries, which WIder industrial development regulations required a licence, which in 
turn required the applicant to demonstrate the necessity of more reftning capacity in tenns of local 
demand; reftnery expansion plans were frequently negotiated with the relevant Minister. Since 
South African refineries' supply envelope also included most of southern Africa, this provision 
ensured a significant degree of protection from competition, and made it even more wtlikely that 
another refiner would enter the market (Interview with S VanDen Berg). 
The state's approach to the oil industry Wlderwent a significant change from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
During the 1950s, industrialisation policy encouraged reftnery development and expansion; with the 
maturity of the industry in the 1960s, given the growth in demand (premised on a stable and low 
international oil price, coupled with high domestic growth rates), both the state and the oil industry 
expected a new reftnery to be a necessity in the 1970s. During the 1960s the state began to take an 
interest in promoting a significant indigenous stake in oil companies; this, coupled with the 1960s 
phase of the state's oil security strategy, which appeared to be moving in the direction of a large 
state-owned oil company ("State Moves in on Oil" (Financial Mail 15/12/1966; see also Financial 
Mail 23/311967)), persuaded oil majors that there was a danger of some fonn of nationalisation 
(Interview with senior oil industry executive). 
A new refmery was anticipated in the mid-1970s, which would require a licence from the state. As a 
precautionary move, Shell and BP fonned a joint marketing company, Trek, in the 1960s with 
Genmin (an Afrikaner mining house), in order to gain a stake in the new reftnery, and were 
subsequently granted a licence (Interview with senior oil industry executive). Moreover, the 
government began using the Ratplan from the late 1960s to promote marketing companies with 
indigenous shareholding; the 1969-1972 Ratplan gave preference in the allocation of new sites to 
"companies 'who have promoted participation of SA capital and enterprise in the manufacture and 
marketing of petrol products'" (Financial Mail 111111968), a clear reference to Trek and its backers. 
24 This data has kindly been provided to me by Dave Wallace from ,BP. 
25 There was effectively a duty on imported fuels not applicable to locally refined fuels, which amounted to around tA of the Sasol 











The new refinery was to be built at Richards' Bay north of Durban, a deep-wat~r port then under 
development by the IDC and capable of berthing VLCCs. The crude pipeline to supply N atref was 
routed via Empangeni near Richards' Bay with this in mind, as was a new liquid fuels products 
pipeline in the 1970s (Financial Mail 5/3/1971). Since Richards' Bay was under development as a 
major industrial hub at the time, the IDC saw a refinery as a natural addition, which would also be 
linked to the inland strategic crude storage network, and potentially form a hub for a petrochemicals 
industry. After 1973, however, the development of Sasol 2 meant that with existing refmery 
expansion programmes, the petrol restrictions introduced in 1974, and a general drop in demand due 
to high prices, more capacity was not required. No further crude refineries have been built in South 
Africa 
In the 1960s, oil industry interviewees described the oil majors "kowtowing" to government, for the 
reasons outlined above. By the end of the 1970s, the position had reversed; the South African 
government desperately needed the oil majors not to disinvest, and deployed a number of incentives 
to prevent this from happening, including offeri,ng coal export concessions26 to oil majors which 
continued to "fulfil their obligations in supplying liquid petroleum fuels in the country" (Economic 
Affairs Minister Chris Heunis, quoted in Financial Mail 18/5/1979). The state had to manage three 
different processes with the industry in the 1970s, all of which involved a cut in the industry's 
production (these will be more fully discussed below). 
The first was the need to curb petrol consumption, via petrol restrictions; the second involved a 
general policy of encouraging fuel-switching by the state, particularly from fuel oil to coal, and the 
third was a process of policy change to accommodate the synthetic fuels industry in the early 1980s. 
The first two problems were dealt with by the oil industry by increasing the complexity of their 
refineries; most refinery expansion in the 1970s was aimed at lowing the fuel oil fraction, and 
increasing the petrol output per barrel (Financial Mail 3/5/1974, Financial Mail 27/6/1975, 
Financial Mail 16/1211977), which simultaneously raised the petrol output per barrel and produced 
less (now superfluous) HFO. The state's approach to the problem of how to simultaneously 1 
persuade the oil majors not to disinvest, coerce them to fit their production to the requirements of 
the state's oil security strategy, and also maintain relatively stable and reasonable petrol prices and \ r 
non-interruption of supply, was to compensate them through the regulatory system; as the state's I' 
~ chief liquid fuels industry bureaucrat in the 1980s commented: J 
"I must admit that the lOcal oil companies always served South Africa very well, and they did 
take into account the country's interests, because this is the one country, because of our 
regulatory system, where they still made profits.. ..no international company would withdraw 












when they were making profits .... particularly when they were making losses in other countries" 
(Interview with S Van Den Berg). 
The development of the regulatory system from the 1950s to the 1970s protected the oil majors in 
several major ways: import restrictions and licensing for refinery projects protected the refining 
industry from competition, and the Ratplan protected the retail trade from competition and managed 
the entry of new players, who were in any case dependent on the refiners for their products. For the 
oil majors, the regulatory system gradually increased refinery margins as the IBLC, based on 1950s 
assumptions about pricing and liquid fuels transport, rendered higher returns by comparison to 
refmers elsewhere. This compensated for the real decline in the marketing margin, which was 
irregularly increased, and subject to decline in real terms due to accelerated inflation from the 1970s 
on. Moreover, the industry was largely exempt from competition legislation from the 1930s 
-:"K. onwards, and was only effectively brought under a competition law regime in the late 1990s (see 
below). 
The oil industry liaised closely with government at a number of different levels, from Ministerial 
level downwards, and sat on a number of committees to regulate the retail and wholesale sectors, 
address bottlenecks and allocate portions of the retail market. The industry itself had developed a 
highly-structured co-operative system (given the exemption from competition legislation), which 
allocated different aspects of the relationship with government to different companies, co-operated 
on the maintenance of market share in most areas, and achieved various economies of scale through 
transfer arrangements (interviews with senior oil executives), to eliminate both unnecessary 
competition between majors, and any threat of' adverse regulation. One of the oil majors was 
charged with responsibility for co-ordinating the industry's management of the regulatory process, 
and liaised regularly with a key group of government officials. Both the secrecy and the level of co-
ordination within the industry were intensified by the state's oil security strategy, in which the oil 
majors participated in various key roles. 
2) 1960s to 1980s 
The outstanding feature of this period of policymaking was the development by the state of an oil 
security strategy, which was developed against a background of growing international pressure to 
impose a mandatory oil embargo on South Africa. While the early part of the strategy comprised a 
modification of the existing liquid fuels industrial and regulatory system, in the 1970s, the state 
embarked on a large-scale synthetic fuels programme, which significantly altered the nature of the 
South African liquid fuels industry in the long term. At the same time, the relationship between 
liquid fuels and coal engendered by the development of the synthetic fuels industry contributed 











refonns integrating liquid fuels policy into new energy policy institutions. The existing regulatory 
regime was extended and modified to accommodate the synthetic fuels industry, while also 
preventing the withdrawal of the oil multinationals. 
The origins and development of the oil embargo 
The international environment just after the second world war was immensely favourable to South 
Africa. The Prime Minister at the time, Jan Smuts, had unprecedented international standing within 
the Allies, and particularly within the British imperial system. This changed with two simultaneous 
developments. The first was the victory of the pro-apartheid National Party in the 1948 elections, 
following which the new government (which held power until 1994) formalised and intensified 
racial segregation and exclusion developed during the colonial period into a theory of 'Grand 
Apartheid'. The second was the disintegration of the European empires in the wake of the second 
world war over a period of three decades, beginning with the independence of India in 1947, and 
ending with the decolonisation of the Portuguese imperial possessions in the mid 1970s. This 
fundamentally changed the nature of the international political environment, and led increasingly to 
South Africa's isolation on the world stage. 
Pre-war international organisations such as the League of Nations were confined to Europe, the 
USA and a few small settler-dominated client states, whereas the United Nations, formed after the 
second world war, was comprised of a much broader and more representative set of nations, 
including two sources of pressure against apartheid. The first was Soviet bloc countries, which were 
opposed to apartheid on ideological grounds, had relationships with the South African Communist 
Party, were later key supporters of African (and South African) liberation movements, and who also 
saw South Africa as an integral part of the Western bloc. The second, and more politically 
significant, source of pressure comprised decolonised nations which had no historical ties with the 
South African state and no racial-colonial affinities with its governing white minority. Two groups 
were particularly significant: the first was India and Pakistan, which were admitted to the UN in the 
1940s, and the second consisted of the newly-independent African states, which were admitted 
mainly during the period 1956 to 1964 (the majority from 1959-61). The first group were extremely 
vocal in the UN General Assembly, partiCUlarly on the treatment of the Indian minority in South 
Africa, and successfully proposed a number of resolutions in this regard (in 1946, 1950, 1952, 
1957, 1959, 1961 and after), and both groups sponsored a constant stream of UN General Assembly 
resolutions from the 1950s onwards condemning apartheid. The first resolution specifically calling 
for sanctions was Resolution 1761112 in 1962 (www.un.org 1111112004), which 'requested' nations 











African states formed the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 1963, with one of their primary 
aims being to " .. rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid" 
(www.african-union.orgl211112004).Asian and African countries forced South Africa's exit from 
the Commonwealth in 1960, and in the same year, a group of African countries proposed an oil 
embargo for the first time (Hengeveld & Rodenburg 1995b: 18), which was formally adopted as an 
OAU resolution in 1964. Amongst more general appeals for sanctions and international pressure, a 
key 1964 resolution of the OAU Council of Ministers contained an appeal 
.... to all oil-producing countries to cease, as a matter of urgency, supply of oil and petroleum 
products to South Africa" (Resolution 31, 3M session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Cairo 
1964 www.african-union.org 1211112004). 
However, the OAU resolution bound only African states, which were not major oil suppliers to 
South Africa, nor did their influence in the UN extend beyond sponsoring and voting for resolutions 
in the General Assembly; thus until the 1970s, the oil embargo remained an ambition of African and 
Asian states and anti-apartheid activists. 
The OAU's opportunity came when the Arab states required their diplomatic support against Israel 
during the 1973 war, at which time African states traded condemnation of Israel for an inclusion of, 
South Africa in the Arab states' embargo of Israel's allies. Given that 90% of South Africa's oil 
came from the Middle East, OAU Secretary General Nzo Ekangaki pointed out that 
.... the time has come for our Arab brothers to use the oil embargo as a weapon against the white 
regimes27 .. (de Quaasteniet & Aarts 1995:270). 
When Arab countries lifted the embargo against other Israeli allies in 1974, the embargo against 
South Africa continued, and both the OAU and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC) intensified international pressure to enforce it; in 1977 all OPEC countries 
except Iran undertook to support the embargo (de Quaasteniet & Aarts 1995:270), and in the wake 
of the Iranian revolution in 1978179, the new Iranian govemmentjoined the boycott. 
In 1975, a resolution was passed in the General Assembly for the first time specifically calling for 
an oil embargo against South Africa (Resolution 3411130), an appeal which was repeated in 1976, 
1979, 1980 and throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The 1980 resolution (Resolution 35/206) 
spells out a comprehensive programme for an oil embargo, and repeats a call made in 1979 to the 
Security Council to pass a resolution imposing a mandatory embargo, which the Security Council 
had done in the case of the arms embargo against South Africa in 1977, in terms of Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter. Resolution 36/8 of 1981 requested: 
.... the Security Council to consider, as a matter of urgency, the imposition of full mandatory 
sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against the racist regime of 
27 He included Rhodesia. then also under international pressure to dismantle a racist state. and in any case tied into South Africa's 











South Afri~ including, in particular, an embargo on the delivery of oil and oil products to 
South Africa." 
The Security Council, despite repeated resolutions from the General Assembly, never did this, and 
so in terms of the UN, the embargo never escaped the status of a 'voluntary' embargo in the way 
that the arms embargo did (which was a 'mandatory' embargo), which made it more difficult to 
enforce. As the South African Financial Mail commented in 1979: 
"There are several ways of circumventing the ban on shipment to SA imposed by most oil-
exporting countries. But a mandatory ban would put an end to such manoeuvres. It is not very 
likely that oil tankers would risk calling at SA ports if they knew that they would be identified 
by American or Russian spy satellites, and could face seizure when next calling at a port of any 
UN member state" (Financial Mail 29/611979). 
The embargo was ended towards the end of 1993, as the General Assembly noted in Resolution 
48/1 "that the transition to democracy has now been enshrined in the law of South Africa28 •• ", and 
declared the oil embargo, as well as other sanctions, lifted. 
The key points in the development of the embargo were the early 1960s resolutions, which led to 
the development of a major oil security strategy by the apartheid state, the 1973 imposition of an 
embargo by Arab producers, which caused South African companies to switch from Arab suppliers 
to an almost total dependence on Iran, and most significant, the 1979 Iranian decision to cut oil 
supplies, which provided a sudden shock to the South African oil industry. In 1972, 54% of oil 
imported into South Africa came from Iran, and the rest from Arab countries; in 1974, 90% was 
sourced from Iran, and 10% from Arab countries, and in the beginning of 1979, 91 % was sourced 
from Iran (de Q~teniet & Aarts 1995:271). Thus the 1979 development was dramatic, and led to 
a sharp intensification of strategic oil security measures by the apartheid state, including the 
assumption of oil procurement activities by the SFF. The embargo proved to be more permeable 
than the apartheid government anticipated; the Shipping Research Bureau, an Amsterdam-based 
group which monitored the oil embargo, published a list of 865 vessels which they thought had 
probably delivered oil or liquid fuels to South Africa between 1979 and 1993, 80% of which were 
VLCCS29 (Hengeveld & Rodenburg 1995a:206-221). 
By 1985, helped by a glut on the world oil market, the Department of Minerals and Energy 
announced in their Annual Report that 
" .. the availability of crude oil for South Africa in the current world market situation and the fact 
that Sasol 2 and 3 are in full production made it possible for most of the fuel conservation 
measures still in existence to be lifted .. " (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual 
Report 1985:58). 
28 The establishment of the Transitional Executive Council in 1993, to govern the country until the elections in April 1994. 











Premiums paid by South African stute oil t rad.::r~ declined towards the end of tIX' 19805. as creative 
wily5 to circumvent Ih.:: embargo were found and .::xploitcd (Van den I1crg \99J. do: Quaastcnict &. 
AIIru; 1995:272-9). Thus IIX' po:-riud from the 19505 to the 1990s can be classified inlO po:-riods of 
pt.'TCCived risk for the apartheid stat,' of nOI beins able to import crude oil (see Figure 6.1 below): 
beron' 1964. there was II very low risk; from 1964-1973. I ~rt was a small bill significant risk ; fmm 
1973 10 1979. I~ was a medium risk; from 197910 1985 tlX'l\' was a high risk; from 1985 10 I99J 
thL-re WI1ll II medium risk. and from I99J on Ihere was no risk. This panem of prn:e-1>'oo risk 
dctl.'fmined key de-vcloprm:1I1.s in lhe Slau:'s oil secunt) SlI111t'IO. as will bc dabonncd funner below. 
The State Oil Security Strategy 
The key elemcnu and developments in the st:ltc oil security SlrBtCS)' are portl1lycd in Figure 6.11 
below. The- dewlopmcnt occurred in thre.: phaSl.'s, indicl1loo alxm:. The first phllSl:. (rum t ..... earl)' 
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coupled wilh u stille-owned inland refin<"ry. as well as lhe launching of an eXplorulion pmliflUT1m.::. 
in an UIlr:mpIIO loo;Ule indigenou~ oil resources, The Sl.'Cond phw;c. fr'\llll 1973 101979, saw the 
inlcnsiliClll ion of the programme through the significant ~~Iing·up of Ihe synl hetic fuels induslry as 
wl"ll as II rol1g~ of measures 10 CUI liquid fuels cnnsumplion, including u progrnmme enoouraging 
industrial liquid fuel s uscrs 10 sl'o; tch to coal (II' elC'C tricifY. and a programmc of pCil'Ol rcSiriclions. 
The SIOIC also est3blished an cncrl!O' puticy capacity during this pha!K'. clO$Cly related 10 Ihe oil 
securil Y slmtegy, 10 develop a compn'!tt.-lt'Ii\·e .strntcgic approach 10 the c:MTl!Y S\.'Curil) problem. 
The third and most intensc p/la!le. wh ich began with a real oil supply cn sis. rrom 197910 I99J, saw 
a doubling of the si7.~ or fht- synlhetic ftICls pro~e. the takeover by the state of crude oil 
acquisition. and the de"dopmrnt o f a long-tcmt synthetic fuels pol icy; these were accompl i~hcd 
I'olthin II n~ly-cstablj shc-d enl,rlO' bureau.:;raq . in which moslliquid fuels-relal.-d poI ic) acthll) 
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was centralised. From 1989, with the accession of De Klerk and a genuine reformist agenda, no 
further major developments took place, except for the completion of the Mossgas project. The 
phases will be examined in more detail below. 
Phase 1 - 1960s to 1973 
Early symptoms of the oil embargo led the state to initiate two programmes in 1964. The first was 
the launch of an exploration programme aimed at finding indigenous oil resources, and the second 
was the creation of a large-scale strategic oil reserve. The exploration programme was co-ordinated 
by a new state entity, Soekor, a state-owned limited company, whose function was to promote 
exploration by private firms, or if necessary undertake exploration itself. Soekor was overseen by 
the Department of Mines, since exploration and production permits were granted in terms of mining 
legislation, and had three roles: to promote exploration, to undertake exploration if necessary, and 
to regulate and co-ordinate the exploration process. Initially, prospecting activity was onshore; 
however no promising finds were made, and onshore exploration was finally abandoned in 1978 
(Trollip 1996:4-13, VandenBerg 1993:51). 
Soekor oversaw a licensing round of oil majors and others keen to explore offshore in 1968, and a 
programme of offshore exploration commenced, which declined in the early 1970s as international 
pressure and unpromising geology discouraged foreign companies from further exploration; the last 
internationally-financed well was drilled in 1976 (Van den Berg 1993:51). As a result, Soekor 
began an offshore programme itself in the same year, which continued until the mid-1990s, the 
main discoveries of the programme being a number of small oil fields off the southern Cape Coast 
(which are now in production), gas fields in the same area, and a gas field off the Namibian coast, 
which was not developed for political reasons (Trollip 1996:4-13). The gas field off the southern 
Cape coast was developed in the late 1980s as part of the Mossgas project, which will be further 
discussed below. The state, however, failed to achieve its primary objective, which was to improve 
oil security. 
Soekor was integrated institutionally with the state's oil security strategy through its shareholders, 
which were in equal proportions Sasol and the IDC, until it was transferred to the Central Energy 
Fund in 1985, of which it became a subsidiary (Van den Berg 1993:51). Funding was in the form of 
grants from the state, channelled through the IDC, until 1985, after which it was fmanced from the 
CEF, in the form of grants until 1988, and in the form of loans thereafter (Vanden Berg 1993 :51). 
The total financial outlay of the state on Soekor's exploration programme is unclear, partly because 
of the way it was financed; however, the Auditor General reported that around R2.35 billion (total 
nominal amount) was paid to Soekor from inception to 1994 (Trollip 1996:4-13). Little data is 











distributing this amount according to available data (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
Annual Reports 1980-1986) over the period in question renders a total amount of R9.75 billion in 
2000 rands, some of which was in the fonn of loans. 
The development of the strategic reserves occurred in two phases. The first was the establishment in 
1964 of the Strategic Fuel Fund Association (hereafter SFF), a not-for-profit company owned by the 
IDC, the objectives of which were to: 
" .. carry on the business of promoting, conducting, establishing, facilitating, guiding the State 
with regard to the location, procurement, storage, production and/or exploitation of fuels, 
materials, products and commodities which are or may become of strategic importance to the 
Republic of South Africa" (quoted in V an den Berg 1993 :49). 
Strategic oil storage facilities were developed in two phases. The first phase consisted of storage 
tanks built at the coast at Durban and Cape Town (Financial Mail 15/10/1966), which were 
relatively small compared to storage facilities built in the next phase, which commenced in 1966. 
The IDC and Sasol were requested by the government in the mid-1960s to assess the practicality of 
constructing a new Sasol plant in order to diminish oil import requirements; on account of the low 
price of crude oil, they were advised by Van Eck (who was also on the Sasol board at the time, as 
well as chainnan of the IDC) instead to build an inland crude oil refinery linked to a strategic 
storage facility; in addition, the refinery should be developed with a partner which could if possible 
guarantee long-tenn oil supplies (Collings 2002:72, Davie 1995:249). This recommendation was 
accepted by government in 1966, which started work at around the same time on the conversion of a 
disused coal mine at Ogies into a strategic oil storage facility with a capacity of 118 million barrels 
(Financial Mail 13/1/1967, Trollip 1996:4-18), as well as a new crude oil pipeline from Durban to 
Sasolburg, the location of the new refinery, with a spur to Ogies. The pipeline, built from 1967-8, 
was built via Empangeni, near the coast north of Durban, in the hope of developing Richards' Bay 
as a deep-water port capable of receiving VLCCs, as well as locating the next refmery there 
(Financial Mail 11/8/1967). The strategic storage programme was veiled in (initially unsuccessful) 
secrecy, and oil imports for strategic stocks programmes were removed from official trade statistics 
(Financial Mail 26/5/1967). 
The Natref refmery was the outcome of a complex set of negotiations between Sasol and the IDC, 
the Iranian National Oil Company, and the French oil major Total, which had entered the South 
African retail market in the 1950s. Both the French30 and the Iranian involvement in Natrefwas tied 
to broader strategic goals: French participation was linked to weapons acquisition (Collings 
2002:73), in particular Mirage fighter jets, which the apartheid government acquired in the early 
1970s, and the deal with the Iranians involved an Iranian commitment to a long-tenn oil supply 











contract for the refinery, as well as broader commitment to supply South Africa's oil needs and R52 
million of the capital cost of the refinery, in exchange for a 17.5% stake (Financial Mail 7/6/1968). 
Iran also dispatched 400 workers to South Africa to help construct the refinery, who were classified 
as 'honorary whites,31 by the South African authorities (de Quaasteniet & Aarts 1995:271). South 
Africa also entered into diplomatic relations with Iran in 1970 (Financial Mail 13/11/1970), and the 
Iranians invested in the South African uranium enrichment programme in the mid-1970s in 
exchange for supplies of South African (natural) uranium (de Quaasteniet & Aarts 1995:271). 
Natref was unusual in various respects on account of its location inland, and its location near the 
coalfields, which meant that there was almost no nearby market for fuel oil; thus the refmery was 
configured to process a higher proportion of heavy fractions into 'white products' (a more 
'complex' refmery), as well as to produce a large volume of jet fuel to supply South Africa's main 
international airport (Financial Mail 16/1111979). It was also hailed as " .. South Africa's most 
important industrial project for many years .. " (Financial Mail 5/311971), and was the South African 
refinery with the largest nominal capacity at the time (57 bbl/sd) until Sapref was upgraded in the 
same year (from 44bbl/sd to 100 bbl/sd). 
The development of Natref involved some regulatory innovations, and inaugurated a new 
relationship between oil companies, the state, and Sasol. The deal with the Iranians involved Sasol 
taking 70% of the product of the refmery (Financial Mail 5/3/1971), and Total the remaining 30%. 
Since Sasol did not undertake marketing of its own fuel (aside from the Blue Pump Agreement -
see above), an agreement was brokered by government between the oil industry and Sasol called the 
Sasol Supply Agreement, whereby Sasol would not market its own products, in exchange for a 
commitment from the oil majors to buy Sasol's product in proportion to their market share, at IBLC 
prices. Government persuaded Sasol to enter into this arrangement (it had ambitions of entering the 
market at the time) on the basis that a) it would be cheaper for consumers, and b) that: 
" .. it would be able to rely on government intervention that would compel the petroleum 
marketers to purchase the necessary Sasol production through their own distribution networks" 
(Van Den Berg 1993:41), 
which it did a decade later. The way in which the IBLC was derived for Natrefwas that a transport 
element was added to the usual basic fuel cost at the coast, as if Natrefs products had been 
imported to its refinery gate, thus giving it an extra margin32, which in theory compensated it for the 
cost of piping crude oil from the coast (Van den Berg 1993:67). Another regulatory advantage 
31 This was the standard way in which the apartheid state approached the awkward problem of doing business with countries such as 
Iran, Taiwan and Japan whose citizens would nonnally have been classified in an 'inferior' racial group in tenns of apartheid racial 
classification, which technically would have barred them from socialising with 'whites' (and attending official functions). 
32 Since this was an unregulated administered price which was set by a state agency, it could be used as an infonnal subsidy, and 











which accrued to Natrer3 was the differential pipeline charges applied to liquid fuels products 
being piped from the coast to the inland market, and charges applicable to crude oil, which were 
much lower, and were based on an estimation of the 'white product' yield of a given quantity of 
crude oil for an average coastal refinery. Pipeline charges were then levied on the volume of 
potentially derived 'white products' (petrol, diesel, IP and jet fuel) from a load of crude oil; thus the 
heavier fractions were transported for free. This was referred to as the 'NatrefNeutrality Principle', 
on the basis that Natref was disadvantaged by being inland (where it had been located for strategic 
reasons), and that this arrangement related the cost of transporting crude to the price which Natref 
added to its IBLC price for selling liquid fuels. However, the 1976 breakup for a barrel of oil 
rendered around 38% fuel oil, refmery fuel and losses (Financial Mail 24/911976), and the average 
for 1997 coastal refiners for this figure was around 30%, which would imply a discount by volume 
of 30-40%, whereas for Natref the actual yield of fuel oil was only 3-5% (Lloyd 2001 :47), because 
of its plant configuration. Interviewees from the oil industry estimated that this difference yielded a 
4-5c premium per litre in the 1980s and 90s (2-5% of the retail petrol price)34. 
There is some evidence (based only on interviews) that the decision to place the Caltex refinery in 
Cape Town was influenced by government's strategic considerations, given its proximity to 
Saldhana Bay, which could receive VLCCs and bec me the location of the second large-scale 
strategic storage facility. Although a refinery in the Cape area made sense in terms of the 
remoteness of the Cape market, the refinery has never run at full capacity due to the limited size of 
the market, which also pushed Mossgas' supply envelope east when it came on-stream in the early 
1990s (Interview with Oil Industry executive). 
The final strand of the 1960s oil security strategy was the acquisition by the IDC in the mid-60s of a 
tanker fleet, initially intended as an integral part of a state oil company (1511211966) to complement 
the strategic stocks and the new state refmery. The tankers were small to medium-scale, six in all, 
bought from the oil majors, and formed an integral part of what the Financial Mail called " .. the 
grand design of the national oil plan" (Financial Mail 23/311967). The strategic role of the tankers 
was to transport crude oil from the Persian Gulf to South Africa; however, it probably occurred to 
state planners that the strategic role of a South African tanker fleet would be non-existent in a real 
embargo situation, since tankers could be easily identified in the Gulf. Another potentially more 
strategic role would be to move strategic stocks and liquid fuels between various coastal 
destinations. However, the key reason that the plan was sidelined was probably economies of scale, 
33 This is not documented in the usual literature on regulation, but has been gleaned from interviews with oil industry executives; 
these views were confinned in the hearings on the Pipelines Bill, which would establish a regulator for pipeline charges, when the oil 
industry divided into two groups terming themselves 'coastal refiners' and 'inland refiners' . Sasol hotly denied that Natref was 
'subsidised' by this measure as alleged by the 'coastal refiners' group, but their rebuttal verifies the coastal refiner's allegations (see 
www.sasol.com). 











Figure 6.12: Value o f Crude Ojl Imports as % of Total Imports 
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The second major im pllCt wus (In pricc~ lind innalion. Since the economy WllS IIIIb..:l) coal·based. 
the on ly 5t'Ctor which was seriously aff~tcd was the tmnspon sector. Thc global impact o f the oil 
emls aOi:ctcd the South Afncan ccunumy in sc,·cral cQntradictory ways. On the' onc hand, demand 
fur c~ports dropped. hut on the other hand. demand for gold and coal boomed. and the: t:nd of the 
19705 SlIW tIK: dcvelopment of u m!l5!livc cool cxpon boom. as well as II massi,·c electricity boom 
whtch was partly related to the gold boom. The direct impact 00 the real petrol pricc ill the 197(k 
was dri"cn both hy rcal incrt'llscs in the cost of crude uil (illdim:tly. through the lBLC). and also by 
.. no .. nupo. .... hot...., t.<>. .. 1)0,0 cuo; ,.., SKU impJ"",lI"" .... ".," .ock. ""'" """"" .. ,)0,0 c.ty 19Il0l. ... II1<II _ wdilcly. bon 
~ .. _bk "' .. ""'IIllI ""..., ~ ~ 'u ,II< i"lj>Ort ltlll .......... 111 otha 0.,."'''''' "'" iD<1u<I<d on lit .. .,. ..... ""'" .. 











FIIIU .. &,13: Petrol Con.,mpti..., and Real Price 
Ihe ImPOSilion of funher 
" 
" .-
-.~ .. leyies '" ~)nthclic 
programme, 
fi nance ,,. 
'"",. 
T'" k" 
"" ~! factor, though. W$ "" • • r-...~, I ",' \'ulncrability .... hich 
".~ ,. 
, '00 
dependence on onl) onc 
supplier,lrnn. had brought, 
:;0 The three key responses of 
In., apartheid sUIte to the-
197) oi l criSlS were the 
- pel,'" con....,..,uon --.... ""rot p<a (2000 celU) ...... """- imposition .f pei fOI 
restrictions. Ille decision 10 build Saoo12, wid lne dcvdopment of a ncv. insti lutional framework fOf" 
cnergy poliey making, of .... hich hQuid fuels was a central pan, The state's reaction was almOS!. 
blase: 
"Thanl.J 10 a number of ftV(}U .. ble ~onSldenlllonS, South Africa was IlOl \:aughl compleld} 
un"wal'l'S by the 011 crisis and WIS able til ctI!X', ""1111 sHght IKIJuSUl1enb and minor difficulties. 
Tile n>os' ;",,,Mant faelor was undoubtedly Ihr fOl'l'Sighl of the anlhorilics. ... hiell l'aulled in 
important steps \:Iting "~efI on good lunc 10 m .. imiS<" the counl'}"s wll>Cfabilil). COO"""lUCflII), 
II was !KIS,ible 10 plan ahemam-e 5tralC&ie$ imn",dialdy. nUln!) i1C<;alM i'l\"~igallons .... had 
61n:ady reacho:tl In a!lvanew SlAS'" Tllis informalion "'IIS of peal value III lhe. Petroleum 
Eoonomism& Commlllee whieh "'-as Sd up 11)' lhe Minl$kr ofF.ronomie Affilirs loward~ the end 
of 1\l 71~ (~n"""-"'I ofPb Jlninl! Annual Rcpon 1974:1) 
The 'stC'ps' WId 'investigations' menlioned abo,'e were lhe Slr:lIegic Siorage program me and the 
special rellllionship wi th Irnn. and more importantly, a seriell of stooie!, mainly by tile Depanment 
of Commerce, btu eo-ortiinated with lhe Ixpanmcnl of Planning's na!iCenl em'rgy So:"~lion, were 
u!llk-rtaJ,.en inlo possible ways to curb petrol consumption, which fOlllll"tl lhe basiS for mCllSures 
recommended by lhe Petroleum Economising Commiucc, SCI up b} thl:- l'rime Minister in late 197) 
and a<h·isin.: him for the remainder of the 19705. The measures whIch were put in place 10 curb 
petrol consumption consisted of relltneted open;n" ho urs. spt.'I.'<i limil!, and other less cnfon::eable 
~ soch as encoumging uS(' ofbuscs IlOd lift dubs. Govemment selU larget of SIlving 20"/0 of 
l'uel consumption (from 1973 - Financial Mail 14/61 1975), but did nol Beilieve o.nywhl:-re ncar this 
level. Figure 6.13 above ponru} ~ lhe level of pelrol demllnd lind Ille real petrol price: although 
pelrol demand gro"'1h did slow bcl ...... .-:n 1973 and J985, nliCtUlllions seem 10 be beu er COm:IUIl'(/ 











l'al1 of the ~ason for high l'1!'aJ prices durinllthi~ period wen: added fuel levies to fund the synthetic 
Illds plants. as well as to eOI'er the oil procurerncnt premiums. which probably contributed 
significamly 10 a drop in oonsumpllon. Aller initial ad hoc measures. based on the I'>eb of informal 
agreement Ilhich comprised thc regulatory systc."Il, parliament pas.<;ed tile Petroleum Products Act 
( 12011977). Ihe purpose o f \I hich \\115 to 
~ .. plU'Oidc mea!;u~1 for the sal In& of pelJ1)IcIm prW~ts nil! all economy in the CIJiI of 11M: 
dislribullon ihI:reQf. and for the ma;mcna~ Ind conlrol of. price lhereof..H (Petroleum 
I'roducts Act t 2(){t977:A ims). 
The Act ga'·e the Minister sweeping pl)I'>CI'll to sct prices and prcscriht-d a mnlle of conditions for 
lhe seiling of petroleum product$. and for the UStS of pwoleu11l products. a.~ well as providing for 
the Minister 10 issue regulations penaining to any of these. The Act was used for a wide I1LIlge of 
lTI(':1)ures. incl udi ng forbidding discounti ng of po:.1rol in any fonn, [orhidding I,.~it sales of pelrol. 
~forcing St..T\'iec standards. lhe banning of sel f-service, und applyin,!! various kinds of rcsIrn:tions 
on fuel usc. In add ition to petrol restrictions, inltstigalions WI,.'Te wxIertaken into a """lIe of other 
11l~ls ure!; 10 eurb the use of non-petrol liquid fuels, including a campaign 10 cncoumge fuel oil 
consumers in industl)l to change 10 coal J ) (FiroanciaJ Mail.ll5/ 1974) and elCClncilY. tile connection 
of s mall towns using liquid fuel s 10 genCl1lle electricity to the nc\\ 1)'-de~elO(k'd national grid. a..u 
investigatIOns into reduc ing tn.:: use of i11uminaling par.lflin (Inter .... iew wi th S Van Dcn Ikrg). The 
impact on ruel oil use was significant, and largely ctiminmed its llSC from lhe economy, bill again 
tllis \\"as probably 1ll1b'tdy drilen b)" pricell. althlll.ijlh assisted by coal policy IIllhmives in Ihe mid-
1970s. ",hleh sooghlto recaplure martels lost 10 fuel oil in the 1960s.. 1n thc wuke o f the Petroleum 
products Act, in 19711. the Departments of Commcrcc: alKl IndllS1ry assembled a task team to draw 
lip ratlOl1lng scenarios for optimal us.: of the Sll';'feglc stocks in Ihe cvent of p lotal emb1.rgo. \\Ilh 
tl\{)- and three-YeN lime hori/ons ( Interview wilh S Van Den Ikrg). 
In the wal:c of the 1973 oil crisis. thc Pnme Minister ordered the establishment of both an Energy 
Poltcy Commille.:: (EPe) and a Cabinet Commillec on Energy Policy. The fnoner waslocatw in the 
Department of p lMning, b.1Sed on the small e-nct,!!y planning section thaI had been creatl,.'d in the 
early 197(b. The Epe conshtcd of representative, of ke)" government t:flC1"gy 1ISSt..1~ (Sasol. Escom. 
lit.:: AFB). the Economic Advisor 10 the Prime MinistC1". tit.:: Secretaries of Commeree (also the 
Pelroleum Cont roJicr/]' rice Coutroller). Induslry. Mines, Planning. Foreign AfTair.i and ulso a 
'CI'''!''''' ''al;''" f,om th" Ra;lway~. MOSI of Ihc:>c ~tal.il·o;S wen:: ,n,"OII-c<l direclly in ,he 
'" 10 197~, .1It: oil ,oJ.....,.. ...--l ""~ "r v ..... " "" i . if ~ conu-od .... hon ,oJ..,rlaIlII> It) ",,"h '" <Gal" 
(firl2Do:iJol MId lI'IIl9"l4~ 
.. 10 1974. Ihe .".... III lifO ..... __ II.bO 1'0" ..... ...- lho: .. -' poi«: <If<:<»l ( ...... ;""'......uI ...... 1 "'as tt)..I(l P<' l<>OO. In 
~ ........ lhe.".... pet (;[ .... ttl .. U onIlt/I)4 b uro ond ~ ,""""""ely; m OIha _ ... di~<>f. r.tI .. of 10 











de\elopmenl of thc Ilil security strntcgy (Saw!. secrctaries of Commerce, Indu~try, Mines (coal 
rcsourc.;,s), planning, railways (I ransport logistics». 
lbc sccn:tary of the EPC. and the head of the: SeCn:larilll in the Dcpanment of I'lanning. Dirk 
Ko171, was a statistician with an oil irxlustry background who pioneered energy plarming in 
government. based on his experience in the oil industry. ·!lre [PC had t,,"O functions in the oil 
security strategy: it had a planning lind co-ordinating function. ami key decisions were referred 10 it 
concerning Sasol 2, Sasol J, and other medium and long-tenn strategies for addressing key 
problems_ including consider..ltion of coal resources. The other function was 10 co-ordinate decision-
making conL~ming medium. lind long-tcrm thinking about cnergy policy issucs through the Prime 
Minister's Eoooomic Advisor and the Cnhincl. The EI'C. howcver. WllS insti lulionlllly III some 
distllnce frum the IIctWlI managcment Ilf kc) JII(."I\Sun:s of the Strmcgy such lIS fuel saving and 
stllitegic stocks. 
The key decision III the pcriod from 1974 to 1979 WIIS the dec ision to bui ll! Sasol 2. which 
commillcd the SllIte 10 a synthetic ruels policy, which became fully-developed only in the carly 
I 980s. IDCfSaso I oonsensus in the 1960s was thaI the oil price W..lS too low ($1.80) to ceonomically 
jUStityunothcr Sasol. and expectation W(lS that oil prices wuuJd remain at around the same level for 
the foreseeable futuro. By tnc L-arly 19705, increased oil prices had brought the possibility of a 
·scoond Sasol" closer. Ily 1973 thc average oil price was $3.29 (a 18{)% increase), and by 1974. it 
had risen to S 11.58 (a 640% increase). Atthe saln.· lime, theR.· was a key debat{' being wagcd in the 
country o ...... r coal resources. formally expressed in the I'elr;ck Commission. Sasol"s rn:Ul,lgcrbl 
elile. a key participant in the state's oil sC(;urity strategy, beglUl to frame the debate in terms of the 
k.ind of integrated resource perspective emerging with tire Commission. and were critical of the 
'cheap energy' coal-electricity nexus which dominated coal policy at the time. Dr I'.E. Rousseau. 
founding MD ofSasol and chairman of the bOMd, st;I! ~'Il in 1970s thaI 
·· .. ,t is time that we approached olltcoal resen:es. not ftom lhe resrricted viewpoim of a series of 
.mall mines. bul from a broad national [IOmt of view.:· (ql/Oted in Financial Mail t'll6l1970j. 
and suggested llmt coal prices (and thus elt:etricity prices) be incrca..~cd to fund higher extr..lelion 
Ilites lUld longer r~rve life. Ili s succcssor us MD. David Dc Vi ll icrs. suggcsted 3 years late r that 
electricity prices should be increased to pay for higher cxtnlelion rates: his main concern in 
advocating Ihis was 
M •• to en~lIfe the Iongc!ll possible availability of coal as a chemical feedStock and base for liqu,d 
ruc!s~ (Financial Mai120nJ 197JI. 
In the same interview. De Villicrs discus.scs the possibility of Hnol lrer Sasol. lbc interview was 
conducted 3 months herore thc 1973 oil crisis; De ViIIi{'1'S commented thm Sasol - . .is constantly 











of2740 MI ofpelrOl per year 10 becconomicaJ. and probably .... ould 1101 be a po5sibilily unlil 1977 
(I-inaJ'lcial Mai l 2(17/1973). Four nJOTllhs aller !he irllcrvicw was published. in NO\'eml!cr 1973. 
A",b oil producers added South Africa to It IiSI of emball.'OCd tOunlries (de Quaasteniet & Aaru 
1995:270). 
Actual delHils of !he decision-makmg pI"O(:css leading up lhe Sa!iOl dcdsion are confused and 
contmdictory (c.g. Collings 2002:65. Lal1g 1995:182). From in tcrvi~ ...... s and med ia reports, Ihe 
following account SCCIIL'i to be the moSt wben..'TIt. s...sol"s relationship wilh govcrnment was 
conducted through the Dcpanmen\ of Indu~lries wKi the IDC. Discussions :md negotiations 
collCcming thc likelihood of a new Sasol plant had begun in the 1960s. ix.-en broken off after the 
Natref decision. and takcn up again as the oil crisis unfolded. Snsol"s mpin concerns W~'1\!" a) the oil 
pnec ...... hich was 100 low. and b) economics ofscalc' go~cmnrenl had 10 commit to building lllargc-
scalc plant. al JcIlSl 5 to 7 times larger than Sasol I. in order \0 be economknlly WId stmtCj:ically 
worth .... hile. The massive oil price hike in late 197} so lwd Ihe oil price problem. and incrca."ICd the 
urgency of addressing the question of the plant. Preliminary slutiil"S were done by Sasol and the 
IDC III the carl y rnonlhs of 1974. The Prime Minister esublishcd Ihe EI'C and 1m: COr1\"sponding 
Cabinet Committee in April 1974. David KolZl'. head oflhe EPC"s sccrdarial in the 1970s. outlined 
tile aClual decision-making prtlCt:SS for bolh S3.'101 2 and Sasol 3. whrch lTlo;{)lvoo setting up a sub· 
conuniuce.ofthe EI'C: 
""1"" way it "'lIS done " 'as ro form • commit\« of all .... n:sportSible. author.ties; nx:. 
depl"menl of comm=:e. dept of im/umie ... and 50 on and $0 fo)f\h: dqm"m"nr of ptann,ng.. 
[the dc<:i~ioo "'a~ fIWIdcl _""ll"Iin .. ccb;. J ",as B member of illar co",,,,ineo:. They got rup:.her 
all .h" teSpOOS,ble people. and the) jusc decided 1"'1 "'e n«d 10 build a seoond Sasol al 
Secundl.. .. ... " the~ was a sccood illICIt [1979J. lhe) just decided to double up .he planl. I 
tbird S.sol adjA«n1 to rhe OIlier plant; bul .... ·ft)· limo: ir "-as w'lhin .... ""b~ (In,cn-i,, .... ;Ih D 
KOlle). 
rhe sulH:ommlUl"(: Wllll head:d by the Secretary oflhe Treasury. G.W.G. I3ro .... 11e. and fonned of II 
subset of the l\.'1:cmly-formcd EPC ( ... hieh did not begin to function umil September) inclUding 
represcntati,cs of511501. tnc IDC and the Departments ofCommcn:e and Industry (Inlerview willi l) 
Kov.':). Cabirw:t minulCS from 3 December 1974. stale mill: 
"C.billel d\.-.;ided in principal that I Sl..'<:ood Sa§OI ~Id be built. as planned by Sasol Rnd 
reconll",:ndc:d by I'" 13m .. "" Committee. lod .lIm lhe lioaoc;ng of 1he pr(~eet will be 1I~ 
~cilic" in 1"'-' mclll<nndu(l~ .. hleh will invol~c I levy of 2 cenlS per litn: un lhe relev.nl 
fuels'· (Cabinet M.nu'es 1974)" . 











The planned plan! was smaller than tlK: 'economic' Sile: SlJ~ted by Dc Villie:rs; 1975 predictions 
were: that Sasol 2 would produce 1200Mtlo ofp.1IOI (1622 MI). significantly below the 2740 MI 
predictl-d by Dc Villicrs. 1"here werc !1e\·eral mstitutional and polley cOntcx(.'i to this decision. The 
role of the IOC, as well as or kc)· cconornic policy udvisoo. ffllmed the 511-'101 dcdsion in two 
decisive contcxts. "The first .... "lIS the context of industrinl strategy. in which it was consistent with 
other IDe t"(1CTgy-intcnsi\( mega-pruject8 uf the time. lind given the nuture of the Sasol projcctS as 
p..1rochLmieal and synthl1ic ftICls mdllstrk"8, w\luld provide Slllnifi~UJlllinkages between different 
areas orthe Minerals Energy Complex. prornoting a ma.~si\"e now of investment into the industrial 
l"COflOmy with significant spin-olTs such lIS boosting COlli Rnd electricity dcmruui Fine and 
Ru.~lOmjl"c describt:d the Sa.o;ol 2 Wid 3 dl"Ci~lons lIS •• •• Ihe rnos! dl."Cisivc industrial policy siocc the 
formmion of Iscor [in the 193051'· ( Finc & l{ ustornjl'C 1996:169). 
The SCl.:ond ~ey eontl'ltt was the imponance uf cuning imJlOl1.~ in tlK: 19705. Repeated Economic 
J);:velopmt"nt rlans in Ihe 1970$ cited the importance of cuning importS WId boosting ClIpons, 
particulnrl y oil. The l"Conomie and stmlegic impo<Uncc of a polii ti\"e trade balance: .... "lIS high lightl-d 
in 1972 by the Reyndcrs Commission (Commission of l"'luuy mto the hxpon Trade). and the key 
impon·~llbstitution projects of the 19705 ....... TC identified by the 1978 Economic Development 
i'rogrtlTmne as Sasol and Armsoor. the Repon argued that no funhl.T impor1 subc<;tillltion was 
necessary: 
·• .. the big SI"I~I!ic: imp(W1 rqllar.:emenl prQjcc15 (vi~. crud.: oil and arms), will CO<1 lrib\lIC grclilly 
to\O'ardl keq>ing the VO"·tb of importS wllhin timit~'· (SOOlh Afric. t979a::ztI). 
lhe third policy eo01;;::<.I allud..-d to abt)\"I:, resulting from the den'luping inte!;fation in the proto-
CIlt"fg}' policies of the timl:, was coal policy, which was linh-d with an eneTiD-inlcmivc optimum 
rCSOll1tc U5C parndlgrtl emphasiSing an integrated approach to U$<." of the nntioool c0.11 resource . The 
Sasol project did not intend to 5(" ·" energy or coal: it was by contrast highly energy-intensive. Pan 
of this process CIIO.."fi;Y was dcrin-d dircc!ly from burning sornc orthe fet-dstocl, and part ont Wll$ in 
the form of cicctncal CI1ergy. Sasol 2 and 3 together rcq uirc 900 MW of gcnl'1"Dting capm.:;ty, of 
wftich 500 MW is sclf-gL"ncratcd: Eskom's nearby Kriel power plam was bUilt spl.'Clficnlly to supply 
the Sa..o;ol plants (Fine & Ruslomjox 1996:80). 
The olltstandinl:! iSSlle rCl!llrdi ng SII.o;ol2 was the relationship b..1wrCII the oil refiners and Sasol. The 
laller would have 10 absorb Sasol's output, which would entail considerable disruption to the 
rcfiru:ril;:5' own .:spansion planning processes. Ileforc the oil .shock. the refining industry had 
!I.~sumt-d :I 10% rale in liquid fuels consumption growth per annwn. which .... "lI$ ~Il.-d back to 7'Y. 
arter 11)73 tFinllocial Mnil 1817/ 1975). and planned their rt"finery cxP1lllllioo accorJlfljly. 
CUmrnenUlIOT!I in the mid-197Qs dcdUCt.-d that gO\·cmmcnt planning fITOCl'$5C$ assumed an I!'Y. 
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..... ould nOi require refineries 10 1ll00hball capacity). Thc.'lC assumptions. plus n 5' poinl ..... eighted 
a,'erage gJ"Q",h 11I1e (or pt""trol. are portro}ed in Figure 6.14 above. 
Gro\\lh in petrol demand grew rapid ly during the 1960:<!, reac hing IU1 D\"elllse peak or Dbo\"(' W., 
which IIL-clined in w early 1970s and became negolillC in the latt' 1970s (110\ shown). A§ Q result, 
typical post-oil-crisis plWltling ('rrors followa!. with e\"cn the modest 7"Ao growth nue used by the 
refillC1"S after 1973 proving oVeroptimistic. Another problematic factor wus the oil indl~'i\ry ' S 
de<:ision 10 invest in complex relinery equipment to boost light frQ(:tion o utpl,.l\ Dod CUI fud oil 
production: \le\'!:nheless, in lhf' mid-I 970:<!, the general view was that accommodating Sasol 2 
production in the Sow.h African market could he manDgt'd. This was not possible al\cr 1979. given 
shrinking demand and thc additional production of Sawl 3. and special arrangements had to ~ 
mOOt- (sec helow). 
TIr financing of Sasol 2. managed through the IOC. was funded through expon credits (25"Ao). 
parliamcnlaf)' grants (15"/.) and a lev)' on hquid fuels (6O"Ao). The levy JIIIymenlS (additional to the 
existing SlI1Itt'gic IUd. fund payment) "'"i:rt' initially included in the w: component and &dministered 
by the IDC. but in 1977 W SUlt(' Cf('at.cd a scparat(' funding ' ·ehicl('. the State Oil FUnd. which was 
created specifICally 10 fund s)'nthctic fue ls prOJects.. TIw: Fund was creatw through the Sl<lte Oil 
Fund Act (J8J1977). ",hlch authorised the SUUC to impose I('vles on liquid fuels.. for financing or 
promoting any activity f('lalW 10 11K- prodoclion and man.eling of $),nthctic rue ls . and "any OIher 
obj1!Ct for "'hich that Fund may be appl i~d. and which has been designated or arprmed b) the said 
Minister in (onsullalion ... i lh lhe Mmistcr of FinaOC('H (State Oil Fund Act J8I1977:Clause 2). 
which was df1!Cth'cl) a 'sclf-financing' provi$1on for the s)"nlhetic fuels industry. analogous 10 











financing Sasol 2, and in the same year, 22% of the electricity price financed Eskom's expansion. It 
is not clear what later proportions of liquid fuels prices were allocated to funding Sasol 3, but these 
quantities probably increased significantly (in absolute terms) in the early 1980s, given the short 
lead time of Sasol 3 and the inflated costs of the project. 
Phase 3 - 1979-1993 
South Africa's relationship with Iran came to an abrupt end with the fall of the Shah at the end of 
January 1979; the decisive moment in the oil embargo was the 4th of March, 1979, on which day the 
new Iranian government which had taken over after the fall of the Shah broke all relations with 
South Africa and joined the oil embargo (de Quaasteniet & Aarts 1995:272). In reality, the supply 
of oil from Iran had been disrupted from December 1978, as strikes in the Iranian oilfields disrupted 
production. South Africa's peculiar dependence on Iranian oil (in 1978, 96% of South Africa's oil 
came from Iran) meant that, unlike other countries caught in the supply crisis of 1978/9, South 
Africa could not switch to other producers, raising the spectre of a real shortage, and at the least a 
short-term crisis. A number of short-, medium- and long-term measures were taken in response. 
Short-term measures included an intensification of fuel-saving measures, the centralisation of crude 
procurement and its transfer to the state, the imposition of a seamless blanket of secrecy on every 
aspect of the industry (to frustrate pro-embargo activists), and the decision to expand Sasol's 
capacity by the construction of another plant identical to Sasol 2. Medium-term arrangements 
included altered regulatory arrangements with the oil majors to accommodate the new synthetic 
fuels in the production and regulatory system and the reorganisation of the state's energy agencies 
into one Department, and long-term measures included adopting a policy of an expanding synthetic 
fuels programme which would provide a minimum threshold of South Africa's liquid fuels on an 
ongoing basis, as well as a related research and development programme into alternative fuels. 
Crude Procurement 
The first emergency measure was drawn up between the SFF, oil majors and the Departments of 
Commerce and Industry, and transferred oil procurement from individual refineries to the state, in 
the form of the SFF. In late 1978, the Minister of Economic Affairs asked oil majors who sourced 
their oil from Iran to draw up contingency plans, and also announced a new fund, the 'Acquisition 
Equalisation Fund' , consisting of the proceeds of an additional fuel levy , to fund premiums incurred 
as a result of procuring oil outside the orthodox oil market (Financial Mail 2211211978), thus 
preserving the economic rationality of the regulatory system (which was based on world prices), as 
well as removing the political responsibility for breaking the embargo from individual oil 
companies. There is some evidence from interviews that oil companies would not have been able to 











were under considerable pressure from anti-apartheid activists to disinvest. The procurement 
strategy also gave the state a key role in managing the crude oil supply situation, as well as 
developing extremely close co-operative relationships with the oil industry. 
The State Oil Fund Act was amended (3011979) to establish the Equalisation Fund, which could be 
used for purchasing crude oil or petroleum products, financing any premium on crude oil purchases, 
or for 
" .. manufacture of or research in connection with petroleum products, as determined by the 
. Minister of Economic Affairs in consultation with the Minister of Finance .. " (State Oil Fund 
Amendment Act 3011 979:Clause lA-4). 
The SFF, with a little experience in trading crude oil through the acquisition of strategic stocks, 
took over the acquisition of most of the country's crude requirements, with the exception of Total 
and Shell, who procured their own crude oil through their international parent companies (Interview 
with S VanDen Berg). The SFF was managed by Sasol on behalf of the state, and taken over by the 
IDC in the early 1980s, with the privatisation ofSasol2 (and thus the majority ofSasol). 
The state oil procurement process, which lasted from 1979 until 1993, occurred in two phases. The 
first phase, from 1979 to 1985, was characterised by a steep learning curve and a difficult world 
market with real shortages of supply. Complex deals were done, often a cargo at a time, 
commanding high premiums and often involving a significant degree of subterfuge, and the SFF 
was the victim of fraud on a number of occasions. Unusual barter deals were concluded 
clandestinely with countries such as Iran, involving South African-made weapons40 (de Quaasteniet 
& Aarts 1995:273). In phase 2, from around 1985 on, world oil prices fell, and there was a glut on 
the world market. The SFF developed routines for circumventing the oil embargo through 
intermediaries (such as oil traders John Deuss and Mark Rich); the source country was informed, 
through the dealer: 
"It was the policy, as far as possible, particularly in the last couple of years, that if you buy 
crude oil from country x, you work through a third party, but the government of that country 
must know that it comes to South Africa, that was always the prerequisite; so all the 
governments involved did know about that" (Interview with S VanDen Berg). 
In this way, South Africa was successful in sourcing adequate supplies of oil at a declining 
premium towards the end of the 1980s, mostly from the Middle East (de Quaasteniet & Aarts 
1995:279). Crude was sold by the state to South African refmers at 'international market prices' 
(Van den Berg 1993:58); the difference between the actual purchase and the derived market price 
was absorbed by the state from the Equalisation Fund. 
40 There is a well-documented by not clearly proven instance of South African involvement i~ the 19808 in the Iran-Contra scandal, 
whereby weapons from the US were shipped via South Africa to Iran through a series of stages, one of which probably involved oil 













A key plank in the South African strategy was secrecy, which not only frustrated attempts by 
embargo enforcers to track oil supplies to South Africa, and make strategic assessments of the 
domestic oil supply, but also protected traders and suppliers, as well as oil companies active in 
South Africa. The key mechanism for this was a 1979 amendment to the Petroleum Products Act 
(72/1979), which imposed a blanket of secrecy on almost all aspects of the liquid fuels industry. 
The key provision stated that: 
"(1) No person shall publish in any newspaper, periodical, book or pamphlet or by radio, 
television or any other means: 
(a) information in relation to: 
(i) the source, manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, quantity or stock level 
of any petroleum products acquired or manufactured or being acquired or 
manufactured for or in the Republic; 
(ii) the taking place and particulars of negotiations in respect of the acquisition of 
petroleum products for the Republic and the transportation thereof; or 
(b) any statement, comment or rumour calculated directly or indirectly to convey such 
information or anything purporting to be such information [ .. ] 
(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1), and the proprietor, printer, 
publisher or editor of any newspaper, periodical, book or pamphlet, or the broadcaster of any 
radio or television programme, in which any information referred to in subsection (1) has been 
published in contravention of subsection (1), shall be guilty of an offence. 
(3) Any person who causes to be published outside the Republic anything of which the 
publication is prohibited by subsection (1), shall be guilty of an offence. 
(4) Any act prohibited in subsection (1) which is committed outside the Republic by any South 
African citizen or any person domiciled in the Republic, shall be deemed to have been 
committed also in the Republic. 
(5) Any offence contemplated in subsection (4) shall for the purposes of jurisdiction be deemed 
to have been committed in any place in the Republic where the accused happens to be. 
(6) For the purposes of this section 'petroleum product' includes crude oil." (Petroleum 
Products Amendment Act 7211979 Clause 4A). 
Thus the Act covered all aspects of the industry, and technically even covered reflecting aloud on 
topics such as the source of South Africa's crude oil, or the circulation of rumours relating to the oil 
industry. Penalties applied not only to individuals but also to the media involved, and applied to 
anyone anywhere in the world, who in theory could be extradited to stand trial (or certainly tried on 
entry to South Africa) for publishing such information elsewhere in the world. Penalties included 











The application of secrecy laws to the liquid fuels industry had a dramatic institutional effect. What 
had previously been a highly secretive industry became hennetic in the extreme. Oil companies 
separated their crude acquisition departments physically from the rest of their businesses; working 
in crude acquisition required security clearance from the Special Branch41; the same conditions 
applied to civil servants (Interviews with Oil Executives, DME officials). Knowledge of how much 
crude oil the country was using, or other related infonnation about quantities of liquid fuels 
produced each year, were restricted to a handful of people within the oil industry and government. 
This had immediate repercussions not only for anyone wishing to inquire into the government's 
liquid fuels policies, but for government department and for oil companies as well. Government 
energy planners (and definitely any others) were routinely denied infonnation on the industry. 
Infonnation on production was only accessible to a handful of people, and often not even to oil 
companies' own planning divisions (Interviews with oil executives)42. Both energy planning and 
analysis, as well as effective governance, were rendered difficult or impossible, and deliberation on 
policy issues took place only at a very senior level, which enhanced the silo-like nature of energy 
policy processes in the DMEA, and furthered the institutional divide between planning and 
regulatory functions. Secrecy provisions were instrumental in crippling the most ambitious energy 
policy project of the apartheid government, the Nation l Energy Council, whose deliberations were 
also classified. Public debate on liquid fuels policy became impossible, until 1993, when most 
secrecy legislation was repealed. 
Sasol 3, Restructuring and Privatisation 
The second immediate response was the decision to build Sasol3, which involved simply building a 
replica of Sasol 2 on the same site, which would draw on the same coal resource. Sasol was asked 
by government to evaluate the possibility of doubling coal production at Secunda in December 
1978, to which they replied in the aftlnnative (Sasol 1990:36). The procedure was the same for the 
Sasol 2 decision (a swift evaluation by a subcommittee of the EPC); however the context was 
different. From 1978, the government had considered the possibility of a total embargo; government 
planners had drawn up contingency rationing plans in 1978, and the Sasol 3 decision was heavily 
influenced by short-tenn emergency considerations. It was clear from around the beginning of 1979 
that the Shah's government would not regain power, and it did not, fmally disintegrating at the end 
of January 1979. The Sasol 3 decision was taken by a subcommittee of the EPC within a few weeks, 
41 A branch of the apartheid state's police which dealt specifically with 'political' offences and related issues, which had a notorious 
reputation (entirely well-founded) amongst anti-apartheid activists for harassment, torture and murder. 
42 An example of the comprehensiveness of these prohibitions and the zeal with which they were implemented is an attempt by the 
Energy and Development Research Centre at UCT to publish a study on paraffin in low-income households in 1993. The study 
contained estimates of how much paraffin households used, and thus required Cabinet permission. A request was funnelled up to 
Cabinet via the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs and was turned down on the grounds that knowledge of the paraffin 











and it was announced on 22 February 1979 (Financial Mail 23/2/1979). The plant would cost 
R3.276 billion (R34 billion in 2000 rands), which would be raised by a combination of the partial 
privatisation of Sasol, parliamentary grants and levies on liquid fuels through the SOF. Funding 
from the initial privatisation was around R700 million, and the rest was provided through the SOF, 
some of which included parliamentary grants; however most of the plant was financed from liquid 
fuels levies, which were converted into 'loans' under the privatisation agreement. 
The privatisation of Sasol was conceived as a way of funding Sasol 3, as well as the funding of 
future synthetic fuels projects; it originated in the late 1970s in Sasol, and was converted into a 
long-term policy by the mid-1980s. Sasol 2 had taken 6 years to build; Sasol 3, on the other hand, 
took only 18 months, and was producing liquid fuels by the end of 1982. The scale of the combined 
Secunda operation is massive, including a massive coal-mining operation, synthetic fuels plants, 
refineries and other petrochemicals processing plants, and is one of the largest single industrial 
projects in the world43• 
The proposal for privatisation, allegedly the brainchild of Joe Stegmann, the MD ofSasol in 1979, 
was approved in principle by government in 1979 (Sasol 1990:36). The process involved the 
formation of a holding company, Sasol Ltd (henceforth Sasol), and the separation of the three plants 
into separate companies, Sasol I, 2 and 3. Then, in a complicated transaction, Sasol paid R400 
million and a 30% stake in Sasol to the IDC, in exchange for which it received 100% of Sasol 1, 
and 50% ofSasol2 and Saso13. The rest of the shares in Sasol were offered to the public, and the 
share issue was massively oversubscribed, since in terms of the conditions contained in the 
prospectus, it was a low-risk, high-return investment. The business world were ecstatic, and the 
financial press hailed the privatisation as both a victory of South African resolve in the face of 
international pressure, and as proof that P.W. Botha was following through with his promises of 
reducing the role of the state in the economy: 
"Sasol is the ultimate South African V sign to the world sanctions threat, with the added 
advantage that it will be profitable too. Furthermore it is the first major public corporation in 
which Government has carried out its promise to reduce its involvement in the economy." 
(Financial Mail 16/1111989). 
The remaining stake in Sasol 2 was bought from the IDC by Sasol in 1983 for R2.6 billion (Rl.l 
billion in cash, R778 million in share issue, and Rl.4 billion converted into a loan to Sasol, 
repayable over 5 years at 1.5% above interest on Escom bonds). The remaining stake in Sasol3 was 
sold to Sasol in 1990 for R2.9 billion (R617 million in cash, conversion of remainder into a loan at 
16%, repayable as follows: R133 million cash, 4 annual instalments of R400 million, final 











instalment ofR550 million, and the interest rate linked to a $23 floor price for crude Oil44) (Van den 
Berg 1993:36-39, SasoI1990:36-37). 
The 1979 prospectus for the initial share offer assured investors that the state would guarantee two 
things: the first is that Sasol would earn a reasonable rate of return, and that if it did not, the state 
would provide the necessary 'tariff protection' ,and that 
" .. the industry must have the assurance that as international oil prices increase in the future, the 
prices of its products will also increase" (quoted in Arthur Andersen 1995:33-34), 
which thus removed the risk from the investment, as well as linking the price of Sasol' s products to 
crude oil, thus removing the options of applying a rate-of-return form of regulation to the synthetic 
fuels industry or imposing windfall taxes during prolonged periods of high oil prices. Several 
developments followed from Sasol's privatisation. The first was that Sasol's management role of 
the SFF and the various funds was discontinued in the early 1980s, and transferred to the IDC, and 
then to CEF. The second was that energy policy fora such as the EPC were 'broadened' to include 
private sector participants, which initially only extended to Sasol, thereby preserving Sasol's 
membership of the energy policy 'inner circle'. The third involved the development of a synthetic 
fuels policy framework in the mid-1980s which was based on two aspects of the Sasol experiment: 
1) new projects would be initiated by the state with funds from previous privatisations, and then 
privati sed, and 2) the same regulatory conditions would apply, which provided a model for the 
successful transfer of risk from investors to liquid fuels consumers. 
Institutional Innovations: the DMEA and the CEF 
The major institutional innovation of the period was the formation of the Department of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs as a result of P.W. Botha's civil service reorganisation of 1980; energy was 
identified as a key strategic policy area. Disparate policy functions relating to the energy sector 
were collected and placed in a new section of the Department of Mines, on account of the coal 
nexus, focused specifically on the connection between coal and synthetic fuels production 
(Interview with S Van Den Berg), which was the central plank in the state's oil security strategy. 
The new Energy Branch was headed by Dirk Neethling, founder and former head of the Minerals 
Bureau, and included all the liquid fuels functions from the Department of Commerce and the 
Department of Industry; the other key component was the EPC secretariat, which transferred from 
the Department of Planning. There was an operational division between regulatory functions, which 
were carried out by the former Department of Commerce and Industry personnel, and planning 
functions, which were carried out in a separate branch of the DMEA by the ex-Department of 
Planning personnel. The former were restructured into a 'management and administration' branch 
44 The link basica1ly specified that if the world crude price was below $23 (which triggered a subsidy from the state to Sasol), then 











when the National Energy Council was formed in 1987, and the latter into a planning subsection 
called 'transport energy' , which in reality concentrated almost exclusively on the supply side. 
The privatisation of Sasol, the shift in policy on synthetic fuels programmes, and the ambitions of 
the Energy Branch to escape the orthodox bureaucratic modelled to a restructuring of the state's 
strategic assets in the liquid fuels sector in 1984/5. Sasol's privatisation resulted in its withdrawal 
from key functions in the oil security strategy in 1984 (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
Annual Report 1984:63); previously, it had managed the SFF (and its procurement programme) on 
behalf of the state, as well as the State Oil Fund and the Equalisation Fund, and had thus overseen a 
large part of the state's oil security strategy; its privatisation thus signalled a significant institutional 
shift. These functions were taken over by the IDC until 1985, when these funds and operations, 
together with Soekor, were collected under a holding company; initially SOF Pty(Ltd), which was 
renamed CEF Pty (Ltd), with the renaming of the SOF as the Central Energy Fund in 1985. The 
State Oil Fund Amendment Act (4611985) renamed the SOF the CEF and the Act was 
retrospectively retitled the Central Energy Fund Act. 
The Act grouped the three key Funds, the Central Energy Fund (previously the State Oil Fund), the 
Equalisation Fund and SFF, under CEF (Pty) Ltd (from now on CEp4s). Levies were set by 
proclamation instead of legislatively (as they had been), and CEF, although institutionally a private 
company, would be accountable to Parliament. A mechanism for the state to purchase 'shares' was 
also laid out, allowing transfers from the fiscus to the CEF funds. The Board would be appointed by 
the relevant Minister. The CEF board was in fact comprised of two representatives from the IDC 
(one of whom was the chairman), the head of the Competition Board, a representative of the 
Reserve Bank, the head of the DMEA' s Energy Branch and the Director-General of the DMEA, and 
representatives from Mobil (an oil major) and Gencor (which was contemplating investment in a 
synthetic fuels project, and did invest in Mossgas). The SFF Board consisted only of the two IDC 
and two DMEA representatives (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 
1985:64). 
The actual operation of CEF was outsourced to the SFF's management, since the SFF had a staff, 
whereas CEF was merely a holding company. The personnel of the SFF, appointed during the Sasol 
era, and primarily originating in Sasol, effectively ran CEF, since the organisations shared 
chairpersons (Interview with H Roberts), until CEF's restructuring in the late 1990s. CEF's other 
function was to administer the IBLC, since the SFF had access to international oil market 
information. There were thus several key functions which CEF performed. The first was, via the 
SFF, crude oil procurement and strategic stocks maintenance. Oil trades, after some of the 
45 The distinction between the holding company and the Fund are somewhat confusing from now on, CEF will denoted the holding 











disastrous incidents of the early 1980s46, were subject to a process of ministerial approval 
(Interview with S VanDen Berg). The second function of CEF was to partially fund the National 
Energy Council during its existence from 1987 to 1991, which was done via levies on petroleum 
products and coal, the aim of which was to give the NEC a certain degree of independence outside 
the orthodox bureaucracy. The third function was the administration of the three funds, which were 
used for a variety of purposes, including buffering liquid fuels price increases, paying subsidies to 
synthetic fuels producers and compensation to refmers (see below), and, more importantly, funding 
further synthetic fuels projects (see below). The function of CEF in this regard was to fund new 
projects in partnership with the private sector and then withdraw (through loan redemption or 
privatisation), using the resulting funds to fund the next project, thus playing a key financing role in 
what at the time was perceived as an ongoing synthetic fuels industry development process on a 
large scale. 
The Synthetic Fuels Programme and Other Alternatives 
After the emergency responses to the crisis of 1979, the apartheid state was keen to commit itself to 
a long-term programme of oil independence. The dire existing situation, both in terms of the oil 
embargo and a declining rand and high oil price, strengthened commitment to an expanded 
synthetic fuels programme. Far from being seen as the 'white elephant~ that Sasol had been labelled 
by the anti-apartheid movement, Sasol was regarded inside the country (at least by the white 
business and political elite) as a prestige project The press hailed Sasol 3 as the latest in a series of 
megaprojects comprising an "energy jamboree" (Financial Mail 29/6/1979); at the end of 1979, 
Sasol was hailed as 
.... the ultimate South African V sign to the world sanctions threat, with the added advantage that 
it will be profitable too" (Financial Mail 1611111979). 
From 1980, the holy grail of liquid fuels self-sufficiency was converted from the ad-hoc reaction 
which it had been to the 1970s oil crises to a programme with well-defined parameters, based on 
economic and strategic tradeoffs. Initial policy measures were based on two principles. The first 
was a decision to involve a wide range of private players, which involved shifting the locus of the 
state strategy from the SasoVIDClDepartment of Industries nexus, which had underlain the 
development of the 1970s and 1980s strategies, to a cluster of private mining houses associated with 
the 1970s coal boom. The second was a programme of incentives announced in 1980 by the 
46 The most notorious of these was the Salem affair, which involved an insurance fraud. whereby a cargo of oil belonging to Shell 
was sold illegally to the unwitting SFF. The operators of the vessel then scuttled it off Senegal. Shell claimed insurance for the oil 
from Lloyds, who detected the fraud and refused to pay. whereupon Shell discovered the actual location of their oil, and the apartheid 
state was forced to pay Shell $31 million in compensation (Scholtz 1995:258); the willingness of SFF to pay premiums attracted 
other dubious middlemen to South Aftica in the early 1980s. Transactions involving some of these involved overpayment (even over 
and above premiums paid by the South Afticans) of around $200 million, and led to an investigation by the Auditor-General in the 











government for new synthetic fuels projects, which included an extension of ''tariff protection" 
applied to Sasol to all new projects, and a non-discriminatory tax regime for alcohols47 and other 
non-petrol/diesel fuels, as well as extra incentives for diesel-producing projects, to balance the 
overproduction of petrol by the Sasol plants (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual 
Report 1980:74). 
Two processes took place thereafter. The first involved a number of proposals from various sources 
for potential projects, which included various kinds of plant-based as well as minerals-based fuels. 
These were considered by a Synthetic Fuels Working Group, a subcommittee of the EPC, which 
would consider these proposals, as well as define an energy policy which 
" .. would encourage potential manufacturers to produce sufficient indigenous liquid fuels to 
meet South Africa's desired level of self-sufficiency at minimum involvement (and cost) to the 
state, and minimum risk." (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1982:63). 
By 1983 it was apparent that the incentives would not be sufficient to make projects viable, and that 
the state would have to involve itself in the financing of projects as well; by 1985, three potential 
projects were being considered: a gas-to-liquids project proposed by Soekor on the basis of the gas 
field off Mossel Bay; a torbanite distillation project proposed by Gencor, and one involving a coal-
based synthetic fuels project proposed by the private explosives and chemicals finn AECI (Trollip 
1996:29). 
The other process undertaken by the DME was a planning and projection process, involving the 
construction of demand forecasts, with the aim of deriving a 'desirable level' of 'self-sufficiency' in 
liquid fuels production, undertaken by the DMEA's energy planning division headed by Dr Robert 
Scott, who stated in 1982 that in the DMEA's model for coal resource optimisation, 
" . .it was assumed that all domestic liquid fuels needs would be coal-based as from the year 
2000" (quoted in Financial Mail 5/3/1982). 
Scott was quoted in another article as specifying the self-sufficiency requirement at 70%, which 
would require three more Sasol3 plants by 1995, and another one every three years after (Financial 
Mail 5/311982). However, the Department's scenario planning process arrived at a figure of 40% as 
strategically sufficient (Interviews with DMEA officials), influenced by the permeability of the oil 
embargo and the failure of repeated attempts by the UN General Assembly in their requests to the 
Security Council to institute a mandatory embargo. In order to maintain this figure, which had been 
exceeded by Sasol from 1983, it was necessary to investigate a new synthetic fuels project which 
would start up by the end of the 1980s, to counter growth in demand which was slowly lowering the 
percentage of synthetic fuels. 
41 The proposal was to apply taxes by energy content rather than by volume: since alcohols have a lower energy content than 
petroVdiesel, if taxed by volume these would be taxed more per energy unit (thus more expensive in terms of useful energy/cent), 











By 1985, the government had committed itselfto the gas project. The other projects continued to be 
'evaluated' after this, but were not considered practical options for economic reasons. Other 
contributing factors to the choice were the location of the project in P.W. Botha's constituency, and 
the role of Soeker, who were the key advocates of the project; the project was the fIrst and only 
potentially productive result from Soekor's exploration programme, and the project thus had a high 
political signifIcance for the agency. The announcement was hailed by the DMEA as the beginning 
of 
" .. a whole new era in South Africa's energy and industrial development .. [and] .. of special 
significance regarding the energy self-sufficiency of the RSA and consequently its economic 
and strategic defensibility" (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 
1985:67). 
Feasibility studies were carried out until 1987 by Soeker, at which time the now-named Mossgas 
project was given the fInal go-ahead. The project did not conform to the synthetic fuels industry 
model outlined by the synthetic fuels policy, in that there was not a signifIcant private partner 
(Gencor, and later Engen took an option in the project, but never took it up), and CEF's role was far 
more extensive than anticipated. Not only did CEF fInanc  the project, but it also managed the 
project closely. When Cabinet fmally approved the project, mainly48 to be fInanced from the Central 
Energy Fund, R6.2 billion was budgeted; the fInal cost was between Rll billion and R12 billion 
(Trollip 1996:4-29), which resulted in a plant of only 40 OOObbVday crude equivalent capacity 
fInally coming on stream in 1992. The reasons for the cost overruns were various. The most 
signifIcant included a switch from Mobil to Sasol technology when Mobil disinvested, which 
involved a complex licensing process49, restrictions imposed by Sasol on the construction process 
(which made it difficult to manage), the insistence at ministerial level on not using the experienced 
contractors Fluor50 (which had constructed the Sasol plants, and thus were experienced in synthetic 
fuels plants construction), and a serious mistake in assessing the gas reserves. The latter was a result 
of the project being based on P50S1 reserve figures for planning the project, rather than the 
conventional use of P90 fIgures, which meant that the project had a much shorter lifespan, and it 
was necessary for the post-apartheid government to expend another R2 billion in developing 
another gas fIeld in the late 1990s (Interview with Senior CEF executive). The economics of the 
48 2S% of the capital for the project was borrowed overseas in dollars, and repaid from operatillg profits. In practical terms, with cost 
escalation, R9 billion was sourced from the Central Energy Fund, in the form of 'quasi-equity' or 'shareholders loans without 
repayment terms' (Interview with Senior CEF executive), which was effectively written off. 
49 The licensing conditions also placed severe restrictions on Mossgas's ability to produce or market petrochemicals, which is one of 
the key advantages of synthetic fuels manufacture, thus prejudicing the plant's economic options severely. 
50 The reason for this was that apparently the Minister was afraid that Fluor might be forced by US sanctions legislation to withdraw 
from the project, since Mobil had just disinvested due to domestic pressure in the US. Instead, a consulting firm that had overseen 
some of the nuclear projects (under the same minister) was contracted, but lacked experience and capacity. 
31 'PSO' and 'P9Q' reserve calculations refer to the likelihood of a particular estimation of a gas or oilfield being correct. Thus a PSO 
reserve estimate of x implies that there is a SO% chance that there is x gas in the field; for quite logical reasons, it is very unusual for 











Mossgas project were thus disastrous; in the late 1990s, the book value of the plant was written 
down to around R2 billion, and the plant has been dependent on subsidies of two kinds since its 
inception, which will be dealt with in more detail below. No other synthetic fuels plants have been 
contemplated. 
Another key policy issue, which also contributed to cost overruns on the Mossgas project, was the 
problem of the underproduction of diesel (see introduction) by the synthetic fuels plants. While 
Mossgas was designed to produce more diesel, a number of policies were pursued in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s to reduce diesel consumption52• The key strategic demand for diesel was from the 
military, and the curtailment of the war in Angola and the withdrawal from Namibia, coupled with 
the public transport shift to petrol-driven minibus taxis which occurred in the late 1980s, led to a 
petrol-intensive economy and a diesel surplus, which is now exported. A final area of activity which 
formed an active if ineffectual part of the oil security strategy was a research programme into 
alternative fuels, ftrst run by the CSIR's National Programme for Energy Research, and then, with 
the merging of the NPER into the National Energy Council in 1987, through the NEC. None of the 
research in the programme was operationalised. 
Regulation and Accommodation: the Oil Majors, Compensation and Petrol Price Mechanisms 
This phase of the oil security strategy created a number of regulatory dilemmas. The basic dilemma 
for the state was how to advance the synthetic fuels industry while accommodating the crude 
reftning industry, which also controlled the downstream part of the industry. This was necessary not 
to encourage investment, which was not required in the 1980s, but to counter the pressure being 
exerted on oil majors to disinvest from South Africa by anti-apartheid campaigners in Europe and 
the USA, since the oil majors still played a vital role in the liquid fuels market in South Africa, and 
thus were a key ingredient of the oil security strategy. The oil majors, on the other hand, needed to 
demonstrate that their presence in South Africa was sufficiently profttable to their international 
owners to justify their resistance to international pressure to withdraw. 
The key intersection of the strategic and economic interests of both the state and the oil majors was 
the regulatory structure, and in particular the determination of liquid fuels prices. The basis for the 
state's pricing policy was stated in the 1985 Draft Energy Policy White Paper as 
" .. the maintenance of a price structure that takes into account economic, efficiency-related, 
social and strategic considerations, as well as reasonable returns at the production and 
distribution levels .. " (Draft Energy Policy White Paper 1985:21). 
52 These were chiefly pricing diesel at the same level as petrol (most countries impose less tax on diesel), and a regulation forbidding 
transport of goods further than a certain distance by road without a licence, which was not an energy policy measure, but an older 
fonn of protectionism for the railway system, and which was abolished in the late 1980s. In addition, the emergence of the minibus 
taxi industry was chiefly a result of an apartheid-inspired neglect of public transport, which, if it had been more rationally planned, 











The key points at which this list of often-contradictory criteria was put to the test was during a 
renegotiation of liquid fuels pricing structures with the oil industry in 1983/4, another round of 
negotiations in 1991, and a less significant set of negotiations concerning the purchase of Mossgas' 
production from 1992 onwards. 
The key focus of the 1983/4 negotiations was the wholesale margin, which had been fixed in the 
early 1960s, and adjusted very little since then, which meant that in real terms it had declined by 
around 80% due to inflation, which was minimal before 1970 but very significant afterwards. The 
decline in the wholesale margin was compensated for by the surplus inherent in the IBLC, as well 
as improvements in efficiency and total volume (Van den Berg 1993:28). However, the 
commissioning ofSasol2 and 3 would require the oil majors to market Sasol's entire output, which 
would be purchased at the IBLC plus transport premium; thus the majors would not be able to make 
up lost returns in marketing through refmery profits, since Sasol would be manufacturing over half 
the liquid fuels in the country. Since the synthetic fuels plants had to be run at full capacity to be 
economical 53, if the oil majors refused to 'uplift' Sasol's entire pr duction, Sasol (and the state's 
synthetic fuels programme, now wooing private investors) would suffer a serious setback, including 
a legal obligation to compensate shareholders. The result was a complex trade-off, involving several 
interrelated components. 
The first component was the extension of the Sasol Supply Agreement, an unsigned agreement 
originally concluded to accommodate the output from Natre(in the oil major's marketing activities. 
The industry had been optimistic about accommodating the synthetic fuels industry's production in 
the mid-1970s (Financial Mail 1817/1975). Investment in extra refmery equipment in the wake of 
the oil crisis to increase the output of 'white products' per barrel rendered this more difficult, but 
low and negative growth rates in demand in the late 1970s, combined with the development of 
Sasol 3, made it impossible without cutting production at the crude refineries. Since government 
was 10th to cut production at Natref for strategic and economic reasons54, the coastal refmers agreed 
to mothball some of their refining capacity. A new extended Supply Agreement was concluded 
between government and the oil majors, the Crude Refiners' Agreement, in terms of which the 
crude refmers agreed to buy all Sasol's output "in recognition of the strategic nature" of the 
synthetic fuels projects, and in exchange were paid annual compensation for mothballing refining 
capacity. 
Mothballing was extensive: in 1983, Calref and Enref mothballed 62 000 and 22 000 barrels/day of 
refming capacity respectively, and in 1985 Sapref mothballed 59 000 barrels/day of refining 
S3 With a subsidy. 
S4 Natref is a more complex refinery; thus the economic consequences of lowering throughput would be more serious. In addition, 
cutting Natref's production would probably have complicated Sasol's privatisation proceSS; but the simplest reason is probably that 
Natref's production, indirectly subsidised by the transport differential, added to Sasol's overall profits and removed some of the 











capacity; in total, 37% of the oil majors' refining capacity. The Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs acceded to requests from refineries to export liquid fuels, which had been severely restricted 
in 197955• The aim of the compensation payment was to compensate refiners on lost refining 
margins due to reduced throughput, and these were calculated accordingly; from 1984 to 1993, 
Rl.26 billion compensation was paid (nominal- Van den Berg 1993:41). Payments were stopped 
when the new government took over in 1994. 
The compensation payments were part of a broader deal involving a new price mechanism for 
determining wholesale margins, the Petroleum Activities Return (PAR), which replaced the old 
system of opaque margin-setting with a process based on assessing the refining and marketing 
assets of the oil majors, including refining assets. Then a margin was calculated, using an 
assessment of the depreciated assets of both refining and marketing assets, and a margin set which 
would provide the oil companies with around 15% return on assets (Van den Berg 1993:28) for 
marketing and refining activities. Thus, the IBLC was only relevant between 1984 and the demise 
of PAR, in 1991, as a basis for calculating the price at which Sasol's production was 'uplifted' by 
the oil majors. The aim of including the refining assets was to lower the total margin received by 
the oil companies (Van den Berg 1993:28), since the return on assets for the refineries was on 
average most likely to have been lower than the IBLC. As in later asset assessments in the liquid 
fuels industry in South Africa, the process for assessing the asset base was not thorough nor critical, 
and the method permitted the oil majors to make significant profits during the 1980s56• The 
combination of compensation and acceptable gross margins was sufficient to achieve government's 
goal of preventing the oil majors from disinvesting. Only one company, Mobil, disinvested, as a 
result of legal pressure from the USA. The others did not, for a variety of reasons, but the key 
reason, according to interviewees, was profitability. One senior executive recalled that there was 
only one year when the South African subsidiary's profit level was the same as the group's global 
profit levels; for the rest, South African profits were far higher: 
"South Africa was a very profitable association; [the South African subsidiary] used to send 
back 100 million dollars every year from 1980 .... we used to get regularly, at least every second 
year, someone coming to do the divestment from South Africa, especially when [the global 
company] was going through bad times .... and every year, they'd go back, and find that they just 
couldn't justify it financially" (Interview with Senior Oil Executive). 
55 Under the Import and Export Control Act, both import and export of liquid fuels had been controlled before 1979, but in practice 
imports were more severely restricted. since South African refineries supplied much of southern Africa. In the wake of the 1979 oil 
crisis, export controls had been significantly stepped up until the supply crisis was over. 
S6 Although there is no hard information on this, and will probably not be in the future, interviewees who worked in the oil industry 
in the 1980s indicated that both the refining and the marketing asset bases contained significant assets which were not 'used or 
useful', such as mothballed equipment or non-fuel marketing assets such as convenience stores, which would explain the indUstry's 
alleged profits in the filce of state attempts to limit returns. The validity of these claims will only be tested if the PAR audits are ever 











At the same time, the pricing regime provided a protected environment for the synthetic fuels 
industry (including Natref), which was protected both by the IBLC mechanism (which provided an 
indirect subsidy though both the fiction of transport differentials and through the inherent premiums 
built into the formula), as well as through direct subsidies, which, although disguised as 'tariff 
protection' (via a rebate on the Equalisation Fund), amounted to a transfer payment. Subsidies were 
initially set at an absolute level per litre of liquid fuels, but were later altered in 1989 to a 'floor 
price' mechanism (described above), whereby subsidies would be paid when an artificial crude 
price, derived from the IBLC, dropped below a 'floor price' of $23Ibarrel, to make up the 
difference. In other words, Sasol was guaranteed a minimum product price which matched what the 
IBLC would be if the crude price was $23. This minimum product price was dollar-linked; thus, 
since almost all of Sasol's synthetic fuels production costs were in rands rather than in dollars, the 
minimum price rose in rands as the rand/dollar exchange rate declined, as it did steadily from the 
mid-1980s. In addition, there was a guaranteed market for all Sasol's products; these two measures 
in combination effectively removed risk from the enterprise. The ther key principle applied to 
Sasol's product prices was that Sasol would get the benefit of any liquid fuels price increases above 
the 'floor price', although in theory a certain percentage of 'excess profits' would be paid back to 
the state until the total subsidy payments had been redeemed. There is no evidence suggesting that 
this was ever done. 
Within this context, the framework for the price structure was settled for the duration of the 1980s. 
The actual prices of liquid fuels were however still set in a non-transparent way, which meant that 
mechanisms to calculate price elements formed the basis for price-setting, but the actual price was 
set at a political level (usually approved by Cabinet), taking into account strategic and other 
considerations. The price elements also determined how income from liquid fuels sales was 
distributed, and served as a basis for making future adjustments where certain parties had 
'underrecovered' their dues. This malleability, as well as the inherent flexibility in the key levies 
administered by the DMEA, gave the Department considerable leeway in setting prices, the aim of 
which was to achieve an element of price stability (in the face of fluctuating oil prices and a 
declining rand), and as Iowa petrol price as possible. This price manipulation involved a range of 
measures: in 1981, the Equalisation Fund was used to defer price increases; in 1982, the oil industry 
temporarily absorbed increases57; in 1983, increases were deferred by 'restructuring' the crude 
procurement programme and temporarily reducing the SOF levy; in 1984, increases were absorbed 
by the Equalisation Fund; in 1985, the Equalisation Fund was totally depleted, and increases were 
absorbed by the sales of a portion of the strategic stocks to offset a massive price hike due to the 
rapid depreciation of the rand against the dollar. 











The next key point was a renegotiation of the regulatory system in 1990/91, which 'deregulated' 
refining margins, and set up another mechanism, the Marketing Petroleum Activities Return 
(MP AR), which calculated a gross wholesale margin based on the collective marketing assets of all 
companies involved in petrol and diesel marketing; the margin was set to allow a return of 15% on 
marketing assets. The oil industry's motivation for proposing the changes was based mainly on a 
strategic assessment of the advantages in terms of increased refinery returns which would accrue 
from a return to IBLC pricing, which was based on three flaws in the IBLC which had developed 
since the formula was derived in the 1950s. The first and second were the use of posted prices and 
small shipping vessels in calculating product pri<;es and freight rates respectively (these have been 
discussed above), and the third was the so-called 'sweet/sour' price differential on the world market 
between crude oil with a high sulphur content ('sour' which is cheaper) and a low sulphur content 
('sweet' - which is more expensive). Since South African environmental regulations lagged behind 
other markets for which products from the 'marker' refmeries for the IBLC were destined, the IBLC 
was based on a more expensive feedstock (and potentially a more expensive refining process), 
which meant that an added. premium could be earned from mLC pricing by betting that South 
Africa would take significantly longer to 'catch up' environmentally, and processing cheaper 'sour' 
crudes58• 
Additional motivations were depreciation of the refmery asset base, which meant declining margins, 
and the added advantages which would accrue from a separate rate of return for marketing only 
(Interviews with Oil Industry Executives). The atmosphere at the time was set by the disinvestment 
of Mobil in the late 1980s, which raised the spectre of the other four international companies 
ceasing operations in South Africa, which disposed government to be more accommodating to the 
oil industry. The incentive that the industry offered government was significant investment 
programmes in the coastal refmeries, which was effectively a commitment not to disinvest. An 
investigation into the regulatory system (which was partly funded by the oil industry), demonstrated 
that the industry would earn similar returns under the proposed system, but that the proposed 
system would allow 
"' .. the oi1 industry to make a free-market decision on whether to proceed with the refinery 
expansions they envisaged at that stage .. " (Vanden Berg 1993 :29). 
Thus, the Cabinet decided that "profit monitoring of the oil industry be restricted to marketing only" 
(National Energy Council Annual Report 1992:38). The same Cabinet decision also rejected 
deregulation of the whole value chain (the subject of another report) on the grounds that regulation 
sa In fact, much of the diesel produced at South African crude refineries in the 1990s and early 2000s has higher sulphur content than 
even the lax South African standards. and was blended with Sasol's diesel, which has almost no sulphur due to the need to remove it 
before the synthesising process. to prevent poisoning ofcataIysts (see Lloyd 2001). New lower sulphur standards, as well as a long-











was a key part of the state's oil security strategy; and devolved decisions on product price changes 
from the Cabinet to the DMEA , in cases where price fluctuations were solely the result of 
fluctuations in the IBLC. 
The pricing structure for Mossgas was negotiated in the early 1990s on a 'transitional' basis, and 
negotiations continued sporadically until 2000. Mossgas was disadvantaged by comparison to Sasol 
by its location at the coast, which meant that the refinery gate price applicable to its products did 
not include a hypothetical transport cost inland, as the ffiLCs for Sasol and Natref did. In addition, 
the oil industry and the DMEA agreed that Mossgas' product would be purchased by them " .. on a 
commercially neutral basis"(Van den Berg 1993:47), or as SAPIA put it, SAPIA members have 
purchased Mossgas' production " .. since the plant came on stream in late 1992 though there was no 
statutory obligation or commercial gain for them to do so .. ' (South African Petroleum Industry 
Association Annual Report 1997). In fact, the 'transitional' arrangementS9 was based on an export-
parity or 'Africa Netback,60 price (Department of Minerals and Energy Annual Report 1998:16), 
which was considerably lower than the IBLC (ironically, an import-parity price), since the export 
price was based on an international market rate (closer to a real import parity) at which the refining 
industry in South Africa exported liqUid fuels to other southern and east African countries. 
The rationale for this approach to pricing was that the oil industry would have to export an 
equivalent amount of liquid fuels to create space in the market for Mossgas' production; thus a 
'commercially neutral' arrangement would involve paying an export price for it. The Cabinet 
resolved in 1993 that Mossgas should receive the ffiLC price for its products (as well as the same 
subsidy applicable to Sasol) (Department of Minerals and Energy Annual Report 1998: 16), but not 
from oil companies, and from then on two payments were made to Mossgas from the Central 
Energy Fund. The first was a synthetic fuels subsidy (on the same terms as Sasol), and the second 
was a 'synlevy' payment, which was reported in the early 1990s as a 'mothballing' payment to the 
oil industry by the DME (up to 1996), but a 'synlevy' payment to Mossgas thereafter. The result 
was the same, since the difference was transferred to the oil industry. The pricing arrangement was 
so clearly not a 'commercially neutral' one that the Auditor General launched an investigation into 
it in 1997, because 
" .. the Office of the Auditor-General wished to establish whether these payments, which amount 
to very large sums of money, were reasonable, in particular from the perspective of the taxpayer 
and the motorist" (Auditor General 1997: 1). 
59 The 'arrangement' was in the fonn of an initial transitional agreement lasting one year. Due to fundamental disagreements between 
the parties. another agreement could not be reached, and the interim arrangement persisted until 199&. which was one of the factors 
which perturbed the Auditor General. 











The Report found that several advantages did accrue to industry from the 'interim arrangement'. 
Among these was the fact that the arrangement was in reality not conditional on the industry not 
using refinery capacity (since this was not verified in any way), and that in fact some of Mossgas' 
product categories (for instance 97 octane petrol) were being imported by industry, which meant 
that the oil industry was earning a roughly $21ton margin on Mossgas' products by selling them in 
the local market at IBLC. In addition, the location of Mossgas was an advantage to the oil 
companies due to its proximity to regional markets, because fuels were priced as if they originated 
in Cape Town (in terms of the zoning system), but only had to be transported from Mossel Bay. 
Mossgas diesel, which contained almost no sulphur, could also be blended with crude-derived 
diesel to improve its specifications (Lloyd 2001 :25, Auditor General 1997:3), The Report, having 
found that the oil companies were net importers of petrol, stated that the Auditor General's Office 
could not confirm that the payments were reasonable; as a direct outcome, a new pricing agreement 
was reached at the beginning of 1998, whereby the oil industry agreed to buy Mossgas' products at 
the IBLC price (Department of Minerals and Energy Annual Report 1998:16). 
3) 1993-2004 
Liquid fuels policy activities in the 1990s were dominated by a complex and uncertain process of 
untangling the security-dominated liquid fuels complex of the apartheid era. These activities moved 
through several phases. In the first phase, from 1993 to 1995, policy deliberation passed from the 
DMEA into the transitional negotiating process, where a multi-stakeholder Liquid Fuels Industry 
Task Force was initially formed to deal with a national outcry over a fuel price rise, but was swiftly 
given a mandate to deal with broader policy issues in the liquid fuels sector. The second phase, 
from 1995 to 1998, focused on the Green and White Paper processes which developed a post-
apartheid liquid fuels policy framework. The third phase, from 1998 onwards, represented the 
'normalisation' of the policy process, as policymaking moved back into the DME, in which a post-
apartheid leadership had been appointed, and the White Paper framework was considerably 
modified; the outcome was that the core of the apartheid-era regulatory system was formalised and 
preserved, and deregulation, espoused as the main policy goal in the White Paper, was deferred 
indefinitely. 
1991 to 1998: Transitional Policy Processes 
In the latter half of 1991, broad-based support by the white business establishment for the oil 
security strategy, and the synthetic fuels industry in particular, began to disappear. The Mossgas 
fiasco had discredited the state's synthetic fuels development programme, and this disapprobation 











media fIrst as a demonstration of South Africa's technological prowess, and then as a triumph of 
private enterprise. By late 1991, the business press was claiming that " .. Sasol is not the private 
sector success story that it claims to be" (The Executive (editorial), November 1991:7); but on the 
contrary, a massive drain on national resources (through subsidies), and the subject of a detailed 
review article in late 1991 (The Executive November 1991:13). The article contained a detailed 
analysis of the liquid fuels industry and the regulatory system (which would have been illegal under 
secrecy legislation and probably still was at the time it was published), which alleged (correctly) 
amongst other things, that a) Sasol was the recipient of massive subsidies from liquid fuels 
consumers (that year, over R1 billion), and that b) the regulatory system advantaged all industry t players, but was specifically designed to advantage Sasol. The article made so many unprecedented 
allegations that Sasol attempted to rebut them in full-page advertisements in daily newspapers in all 
major centres, alleging that the article was specifIcally designed to "discredit Sasol not only with its 
customers and investors but also with the public at large" (Sasol Advertisement, Cape Times 
29/1111991). However, the damage was done, and the media followed it up with a series of reports 
and editorials on the synthetic fuels industry, which were unanimous in their conclusions that a) 
although financial support for Sasol, and other strategic measures, were necessary during the oil 
embargo, these should now be dismantled, b) the regulatory system which supports these should 
also be removed (for instance, Financial Mail 15/1111991, 10/4/1992,8/10/1993). 
This pressure was exacerbated in 1993 by the removal of secrecy provisions and a Competition 
Board investigation into the liquid fuels industry, which was commissioned in March 1993 and 
1
1 reported at the beginning of 1994, which found that the South African industry was fundamentally 
i anti-competitive, that competition had signifIcantly reduced prices to consumers after deregulation 
. I 
.1 in other markets, and recommended that price control and the Ratplan should be phased out 
/ (Competition Board 1994:3). Before the investigation concluded, a report compiled by the DMEA 
for the Cabinet, in response to the clamour for deregulation (Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs 1993), found that a) no parts of the regulatory system could be removed separately 
(policymakers thus had a choice between the current system and full deregulation), and b) removal 
of any element of the regulatory system was undesirable: 
"Any change to the current proven system must, particularly in a developing South Africa, 
deliver a guaranteed better overall deal for the country. Evidence internationally suggests that 
such a guarantee would not be possible to deliver" (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
1993:33). 
The Cabinet concluded at the beginning of July 1993 that there would be no deregulation of the 











The government had thus met what was a growing policy crisis with a blunt demurral. The policy 
crisis however suddenly turned into a political crisis in September 1993 as protests against a 7cll 
petrol price rise spilled out into the streets. The protest was launched by minibus taxi61 associations 
against the last in a series of petrol price increases; taxi associations were able to cause significant 
disruption by blockading public roads. The protest spread to trade unions, who joined the protest as 
consumers, partly out of frustration at the (general political) negotiation process underway 
(Crompton 1998:4). The protest was aimed both at the immediate increase and also at the unilateral 
and non-transparent way in which the petrol price was set, which, like almost all aspects of the 
apartheid state's policies, was now open to question. 
The protest caused an immediate political crisis for the apartheid state, both in the context of the 
ongoing transitional negotiations, and because government was finalising an agreement on GATT 
between government, business and labour. The Minister of Minerals and Energy set up a Liquid 
Fuels Industry Task Force (LFITF) within the National Economic Forum62 two days after the crisis 
erupted (Crompton 1998:2). The LFITF had been constituted in tenns of the structure of the NEF, 
comprising government63, represented by the DMEA and the CEF (including Mossgas), business, 
represented by the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB - traditionally representing 
'English' business in~erests) and the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut (AHI - traditionally representing 
'Afrikaans' business interests), and labour, mainly represented by COSATU-affiliated unions 
involved in the liquid fuels or transport industry. The liquid fuels industry was represented through 
SACOB (the oil majors) and the AHI (Sasol). When more fundamental policy considerations began, 
the taskforce was broadened, and the Automobile Association, the Motor Industries Federation, 
Transnet, the organised taxi industry, the South African Agricultural Union, and several other 
agriCUltural and transport interests were also included (Crompton 1998:9). The ANC was excluded 
on the grounds that the NEF framework did not include political parties, which left the unions as the 
only participant aligned with the ANC; however, key union personnel such as Crompton were also 
prominent members of the ANC's energy policy forum, the Minerals and Energy Group. 
Two processes began in the LFITF: the first was aimed at defusing the immediate crisis, and then 
extended by the Minister to the problem of proposing a more politically sustainable pricing system 
(Crompton 1998:5), and the second was concerned with the more challenging task of negotiating a 
new regulatory framework. The first process got underway immediately: the LFITF's initial 
61 Minibus taxis were a privately-owned (largely black-owned) form of public transport, and provided commuter services, primarily 
for poor and black commuters. 
62 The National Economic Forum (NEF), established in 1992, was a negotiating forum to facilitate policy discussion between 
business, labour and government in the context of the transition from apartheid. It was replaced by the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) in 1995, which is a permanent statutory body designed to facilitate consultation 
between labour, government, business and community organisations on major policy issues. Government has a statutory obligation in 
terms of the NEDLAC Act (1994) to pass major social, economic or labour policy or legislation changes through a consultation 
frocess in NEDLAC before proceeding with them. 











mandate was to find ways of partially reversing the September price increase to defuse the resultant 
political crisis. Thus, the key challenge of the LFITF in the short term was to allocate the costs of a 
petrol price decrease amongst industry participants. Their initial proposal to the NEF in October, 
that government sell off a portion of the strategic stocks to subsidise the price temporarily (the costs 
being borne only by the state) was rejected by Cabinet (Crompton 1998:5). A further proposal was 
made, splitting the costs of the decrease between Sasol and the oil majors64, which reduced the price 
by 2cfl; this was accepted by government; thus, the immediate crisis was resolved. 
In order to prevent further revolts over petrol price increases, the government transferred the price-
setting function to the LFITF, which performed it from November 1993 to April 1994, overseeing 
several price reductions due to fortuitous international oil price movements. A rise in the price of 
crude oil in June 1994, which would have resulted in a significant price increase, prompted the 
LFITF to achieve a more permanent solution, which consisted of two elements. First, the mLC 
would be re-evaluated, since it was widely (and correctly) suspected that it gave unnecessary 
benefits to liquid fuels producers, and second, the process of price-setting would be removed from 
governmental discretion, and thus de-politicised, by developing a transparent formula which would 
derive the petrol price automatically from the IBLC on a regular basis. The Task Force was also 
eager to relinquish its price-setting role (Crompton 1998:11). Key reforms to the mLC were the 
, replacement of the 'marker' refineries, which had been refineries owned by the oil majors in South 
\" 
, Africa, with other 'neutral' refineries; the replacement of the shipping component with rates for 
more realistically-sized tankers; and a change from pure posted prices to a mix of 80% posted prices 
and 20% spot prices65• These measures were immediately successful in lessening the price increase, 
and collectively had a long-term effect on the petrol price. The price would also henceforth be 
adjusted automatically once a month in terms of the new mLC. The changes were approved by 
Cabinet and implemented in late 1994. 
The second, and more difficult, process began with the enlargement of the LFITF in the wake of its 
first success. The process unfolded on two levels: on the first level, a process got underway to 
achieve a degree of consensus on a post-apartheid policy framework, which was primarily an 
" 
ideological struggle (between proponents and opponents of deregulation), and on the second level, 
the forum became a battleground between Sasol (and Mossgas as a supporting act) and the rest of 
the oil industry to determine their relative positions in the new regulatory dispensation, which was 
64 This follows Crompton's (1998:6) description of the allocation of costs; however, it was not as simple as that, since the 2c/1 was 
extracted from a series oflevy payments (to fund the synfuel subsidy and the mothballing subsidy), which were funnelled via CEF to 
the beneficiaries in a very opaque way; thus, it is not clear whether the parties concerned actually lost out in the long run, since the 
temporary adjustments did not affect the payment mechanism for subsidies or mothballing compensation payments, but merely the 
collection mechllnism. Mothballing payments were in any case halted in 1994. 
65 See introductory section fur more detailed discussion. The change in marker refineries was significant, since it was rumoured that 
the oil majors operating in South Africa which owned these refineries used their posted prices to boost the South African regulated 
price. Caltex's refinery in Bahrain, for instance, was apparently the only refinery which still used posted prices in the 199Os, for 











primarily a strategic struggle. The process was complicated by another factor: the existing 
government was represented by the DMEA, which, apart from a knee-jerk commitment to the 
existing system, could not present a policy position on behalf of government, which changed 
halfway through the process (Crompton 1998:10), and the ANC (the government in waiting), which 
was not directly represented, did not have a clear liquid fuels policy position. Principled hostility to 
the whole liquid fuels establishment in South Africa, developed during the oil embargo, was 
gradually replaced by a more pragmatic attitude, especially to Sasol: Tito Mboweni66, then on the 
ANC Economics Desk, announced that as a result of "recent research", Sasol would henceforth be 
regarded as a national asset, which could potentially contribute to national development (Cape 
Times 8/lO/1993). However, union delegates to the LFITF failed to get a commitment from the 
ANC's leadership to a more specific policy position: 
"Despite briefings and meetings with senior ANC leaders it proved impossible to raise the issue 
sufficiently high on the ANC's agenda to extract a formal policy position, a shortcoming which 
persists to this day" (Crompton :1998:9). 
The unions' position was that they were "ideologically opposed to deregulation" (Crompton: 
1998:9). One of the key union representatives, Rod Crompton67, was quoted in the media as saying 
" .. there is no possibility of deregulation in South Africa - only of who controls regulation", and 
went on to say " . .labour favours a middle-of-the-road policy of benign regulation, with an 
independent regulatory authority and government having the final say .... our model would leave 
room for competition, wherever possible .. " (quoted in Financial Mail 1113/1994). The ANC's 1994 
Draft Minerals and Energy Policy Document (African National Congress 1994a) is an elaboration 
of this position, favouring a process of 're-regulation', and the phasing out of subsidies for the 
synthetic fuels industry over a number of years, a position which was largely defined by the union .\. 
participation in the LFITF. 
The business caucus, on the other hand, was supportive of deregulation; in addition to a strong 
ideological commitment to the market, 
" .. there was an antipathy from the broader business community towards Sasol and the oil 
companies who were believed to be benefiting unduly from the state .. " (Crompton 1998:8). 
This view was not shared by some business constituents such as the MIF and the taxi industry 
(Crompton 1998:8), and the business caucus included both Sasol and the oil companies, whose 
position was somewhat more complicated. 
As alluded to above, criticism in the business press since 1991 was directed at the regulatory system 
in general, but the synthetic fuels industry was perceived to be at the heart of the regulatory system, 
66 Now Reserve Bank Governor 











and singled out for specific attention. By 1993, the oil companies began to take advantage of this: 
up to then they had been unmoving in their support for regulation, but a change in direction was 
signalled in October 1993 through a public attack on Sasol by the CEO of Engen68• Engen's role 
was decisive, as reported by the Financial Mail: 
"Until recently, the oil companies and especially Sasol, were also fierce opponents of 
deregulation. But last year Engen broke ranks with the other companies and last week it 
succeeded in getting the industry to agree to a phased deregulation" (Financial Mail 11/3/1994). 
This was. strategically appealing to the oil industry, since the synthetic fuels industry had become 
symbolic of the regulatory system and its negative connotations; as the Financial Mail noted; " .. in 
the fight to scrap these costly controls, Sasol and Mossgas have become the main target" (Financial 
Mail 8/10/1993). The main strategic goal of the oil industry was to undermine Sasol's dominant 
position in the industry, which was largely a result of the regulatory system; to achieve this, they 
chose to attack the synthetic fuels subsidies. Taking a pro-deregulation stance had two advantages: 
first, it aligned the oil companies with the business constituency against Sasol, and second, given 
the uncertainties of the new order, deregulation was a safer option since it had more known 
parameters. In reaction, Sasol declared itself in favour of 'phased deregulation', which became the 
central policy mantra of both the oil industry and Sasol. This formed the basis for a rapprochement 
between the liquid fuels industry and the business constituency, which announced in March 1994 
that the business delegation had reached consensus on " .. the need for phased deregulation" 
(Financial Mail 11/3/1994, Crompton 1998:8). Ultimately, however, aside from the ideological 
differences within the Task Force, agreement could not be reached in the LFITF on the way in 
which the regulatory system could be reformed, which was partly on account of the complexity of 
the system (Crompton 1998:12). 
Much attention was focused on the question of the Sasol subsidy, which was tackled, after months 
of negotiation, by the commissioning of an independent study by Arthur Andersen on the Sasol 
subsidy (Mossgas was not considered). The Report considered three key issues: whether it was 
desirable from a national interest point of view that Sasol's synthetic fuels business69 continue to 
operate; what type and level of subsidy would be necessary to keep the synthetic fuels business in 
operation; and what kind of subsidy regime would be 'fair' to shareholders in the light of the 
commitments made by government in the privatisation process. The report concluded, on the basis 
of a return-on-assets calculation, that Sasol Synthetic Fuels (SSF - the synthetic fuels division 
within the Sasol group) and shareholders had received above-average returns on investment (Arthur 
68 The successor company to Mobil, which disinvested in the late 1980s. Engen's leadership were thus not part of the 'old guard', 
which was significant 
69 By this stage, the synthetic fuels business was only a part of Sasol's total business, which included crude refining (Natref), 
petrochemicals, coal mining and industrial gas production; it was thus conceivable that Sasol could convert or scrap its synthetic 











Andersen 1995:82-84,89), but that abolition of the subsidy would lead to below-average returns; the 
subsidy should thus be pitched at a level which a) fulfilled government's contract with shareholders 
to guarantee a reasonable rate of return, and b) would not result in SFF shutting down. The latter 
condition was an outcome of an assessment of Sasol's positive role in the economy, the key feature 
of which was the contribution which Sasol made to savings in foreign exchange (Arthur Andersen 
1995:1). The assessment was based on a report from the Central Economic Advisory Services, an 
institution which evolved from the economic planning and co-ordination processes based in the 
Department of Planning in the 1970s, and linked to the office of the Prime Minister, which had been 
responsible for co-ordinating much of the oil security strategy, and was couched in the familiar 
language of the decision-making processes which characterised the oil security strategy. The 
reliance on an apartheid-era assessment of the strategic importance of SSF70 (in the absence of a 
new policy framework), as well as the uncritical acceptance of government's ongoing compact with 
Sasol's shareholders, significantly narrowed the range of possible outcomes. 
The conclusion of the study was that subsidies should continue, but at lower levels, and be 
progressively reduced71 • The report was not accepted by the oil companies, who walked out of the 
business delegation when their request to be represented through a minority opinion was turned 
down (Crompton 1998:13, Interview with oil industry executives). Without the oil majors, the 
LFITF's status as a consensual transitional policy arena was undermined, and after recommending 
to government that the Report's recommendations be accepted, it held its last meeting in August 
1995 before dissolving, leaving the broader questions unanswered. 
The next significant development in post-apartheid liquid fuels policy was an initiative to develop 
an Energy Policy White Paper. The process began with an Energy Policy Discussion Document 
(1995), or 'Green Paper'. The aim of the Green Paper was to outline a set of options for each policy 
issue, in an effort to encompass a set of widely divergent views; although the Green Paper was 
significant in delineating options~ it did not propose a new policy framework as such. A draft White 
Paper was circulated in 1996, which for the first time contained a post-apartheid liquid fuels policy 
framework. The process was delayed by a change in Minister, after the withdrawal of the National 
Party from the Government of National Unity. Not only was an ANC Minister of Minerals and 
Energy appointed, but a wide-ranging transformation process was set in motion in the DMEA, 
which displaced the apartheid-era leadership which had worked on the Draft. The final draft was 
only produced in 1998, and after parliamentary hearings, the final White Paper was tabled at the end 
of 1998. The evolution of key policy issues is traced in Figure 6.15 below. 
10 Which is not to imply that Sasol's contribution to foreign exchange savings is not valuable. 
71 There was no mention after this of the obligation Sasol had to pay the subsidy money back if the oil price climbed above a 
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The key feature of the liquid fuels component of the White Paper was a process of 'phased 
deregulation', which included a process of phasing out the synthetic fuels subsidy. From 1995 to 
1998, the key addition to liquid fuels policy was the issue of ownership and control of assets in the 
liquid fuels sector by previously disadvantaged South Africans, or Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE), which became a central feature of liquid fuels policy in the new century. BEE first made its 
ap~arance in the ANC's Mineral and Energy Policy Document in a very limited way, in a 
stipulation that service station ownership by previously disadvantaged South Africans should be 
encouraged by retail regulation, and only emerged in the 1998 draft White Paper as a 'milestone' to 
be achieved before deregulation. Since the government foresaw deregulation as a process which 
would supersede the existing regulatory system, there was no real reconsideration of the system as it 
existed in the White Paper. Instead, deregulation was outlined as a process which would pass 
through three phases (1998 Energy Policy White Paper:81-82). The first phase would involve the 
achievement of a set of 'milestones', which included: 
" .. the sustainable presence, ownership or control by historically disadvantaged South Africans 
of approximately a quarter of all facets of the liquid fuels industry or plans to achieve this" 
(1998 Energy Policy White Paper:81), 
as well as the introduction of appropriate governmental capacity to monitor the industry and counter 
monopoly abuses, satisfactory arrangements for the marketing of synthetic fuels, measures to 
address potential unemployment as a result of deregulation, measures to regulate liquid fuels 
pipelines if necessary, and measures to promote small business in the retail sector. The second 
phase would involve the scrapping of price regulation, import control and the Ratplan, and the third 
would be a "post-regulation transition phase" involving monitoring and possible corrective action 
where necessary. The deregulation scenario was the outcome of a rapprochement between the oil 
majors and the new energy bureaucracy in 1997, which involved not only a trade-off between 
deregulation and BEE, but also the continuation and application of the MP AR mechanism, which 
the new government had threatened to repudiate (Interviews with oil industry executives, DME 
staff). 
1999 and after: 'Regularisation' and Black Economic Empowerment 
Two key processes characterised the development of liquid fuels policy in the five years after the 
White Paper: the signing of a Liquid Fuels Charter by government and the liquid fuels industry, and 
a process of 're-regulation', or 'regularisation'. The Charter, a ground-breaking agreement which 
has since been emulated in many other sectors of the economy, was a commitment by liquid fuels 
companies to facilitate the transfer of 25% of all facets of the liquid fuels industry to historically 
disadvantaged South Africans, and also included a range of commitments regarding employment 











specifically mention deregulation in her speech at the launch of the Charter (Liquid Fuels Charter 
2000:5-9). Although the mid-1990s led to a proliferation of independent black-owned liquid fuels 
companies (most of which were very small and confined to marketing), by 2002 the dominant 
model for significant black participation in the liquid fuels industry was in a partnership with one of 
the 'big six' existing companies. The Charter thus had the effect of reinforcing the structure of the 
industry, which was also reinforced by the regulatory system72, and by 2005, all major liquid fuels 
companies except one had finalised deals with BEE partners. 
Policy developments after 2000, however, did not develop in the direction of deregulation, but 
rather in a direction which can be better defmed as 'regularisation', or 're-regulation', which was a 
process of formalising the existing regulatory arrangements inherited from apartheid, most of which 
depended on unsigned agreements between the key actors. This process was hastened by pressure 
from the Competition Commission, which had been constituted in terms of the 1998 Competition 
Act, which had far more extensive powers than previous competition authorities, and swiftly 
-~j warned the liquid fuels industry that many of these arrangements contravened competition law. The " I 
key targets of authorities were the Ratplan and the Sasol Supply Agreement. In the late 1990s, Sasol 
gave notice, as required by the agreement, of its intention to enter the retail market, at which point 
the agreement would no longer be in force. This occurred in 2004. The Ratplan was superseded by a 
licensing process, administered by the DME, in terms of the 2005 Petroleum Product Amendment 
Act. The mLC was superseded in 2002 by a Basic Fuel Price, which was an import parity price 
designed to accurately simulate the importation of liquid fuels into South Africa, and thus based on 
spot prices in likely markets, including the Gulf and the Mediterranean. The oil industry 
successfully lobbied for an additional element, which would represent the cost of maintaining 
storage facilities and stocks if one was actually importing liquid fuels in the volumes which the 
South African market would require. Price regulation was applied to the petroleum pipeline network 
in terms of the Petroleum Pipelines Act (2003), which established a Pipelines Regulator to set 
tariffs. No restrictions apply to refinery expansion or new refinery building, or to the importation of 
crude oil. The synthetic fuels subsidy was phased out in 2000, although the crude oil price was high 
enough before and since for subsidies not to apply. The state oil assets (Mossgas and Soekor) were 
restructured into PetroSA, the state oil company, and the licensing section of Soekor was separated, 
and established as an independent agency, the Petroleum Agency of South Africa. CEF remains the 
holding company of PetroSA, as well as the SFF, the role of which has been limited to maintaining 
90 days of crude oil stocks. 
12 Whereas the underlying economics of the industry would certainly limit new participants in refininglmanutacturing liquid fuels, 
the regulatory system, and particularly the way in which it linked refining and import controls, tended to limit new participants in 












The liquid fuels industry in South Africa had throughout its history been awarded a special status. 
From the 1930s to the 1950s this was justified by the nature of the petrol retail industry, which had 
certain unique features, and from the 1960s onwards this justification was augmented by its 
strategic status. This special status was primarily characterised by an exemption from competition 
legislation, which led to a range of fonnal and infonnal institutions within the industry to facilitate 
co-operation between individual companies, and between the industry and government. Thus, the 
strategic focus of individual companies was not primarily on competition within the liquid fuels 
market, but, as one interviewee put it, on "managing governmenf': 
"The most important thing about making money as an oil company in South Africa, was not 
how well you serviced the market, it was about how you managed government; that Was' what 
profitability of the oil industry was about .... that's why the commercial market was many times-¥l, 
I 
the profitability of any other commercial market in the world; in orders of magnitude, not just \ 
once or twice - ten times more profitable" (Interview with Oil Industry Executive). 
Although this strategic orientation is common in many regulated (or merely oligopolistic) 
industries, the level of co-{)peration within the liquid fuels industry and between industry and 
government in the case of the liquid fuels was striking, which lends particular importance to the 
analysis of policy networks in this context, since state/industry interaction was highly 
institutionalised in most instances. The regulatory regime which developed in the early history of 
the industry established an institutional structure which significantly influenced its subsequent 
development, not least by establishing patterns of interaction between the state and industry. These 
patterns were preserved and elaborated when the state itself became an actor in the liquid fuels 
industry in the 1970s, and a surprising number of features of the regulatory system were perpetuated 
in the post-apartheid era 
The development of state/industry interactions began with disputes between different state agencies 
in the 1930s concerning the applicability of competition principles to the petrol market. The first of 
these, the Department of Commerce and Industry, saw liquid fuels policy (which at that stage only 
covered importing and marketing of fuel) as 'service station policy': problems in liquid fuels policy 
were thus addressed as part of a larger set of problems with the service station industry in general, 
including workshop standards, complaints about cars sold, and so forth. The two key policy 
problems were viability of service stations and levels of service. The solution to these problems 
conceived by the oil industry and the service station industry was to control the number of 
participants in the market, and set prices; this solution was endorsed by the Department. The other 
state agency which took an interest in the issue was the BTl, which saw liquid fuels policy as a 











community consisting of the oil industry, the service station industry and the Department of 
Commerce and Industry, the BTl was marginalised, and further critiques of the industry by 
competition authorities were ignored until the late 1990s. 
The 'special status' which allowed the policy community to marginalise the competition authorities 
so successfully developed in three phases. In the first phase, from the 1930s to the 1950s, the case 
for the industry's special status was weak, and based on one of a number of possible solutions to the 
problems outlined above. For this reason, the competition authorities were relatively successful in 
periodically. reversing gains made by the industry away from competition. In the second phase, from 
the 1950s to the 1960s, a new dimension was added: an indigenous refming industry, which the 
state was eager to promote. A new comprehensive regulatory system was introduced, which 
regulated the whole value chain, and also imposed various other protectionist measures, including 
restrictions on imports, restrictions on new refinery construction, and preferential tariff measures. 
An additional aim of this protection was to protect the state's small synthetic fuels plant, Sasol 1. 
Liquid fuels policy was integrated via the regulatory system, and the Department of Commerce and 
Industry saw the regulatory system as indivisible (both in terms of the value chain, and in terms of 
the actors involved, which were the same); thus, the industry's special status was further protected 
through the state's wish to promote the refining industry, and to protect the nascent synthetic fuels 
industry. In the mid-1950s, the refming industry was included in the regulatory system, and in 1960, 
with the introduction of the Ratplans, the industry's special status was entrenched. 
The final stage, which put the industry out of reach of competition authorities, was the development 
from 1960 onwards of the credible threat of an oil embargo, which lent the industry a strategic 
aspect, and heightened the requirement for co-operation amongst the industry, and between the 
industry and the state. Price regulation of the whole value chain was formalised in terms of the Price 
Control Act in the early 1960s, and by then, policy measures, regulatory measures, and even 
operational details were brokered by a policy community in which the commercial section of the 
Department of Commerce and Industry was the dominant agency; it administered the IBLC, 
negotiated each Ratplan with the oil industry and the MT AlMIF, and policed imports and exports. 
Other state policy goals such as Afrikaner empowerment were negotiated through the Ratplan or in 
other committees on which the state and the industry were represented. The result of this was that 
there were almost no new entrants to the market; in the 1950s, the French company Total entered 
the market, but after 1960, the only new entrants had political backing (the Portuguese company 
Sonarep, and the Afrikaner-empowerment company Trek), and their entrance was negotiated by the 
state through the Ratplan. Refining remained a preserve of the 'big four'. In institutional terms, by 
the 1960s a set of non-statutory committees was established (the Ratplan is the key example), on 











represented, through which key policy and regulatory issues were negotiated and resolved. Within 
the industry itself, routines for dealing with intra-industry conflicts (concerning amongst other 
things, market encroachment) and for co-ordinating interaction with the state, were institutionalised. 
In the 1960s, however, there was a significant change in the state's approach to liquid fuels policy, 
brought about by the threat of the oil embargo from 1960 onwards. The state considered a number 
of strategies, including investing in its own tanker fleet, but finally it was decided to a) initiate an 
exploration programme, and b) establish a significant strategic stockpile of crude oil, and also an 
inland refmery. The first initiative was not successful, but the second involved the development of a 
state-owned presence in the liquid fuels industry, which was achieved through its small existing 
asset, Sasol, in which resided an existing pool of expertise on the industry. The initial impact of the 
strategy on the existing industry was minimal, since it was limited to a relatively small-scale 
strategic storage scheme: the only significant outcome for the industry was the location of the 
Caltex refinery, which was apparently influenced by state pressure, since Cape Town was a more 
appealing location from a strategic point of view than from a commercial point of view. 
The turning point, however, was the decision to build the Natref refinery, which had a number of 
impacts on the existing liquid fuels industry and the liquid fuels policy community. The first was 
that it set back the industry's plans for another refinery, due to be built by Trek (in which BP and 
Shell had a significant stake). The second was that Sasol, who with the IDC managed the strategic 
stocks and the associated funds, and who would own and operate the new refmery, developed into a 
significant actor in the liquid fuels industry. The third and most significant outcome was that a new 
centre of influence developed in liquid fuels policy: the oil security strategy was not developed in 
the existing policy community, but within the state's industrial policy elite, which, unlike the 
existing liquid fuels policy community, was well-integrated with both the political elite and the 
state's economic and industrial strategic planning processes. The different elements of the strategy 
were formulated and implemented in the 1960s and 1970s through a different section of the 
Department of Commerce and Industry dealing with industrial development. 
This bifurcation of state influence in liquid fuels policymaking posed various difficulties for all the 
main actors: the oil industry was threatened with state-sponsored encroachment on its markets by 
Natref, which was located nearer to the prime liquid fuels market in the country than any other 
refinery (other than Sasol, whose output was by then an insignificant share of the market); the state, 
on the other hand, needed to maintain its 'infrastructural power' in respect of the oil industry, since 
its co-operation was vital for the success of the oil security strategy. The way in which the problem 
was resolved was to limit Sasol to behind the refinery gate, thus maintaining marketing and retailing 
of liquid fuels as the exclusive preserve of the oil companies, on condition that they bought all of 











regime would not be a hostile one, and that they would be well-protected from competition. Thus, 
by the end of the 1960s, there were two spheres of influence in liquid fuels policy, which were 
articulated by a regulatory entente. The division was enhanced by a split between the commerce and 
industry functions of the Department of Commerce and Industry in the late 1960s; however the 
entente led to an unusually-structured variation on a policy community. The centre of influence 
moved from the oil industry/commerce centre of influence (hereafter centre 1) to the 
Sasol/IDC/industry centre of influence (hereafter centre 2), which became the focus of key policy 
developments in the 1970s. However, there was considerable interaction and negotiation between 
the two clusters, which in terms of the Chapter 1 criteria comprised a single policy community. The 
oil companies however played a subordinate but vital role during the 1970s and 1980s, and their co-
operation with the state was indispensable in implementing the oil security strategy. 
Developments in the oil security strategy in the 1970s enhanced both the institutional influence of 
Sasol and the second centre of influence, and Sasol's market share of liquid fuels manufacturing, 
until by 1982 it was manufacturing more than half the liquid fuels requirements of the country as 
well as managing all the other elements of the oil security strategy except for exploration. The 
seminal decisions to build the Sasol plants had been made (on the basis of strong representations by 
Sasol) by the Energy Policy Committee, which became  third centre of influence, and the means by 
which the synthetic fuels programme was co-ordinated with other aspects of industrial and 
economic policy; this co-ordination was also facilitated through Sasol' s links with the IDe. 
However, the role of the EPC was limited in terms of liquid fuels policy generally: decisions On 
regulatory issues were still the preserve of centre 1, and oil security strategy issues such as crude 
procurement and strategic storage issues were the exclusive preserve of centre 2. As a result, 
developments in the synthetic fuels programme were not well co-ordinated with developments in 
the rest of the industry, an example of which was the refinery expansions in the 1970s. By the end 
of the 1970s, it was necessary to extend the existing agreement with the oil industry concerning 
Natref's production to cover the production from Sasol 2 as well, which also involved the 
introduction of a significant subsidy, paid through a fuel levy, in addition to other levies used to 
fund Sasol2's construction, crude procurement and the strategic stocks programme. 
By the end of the 1970s the oil embargo had finally become a reality as Iran cut off oil supplies, and 
the accession of P.W. Botha led to a civil service reorganisation, which included the centralisation 
of all liquid fuels functions in government in the DMEA In reality, it took another five years for 
full integration to be achieved. The necessity for more integration of liquid fuels policy processes 
was related to two developments. The first was the development of Sasol 3, which required a 
significant renegotiation of the regulatory system in order to accommodate Sasol3's production and 











the regulatory system provided the oil industry with enough incentive not to disinvest, which it did, 
except for Mobil, which was compelled to disinvest for legal reasons (US legislation) in the late 
1980s. The second was the privatisation of Sasol (1979-1991, with the bulk transferred by 1983), 
which led to the withdrawal of Sasol from managing the Funds, the strategic stock, and the crude 
procurement programme in 1984. This development led to the establishment ofa holding company, 
CEF, to house the SFF and other oil security strategy assets and activities, which was a way in 
which the strategic aspects of the oil security strategy could be kept institutionally separate from the 
more routine policy and regulatory aspects of the state's involvement in the liquid fuels sector; in 
addition, CEF was seen as a facilitating agency for the post-Sasol synthetic fuels programme. At the 
same time, in 1980 the DMEA embarked, with the EPC, on the development of a long-term 
synthetic fuels policy, and CEF was appointed the core agency in its development. CEF functioned 
not only as a holding company for the Funds, but also as a conduit for funding from coal, electricity 
and liquid fuels levies to fi~ce the NEC. Sasol's influence and its membership of a liquid fuels 
policy inner circle persisted for some time after its privatisation, and maintaining it! presence in the 
liquid fuels policy community was one of the motivations for appointing 'private sector' 
representatives to the EPC. 
One of the state's motivations for developing the oil security strategy in the way that it did was to 
create an influential bloc in the liquid fuels industry which consisted of 'insiders', which they had 
begun to do in the 1960s through various incomplete Afrikaner empowerment ventures: the 
privatisation of Sasol completed this process. After the completion of Sasol 3, the synthetic fuels 
programme was not a success for a number of reasons, and the only outcome was Mossgas, which 
was a fiasco, for reasons outlined above. An additional institutional outcome of the oil security 
strategy in the 1980s was the imposition of secrecy legislation in 1979, which had a significant 
impact on the way in which liquid fuels policy processes were conducted, and the way in which 
these were integrated into broader energy policy processes. The divisions between strategic and 
non-strategic aspects of liquid fuels policy was hardened. The centre of the secrecy regime was the 
importation of crude oil; as a result, only a small number of officials involved in oil procurement 
knew how much oil South Africa imported, or even how much was processed annually by the 
refineries. The private refining companies also segregated crude procurement functions physically 
and institutionally within their organisations, and these isolated departments liaised with the state 
officials: beyond this group, information on crude imports and production by refineries was not 
available, even to relatively high-ranking officials in the DMEA. 
The beginning of the transition removed any further impetus to develop the synthetic fuels 
programme, and the uncertainty which it engendered in the policy environment led to a policy crisis 











strategic imperative undermined the apartheid-era balance between the two centres of power in the 
policy community: although the separate state agencies in the centres had been integrated in the 
DMEA, Sasol still had strong links with an economic and industrial policy elite. The outcome of the 
1993 policy crisis consisted of two processes. The ftrst was a struggle between the oil majors and 
Sasol, in which the majors wished to reassert their dominant position, both institutionally and in the 
market, and the second was a process of building relationships with the emerging anti-apartheid 
state. The role of the LFITF episode was a key point in this process, through its legitimation of 
Sasol's role in the national economy and its subsidy, as well as the legitimisation of liquid fuels 
price-setting procedures, which addressed the immediate causes of the policy crisis. Sasol's victory 
was notable for two reasons: fIrst, the way in which the inquiry was framed, as well as the way in 
which its broader importance to the country was assessed, was signiftcantly influenced by 
apartheid-era planners (still in position in 1995); and second, its victory was more signiftcant as a 
form of post-apartheid legitimisation than in terms of the maintenance of the subsidy, which was 
phased out over the next four years. In 2001, Sasol joined the oil industry association SAPIA, an 
indication of a fragile truce between Sasol and the reftning industry. 
Although the oil majors took a strong position on deregulation, as did the state in the White Paper, 
in reality when the uncertainty that the new state entailed disappeared in the late 1990s, both the 
state and the liquid fuels industry toned down pro-deregulation rhetoric signiftcantly, and a process 
of'regularisation' followed, which formalised the apartheid-era regulatory system. Some of the 
more excessive aspects of the apartheid regulatory system were ~bolished: the IBLC was reformed, 
pipeline charges were subject to independent regulation, the Natref 'neutrality' principle was 
phased out, CEF and SFF were restructured, the Ratplan was replaced by a licensing system based 
in the DME (under pressure from the competition authorities), and synthetic fuels subsidies were 
phased out. However, marketing and retail margins were not subject to reform, import restrictions 
still remain, and the regulation of the value chain has a similar form. The main watershed in the 
relationship between the post-apartheid government and the liquid fuels industry was the Liquid 
Fuels Charter, which was the formalisation of a process which began with the appointment of an 
ANC minister in 1996. The post-apartheid policy consensus consists of a commitment to phased 
deregulation of the liquid fuels industry as BEE targets are met by the industry, combined with the 
reality of post-apartheid liquid fuels policy (re-regulation), which is supported both by industry 
(whose commitment to deregulation weakened as uncertainty about the new order disappeared), the 
new leadership in the DME (who are committed to re-regulation), and the political leadership (who 
are committed to BEE). One striking lacuna in post-apartheid liquid fuels policy is the absence of 
energy poverty policy pertaining to liquid fuels, since liquid fuels use by poor households both 











sector, a deal was not concluded between industry and the ANC to address energy poverty. The 
only notable initiative was the establishment of a paraffin safety association by the liquid fuels 
industry, which does publish useful annual data on the rate of paraffm-related accidents and 
fatalities in households. The reasons for this are complex, but a few points are pertinent. First, the 
EDRC policy activists, who played a key role in brokering the electrification programme, had not 
developed a detailed understanding of the liquid fuels industry73, partly on account of its traditional 
secretiveness, and partly on account of the willingness of Eskom to engage, and the concomitant 
focus on electricity. Moreover, some of the key activists were also employed in the electricity 
sector. Second, differences in the aims and functions of the two negotiation forums played a major 
role: the aim of NELF was electrification, and other agendas were attached to this, whereas the aim 
of the LFITF was to legitimise the regulatory process. Third, a basic institutional fact was that there 
was no equivalent of Eskom in liquid fuels - an agency which could provide organisational 
capacity, institutional legitimacy, and capital. The last reason was the way that the problem was 
understood: in the early 1990s, the problem was considered to be lack of electricity, and for those 
without access to electricity, the problem was to make IP safer and cheaper. Only after 2000 did a 
consensus emerge that the problem was the price of LPG74; in other words, a liquid fuels policy 
problem linked to the structure of the LPG market. This problem still remains to be addressed. 
In terms of the relationship between liquid fuels policy and energy policy, the policy regime up to 
the 1970s fits uncomplicatedly into paradigm O. Unlike in many other countries, there was 
extremely limited substitution of liquid fuels for coal, and no state initiatives to accomplish this, and 
thus no corresponding paradigm 1 institutions were established before 1973. The limits of the liquid 
fuels market were defined clearly and fairly rigidly in the energy system. HFO was largely exported 
or used as refinery fuel, and had ery limited use in industry or electricity generation. The turning 
point was 1973, and integration of liquid fuels policy occurred in two phases, in the 1970s and in 
the 1980s. In the first phase, from 1973 to 1979, the coal-oil nexus was the core of the state's 
energy policy project; however, in terms of decision-making patterns, 'energy policy' really only 
extended to the substitution of oil by coal in the 1970s, and other liquid fuels policy matters were 
kept out of the energy policy community. Bearing in mind that the context was different (not 
created by economic or structural factors, but by the threat of the oil embargo), the oil substitution 
programme resembled coal substitution programmes in the 1950s and 60s elsewhere. The limited 
13 A detailed report was compiled in 1993 on the paraffin value chain, but pennission to publish it (required under still-existing 
secrecy legislation) was denied by the Cabinet. 
74 In most countries, including developing countries, households commonly use a combination of electricity and gas (either bottled-
LPG - or piped natural gas). South Africa is unusual in that households which have access to it, and can afford it, use solely 
electricity, which led energy analysts to classify LPG as a 'transitional fuel', which would be used by households in a 'transition' 
from cheap unpleasant fuels (coal/wood) to expensive 'modern' fuels (electricity). Most middle-income developing countries (in 
which category South Africa falls) have relatively high per-capita LPG consumption figures, but South Africa does not, mainly on 











penetration of liquid fuels outside of the transport sector was rapidly reversed in the 1970s, partly as 
a result of government encouragement, and partly on accoWlt of market forces responding to the 
massive increases in the price of oil. Attempts to mitigate liquid fuels consumption were limited to 
short-term conservation measures which were "very carefully managed" with the oil industry 
(Interview with S VanDen Berg), and demand-side measures were eschewed. Aside from the other 
limitations, the formulation and implementation of paradigm 2 measures would have fallen foul of 
the delicate balance the state was pursuing between the interests of the oil industry and those of the 
emerging synthetic fuels industry. Limited institutional capacity was developed to investigate trade-
offs in the energy sector, and these were primarily based on modelling coal reserves and demand 
Wlder various scenarios for electricity and synthetic fuels growth. 
A higher degree of co-ordination was brought about in the 1980s with the creation of the DMEA, 
and the combination of regulatory and other functions in one department, which had several 
important consequences, of which the most important from an energy policy point of view was the 
attempt to develop a comprehensive synthetic fuels policy. This involved exploring a number of 
possible primary energy carriers, including cane sugar and natural gas, and thus was a paradigm 1 
programme par excellence. Further integration of the oil security strategy functions into the CEF in 
1985 represented an interesting innovation, in that CEF was expanded to collect levies from other 
energy supply sectors (coal, electricity) to fund energy policy-related research in the NEC. 
However, secrecy legislation, which prevented information flow about liquid fuels even within the 
state's energy bureaucracy, inhibited the development of more sophisticated and integrated energy 
policies. The removal of the security imperative in the early 1990s put a halt to further 
developments of the synthetic fuels programme, and with it the impetus for oil substitution 
programmes. 
The post-apartheid era, begWl by a retreat from further oil substitution policies, is characterised by 
an absence of energy issues in liquid fuels policy, which is a reflection on the enduring nature of the 
South African energy supply system. The only possible candidate is household energy demand, 
which, if an integrated policy were developed, would lead to a series of tradeoffs between different 
energy carriers, but this has not occurred. Institutionally, however, thd strongest policy capacity in 
the DME is, as has traditionally been the case since 1980s, located in the liquid fuels section: unlike 
the electricity sector, regulatory functions in the liquid fuels industry are located in the DME. 
However, these are extremely limited by comparison to the NER - aroWld 5 to 7 people, as 
compared to 100. Although there is a significant level of policy activity in liquid fuels in the DME, 
in terms of energy policy, the post-apartheid era represents a weakening of co-ordination across 












Energy Policy Activities in Government 
Introduction 
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idcnlif)'inll the main points of policy and insciHJlional change. the origins and d<-\eloptnm\ of 
$QUlh African ~rgy poIi!,:) to dale can be undel'Slood lIS • sml."$ of six phases. inll4lgUl1ll~ by 
/.:ey policy crises. and Icadinll to paradigm chan!:e or modifieDlion. These phases and the /.:C) 
dt:\'elopmenl~ "jlhin each plla:>e an: rqm::;t'nled In Fillure 7. 1 below. 
In the firM phase. befol\: IY72, policy In different ellCIl:) s uppl) k<:IOI1i d!:\c]o", .. d in vinuall) 
aulonomollS Slr\.'3JTlS (comsponding \0 paradigm 0), ' "he beginnings or Imffll) polk)" act;" ;,y in 
Soulh Africa o«urred through 1M establishment of 9 small subsection of Ill<' Slate"s n:uur.tl 
rnourcc plannj~ infrastnJc1ure, which in the lale 1%Os .... '8$ insIt\llm:nlal in refr:nning coal 
policy in lemtS of stmtcgic resource usc. This was Casi tnto sharp relief by the 1973 oil crisis. 
"hidl raised the possi bility of a large'SClile l!o")"mhetic fuels industl) . thus linking the two scpamtc 
clements of the energy supply s)·st('m. 11K- liquid fuels industry and the eltt"\ricily indUSll)". 
Ihruu\,lJt cool. lhe primary resource. As in other indusnialised CQumries. this convergence Icd 
SY. ll1lYlo hish-le\'eI support for Ihe inaulluratioll of the energy pol ic), project 
The second pha.<;C.' began "ith the e>Ulblishment of tltt- firsl siynificant cnerg) pol icy institution. 
the Fner1lY Poltcy Commiue\' (EPC) io J974. on "hich were represented the Key st:nc enterprises 
and government departments involved in energy suppl). thus representing II variant on paradigm 
I. "ilh 1"0 cenlral features: the predominance or lhe slr3l.egic imperative. and the focu.~ OIl coal 
as the fundamenml ne:olus of the ellt:rgy system. Actual encrg)' policy capacity in government 
consisted of the Eres secretariat in the Department of r la'lIl ing. but policy and rcgul~t ory 
il15litutions peruining to the enerb'Y supply industries "ere based elS('1A.ilerc in the Stille systcm. 
The third phase wa.~ precipitated by a combinlllion of a further policy crisis and II change in 
political lcadcrship. The second oi l crisis in 1979. h:s.o; severe in ils efTC<:ls intelTllllionally. was 











Figure 7.1 : Evolution of Energy Policy Functions in Government 
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The oil security strategy was stepped up: with other measures, the synthetic fuels programme 
was doubled. At the same time, the energy policy function in the Department of Planning was 
enhanced, and in 1980, most energy-related policy and regulatory functions were centralised in a 
new Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs; energy policy was given a high strategic 
priority. Recurring crises in the early 1980s, caused. by the high cost of imported oil and the 
related. decline of the rand/dollar exchange rate, led to the proposal of a new institutional 
structure in the form of a National Energy Council in 1987, the establishment of which signalled 
the beginning of phase four. The NEC furthered the integration of energy policy institutions by 
incorporating the National Programme for Energy Research (previously housed in the state's 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research), as well as addressing some of the pressing 
resource difficulties, but other problems it had been designed to address (further integration of 
energy governance institutions, the development of energy planning capacity), it failed to do. 
The experiment was brought to an end by a further policy crisis, which will be termed here 'the 
crisis of the transition' . 
The central feature of this policy crisis, which affected a wide range of policy domains, was the 
collapse of the strategic imperative, which had been the prime driver in many apartheid-era 
programmes, in the face of the transitional process: since negotiations had begun with the anti-
apartheid opposition, threats such as sanctions and embargos would disappear in the short term. 
Thus, political support for energy policy activity, which was largely based on strategic grounds, 
declined precipitously from 1991 onwards. In addition to this, the tightly-structured energy-
related and other policy communities of the apartheid era collapsed or were significantly 
modified as a potentially hostile government-in-waiting emerged. These developments signalled 
the beginning of the fifth phase, which began with the scrapping of the NEC in 1991, and the 
reincorporation of its fu ctions into the DMEA, as a smaller and less-influential Chief 
Directorate, as well as a number of policy processes connected in various ways to the main 
political negotiating process, CUlminating in the development of a new Energy Policy White 
Paper in 1998. The central feature of this period was the accessibility of key policy processes 
compared to the apartheid era, when energy policy was generally the preserve of a tiny elite. As 
the new government negotiated. with the main energy sector actors, policy processes were 
'normalised', policy communities were reformed, incorporating the new political elite and 
reformed configurations of energy sector actors, and the DMEA was restructured, which 
inaugurated the final, short phase, from 1998 to the present. This phase was characterised by the 
formalisation of apartheid regulatory frameworks and the re-establishment of a supply-oriented 
energy policy consensus focused on regulation and governance of energy industries rather than 











In a more detailed description and discussion of these phases below, these developments will be 
discussed in terms of the energy paradigms framework outlined in chapter 2, in terms of which 
paradigm transition involves the adoption of a new conceptual framework underpinning the 
paradigm (the 'system of ideas'), a set of corresponding problems, a set of legitimate policy 
alternatives, and a set of corresponding institutions. The link between these abstract paradigms 
and the development of concrete energy policy paradigms in specific locales can be explored 
through the structural features identified in Chapter 2: a 'core' on which there is consensus 
amongst actors who are members of the energy policy community, consisting of concrete 
features which delineate the boundaries of the paradigm, and a periphery consisting of 
institutions and pOlicies related to the 'core' programme. 
There are thus two types of change within this framework: the first is a change in the paradigm 
itself, as the 'core' is significantly modified or replaced and significant institutional reform takes 
place, and the second is a change within a specific paradigm, as the 'core' is reconfigured, 
institutions are developed, integrated or excluded, and the structure of the policy community is 
altered. This in tum required the delineation of policy corrununities, through the criteria outlined 
in Chapter 1, in terms of which actors were involved, which institutions were integrated into the 
policy domain, and to what extent policies were supported politically. The 'core' parameters of 
the policy paradigm can then be identified, in terms of patterns of decision-making (who makes 
decisions about what policies), which institutions are included or excluded, and what consensus 
exists on policy problems and alternatives (including the elaboration of appropriate conceptual 
frameworks, which usually involves the development of new organisational capacity), and the 
points of change and the reasons for change can be more clearly understood. In the conclusion, a 
case will be made for a specific pattern of paradigm changes and modifications stemming from 
this analysis, in terms of which the development of South African energy policy can be 
explained and understood. 
The Development of Energy Policy Activity 
1) pre-1972 
The locus in the state where a general interest in energy policy per se developed was in the 
state's planning agencies, which were in tum developed to co-ordinate·.post-war industrialisation 
policies. The first planning council, the Social and Economic Planning Commission (SEPC), was 
established in 1942 on the recommendation of the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements 
Commission (1940-41) which was headed by Van Eck, also at the time the General Manager of 











a far greater degree of co· ordination between. government agencies, parastatals and the private 
sector in industrial development, in a context in which inter·agency ca.operation was 
traditionally weak. 
The first key post-war project with which the state was faced was the development of the Free 
State goldfields, which required not only massive levels of private capital investment, but also a 
high degree of co·ordination between mining houses, other private industrial concerns and state 
agencies, to develop the tequired infrastructure including railways, electricity supply and water, 
as well as the social infrastructure, which required a significant level of physical and economic 
planning. Fine and Rustomjee comment that: 
"The scale of this project cannot be overemphasised .. [contemporary industrial projects] all 
pale into insignificance compared to the Free State goldfields development of twelve 
individual gold mines in a part of the country where supporting infrastructure was virtually 
non.existent. De Kock imparts a striking impression of an interplay between state and 
corporate planning right down to the last compound for mine workers .... (Fine & Rustomjee 
1996:155). 
The state agency responsible for co·ordinating this project was the Natural Resources 
Development Council (NRDC), one of the successor institutions to the SEPC, which was 
established in terms of the 1947 Natural Resources Development Act to promote resource-driven 
industrial development. Its first task was to manage the planning process for the Free State gold 
fields development, after which it broadened its scope, which included the complex local and 
regional spatial planning processes which had become central to the development of the 
apartheid state 1 , as well as the development of indigenous natural resources and their 
beneficiation (and the accompanying infrastructure), which was the focus of most industrial 
mega-projects in the country in the second half of the 20th century. The co-ordinating role of the 
NRDC, as well as other state planning agencies, was superseded by the formation of the 
Department of Planning in 1964, the function of which was the national ca.ordination of 
economic, physical and scientific planning and research. The Department was established, 
according to its first Annual Report: 
" . .in view of the growing importance of combined planning and the co-ordination of certain 
activities in various spheres and with a view to obtaining co-operation in this connection 
between the public and private sectors of the community .. " (Department of Planning Annual 
Report 1965: 1). 
I A fusion of racial zoning of urban land and rural regions. regional 'development' of 'self-governing territories' and an 
industrialisation policy which included an emphasis on 'decentralisation', or development of industries close to or in these 
territories, which had abundant supplies of cheap labour, but few resources and almost no infrastructure. In addition, under 
apartheid, the development oflarge regional industrial projects such as the Free State gold fields or the Richards' Bay project was 











The Department was set up in an attempt to provide a higher degree of co-ordination to a state in 
the process of rapid industrialisation, which was characterised by a high level of agency 
autonomy and a lack of strategic co-ordination, where 
" .. decisions about state action were detennined more by patronage networks within the 
National Party than by a co-ordinated plan of state action .. " (Swilling 1988:3). 
Thus 'planning' was, as is often the case, an instrument to broker cross-sectoral policies, and to 
negotiate the co-operation of state agencies in these initiatives. 
The Department of Planning took over control of the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research, the state's central statistical service, and the NRDC, absorbed planning functions 
already established in the Department of the Prime Minister, and established three advisory 
councils, the Economic Advisory Council, the Scientific Advisory Council and the Planning 
Advisory Council, all of which advised the Minister of Planning and the Prime Minister, and 
were co-ordinated with advisors in the three spheres based in the Department of the Prime 
Minister, and which were provided with secretariat services by the Department (Department of 
Planning Annual Report 1967: 1-2). The Councils consisted of the top leadership of government 
departments, parastatals and other state agencies, and occasionally representatives of the private 
sector on non-strategic Councils, and formed the institutional precedent for the EPC. 
The key council from an energy policy perspective was the Planning Advisory Council (PAC), 
created in 1966, which officially asswned the spatial development and natural resource functions 
of the NRDC in 1967 with the passage of the 1967 Physical Planning and Utilization Resources 
Act, which repealed the 1947 Act as well as abolishing the NRDC. The composition of the PAC 
was significant: amongst others2, it included the top officials of the Departments of Planning, 
Finance, Commerce and Industries, and Mines, and the South African Railways, as well as the 
Chairman of Escom and the Managing Director of the IDC (Department of Planning Annual 
Report 1967:3). As the importance of energy policy unfolded in the 1970s in the wake of the 
1973 oil crisis, the General Manager of Sasol and the head of the Atomic Energy Board joined 
the Council, making the PAC an extremely high-level forwn for co-ordinating strategic 
developments and policy across government arid parastatals related to energy and natural 
resource policy. Representatives of the private sector, appointed to the original Council, were 
mostly eliminated at the beginning of the 1970s (Department of Planning Annual Reports 1967, 
1972, 1974) as the Council began to deal with issues of strategic importance. 
Interest in the energy economy as a whole by government occurred briefly in the 1930s, when a 
survey of the energy commodities used in the Union (coal, electricity and liquid fuels) was 
derived from the industrial census in response to a request from the World Power Congress, later 











the World Energy Council (South African Yearbooks 1933-1936). A more systematic concern 
with energy emerged for the first time in 1966, when the PAC began to express an interest in 
"trends in the consumption of energy in the Republic" (Department of Planning Annual Report 
1967:3). In reality, however, the Department of Planning lacked any capacity to carry out any 
such assessments. A key <;!.evelopment was the appointment of Dr W.C. Van Rensburg in 1967 in 
the area of natural resources planning and development, who began to develop a capacity in the 
Department to consider energy issues (Hofinmmer 2002:221). In 1968, the PAC established a 
Subsidiary Committee to investigate 
" .. tendencies in the energy consumption in and future requirements of the Republic, and also 
to evaluate the various sources and reserves of energy" (Department of Planning Annual 
Report 1968:6), 
which was the first use of the category 'energy' in this context in government. Van Rensburg's 
first activity was to complete a ground-breaking survey of the nation's coal resources (see 
Chapter 3), in collaboration with the Fuel Research Institute and the Geological Survey (in the 
Department of Mines), under the auspices of the Coal Advisory Board (Department of Planning 
Annual Report 1969:9). ;The survey placed the question of coal reserves in a broader energy 
policy context for the first time, a conceptual shift supported elsewhere in the state, particularly 
by Sasol's leadership, who were centrally involved in developing and implementing the state's 
oil security strategy (see Chapter 6), and had ambitions to scale up the limited synthetic fuels 
industry then in operation. 
The Department of Planning's decision that the investigation (which was headed and mainly 
undertaken by its own staff) be placed under the auspices of the CAB3 was a shrewd strategic 
move designed specifically to a) circumvent the existing coal policy community, dominated by a 
narrow market-based regulatory focus, b) capitalise on the CAB's mandate, which was to advise 
the Minister of Mines on coking coal resource use (by extending it), and thus, c) place the coal 
policy debate in a resource-based context rather than in a market-based context. The 'coal 
problem' had begun to turn into an 'energy problem', due largely to an emerging triangle 
between coal, liquid fuels and electricity, and the strategic awareness that arose through the coal 
survey of the possibility that it was very likely that strategic tradeoffs would be required between 
electricity, liquid fuels security (assuming an enlarged synthetic fuels industry) and coal exports. 
The survey led directly to the appointment by the government of the Petrick Commission in 
1970, to which Van Rensburg was appointed. The completion of the coal survey delayed a more 
comprehensive investigation of energy use, which was lamented in the Department's annual 











report on account of the potential nuclear developments then underway, as well as the discovery 
of natural gas offshore: 
"With the discovery of gas on the continental shelt it has become necessary to investigate 
the potential markets for gas and other sources of energy, but this work has inevitably been 
delayed to a certain extent by a shortage of qualified staff" (Department of Planning Annual 
Report 1969:11). 
Coal, gas and uranium were all natural resources, the usefulness of which could be assessed by 
existing routines; however, the Department had no existing capacity to evaluate them as energy 
resources. The structural conditions for the emergence of energy policy, which comprised a 
degree of potential convergence between different energy carriers, which had occurred in many 
other industrialised countries in the 1950s, were absent in South Africa until the late 1960s; 
whereas previously economic growth required 'energy commodities' (coal, electricity, liquid 
fuels), by the end of the 1960s, the economy began to require 'energy resources'. After almost 
100 years of hermetic development of key energy supply industries, from a planning point of 
view it seemed that these contexts were too narrow to make energy supply decisions; the 
development of gas or nuclear power policy could not take place without considering electricity 
and liquid fuels policy. 
Thus the institutional context for the emergence of the apartheid state's interest in energy policy 
was natural resource planning, rather than one of the policy contexts of the constituent energy 
supply sectors; importantly, ambitions to develop a co-ordinated energy supply strategy came 
from outside the existing energy sector-related agencies. In addition, its location in the 
Department of Planning lent the new area of policy activity a set of institutional resources which 
had been developed primarily to address co-ordination problems between state agencies in 
development processes since the 1940s, which both enabled and limited the development of 
energy policy in the 1970s. 
The government's response to both the CAB report and the ongoing Petrick Commission was to 
expand the natural resources functions of the physical planning division of the Department of 
Planning; dedicated planning functions were established to develop a co-ordinated approach to 
the development of both minerals and energy resources. The first dedicated energy policy 
function was established in 1972, and Dr D. Kotze, a statistician who had worked in the oil 
industry on energy demand forecasting, was appointed to head it. Kotze had completed a PhD in 
statistics which proposed an econometric model of South African energy demand, which was 
updated and used as the basis for much of the state's energy planning activities in the 1970s and 
1980s (Hofm1lnner 2002:219-221); his PhD predated the establishment of any energy policy 











research activities at South African universities. Thus, the first formulation of basic energy 
policy goals was contained in the Department's Annual Report in that year: 
" .. to promote the optimum utilisation of the country's energy resources and to ensure 
adequate and strategically safe supplies, at reasonable prices, of various fonns of energy 
essential to economic growth .. " (Department of Planning Annual Report 1972:7), 
which contained the basic parameters of apartheid-em energy policy until the late 1980s, which 
were a) a natural resource approach, which emphasised primary energy commodities mther than 
energy industries, b) the strong energy security element, and c) the basic function of the energy 
sector as one of the drivers of economic growth. 
2) 1973 to 1979 
The seminal event in the development of energy policy in the 1970s was the 1973 oil crisis. In 
the build-up to the crisis, the PAC scaled up its ambitions for a 'comprehensive' approach to 
energy planning, 
" .. emphasising the necessity of implementing an integrated and comprehensive energy 
programme for South Africa. The establishment of such a comprehensive programme 
comprises the following: 
a) The collection and analysis of economic and energy data 
b) A projection of future energy consumption as deduced from economic 
forecasts, or at any rate not irreconcilable with such forecasts; 
c) An identification and anal sis of possible alternative sources of energy, both 
indigenous and imported, the cost involved and their optimisation 
d) Policy recommendations bearing on national energy supply and consumption" 
(Department of Planning Annual Report 1973:5). 
The programme outlined above was limited to the context of the Department of Planning; what 
was meant by an 'energy progmmme' was in fact an energy planning process which would be 
able to provide a context for energy-related decision-making processes by executive planning 
bodies. 
The occurrence of the energy crisis, from October onwards, led to a dramatic escalation of 
interest from government in energy policy, and a series of institutional innovations. Not only had 
the oil crisis threatened South Africa's security of supply, and increased the cost of oil 
significantly, but it had also (through a massive price increase in crude oil) rendered a potential 
large-scale synthetic fuels programme an economically realistic option, thus increasing the need 
for the development of an energy-baSed decision-making framework. 
The first response was to extend the PAC in early 1974 by the appointment of Dr A. Roux, head 











policy, as well as the Managing Director of Sasol (Department of Planning Annual Report 
1974:3). The tiny energy section of the Department was expanded to a-8ubdivision in 1974, and 
a Division by 1976 (Department of Planning Annual Reports 1972-6); by 1979, the Department 
of Planning was renamed the Department of Planning and Energy, as energy policy was 
prioritised both within and outside the Department. The energy section also liaised with a set of 
other agencies which were sympathetic to the energy policy project, including other planning 
agencies and the Minerals Bureau, where Van Rensburg became the Deputy Director. 
In April 1974, the Prime Minister established a dedicated Energy Policy Committee, as well as a 
corresponding Cabinet Committee (Department of Planning Annual Report 1974:7), the former 
chaired by the Secretary of the Department of' Planning, and the latter by the Minister of 
Planning; Kotze, the chief energy bureaucrat, acted as the EPC's secretary. The EPC consisted of 
the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce, Industries, Mines, Finance, Planning and 
Foreign Affairs, as well as the heads of Sasol, Escom, the Atomic Energy Board, and the South 
African Railways, and the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, notably excluding any 
participation from the private sector, which dominated the coal and oil industries. The EPC was 
thus not a 'stakeholder forum', but an attempt to co-ordinate an inner circle of powerful and 
relatively autonomous state agencies; the political elite and line departments had their own well-
developed networks with both the oil and coal industries. The energy section of the Department 
of Planning acted as a Secretariat to the EPC. The operating procedure of the EPC was via 
subcommittees or working groups, which would be appointed to deal with specific issues, with 
support from the Secretariat. The conclusions of the subcommittee would be approved by the 
EPC, and then presented to the corresponding Cabinet Committee, which would raise the issues 
with the Cabinet (Interview with D Kotze). 
In terms of membership, the EPC was almost a subsetS of the PAC, and their different spheres of 
influence overlapped significantly. While the EPC focused primarily on strategic energy issues 
(coal, liquid fuels), the PAC considered these in a broader development context, and there were 
energy issues which the PAC dealt with which were not considered by the EPC, such as spatial 
planning issues related to the electricity system, since Escom had been integrated into regional 
planning processes since after the second world war. The PAC also established a "Subsidiary 
Committee for Trends in Energy Consumption" (Department of Planning Annual Report 
1975:7), which commissioned reports such as the 1977 'Outlook for Energy in South Africa' 
(Department of Planning 1977), and the 3-volume 'Energy Utilisation in South Africa' 
(Department of Planning 1978) undertaken by the Energy Research Institute at UCT. 











Within this organisational and jurisdictional complexity, however, the basic parameters of 
energy policy activities were set by a contest between three different groups, which continued 
from the early 1970s until the 1990s. The first of these, which can be characterised as 'energy 
policy advocates', comprised a small collection of bureaucrats and intellectuals, and their 
supporters amongst senior bureaucrats, who were ardent proponents of the development of 'an 
integrated and comprehensive energy programme'; the bureaucrats generally espoused an 
institutional culture based in some form of planning, and the intellectuals were usually situated in 
a university context. The second group consisted of bureaucrats directly involved in regulation 
of, or policy activity concerning, energy supply sectors, and the third consisted of actors in the 
energy sector, which included parastatals and other state agencies such as the nuclear 
establishment, as well as coal producers and oil companies. Broadly, the aim of the first group 
was to develop a strongly-integrated energy policy and planning process, which would to a large 
extent incorporate the decision-making processes of the other two groups, whereas the aims of 
the second and third groups was to influence or evade this process. Organisationally, the first 
group comprised the energy policy section of the Department of Planning, which was mainly 
concerned with developing the 1973 planning-based programme outlined above, which was 
pursued in both the EPC and the PAC, whereas the second and third groups were structured into 
two groups: the second group, and the state agencies in the third group, were represented on the 
EPC and the PAC, whereas the oil and coal industries were not, but had other direct ties to the 
political and economic elite. 
Thus, in the 1970s, policy activities were neatly divided between the development of a 
comprehensive energy planning process (Department of Planning) and sectoral policy and 
regulatory activities, which were pursued elsewhere, and partially negotiated in the EPC. Below, 
the first activity will be discussed, before a detailed analysis of the nature and scope of decision-
making in the EPC. The 'energy policy advocates', including the Secretary of the Department of 
Planning, were heartened by the reaction to the 1973 crisis, for two reasons: first, in the wake of 
the crisis, 
" .. the call for more comprehensive energy planning and co-ordination became stronger. 
which is a sign that the importance of this aspect of the planning task is now realised in all 
quarters .... (Department of Planning Annual Report 1975:5); 
and second, political pressure created by the crisis increased inter-agency co-operation in the 
energy policy domain (see below). However, the capacity of the energy section to develop an 
'energy programme' as referred to above was severely hampered by a shortage of organisational 
capacity, in terms of both skills and staff. The solution to this problem was to form close 











with two university-based energy research institutes, and was extended into a more complex 
network through first the CSIR and then the NEC in the 1980s and 1990s (see below). 
The fIrst of these was the Energy Utilisation Unit (EUU) formed in 1973 in the Department of 
Mechanical Engineering at the University of Cape Town by Professor R Dutkiewicz, who had 
previously started a research department at Escom. The EUU became the Energy Research 
Institute in 1976, and was given its first large contract by the Department of Planning's energy 
section in 1973, to undertake a survey of energy demand6 in South Africa (Hoftnanner 2002: 190-
192; Interview with D Kotze); further work included extensive demand studies and other policy-
related work, including a large programme on alternative liquid fuels during the 1970s and1980s. 
The second research unit was initiated by the Department of Planning itself, in collaboration with 
BP, who funded the establishment of a Chair in Energy Studies at the Rand Afrikaans University 
in Pretoria in 1975. The Chair was situated in a new Institute for Energy Studies, the aim of 
which was both to develop skilled personnel to undertake energy policy analysis, and to provide 
support to the energy policy process. The Institute was formally ass ciated with the PAC and its 
subsidiary committee, and was intended to provide additional support to the PAC. Both Institutes 
were governed by 'advisory boards', which consisted of key representatives from the energy 
sector, and much of the Institutes' funding was also derived from the energy sector via 
consulting work or contract research. Most key organisations in the energy policy sphere were, 
in addition, members or associates of the Institutes. Both Institutes thus served not only as 
intellectual centres for the new energy policy project, but also as important networking points for 
the energy industry generally. The EUUIERI held the fIrst of a series of national South African 
conferences on energy policy in 1975, and the IES hosted numerous "closed conferences" on 
energy policy issues (Hoftnanner 2002:220), which contributed to the building of an intellectual 
consensus amongst an increasingly closed energy policy community on the scope and direction 
of energy policy. 
The kind of 'energy planning' undertaken in the 1970s was epitomised by the 1977 'Outlook for 
Energy in South Africa' (Department of Planning 1977), which was an assessment of future 
trends in the commercial energy economy, based on linear relationships between economic 
output and energy consumption, culminating with a resource-focused chapter on "The 
availability and adequacy of energy carriers" (Department of Planning 1977:93). The study is 
remarkable in that it is one of the fIrst conceptually-integrated descriptions of the energy sector 
in South Africa, and follows almost exactly the model for paradigm 1 energy planning outlined 
in Chapter 2; as such it made no normative recommendations, but merely forecast demand. A 
6 This was a ground-breaking survey, and the flJ"St of its kind in South Africa. containing a detailed analysis of energy demand, on 












closer look at what is at first glance an intimidatingly comprehensive document reveals some 
strange lacunae; the electricity and coal sectors are well-covered and contain detailed projections 
for demand and production, but while there is an aggregated demand projection for 'transport 
fuels', both the refining and synthetic fuels reviews contain no projections. Instead, the section 
on refining contains the final paragraph: 
"For the future it is assumed, for the purposes of this study, that refinery capacity will always 
be sufficient to meet domestic demand .. " (Department of Planning 1977:62), 
which eliminates one of the basic functions of energy policy, security of supply, especially 
considering that total liquid fuels manufacturing capacity was about to become a central focus of 
South African energy policy via the Sasol projects. This was closely connected with institutional 
limitations: whereas energy-related infonnation on coal reserves and use was by 1977 the focus 
of a highly co-ordinated and well-resourced process linked directly to the energy section in the 
Department of Planning, and electricity planning was carried out by a single agency in Escom, 
planning for liquid fuels manufacturing expansion was carried out by the (privately-owned) oil 
industry, and was not accessible to the energy section in the same way (both because of lack of 
access to the oil industry and lack of capacity); thus, apart from affecting actual policy processes, 
the structure of energy sector institutions also affected the structure of available infonnation. 
This effect would intensify dramatically after 1979, when access to any infonnation on the liquid 
fuels industry was barred. 
The central question is how this analytical capacity was integrated with concrete policy and 
planning processes, which existed independently in different energy supply sectors. 
There were two types of limits on what defined the EPC's decision-making scope. The first was 
defined by the institutional limitations of the Department of Planning, which was not the 
implementing agency for energy policy decisions, as outlined neatly in an interview by the 
secretary of the EPC in the 1970s; 
" .. although the government established the Energy Policy Committee .... that committee, or 
the Department of Planning never really had the authority to implement energy decisions on 
the ground. It never really dealt with the day to day running of the energy industries. For 
instance, Eskom and the responsible Secretary, would decide when they wanted to build a 
new power station [or alter the electricity price, etc] .... those issues were never dealt with in 
the EPC. Similarly, the Department of Commerce ran the oil industry .... everything 
concerning the day-ta-day running of the oil companies was done between the oil companies 
and the responsible S4'Cretary .... One may ask, what was the function of the EPC? In practice, 
it was just an advisory body, where all the heads of the various energy responsibilities could 
come together and at least have some sort of contact, and over the years the issues that were 











issues. It's impossible to separate them, and in practice it did lead to a situation where there 
was tension between the chair of the EPC (and ,his responsible Minister), and the Heads of 
Departments, the Secretaries who were responsible for the day-to-day running of these, such 
as the oil industry. Sometimes for instance, issues would be referred to the chairman of the 
EPC by outside interests, say an oil company who wanted to import refined product, but the 
Department of Commerce would say 'but it's not your business, it's not your brief - you 
must leave that to us' - so quite often there was tension there, and that tension in fact existed 
for as long as I can remember until it sort of dissipated with the institution of the DMEA, 
because then the responsible units were centralised in the DMEA" (Interview with D Kotze). 
The second was in overcoming the autonomy of existing policy domains in the energy sector. 
The success with which this was done depended on a mixture of institutional and political factors 
(which will be elaborated on below), and in many instances hinged on the existence of a 'threat': 
" .. each responsible office did their own thing ... Commerce looked after oil, Mines looked 
after Mines and so forth, and they guarded their areas very jealously; even though it was all 
government business, it did not prevent these guys from getting very excited if they felt that 
another Department was encroaching on their area; but ultimately when there was a threat, 
then they very quickly organised themselves and [we] got that co-operation" (Interview with 
DKotze). 
The amount of co-operation varied significantly across energy supply sectors, and was a 
combination of the broad political context (the political perception of 'crises'), the operation of 
the policy networks of individual energy supply sectors, institutional factors and the limits of the 
particular conceptual approach to energy policy shared by policy-makers during the 1970s. 
These can be better demonstrated through a more detailed examination of which key energy 
policy-related decisions the EPC involved itself in from 1974 until 1979 in the four energy 
supply areas discussed in Chapters 3 to 6 (coal, electricity, nuclear and liquid fuels). These were 
determined by a combination of two factors: first, certain issues were identified as 'energy 
policy' issues by the executive (mostly through the Cabinet) on which the EPC should 
pronounce, and second, members of the EPC promoted and excluded issues themselves, with 
varying succes. 
The EPC's involvement in key coal policy decisions began when ili.e first tranche of export 
permits was referred to the EPC for approval in late 1974 (Department of Planning Annual 
Report 1974:7), with accompanying conditions regarding local supply and extraction rates. The 
remaining tranches (1976, 1979, 1982/3), including the two phases of the fourth tranche, were 
also referred to the EPC after the creation of the DMEA (Department of Planning Annual Report 
1977, Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Reports 1980-83). The Petrick Report, 











tabled in parliament; the EPC was asked to recommend policy changes which might flow from it 
(Financial Mail 16/5/1975, Financial Mail 13/6/1975). The EPC then established a working 
group to analyse the Report consisting of members of the EPC as well as others co-opted from 
the Minerals Bureau, Sasol, Escom, Iscor, the Office of the Government Mining Engineer and 
the Geological Survey (Department of Planning Annual Report 1976:7), but notably lacking the 
Department of Commerce, the traditional coal policy agency; the Working Group's report 
stressed, amongst other issues, the " . .importance of the centralised co-ordination of government 
powers" in developing an integrated coal policy (Department of Planning Annual Report 
1977:31). By comparison,with the old coal policy paradigm, which really only involved one state 
agency, the Department of Commerce, the new coal paradigm did indeed involve the co-
ordination of a number of state agencies, including new agencies such as the Minerals Bureau, 
which Department of Planning personnel were instrumental in establishing, ~d to which they 
had been seconded; thus the Department of Planning had been instrumental in creating the new 
policy context, and the EPC (and the PAC before this) played key roles in this co-ordination 
process. Moreover, the new coal policy was eagerly supported by a key constituency, the coal 
producers. Planning processes, which began with a new paradigm for assessing the resource base 
pioneered by the CAB report and elaborated by the Petrick Commission, were based in the new 
Minerals Bureau, and formed an important part of coal policy processes. Thus, in terms of coal 
policy, the EPC played a central role, and was involved in key decision-making processes in the 
1970s and early 1980s. ~ 
The involvement of the EPC in liquid fuels policy was significantly more limited, and focused 
on the synthetic fuels programme decisions; the EPC played a key role in the decision to build 
Sasol 2, and the later decision in 1979 to build Sasol 3. In the case of the Sasol decisions, both 
were taken by specially established subcommittees, based on detailed proposals prepared by 
Sasol. In the case of Sasol 2, the EPC had its first meeting in August 1974, and the decision 
process took place in October and November (Interview with D Kotze); the energy section of the 
Department of Planning had been in existence just over a year; thus the subcommittee was 
heavily dependent on Sasol for feasibility studies and analysis. The Sasol 3 decision was made 
within a similar time period in early 1979. Both decisions were made by the EPC in the context 
of the new coal policy framework. 
By contrast, in other areas of liquid fuels policy the EPC was less involved, or not at all: it had a 
small, programmatic policy role in the fuel conservation programme, but major policy decisions 
were the domain of the Department of Commerce, which was also resistant to any involvement 
of the EPC in regulatory issues. The EPC was also not involved in any way in policy issues 











crude oil procurement in the SFF); these were limited to Sasol, the SFF, and a small section of 
the Cabinet. Another area which the EPC was not involved in at all, and was not well-co-
ordinated within the state until the 1980s, was expansion planning in the liquid fuels sector. 
While the closely co-ordinated oil industry made refinery expansion decisions themselves based 
on demand models, plans to add refinery capacity (either through extension or new plants) was 
subject to licensing by the Department of Industries, and expansions after 1973 were undertaken 
in 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978 (see Chapter 6). While the oil companies controlled the liquid 
fuels manufacturing industry, this system functioned relatively well, but the Sasol 2 decision, . 
coupled with an unpredictable demand pattern after the oil crisis, required more co-ordinated 
investment in what was both a strategic industry and an industry where market forces played a 
very limited role, and almost no allocative7 role after 1973. 
The reasons for the limited role of the EPC was that neither the development of the oil security 
strategy nor the oil crisis had resulted in a change in policy paradigm; on the contrary, the 
existing policy framework was carefully augmented to ensure the c ntinued co-operation of the 
oil industry. Control of key areas, specifically regulation, was maintained in the same 
institutions, and there was no significant shift in the membership or influence of the policy 
community; to this end, Sasol was carefully kept out of the retail market by the government, to 
maintain it as the exclusive province of the oil majors. Thus, while the EPC did not decide on 
any other liquid fuels policy issues, which were the preserve of the Department of Commerce 
(regulation), the Department of Industry (refining), the oil industry, Sasol, the IDC, and the 
Minister of Economic Affairs, the Sasol decisions were conceived of at Cabinet level as 'energy 
policy' issues on account of the coal nexus. The institutional outcome of this distinction was that 
whereas the Department of Planning and its associated Committees and Councils performed a 
co-ordinating function in the new coal policy regime, there was no similar co-ordinating function 
in the enlarged liquid fuels policy landscape of the 1970s, which had serious shortcomings8, and 
was one of the factors behind the centralisation of liquid fuels regulatory functions in one 
Department after 1980. Thus, in terms of liquid fuels policy, the EPC's role was limited, and 
delineated by the nexus between coal and the synthetic fuels industry; ventures into more general 
liquid fuels policy issues were successfully discouraged by hostility from other agencies. 
The electricity sector was mostly impervious to the EPC: the distribution industry was regarded 
in both the 1970s and the 1980s by energy bureaucrats (see Chapter 4) as beyond the scope of 
7 Investments in Sasol 2 and 3 were made despite the market, rather than in response to it, and refinety upgrades after 1973 were 
made on the basis of previous demand growth trends, which did not extend into the future; also, although the regulatory system 
was designed to mimic a market price, oil security strategy premiums caused it to diverge significantly from a realistic import 
parity price, which also explains the overinvestment in refmety capacity in the 1970s, since demand was dampened at the higher 
rriCe5 ofliquid fuels. 
Related to plarming and co-ordination of productive capacity (see above) and in the 1970s, the co-ordination of capital 











electricity or energy policy9 since the decision in the 1960s to centralise generation in Escom, 
which was also a reflection of the predominant energy policy paradigm; thus, the ambition of 
energy planners to integrate electricity policy into a more general energy policy context was 
limited to Escom. In terms of coal policy, Escom collaborated closely with strategic initiatives to 
increase extraction rates and boost investment in new mining capacity, which was partly required 
for (and financed by) Escom's massive expansion programme, which gave coal policy agencies 
significant leverage on coal producers. 
There were three key areas in which major electricity policy decisions were arrived at in the 
1970s, without reference to the EPC: the first was Escom 's expansion programme, and its 
planning process in general; the second concerned the nuclear power programme; and the third 
concerned the dramatic price increases in the late 1970s, and the associated decision to expand 
the use of the CDP (see Chapter 4). Major expansion programmes were announced in 1974 and 
1979 with very significant implications for coal resources and capital requirements (which was 
the rationale for the EPC considering the Sasol decisions), which were an outcome of Escom's 
planning process alone. The 1977 Board of Trade inquiry into electricity tariffs pointed out that 
the Department of Industries lacked any policy capacity to make assessments concerning critical 
electricity policy decisions (see Chapter 4), and, while there was limited co-operation between 
Escom and state industrial development agencies in providing electricity supply to new industrial 
projects, Escom's interaction with other state agencies was only at the highest level: 
"Escom and the responsible Secretary would decide when they wanted to build a new power 
station, or when they wanted to change the status of Escom from one kind of government 
organisation to the other, or when they wanted to increase the tariffs, the prices of electricity; 
that kind of thing. Those issues were never dealt with in the Energy Policy Committee" 
(Interview with D Kotze). 
The same applied to the major decision to start a nuclear power programme in the form of the 
decision to build the Koeberg power plant. Although the decision to build Koeberg was taken in 
principle in 1974, before the EPC was functioning effectively, subsequent decisions (including 
the fmal contract) leading up the final process were not dealt with by the EPC at all: 
"I cannot remember that we ever discussed this in the Energy Policy Committee - there 
again is an excellent example of where a decision was taken in the top echelons of 
government - it was not an energy decision - it never came across my desk .... (Interview 
with D Kotz6). 
<) For most of the 1970s and 1980s. electricity distribution was simply regarded as the preserve of local authorities. and did not 
require policy intervention. except for two (unsuccessful) proposals by central government to introduce electricity conservation 











The extent to which electricity was not considered to be an energy policy matter by the Cabinet 
in the 1 970s is indicated by the response to the price hikes from 1975-8 by the state, which were 
linked to coal price increases and, more significantly, Escom's need to 'self-finance' after 1976. 
The BTl, which was appointed to investigate, did not place the problem in an energy policy 
context, by contrast with the later De VilHers Commission and the earlier Petrick Commission. 
The decision by the Minister of Economic Affairs to accede to Escom's request to significantly 
increase CDF contributions, which probably had the largest economic impact on the South 
African energy system in the 1970s, was not considered by the EPC. 
There were two significant steps that the EPC did take in relation to the price hikes. The fIrst was 
a programme of evaluating, and attempting to place in an overall policy context, the various 
investment programmes underway in the energy sector from 1975 onwards, as recorded in the 
1975 Annual Report of the Department of Planning: 
.... recently it has again become evident that heavy demands would be made on South 
Africa's capital resources by developments within the energy industry. In this connection 
mention may be made of the expansion of the coal production capacity and the erection of 
plants for the conversion of coal into liquid fuels and gas, for the generation of electricity 
from coal and uranium, and for the enrichment of uranium. During the past year the 
Committee and its Secretariat have tried to evaluate the implications of these development 
and will continue to do so in the future." (Department of Planning Annual Report 1975:7). 
In 1977, Escom was forced by the government to cut back its expansion programme, as a result 
of growing alarm over increasing prices (during a recession in 1977) and domination of the 
scarce foreign exchange resources after 1976; the initiative for this probablylO emerged from the 
Department of Planning's co-ordinating structures, either through the PAC or the EPC. The 
second step consisted of the initiation by the EPC of investigations into the feasibility of an 
electricity conservation programme, in collaboration with, and at the request of, the Department 
of Industries, which consisted of the establishment of a working committee comprising 
"consumers, electricity suppliers and the public sector" (Department of Planning Annual Report 
1978:73). The committee met twice and submitted a report to the EPC in 1978, but the initiative 
did not continue. It seems that local authorities expressed interest in the programme, but Escom 
did not (Department of Planning Annual Report 1978:73). 
Several factors combined to marginalise the EPC's role in policymaking in one of the three core 
supply industries in the South African energy system. Generally, electricity policy in the 1970s 
10 The fact that a large power station order was cancelled is well-established but the provenance for this decision is not: it seems 
most likely that it came from a planning agency or committee close to the Prime Minister, who would have had to understand and 
support the move. There is a passing reference in the 1976 Department of Planning Annual Report to the EPC being tasked with 












was not viewed by the political elite as within the energy policy domain, except through the coal 
nexus, but it was viewed as such by energy planners, who were frustrated by this attitude. In 
addition to this, no state agency outside Escom had the capacity to develop electricity policy 
alternatives; the electricity system was developing on the same trajectory which it had for the last 
few decades, and its development was overseen almost solely by Escom. Unlike the liquid fuels 
industry, the peculiar s~cture of the South African energy system meant that the electricity 
system was not directly affected by the oil crisis, nor was it threatened by an embargo; thus, 
unlike in other energy supply industries, the oil crisis did not result either in any external threat 
to the policy community, or in political pressure to co-ordinate decision-making in a broader 
energy policy context. 
The nuclear establishment was the most hermetic, as a result of a number of peculiar features, of 
which the main one was that it did not produce anything tangible until the late 1970s, which 
meant that it was not involved in any kind of economic relationship with any other stakeholder 
other than the state, which provided all of its funding ll . Until the development of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, which only began production in the mid-1980s, this relationship was entirely one-sided. 
The institutional nature of the nuclear establishment was that it had been shrouded in complete 
secrecy since its inception; this secrecy was intensified from the late 1960s with the development 
of nuclear technology (and weapons). As a result, although the nuclear establishment was 
overseen by the Department of Mines, and later the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, 
neither Department had any role in making nuclear policy or even legislation until the late 1990s, 
and lacked entirely the capacity to do so. One of the key rationalisations of the nuclear 
programme was that it would succeed coal as. South Africa's primary energy source, which was 
given a new spin by both the apparent promise of the South African enrichment technology, and 
the energy security context. The vice-president of the AEB, Dr Louw Alberts, commented in 
1973 (a month after the start of the oil crisis) that by the end of the century, electricity in South 
Africa would "to a large extent" be sourced from nuclear power plants, while coal would mainly 
be used to produce liquid fuels (quoted in Financial Mail 2111/1973). This was not ultimately a 
strategy pursued by government; the nuclear establishment succeeded in maintaining state 
support (with the limited goal of producing Koeberg's fuel), but not in establishing either a 
large-scale nuclear power programme, or a commercially-scaled nuclear-industrial complex. 
The three key nuclear-related decisions of the 1970s, the Koeberg decision, a series of decisions 
on the construction of a commercial-scale enrichment plant, and the series of decisions regarding 
fuel for Koeberg, which culminated in the decision in 1979 to build the three semi-commercial 
11 The nuclear establishment did not even produce uranium, the production of which initiated the state's involvement in nuclear 











fuel cycle plants, were not considered by the EPC, but in secret by a smaller group consisting of 
the Prime Minister, a handful of Cabinet ministers and the leadership of Escom and the nuclear 
establishment, although the secretariat of the EPC had done significant work on nuclear power. 
The limitations of the role of the EPC, combined with the lack of capacity in the energy section 
of the Department of Planning, led to the frustration of the goal of formulating a 
'comprehensive' energy policy framework; however, the core parameters were fairly clearly-
defined; these were based on a variant of paradigm 1, involving two key components: energy 
security, and a natural resource-based approach to energy policy, based primarily on coal. 
Conservation programmes were viewed as emergency measures only, and demand-side measures 
were excluded: a 1979 interview with Chris Heunis, the Minister of Economic Affairs, is 
revealing, in that the Minister specifically ruled out the two key demand-side measures which 
could have cut fuel use significantly: 
"Question: Why has the motor industry not been compelled to incorporate more efficient 
engines in its vehicles, as has happened in certain other countries? 
Heunis: We prefer persuasion, rather than dictation. 
Question: Why has not special help been given to expand th  public transport system? 
Heunis: If our problem becomes more serious, we shall have to take another look at the 
quality and availability of public transport in the main metropolitan areas. It is a matter of 
priorities and availability of capital" (quoted in Financial Mail 291611979). 
The assertion that the apartheid state ''preferred persuasion" is remarkable not only because of its 
fundamentally coercive nature, but also because of the range of state controls imposed on the 
economy at the time, as well as draconian measures such as the 1979 Petroleum Products 
Amendment Act The reflections on a shortage of capital as regards public transport are equally 
at odds with the massive capital expenditure programmes then underway in the energy sector. 
Neither were demand-side policies considered in other areas; the energy intensity of the South 
African economy in fact increased by one third12 from 1970 to 1985, partly on account of energy 
sector projects such as Sasol2 and 3, and the uranium enrichment plant By the end of the 1970s, 
the business press reported that 
.... SA is riding an energy boom the magnitude and implications of which are comprehended 
by few .... the country seems to have acquired a Texas complex, currently having in hand the 
development of the world's biggest coal mine, biggest coal-fired power station and biggest 
coal liquefaction plant.. .. within the Republic, the energy industry is marked by massive 
projects and escalating pioneering activity .. " (Financial Mail 29/6/1979). 
At the time, energy megaprojects under development included Sasol Z and 3, several huge coal 
mines, a nuclear power plant, several coal-fired power plants, and three nuclear fuel cycle plants, 











all of which, except for the coal mines, were being developed by state agencies; even the coal 
. mines were largely fmanced through Escom. However, as detailed above, the role of energy 
policy institutions per se in co-ordinating this immense development was limited. The 1979 oil 
crisis, which, unlike the first oil crisis, created a real oil supply crisis, heightened the strategic 
imperative for co-ordination in developing and implementing liquid fuels policy, and highlighted 
the weaknesses of the existing institutional arrangements, which primarily involved a lack of co-
ordination. The next phase in the development of South African energy policy attempted to solve 
these problems by co-ordinating both state agencies (through bureaucratic centralisation), and 
the private sector, through new energy policy institutions. 
3) 1980 to 1986 
The next phase in the development of South African energy policy and institutions was 
precipitated by two factors: the 1979 oil crisis, which intensified the strategic importance of 
energy policy, and a change of national political leadership (in 1978), which resulted in a 
reorganisation of the civil service, and a significant shift in economic policy within the state, 
combined with a rapprochement with the private sector. In the reorganisation, energy functions 
were centralised to a far greater extent; in practical terms, this primarily involved the 
centralisation of coal and liquid fuels regulatory functions, as well as a restructuring of the oil 
security strategy's key processes in a new holding company based in the new department, the 
Central Energy Fund (CEF) in 1985. 
The crisis which was engendered by the 1979 'oil crisis was repeated in local terms in 1985 by a 
precipitous fall in the exchange rate, which produced a similar rise in the rand price of oil to the 
1979 crisis, which coincided with a general economic slowdown throughout the 1980s: thus, 
there was significant political support for restructuring energy policy institutions, which were 
mainly understood within a strategic context. 
The Botha civil service reorganisation 
The bureaucratic reorganisation of the state under Botha in the early 1980s (Swilling 1988:3-4, 
O'Meara 1996:278-290) had numerous implications for energy policy institutions. The 
resignation of B. J. Vorster13 as Prime Minister, and the election by the National Party of P.W. 
Botha in his place, represented a shift from an old-style 'Grand Apartheid' state ideology 
characterised by significant bureaucratic control of a large percentage of the economy, to a 
reformist and technocratic state, characterised by a move to a 'free enterprise' ideology 
II Vorster resigned in the so-called 'info scandal', in which state agencies were found to have used government resources to 
clandestinely fund various pro-apartheid propaganda operations, in South Africa and abroad. The leaking of key aspects of the 











characterised by deregulation and privatisation, as well as an increasing militarization of the 
state. As part of this shift, state institutions were restructured over a five-year period from 1978 
to 1983. The policy framework for this reorganisation was outlined in a 'White Paper on the 
Rationalisation of the Public Service and Related Institutions' (1980 Public Service White 
Paper), resulting from a Public Service Commission review ordered by Botha in 1979. 
The reason for the rationalisation was the unwieldy structure of the civil service, a "ramshackle 
affair", in which " .. bureaucratic incoherence was a serious problem" (Swilling 1988:3), and 
central co-ordination of policy and strategy was weak; furthermore the apartheid state was facing 
a growing political crisis in the form of internal resistance and insurrection to apartheid, coupled 
with increasing international pressure and isolation Botha constructed a new power bloc by an 
ingenious combination of three elements to counteract this crisis: a reformist approach to 
apartheid, an alliance with private capital, partly achieved by a rapprochement between 
'Afrikaner' and 'English' capital and the success of the former in the 1960s and 1970s, and a 
militarist approach to social and political stability (Swilling 1988:5). The synthesis was based on 
a complex reform strategy based on the work of US political scientist Samuel Huntingdon, who 
advocated a transition to democracy via a period of 'autocratic reform', coupled by an attempt to 
cast 'radical' opposition to apartheid as a 'total onslaught' masterminded by Moscow, which was 
calculated to gain (anti-communistlanti-socialist) support from the business community, discredit 
anti-apartheid movements, and garner support from the USA (Reagan) and the UK (Thatcher). 
Thus, the motivation for the rationalisation of the civil service was to gear the state to carry out a 
'total strategy', by rationalising its key functions and improving strategic and policy co-
ordination in the light of the main threats facing it, which amongst other things included 
" .. onslaughts on the Republic, which call for new services and government measures as well 
as for the adjustme t of priorities .. [and] .. problems arising from the proliferation of 
government institutions, with resulting problems of co-ordination and the under-utilisation of 
manpower" (1980 Public Service White Paper:2). 
The White Paper specifically cited the (1979) energy crisis as a cause of a "shift in emphasis" in 
national priorities (1980 Public Service White Paper:2), which was based on the prioritisation of 
three major goals for the executive: energy security; mitigation of the impact of energy projects 
and oil imports on foreign exchange and capital requirements, and the resistance of nuclear and 
oil sanctions, for both practical and symbolic-propaganda purposes. 
The specific changes which affected energy policy-related institutions occurred at several levels. 
The first, and most immediately significant, was a restructuring of state departments, which were 
reduced significantly in number (from 39 to 22) and restructured according to operational and 











Mineral and Energy Affairs, which will be described in more detail below. The second 
significant change was a change in the state's planning and policy co-ordinating system. The 
Department of Planning ~d Energy was abolished, and the Department of the Prime Minister 
converted to a more centralised Office of the Prime Minister, which included four streamlined 
planning functions, before transferring them to the newly-created Department of Constitutional 
Affairs and Planning in 1982, which became centrally important in devising and implementing 
reformist apartheid policies in the 1980s (Swilling 1988:6). The Cabinet system was 
restructured, and the large number of Cabinet committees (including the Cabinet committee for 
energy policy) replaced by only four, including a Cabinet Committee for National Security, or 
the State Security Council, and a Cabinet Committee for Economic Affairs, which dealt with 
energy policy issues. The State Security Council under Botha served a crucial co-ordinating 
function in the 1980s, and extended its reach through a 'National Security Management System' 
to all levels of government, serving as a 'state-within-a-state', and included 13 'inter-
departmental committees', including a 'national supplies and resources' committee, and a 
'telecommunications and electrical power supply' committee (Swilling 1988: 5-8; 1980 Public 
Service White Paper:4-8). 
An additional shift of some significance was the restructuring and 'commercialisation' process 
applied to parastatals in the 1980s, which were 'corporatised'. In terms of energy sector-related 
institutions, Sasol was largely privatised in the early 1980s, the South African Railways (and 
affiliated transport assets, including harbours, the national airline, and the petroleum pipelines 
network) was converted into Transnet, the Atomic Energy Board into the Atomic Energy 
Corporation, Escom into Eskom, and the system of quasi-state organisations and funds 
comprising the state's oil security strategy placed into an umbrella holding company, CEF Pty 
(Ltd). In almost all cases, this was achieved by a cadre of high profile and politically well-
connected Afrikaner businesspeople from both the private sector and the IDC, handpicked and 
imported into parastatals by P.W. Botha. 
The creation and structure of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
In 1980, the Public Service Commission created, amongst other new and consolidated 
departments, a new Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, which contained an Energy 
Branch, which was the second significant energy policy-related institutional innovation of the 
apartheid state. The head of the Energy Branch had the rank of Chief Director, two ranks below 












" .. for the first time in the history of the public administrative system in South Africa all 
energy related functions are not only housed in one and the same department, but are housed 
in a department which is responsible for both the energy and the mineral policy in the 
country .. " (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1980:71). , 
The immediate institutional antecedent for the Energy Branch was not the Department of 
Planning's energy section, but the Minerals Bureau, which the newly-appointed head of the 
Energy Branch, Dirk Neethling, a geologist by training, had founded in 1975. The Minerals 
Bureau had been founded for a similar purpose (the development of a strategic approach to 
minerals development policy), and had the same institutional origins as the energy function in 
the Department of Planning (natural resources development policy). The Minerals Bureau was 
also created from the merging of a number of functions in diverse state agencies, and also 
aspired (quite successfully) to develop a policy consensus based on research, involving 
considerable involvement from the private sector (which owned most of the minerals industry). 
Neethling's appointment was also indicative of the common perception of energy policy at the 
time, which was based largely on coal, one of the Minerals Bureau's .main areas of activity, as 
was the location of the new Branch in the Department of Mines rather than the Department of 
Trade and Industry. As the DMEA's fIrst Annual Report observed: 
" .. since coal is South Africa's most important source of energy, for the present as well as for 
the foreseeable future, the combination of the energy and minerals functions is of great 
importance for effective detennination of [energy] policy by the Government on a co-
ordinated basis .. " (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1980:71). 
What characterised Neethling's tenure as the chief state energy bureaucrat (from 1980 to 1991) 
was an ongoing .technocratic concern to develop a programmatic energy policy, which was 
consonant with his work in the Minerals Bureau (Interview with D Neethling), and also with the 
Public Service Commission's mandate in 1980 to: 
"(a) Detennine present and future energy demands; (b) Detennine energy sources and 
potential sources of energy; (c) Arrange for the satisfaction of the country's energy 
requirements, and (d) initiate energy conservation measures" (Department of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs Annual Report 1980:71). 
While the 1970s functions of the energy policy bureaucracy were limited to promoting co-
ordination and providing a policy context (through 'energy planning'), the Energy Branch was 
expected to actually " .. arrange for the satisfaction of the country's energy requirements .. ", which 
required not only a centralised planning capacity, but also a previously-fragmented capacity to 
execute plans. 
To this end, the creation of the Energy Branch required signifIcant institutional restructuring, 











planning and policy-making functions. Of these existing functions in government, the core of the 
new Branch was comprised of two clusters: liquid fuels and coal industry policy and regulatory 
functions, which were transferred from the Departments of Commerce and Industry, and the 
energy section from the Department of Planning; the Minerals Bureau's coal resource evaluation 
functions remained in situ. The other cluster of functions pertaining to the oil security strategy 
which were administered by the IDC and Sasol, including the SFF and the other Funds, the 
strategic stocks process and crude procurement, were progressively restructured during the early 
1980s. After a series of disastrous and highly-publicised frauds, oil trades were approved through 
the Energy Branch by the relevant Minister, and the privatisation of Sasolled to its withdrawal 
from the management of the SFF and related Funds. These were managed by the IDC until the 
creation of a holding company, CEF Pty (Ltd) in 1985, which also housed Soekor (previously 
based in the Department of Mines). There was, from the early 1980s, a significant degree of 
interaction between the regulatory arm of the Energy Branch and CEF concerning synthetic 
fuels, regulation and oil trading: thus by the mid-1980s, the three poles of the liquid fuels policy 
system in the apartheid state - market and trade regulation, manufacturing regulation, and the 
IDC/Sasol-based planning and implementation functions (in the synthetic fuels industry and 
strategic stocks programme) - had reached an unprecedented level of co-ordination. The first 
two functions were incorporated directly into the Energy Branch, whereas CEF was attached to 
the DMEA as an 'associated institution': infonnation on operational aspects of the strategic 
stocks and crude procurement programmes were kept within CEF, and details concerning liquid 
fuels (and crude) consumption and trade were confined to a tiny circle of officials in CEF, the 
DMEA and the oil industry. 
However, integration of the other two areas of policy activity in the energy sector were not 
significant: although oversight of Escom was transferred to the Energy Branch from the 
Department of Industries, electricity policy-making and planning resided entirely in Escom, and 
the Energy Branch did not develop any notable electricity policy capacity. The other aspect of 
energy policy, the ECB, which had been augmented (by two board members and half a staff 
member) following the BTl investigation, was also transferred to the Energy Branch, which 
provided various forms of support; however, the regulatory dispensation relegated the ECB to a 
minor role, and Escom's status and elite connections rendered the Energy Branch ineffectual in 
influencing electricity policy. The Energy Branch in any case did not develop any significant 
electricity policy capacity. Nuclear policy was even more removed from the Energy Branch's 











(previously the Department of Mines), the Energy Branch was not given oversight of either the 
AEC or the relevant legislation, and scrupulously avoided any trespass into nuclear policy14. 
The Energy Branch was divided into two sections: an 'energy supply' division, consisting of the 
above functions divided into two further sections ('energy acquisition', including crude 
procurement oversight, coal production and the liquid fuels manufacturing industry, and 'energy 
distribution', which included coal and liquid fuels market regulation); and an 'energy planning' 
division. The latter division's function was to provide an overview of the energy economy as a 
basis for policy development; in relation to this, the division had two other functions. The first 
was inherited from the Department of Planning, from which the division was transferred: the 
division continued to serve as a secretariat for the EPC, which continued to endorse key energy 
policy decisions until its replacement by the NEC in 1987. The composition of the EPC changed 
significantly in 1982, with inclusion of 'private sector' representatives (Department of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1982:62). This was again not an attempt to transform the EPC 
into an energy sector-wide stakeholder forum, but merely a response to the privatisation of Sasol, 
which formed an important part of the state's energy establishment, and was reincluded on that 
basis. Another notable addition since the 1970s was the inclusion of the President of the CSIR, 
who was appointed on account of the second function of the planning division, which consisted 
of liaising and overseeing the National Programme for Energy Research (NPER) (based in the 
CSIR). The NPER was founded in 1978 as the Co-operative Energy Research Programme by the 
CSIR, and restructured in 1981 as the NPER, which was 
" .. established to function .... as the non-nuclear research and development ann of the 
Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs" (Hofinanner 2002:80), 
the aim of which was to co-ordinate technical energy sector-based research projects which were 
deemed to have significance for energy policy problems, since as the 1981 Annual Report 
correctly pointed out, 
" .. government funding of energy research and development to date has largely been directed 
towards nuclear energy .. " (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 
1981:61). 
The NPER was managed by the National Committee for Energy Research (NCER), on which 
were represented the Energy Branch, the CSIR and several other government agencies, and 
funding for the programme was from 1982 channelled through the Energy Branch. The NPER 
had a staff of six, and commissioned research from various sources according to criteria set by 
the NCER. 











Apart from this fonnal structure, Neethling made efforts to develop his own network by having 
himself appointed to the boards or governing bodies of a number of energy sector-related 
institutions which were less well-integrated into the Energy Branch; th~se included the 
Electricity Control Board (Chainnan from 1981), the Eskom Electricity Council (from 1985-
1992), the SFF (Chainnan, which included Cpmnnan of the SOF, until 1985), and CEF (from 
1985 on). Notably, Neethling was not appointed to any of the nuclear establishment's Boards. It 
is also notable that Neethling was appointed to Eskom's governing body only after the De 
Villiers Commission, when Eskom had temporarily lost some of its political influence, and the 
Commission had explicitly stressed the energy policy context of electricity policy. 
The creation of this new edifice involved some significant changes in organisational culture: 
whereas energy policy activity per se had been centred on an energy planning function in the 
Department of Planning, the new leadership of the Energy Branch was drawn from a diverse 
institutional background. The original energy planning group was merged with others from a 
regulatory background (both in industry and in markets), and Neethling was from a third 
background in the Minerals Bureau. The result within the Energy Branch was that energy 
planning, which was favoured by Neethling as the basis for a 'comprehensive' energy policy, 
was elevated in tenns of developing overall policy frameworks, but marginalised in tenns of 
developing operational policies in specific sectors. The bureaucratic context of the Energy 
Branch, the DMEA (the rest of which was dominated by an engineering-based mining 
organisational culture), tended to emphasise two aspects of energy policy development: the 
emphasis on coal (and other primary sources), and the emphasis on large-scale technology-based 
policy alternatives, rather 'than either market-related or demand-side policies. 
Key Areas of Energy Policy from 1980 to 1986 
These can be divided in several areas: the first of these consists of major supply-side initiatives, 
most of which were continued from the 1970s; the second consisted of conservation measures, 
which consistently fonned one of the basic mandates of the Energy Branch; the third consisted of 
the planning division's activities, which included a range of research projects initiated through 
the NPER, and the development of an Energy Policy White Paper towards the end of the period, 
overseen by the EPC. 
Major supply-sector policies consisted of initiatives in coal and liquid fuels, as well as less-
successful attempts at intervention in electricity policy; the Energy Branch had no role in nuclear 
policy decision-making 'at all: although the fuel cycle decision, which set the nuclear 
establishment's activities and funding for the 1980s, was taken in 1979, there were a number of 











which the Energy Branch was not party (see Chapter 5). Coal policy unfolded on a trajectory set 
in motion during the 1970s through a set of co-ordinated state agencies, which were collected in 
the DMEA in 1980; coal policies probably constituted the most advanced energy sector policies 
in terms of co-ordination and sophistication. After 1980, coal policy activity consisted of a co-
ordinated process of assessing coal reserves, developing and implementing export programmes 
linked to an increasingly complex set of policy objectives, and regulating the domestic coal 
market. Major export allocations, in phases 4A and B of the programme, were considered and 
granted by the EPC from 1981 to 1983. The next significant policy decision was made during 
1985 and 1986, when the Energy Branch, under pressure from industry and elsewhere, 
deregulated the domestic coal market. After this, since no further export tranches were granted 
(export regulation was lifted in 1991), the only remaining coal policy activity related to energy 
was the monitoring of coal reserves, carried out primarily by the Minerals Bureau (Department 
of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Reports 1980-1986). By the mid-1980s, the coal industry 
had undergone the transformation which the policy initiatives were designed to bring about: 
extraction technology was revolutionised, massive investments were made in new capacity, and 
infrastructure to supply the domestic market was well-developed. In addition to this, both an 
international coal glut and sanctions against South African coal (both from the mid-1980s to the 
beginning of the 1990s), combined with the slower pace of Escom~s expansion programme, 
removed any domestic supply problems. Improved· extraction rates, slower primary energy 
demand growth, slower growth in liquid fuels demand (lessening the potential for expansion of 
the synthetic fuels industry), and Escom's improved power plant technology15 also improved 
reserve figures. These factors taken together gradually took coal off the energy policy agenda. 
Activities in liquid fuels policy in this period co~isted of two major initiatives, as well as the 
continuation of other oil security-related functions. The first consisted of significant innovations 
in the regulatory system, designed to accommodate the output of Sasol 2 and 3 in the existing 
; 
liquid fuels market, which occurred in 1983 and 1984, and the second was the development ofa 
general policy framework for the development of the synthetic fuels industry between 1980 and 
1984, which was approved by the EPC, and which was based on two principles: the first was a 
I 
threshold of 40% liquid fuels produced from domestic resources, and the second was a strategy 
( 
for the private sector-driven further development of the synthetic fuels industry, based on a 
package of various forms of state support (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of these 
developments). 
IS A1lowing the burning of coal with a very low calorific value (energy content). which in many instances had no previous 











The Department's role in electricity policy during this period was far more marginal and 
difficult. In statutory terms, the DMEA's role in the electricity sector consisted mainly in 
providing support to the Electricity Control Board (ECB), which was also chaired by Neethling. 
The ECB's statutory influence and political importance, however, was very limited. Energy 
policy-makers in the DMEA had neither the institutional authority, nor the capacity, to influence 
electricity policy at the time, despite the widespread unease in various other locations in 
government concerning Escom's autonomy from economic and industrial policy processes. It 
required the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry by the premier to intervene: 
"I don't think the DMEA had the capability of in any way analysing what was happening in 
Eskom. They didn't have the capacity; they didn't have the power. Dirk Neethling at the 
time was the boss; he was a Chief Director, who is not a tremendously senior guy. The 
chairman of Eskom, who was possibly earning three times what he did, had direct channels 
to the Prime Minister, which Dirk Neethling didn't. Eskom itself was a powerful body, still 
is a powerful body, make no mistake. They had something like 70 000 people, they had vast 
resources; if they wanted to do something and analyse something they could do so - the 
Energy Branch had 30 people - so that's why a commission was required .. " (Interview with 
J Basson). 
One of the outcomes of the Commission was to integrate Escom more closely with the political 
and administrative system, which included Neethling's appointment to the Electricity Council; 
however, the state's policy goals regarding Escom were not primarily energy policy goals, 
despite the emphasis plaoed on energy policy by the Commission. The recommendations of the 
Commission actually weakened the Energy Branch's grasp on electricity policy and governance 
through two measures: first, the ECB, which was one of the primary forms of influence which 
the Energy Branch had on energy policy, was marginalised, and second, instead of vesting a 
government department such as the DMEA with the task of energy policy-making (which would 
have led to the establishment of a significant electricity policy capacity in the Energy Branch), 
this task was largely devolved onto the newly-created Electricity Council, which assumed the 
primary oversight function. Electricity policy, and Escom in particular, was not seen by the 
government as primarily within the energy policy sphere, but within an economic policy context, 
with other parastatals in the process of restructuring for possible privatisation. This shift was 
completed in the late 1980s, when Eskom was moved from the nominal oversight of the 
DMEAlNEC to a newly-created Office of Privatisation. Escom's expansion programme 
(concerning which a number of strategic decisions were taken in the mid and late 1980s), and 
other later initiatives such as the electrification programme, were subject to Electricity Council 











The generalisation of the government's commitment to energy conservation, pioneered in the 
1970s as a short-tenn measure to cut oil import requirements, consisted, apart from the 
publication of a set of posters in the early 1980s (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
Annual Report 1984:60), of two initiatives. The first and most significant was the petrol 
conservation programme, which was a contingency measure enforced only until longer-tenn 
supply policies were successfully implemented. As a result, restrictions aimed at reducing petrol 
consumption were entirely removed by 1985 (despite the continuing oil embargo) because of the 
success of the Sasol projects and the state's oil procurement operations. More structural energy 
efficiency policies, such as increasing the efficiency of vehicle motors or promoting public 
transport, did not fonn any part of the Energy Branch's activities16: 
.... public transport wasn't in our department.. .. and of course our general public in South 
Africa, particularly the more affluent people, the white people, weren't prepared to give up 
their cars and go by bus to town" (Interview with S VanDen Berg). 
The second initiative was electricity conservation, which had been mooted both by the 
Department of Planning's energy section and by the BTl inquiry in the late 1910s, in response to 
the expansion-linked price increases of 1976-7. As noted above, these initiatives did not succeed 
due primarily to the opposition of Escom17. The impetus for electricity conservation was 
forcefully reinstated by the De Villiers Commission, which advocated a major role for Escom in 
promoting various forms of electricity efficiency to mitigate the massive investment 
requirements. As a result, the Cabinet established a Working Group (Department of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs Annual Reports 1984:58; 1985:59) on electricity conservation in 1984, which 
concluded by 1985 that demand-side management programmes, managed by Escom, were the 
most appropriate intervention, thus ruling out longer-tenn efficiency options18• At the time these 
appealed to Escom, which was facing critical short-tenn supply problems in peak periods, and 
did make significant load-shifting arrangements with key large-scale users, including the 
introduction of time-of-use tariffs, and providing advice on electricity application (Conradie & 
Messerschmidt 2000:284-5). This enthusiasm was of short duration, however, since by the late 
1980s the utility was facing an overcapacity problem: post-De Villiers tariff structures were 
16 Programmes to encourage use of public transport were ineffectively pursued by the Department of Transport. but these were 
not integrated in any way with energy policy activities, and were not researched by energy policy planners. Because of the 
structure of apartheid society, these were directed mainly at white commuters, since car ownership amongst black commuters 
was extremely low (due to income inequality and other factors). and the latter were thus all using public transport. which was 
unsafe and inefficient The spatial planning practices of apartheid, which distorted settlement patterns in and around cities, 
exacerbated the problem and made the transport system even more inefficient 
17 This itself is curious. since the energy section identified Escom as a major participant; since these might well have involved 
demand-side policies, the participation of Escom was not essential. However, neither the institutional resources nor the 
organisational capacity existed to plan or implement this kind of initiative in the late 1970s; thus, Escom's participation was 
r.robablyessential. 
S This in any case is implied by the term 'conservation', although DSM programmes are not conservation or efficiency 











designed to promote the development of electricity-intensive industry 19, as Eskom's official 
history correctly notes: 
" .. there is no doubt that this radical approach helped significantly to encourage the growth of 
electricity-intensive industries in South Africa .. " (Conradie & Messerschmidt 2000:286). 
Thus electricity conservation initiatives were firstly not based in the Energy Branch (and thus did 
not fonn part of a comprehensive conservation programme) and secondly, degenerated from the 
long-tenn De Villiers vision into a short-tenn load-management strategy for Escom, which had 
switched to programmes1aimed at boosting electricity consumption by the end of the decade. 
Thus, by 1986, a comprehensive energy conservation programme did not really exist. 
The general function of the planning division was the development of broad energy policy 
frameworks per se, as it had been in the 1970s; attempts were made to achieve this via three 
activities: the first was energy planning (which included the establishment of data collection 
routines and energy modelling), the second. was research activities undertaken through the 
NPER, and the third was through the development of an Energy Policy White Paper (through the 
EPC) in the mid-1980s. Although these activities were best undertaken as a co-ordinated whole, 
there was in fact very little co-ordination between them. 
Energy Planning was consistently advocated as the basic solution to energy policy problems 
during the apartheid era, but ironically not much of it actually took place, due to lack of both 
capacity and data, as noted by an energy policy researcher at the time: 
" .. [the Energy Branch] had a Directorate called energy planning, but it did not do any 
planning .... to do any planning, you require data, and they had two very junior people 
working on data, but they did nothing with the data" (Interview with J Basson). 
The skills problem was partly addressed through the IES at RAU, which was by the early 1980s 
run by Kotze, who had been appointed professor in the late 1970s: however, the work of both the 
IES and ofits students consisted largely in updating Kotze's 1960s econometric model. Another 
more severe problem was data: the 1979 legislation prohibiting the flow of infonnation on the 
liquid fuels industry, coupled with the general secretiveness of the energy supply industries and a 
lack of energy data-collection institutions or infrastructure, crippled attempts at energy planning: 
the sector with the highest priority in the early 1980s, liquid fuels, could thus not realistically be 
subjected to planning processes. Despite this lack of actual output, energy planning was 
increasingly stressed as the central activity of energy policy-making. 
The second focus of activity of the planning division was the development of an energy research 
programme, the NPER, which by 1981 fell within the planning division's ambit. The NPER was 
19 It is of course possible to encourage the development of energy-intensive projects which also use energy efficiently, but very 
low energy prices, which were generally the key factor in this encouragement in South Africa. tend to result in investment in less 











significant in two ways: first, it widened the scope for energy policy interventions, which 
included the gradual shift to a broader conceptual framework for energy policy including 
demand-side interventions; and second, it introduced a new institutional culture (research) to the 
largely orthodox apartheid state bureaucratic culture of the DMEA, which would have its most 
significant impact when the NPER was incorporated into the NEC. Whilst NPER researchers 
were not bureaucrats, they were part of the CSIR, which still formed part of the state; however, 
much of the NPER's work consisted of funding outside researchers. The concept of 'energy 
policy research' was not clearly-defined, and included a range of subjects from highly technical 
studies of power plant efficiency (more common) to rural development issues (less common); 
this in turn produced a range of work which would not have emerged from the civil service. 
However, the cost of this distance was that very few research initiatives led to policy change. 
There was poor co-ordination between the Energy Branch and the research programmes, which 
was partly due to a lack of capacity in the Energy Branch (too few personnel with too few skills), 
and partly because of a lack of understanding of the relationship between research and policy. As 
one researcher commented: 
" .. the Department was so busy with its own activities, that research was not something that 
they really wanted .... we from the NPER often went to them and said 'what are your needs?' 
and they couldn't express them" (Interview with J Basson). 
However, the lack of co-ordination also meant that the NPER could explore energy policy-
related areas which were not directly related to policy activities within the Energy Branch. 
Research began in 1980 with research programmes on aspects of coal utilisation continued from 
the work of the Fuel Research Institute, which was incorporated into the CSIR by 1980, and 
electric vehicles, a research project initiated by the Department of Industries in the 1970s 
(Department of Miner.al and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1980:75). This expanded into 
technical programmes related to coal "exploration, exploitation and utilisation", alternative 
transport fuels (including synthetic fuels), energy utilisation and conservation, and "renewable 
non-chemical energy sources and energy storage" in 1981 (Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs Annual Report 1981:62). In 1982, the programme was restructured into three groups: 
coal research (which included extraction and end-use technologies), "Energy in Transportation" 
(which involved electric vehicles, alternative liquid fuels - synthetic fuels and others, such as 
biomass-derived fuels - and fuel conservation), and "Alternative Energy Technologies" (which 
included a broad range of projects, including renewable energy sourcbs, energy conservation -
load-shifting and end-use efficiency and "energy for development" or "appropriate 
technology" (see below». In 1983 programmes in energy modelling and energy information 











the NPER was incorporated into the National Energy Council (Department of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs Annual Reports 1980-1987). 
One of the most significant areas of research which the NPER embarked on was energy poverty. 
Up until then, questions concerning black poverty had largely been ignored by the apartheid 
state. In terms of access to energy services, black households were severely disadvantaged in 
terms of both access and .affordability, and as discussed in Chapter 4, the level of electrification 
of black households was extremely low. The key development, which was facilitated by the 
NPER's interest in the issue, was the reconceptualisation of a disparate set of problems as an 
energy problem. These included a range of issues which were being investigated by researchers 
at the time, which were divided into two converging areas of interest. The ftrst was 
electrification, which was initially driven by a concern in the 1970s with air pollution in urban 
areas caused by coal smoke, which led to an abortive electrification project in Soweto, South 
Africa's largest back township. The second was a growing interest in the problems of fuelwood 
scarcity in rural areas, associated with deforestation and other problems such as increased 
collection times (having to walk further), as well as respiratory and associated problems linked to 
fuelwood use. The added significance of the energy poverty issue was that it was primarily a 
demand-side issue; thus' considering it as an energy policy problem required a significant 
conceptual innovation. The range of complex issues which were embraced by the problem of 
energy poverty were allocated to several different government· agencies, or to none at all. The 
Energy Branch and the Minister understood the scope of energy policy to include (at its 
maximum) the supply of commercial energy carriers, which included paraffin, but excluded 
firewood, and also excluded electrification, which, apart from rural electrification projects (to 
connect remote white farmhouses to the grid, carried out by Escom), was regarded as the domain 
of local authorities in terms of contemporary government policy: 
" .. the Department basically said that things like providing electricity by local authorities is 
not their concern, it's the local authorities' concern - they had no mandate about that, and 
didn't do anything about that.." (Interview with J Dasson). 
Other issues such as firewood were not understood as energy policy issues at all: 
"In 1986, we [NPER researchers] had a morning session with the Minister and the 00 of the 
Department, basically giving inputs to them as to what we were busy with in the NPER, 
what we found, and some indicators as to the support we wanted from them. I gave a lecture 
on the issue of firewood, how important firewood was, how it was being used, how much it 
was being used, the fact that we were losing firewood in certain parts of the country, that 
there were no programmes of replacing the firewood and so forth, and the Minister lent over 
to the 00 during this presentation and he said to the 00: 'but firewood is not our 











The point at which energy poverty began to become an energy policy issue was in 1983, through 
the NPER's 'Alternative Energy Technology' progranune. The progranune was begun in 1981 as 
a research programme into renewable energy, particularly solar energy, and its possible 
application in remote areas of the country. This was regrouped into an 'Alternative Energy 
Technology' research progranune in 1982, which began in 1983 to investigate, via a contract 
with the ERI at UCT, issues related to energy use by poor rural households. The research was 
recast in 1985 as research into 'appropriate energy technology', defined as ''third world energy 
technology" and "bio-energy (energy from all organic material of biological origin)" 
(Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1985:73), which in practice meant in 
the latter case research on fuelwood supply and demand, and in the former, remote energy 
solutions for poor rural households. Research was again recast in 1986 as "Energy for 
Developing Areas", which again referred to energy requirements of ~or rural households. The 
shift from 1981 to 1986 from a technical supply-oriented approach to a more integrated demand-
side approach2o came about through a number of factors, including an increasingly critical 
attitude to apartheid policies amongst researchers within the CSIR (a more difficult proposition 
for bureaucrats in the Energy Branch), and, most importantly, the funding of a series of research 
projects at universities on various aspects of energy poverty, which would not normally have 
been funded by state agencies for political reason~l. These research projects included pioneering 
work (since no-one had systematically studied the energy poverty problem in South Africa 
before in any detail) at the ERI, where growtd-breaking surveys were completed on energy 
demand and usage patterns by poor rural and urban households (Eberhard 1984, 1986); from 
1986 the NPER also funded some work at UCT by Charles Dingle~ on urban electrification, 
, 
which was influential in the later establishment of a large-scale electrification progranune. Thus, 
the NPER created a space for non-governmental researchers to begin developing what ultimately 
became the primary post-apartheid energy policy context. 
The final policy development of significance in this period was the development of the 1986 
White Paper. The first comprehensive statement of energy policy goals was contained in the 
1981 Annual Report: 
"I - an uninterrupted energy supply at reasonable cost, from both domestic and foreign 
sources 
2 - a continuously decreasing reliance on imports of crude oil within the bounds of strategic 
and economic considerations 
20 In research commissioned by the NPER. and their conceptual framework, but not in actual policy tenns. 
21 Research on poverty in the 1980s was generally associated with a critical attitude to apartheid, and the outcomes were 











3 - optimal extraction of coal, the I country's major source of energy, to provide for adequate 
future supplies 
4 - exports of reasonable quantities of energy carriers, notably coal and uranium, to enhance 
foreign exchange earnings 
5 - the active pursuit of conservation of energy in all sectors of the economy 
6 - research and development on a level commensurate with the various policy objectives 
and priorities 
7 - the continued search for domestic resources of natural oil 
8 - continued further development of the local synthetic fuels industry, preferably by the 
private sector 
9 - appropriate long-term energy policy planning to provide for, in particular, orderly and 
timely phasing in of alternative sources of energy" (Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs Annual Report 1981 :59). 
lhis list was a codification of energy policy priorities as they existed at the end of the 1970s. By 
1984, the short-tenn policy goals of the apartheid state's energy strategy had been achieved: coal 
production had been dramatically expanded, extraction rates and mining techniques transfonned, 
energy security existed in coal, liquid fuels and electricity provision, and the synthetic fuels 
industry was operational and, in tenn.s of the state's criteria, economically and technically a 
success. In 1984, the Minister of Minerals and Energy instructed the EPC to oversee the drafting 
of an Energy Policy White Paper, which was announced at the 26th meeting of the EPC, held at 
Secunda to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the initiation of Sasol 2 (Department of 
Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1984:26). The motivation for producing a White 
Paper at that point was based on a number of factors. The first was the acceptance in government 
that the 1979 oil crisis had led, not to a temporary embargo (as the 1973 crisis had), but to a 
pennanent 'oil emergency', which would have long-tenn impacts on the South African economy 
(1985 Draft Energy Policy White Paper:l). Following from this was the requirement for more 
effective co-ordination of energy policy-related policy activities, including co-ordination with 
the private sector, which was the dominant investor in coal production, and was being 
encouraged to invest in synthetic fuels projects. 
A Draft White Paper was tabled in 1985, and the final White Paper in 1986. Although there is a 
consensus amongst senior DMEA officials that the White Paper was "not implemented" 
(Interviews), this is only partially true, and the documents are in any case a cogent expression of 
the apartheid state's energy policy establishment's thinking at the time, although it was 
surprisingly devoid of specific policy programmes and recommendations, and extremely short. 
The most important feature of the documents was not the policy goals proposed (which were not 











furtherance of the energy policy project (which was very significant). The final version of the 
draft was written by Neethling himself, and the White Paper itself was signficantly modified by 
the EPC, and was significantly less ambitious and more politicatly and organisationally 
workable. The key components of the White Papers consisted of a broad ideological and policy 
framework derived from general policy goals of the apartheid state, an institutional vision for the 
energy policy project, and frameworks for specific policy goals. 
The first component contained various elements which had become important to the apartheid 
state in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The first element of this was a commitment to the 
'independent states' myth which underlay the late-1970s programme of 'independence' of parts 
of South Africa included in the apartheid-era 'homelands' or Bantustans; there was thus a 
commitment to " .. the countries of southern Africa in general" in developing energy institutions 
and policies22 (1985 Draft Energy Policy White Paper: 1; 1986 Energy Policy White Paper:6). 
The second, and far more significant, component was the commitment of the Botha regime, and 
of Neethling, to 'private enterprise', which took a number of forms in relation to energy policy. 
The first was an ideological shift within the apartheid state from a highly interventionist state 
with a culture of regulation and price control to a commitment to 'free enterprise', competition, 
deregulation and privatisation. Botha held a series of conferences with business leaders from the 
late 1970s; at one of which he asserted that it was ''the Government's serious intention to expand 
further the system of free enterprise" (quoted in Mann 1988:61). 
This implied not only a change in the government's attitude to the economy, but also two other 
developments which affected the energy sector. The first was the emphasis on, and necessity of, 
involving the private sector in key policy processes, and the second was the 'corporatisation' of 
key energy institutions, which were restructured with a private-sector veneer. Specifically, 
Neethling's experience with the Minerals Bureau and the operation of the Minerals Policy 
Council, which was set up in the late 1970s and was primarily a forum for the co-ordination of 
the state's strategic goals in the minerals sector with the privately-owned minerals industry, as 
well as the success of the privatisation of S88Ol, the state's strategic energy project par 
excellence, had provided inspiration for the approach outlined in the White Papers, which 
emphasised that 
" •. although the State has the major responsibility for administering the overall energy policy, 
the private sector and the State are jointly responsible for formulating that policy and 
:u Limited co-operation with real southern African states occurred slightly later (following the Nkomati Accord with 
Mozambique), and was tainted by the South African threat of military strikes against their capitals in reprisal for hosting ANC 
delegations, as well as the support of the apartheid state for military and economic destabilisation. Real co-operation on energy 











idcrll if) inll priorities r", th~ dr~t "'e imp~llIfttion of slBleg"'" (1986 Encrg> !'oliC) 
White Paper: I I). 
The policy framc"mk for the White I'aper aimed m achie~inG ~ .. the htGhest me3SUl"I." of freedom 
for market rol'\:e~" and ~in,ohen\Cm ofthc pri\'lIte sector In the formulalion and Implementation 
of the Slrategies~ (1986 Energy Policy White Pnrer.7). In pmctice. in 011l' of the most hcavil)·-
regulated sectors of the economy (apa11 from coal. which was deregulated in 1985). the aim of 
these sentiments wa.~ to integrate the primle lIC('"Ior into the poIicymaking and implementing 
process. raLh...'T than 10 deregulille energy markets. " Iuch did 1\01 in fOCI occur. The emphasis on 
""marir.et rorC\'S~ and -private entt'TJH"isc" C<H:xistoo in an ulleasy tcnsion wilh the OIher main 
empha.~is "rthe White Papers: energy planning. 
Thi§ WliS more forct'fully expressed in the Draft While I'aper, which proposed an "cllcrgy 
management s~sti:m" lIS the core o f CI1CI'J!,) pol icy (lCtivities. which wo ul <.l consiSI of an . Energy 
1'<lHey Committee·. which \\"oul<.l advise Ih<: DM EA on the implementatiun uf 12 ·· in<.livid ual 
energy plal1s~. and the intcgration of these inlo un Ilvcrall ··Energy !'Inn". <.Iivide<.l inlo a long-
leno I 5-ycar plan, revised every 5 yeaTS. and a shon-tenn S· year plan, re~iSl.'(j every 1"0 years 
(1985 Dmfi Energy I'o liey White I'aped), In<.livid ua l ene rgy plans wcn: provided as an Wlncx'o 
the Dmft Energy I'olicy White Pltrer, cOI·ering energy consc .... 'Dtion. coal. umnium. indigenuus 
oil ond WIS. renewab le energy, new en~rgy technologies , electricity, petroleum products. 
synt~lie fuels . the energy resea rch and development prognomme lind "intcr.stote co-operntiun in 
the field of el1l'rgy" (1985 Uraft Energy Policy Whi te l'upC'r:S). lbcsc rl~ renecte(! fatrly 
ac<:urntl.'ly the insti tutional limitations uf the DMEA, containing as they <.lid a detailed pulic) 
progmmme for liquid fuels an<.I coal. II summary of lhe De Villil.'rs Commi!lSion roc clcdrici ty. 
nuthlllg 011 nuclear power OIher than an mssessment of uno.nium prodUl1ion. and II statl-ment of 
c,.;istiaG t:Qn§I.'I'VlIlion measlU"CS. plus plans for fU1u~. more genernl proGrammes (primarily 
in,o)I'ing u publicilY campaign) ( 1985 Drafi Eocrgy I'olicy White f'apcr:6-29J. 
The system "'lIS refined in the Whitc r aper as II ~C\'ntralised and co-unIinated notionul energy 
pI!U1ning system~. consisting of the sub-pJlU1S (minus interstatc oo-uperation), nnd "ith ·cnergy 
eonserv!ll iun ' cor\l"encd to 'encrgy efficiency', plus a 3O-year long.term phm. and a S-ycar plan , 
ehe first of "hieh was d lle \0 be published in 198617 ( 1986 Energy rolicy Whi,e ]'IIf'Cr:9-IO). 
rhe process ",·ould be o,·cl1ICen by an ·Energy Advisory Counci l' COl1lliSling uf rcpmcnlltl h ·cs uf 
relev!U1t puhlic and private-sedor bodies. supponed by ··a rlllional ise<.l nutionnl <C!lCllrch and 
lI<.1visory committee syslem", whkh lIould lIlclude the NI'ER_ In add itiol1, CEF wo ul<.l rll.y U 
siglliliclmt role in its <C$truCture<.l form. including as ·· .. afimdmllellwi dem .. tJI in the fu tun: of 
Ii rmr>Cing of gU"emmcnt involvcmen t in large-scale en ... Tgy projccts uf a strategic nuture.:·, and 











Flgu .. 7.2: 1985 'mlnl 011 crisis' 
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levy. as .... ;dl as the existing research levy on coal, and II new le'y on ele1:rricity ( 1986 bnergy 
Policy Whit~ Pnpt:r: 11-12~ 
Thus lit the end of the period In 1986. thc statc hod endolSCd the most ambitious plan for 
increasing thc capacity of ils C11crgy policy appanlllls_ and extending its reach considerably, 
which was an allempt 10 solve some of the continuing co-ordinalion problems still extant in 
1986. The broad politieul mOlivutioll lor doing Ibis was provided by a 1985 fillam:ial crisis in the 
COUllt!)' caused by a refUSilI o f international bank~ to refinance South AfIiell's foreign borrowing 
(ix.'Cause of the ongoing polilieu! instability), coupled with ~ recession. The result was ~ 
precipitous fill! in the mnd, which euused II 'mini-oil crisis' ill 1985_ as the rnnd price of oil 
soared dranmlicaJly. as pon myed in Figure 7.2 above, ..... hich again focIISCd policy-makers' 
anemion on the oil problem. The period was Chal"JClerised by the ccnlrulisalion and co-
ordinat ion of liquid fuels policy orJllUlS (including Ih ... eEl'). which saw liquid fuels displace coal 
as the most importam focus of energy policy Beti vity. but an ongoing failure to integrate other 
sUllPly seCIOrs_ initiate a c()mprehensivc conservalion programme. or devdop an energy planning 
capacity_ An additional factor wa.~ a significant slowing ()f rxooomic growth (and a recession); 
whereas in 1979_ energy demand gro""1h was Yery high. by the mid·1980s it had slowed 
significantly. Politically, lbe mid-1980s was the high point of political support during armnheid 
for the energy policy project. bllf as the institutional refonns foHowing the White Paper 
unrold~d, the crisis begalllO diminish with the oil price, and political support began \0 ..... ane. 
4) 1987 to 1992 
The fourth phase of the development of South African energy policy and institutions was 
chllract~ris.;,d by B lack of major ~nergy policy initiatives. wilh the exception of Mossgas. which 











rapidly: in 1987 the apartheid state was facing a severe political crisis consisting of an 
insurrection which was no longer significantly curbed by state repression, the failure of Botha' s 
'reforms', and growing international pressure, exacerbated by the refusal of international banks 
to reschedule South Africa's foreign debt in 1985. Two events in 1989 changed the course of 
South African politics radically: first, Botha was replaced as President by F.W. De Klerk, and 
second, the Cold War drew to a close with the fall of communist governments in eastern Europe, 
thus depriving the apartheid government of the strategic context within which it maintained 
support from its key allies, the US and the UK. De Klerk swiftly intensified a process of 
negotiation (which had begun under Botha, but rapidly stalled) with the leadership of anti-
apartheid movements, which culminated in the unbanning of the ANC and release of political 
prisoners in 1990, the signing ofa National Peace Accord between the government and the ANC 
in 1991 which resulted in the beginning of transitional negotiations (the inauguration of the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), in which transitional arrangements and an 
interim constitution were negotiated), the signing of a 'minute of understanding' between the 
ANC and the NP in 1992, which signalled the beginning of negotiations in earnest, and finally 
the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council in 1993 to govern the country in the run-
up to the first post-apartheid elections in 1994 (O'Meara 1996:410-413). 
The significance for energy policy was that from 1989, the strategic imperative which had 
underpinned the initiation of the energy policy project, as well as its major programmes, began to 
disappear as the transitional process unfolded. The nuclear establishment's 'special relationship' 
with the political elite was terminated by De Klerk in 1990 with his order to dismantle the 
weapons programme, coal export restrictions were lifted in 1991, and no further synthetic fuels 
projects were contemplated. More significantly, the importance of energy policy per se declined 
in the view of the political elite as the threat of sanctions disappeared; this was combined with a 
trend towards deregulation (other than in liquid fuels) and privatisation, which, although it did 
not have significant practical outcomes in the energy sector, undermined the case for more co-
ordinated planning processes for the energy system as a whole. The period began with the 
inauguration of the most ambitious energy policy institution of the apartheid era, and ended with 
the demotion of the energy policy function to a lower bureaucratic status than the Energy Branch 
had in 1980. 
The establishment, structure and demise of the National Energy Council (NEC) 
The main institutional outcome of the Energy Policy White Paper was the passage of the 1987 
Energy Act (42/1987), which established the National Energy Council (NEC), the third 











was, in the context of the apartheid state, a very unorthodox and innovative attempt to address 
the severe institutional limitations of the apartheid state's energy bureaucracy. The structure 
consisted of the Council23 itself (the 'Energy Advisory Council' in the White Paper), which 
replaced the EPC, and borrowed its institutional composition from a combination of a company 
board and a stakeholder forum. The key energy producers were represented; the traditional state 
entities (including the now privatised Sasol) by their CEOs or Chairpersons (Eskom, AEC, CEF, 
Saso1), and the private sector via the Managing Director of Amcoal24 (rather than through an 
industry association), and the oil industry via the retired Chairman of one of the four oil majors. 
Consumers were sporadically represented, directly via the Automobile Association, the 
Housewives League, and the South African Agricultural Union (representing commercial 
farmers), and indirectly through a small number of business people. Representation of 
government departments was limited to the DMEA, the CSIR and the Department of Finance, 
and other representatives included a school principal and a middle-ranking official from the 
Department of Education (National Energy Council Annual Reports 1987-1991). 
The Council was chaired by D.P. De Villiers, previously chairman of Sasol and Soekor, and its 
vice-chair was W.J.L. De Villiers, CEO of the AEC (National Energy Council Annual Report 
1988:3); the former was one of the architects (and implementers) of the oil security strategy 
during his time in Saso1. What is significant about this list is a) the NEC's primary function as a 
means for continued co-ordination of state energy sector activity, with only limited 
representation of the private sector or private energy industry (despite the White Paper 
commitments), and b) the limited and arbitrary nature of consumer representation, which 
excluded both systematic representation of private industry and/or business, and energy-intensive 
users. This was indicative of the government's perception of energy policy as defined primarily 
by the liquid fuels-coal nexus (both the AA and the SAAU were important liquid fuels 
consumers), which would also partially explain the lack of official representation from the oil 
industry .. Electricity consumers (including energy intensive users) were in fact represented on the 
newly-formed Electricity Council. The final notable feature of the Council was the relatively 
high status of the nuclear establishment (the AEC's CEO serving as the Vice Chairman). 
The Council was supported by an additional set of 'Advisory Committees' in coal (a statutory 
body, the Coal Advisory Committee(CAC», coal mining research, electricity, energy efficiency, 
transport energy, and 'new and renewable energy' (National Energy Council Annual Report 
1988:7), which had far more detailed stakeholder representation by sector, other than the energy 
2J The term 'NEC' is ambiguous in this context, since it refers both to the actual Council, as well as to the body as a whole (in 
this context, usually a reference to the stafl); thus, from now on, 'Council' will refer to the Council itself: whereas 'NEC' will 
refer to the whole organisation (the stafl). 











efficiency committee, which was chaired by Eskom and consisted of experts, businesspeople and 
others. In addition to these, the ECB was also affiliated to the NEC. The role of these committees 
was to provide detailed recommendations to the NEC on specific sectoral policies: since the 
dominant policy activity of the NEC was research, a large portion of the activities of the advisory 
committees was concerned with the scope of research programmes (National Energy Council 
Annual Report 1991:2-13). Involvement by the private sector thus was more significant in the 
sectoral committees than in the Council itself, which was populated by political 'insiders', who 
were required to obtain security clearance because of the strategic aspects of energy policy: 
meetings of the Council were highly confidential, and the minutes were circulated to a very 
small circle of officials. The Council struggled to develop a consensus on energy issues, which 
became broader and less focused with the decline of the strategic imperative, which also 
removed the political incentive for co-operation: 
" .. one of the reasons why that Council did not work. was that it consisted of the boss men of 
the energy businesses, and other very powerful people .... these council members were so 
intent on looking at their own well-being that the council was basically stagnant - it couldn't 
move; because if a decision was made that favoured nuclear energy, then something else 
wasn't attended to, and if something was done that favoured synthetic fuels, it didn't favour 
conventional fuels, and I think this is one of the reasons why this kitty of money wasn't 
spent, because these guys didn't have a specific vision of where they were going - they were 
all looking at their own interests .. " (Interview with J Basson). 
The Council was supported by an organisation consisting of staff which had been transferred 
from the Energy Branch, as well as the NPER (which was integrated into the NEC), which 
involved another merging of institutional cultures: unlike the staff of the Energy Branch, the 
NPER researchers were not career bureaucrats, and found the autocratic culture of the apartheid 
civil service alien; at the same time, they brought a strongly technocratic understanding of policy 
processes (of which they had litt1e experience) into the NEC, which was particularly influential 
in the transitional process, since the chief energy bureaucrat during the transition, Johann 
Basson, originated in the NPER (Interview with J Hasson). This had two effects: it contributed 
to the political irrelevance of policy, and at the same time, it extended the space available to 
researchers and policy analysts inside and outside the NEC to develop energy policy alternatives 
outside the apartheid-era energy policy paradigm. 
This institutional clash took place in an institutional context which was unique in South Africa. 
The NEC was what Neethling, the NEC's newly-appointed 'CEO', referred to as "a 
private/government sector institution", which had civil service-like statutory functions and 











Administration2s), but which styled itself as a business organisation, headed by a CEO, divided 
into 'Groups' which in turn were headed by 'Group Executives', and installed itself in a new 
location outside the DMEA's more austere building in what resembled a corporate headquarters. 
The shift in the White Paper towards the private sector was thus also espoused as a path to 
successful policy-making and regulation; as the former Chairman of Saso126, the Council's 
Chairman, observed in 1988: 
"It was particularly heartening to those members of Council from the private sector to 
observe, from the outset, the determination amongst personnel to achieve a declared 
objective of developing a private sector culture in this new organisation .. " (National Energy 
Council Annual Report 1988:2). 
Neethling described the NEC as 
" .. a mileston~ in the history of energy policy formulation and implementation in the RSA, 
which not only paved the way for further privatisation of the Government's role in the 
country's energy affairs, but.. .. will also involve the private sector on the highest level in the 
overall planning, co-ordination and guidance of energy policy .. " (National Energy Council 
Annual Report 1988:4). 
The NEC thus took over the statutory and other functions of the Energy Branch (with the 
continued exclusion of the AEC and nuclear legislation), as well as the NPER. The combination 
of statutory activities, research and co-ordination with stakeholders posed certain challenges, 
since statutory functions, including regulation and administration, were carried out by the NEC, 
but the staff carrying out these functions were formally accountable not to the NEC, but to the 
DG of the DMEA or to the Minister (National Energy Council Annual Report 1988:2): The 
creation of the NEC led to the amalgamation of Ministries (not Departments); one Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Technology oversaw the DMEA, the NEC and the Department of Trade 
and Industry (and appointed the Council), which was indicative of a shift from a resource-based 
view of the energy sector to an industry-based view. By 1990 a new Minister of Minerals and 
Energy was appointed. 
The institutional solution to accommodation of the administrative functions, with their separate 
line of reporting, was to house them in a single 'Group', one of three in total. The group 
functions were derived from a fusion between the organisational structure of the Energy Branch 
2S The Commission for Administration oversaw the entire civil service; changes to structure. function and number and level of 
posts had to be approved by it It was somewhat inflexible in matching the level of posts to specific policy areas, and applied a 
rigid fonnula to the ratio of junior to seniorlprofessional posts; thus, in a case such as the Energy Branch, which required many 
senior professionals for analysis and negotiation with powerful stakeholders, the Commission would only grant one 
senior/professional post for every three junior posts, which contributed to chronic skills shortages in the energy bureaucracy. 
26 This was an ironic reflection on De Villiers' part. given that 8asm had only recently been privatised, and was still largely state-
owned, and had been during his tenure, and also heavily protected from competition, and subsidised. Thus it was not subject to 
any of the rigours of the market, which is normally considered in this type of discourse to be the source of the virtues of 'private 











and that of the NPER The fonner was divided into an 'energy supply' and 'energy planning' 
division, which in practice involved a division between regulatory/administrative functions on 
the one hand, and research and policy development on the other. The NPER had been divided 
into four research groups: coal, 'energy in transport', 'alternative energy technology' and 
'systems and models' (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1985:71). 
The NEC's three Groups were 'Energy Administration and Management' (which maintained its 
title for 5 years), 'Electricity and Coal' ('Electrical Energy, Energy Efficiency and Strategic 
Planning' in 1989, 'Electrical Energy, Energy Efficiency and Decision Support' in 1990, and 
'Coal, Electrical Energy, Energy Efficiency and Decision Support' in 1991 and 1992), and 
'Transport Energy' ('Transport Energy and Energy for Development' from 1989 onwards). Thus 
the first group administered liquid fuels legislation and liaised with the liquid fuels industry, as 
well as providing support to the ECB and nominally overseeing CEF; th~ remaining coal 
functions were administered by the second group, but these were attenuated by 1987 to 
monitoring the export programme and the coal resource base. Thus the second and third groups 
presided over an extensive research and development programme, which included projects on 
coal production and utilisation, alternative and synthetic fuels, and energy planning and 
modelling. 
A key feature of the NEC was the way it was funded. While some of its funds came from the 
fiscus (and fonned part of the government's budget), the rest were derived from levies on liquid 
fuels, coal and electricity, which were collected by CEF, which allowed the NEC some latitude 
in addressing the significant lack of capacity which had existed in the Energy Branch: staff levels 
increased from around 30 in the Energy Branch to around 60 in the NEC (see footnote 25). The 
main function of the additional budget was to fund research projects (in a range of fields from 
economic analysis to the development of technical solutions), which were contracted to 
universities, the CSIR, state corporations and private companies in the energy sector, and were 
intended, by the early 1990s, to lead to a number of large-scale demonstration projects, but these 
never materialised (see below). 
The NEC experiment was halted in April 1991 (through the Abolition of the National Energy 
Council Act 95/1991), and the staff and functions of the NEC transferred back to the DMEA 
after a transition period of a year. The actual decision to reincorporate the NEC into the Energy 
Branch followed a process of investigation into funding and accounting processes within the 
civil service (which was an outcome of the accession to the presidency in 1989 of F.W. De 
Klerk, who attempted to rein in some of the excesses of the Botha era), which led to the 
appointment of another inquiry carried out by a retired Director-General of the Department of 











the funding of the NEC, which was underpinned by unease at its quasi-governmental (and quasi-
independent) status, and the inquiry concluded that the best option would be to reincorporate the 
NEC into government (Hansard 27/5/1991:10709-10718, Interview with D Neethling). There 
were three underlying reasons for the demise of the NEC. The first was an outcome of the 
institutional innovation itself: Neethling and others had sought to solve some of the Energy 
Branch's problems (co-ordination problems, lack of capacity, and the restrictions of the civil 
servi'ce environment) by moving the energy policy function out of government, but this created 
its own problems, summed up by an NEC official: 
" .. everyone was very enthusiastic in taking this function out of government and putting it 
next to government, and with hindsight, that was a mistake, because [the NEC was] doing a 
governmental function, of policy development, of policy management, of policy 
implementation, was away from the fife; and whereas government departments worked 
actively with each other and they saw each other as colleagues, this body was now seen as 
something different. We had offices that didn't look like governmental offices, things that 
the government did, wasn't done by the Council - the government had a tender procedure, 
the NEC didn't,. etc .. " (Interview with J Basson). 
While the NEC partly succeeded in improving co-ordination with the private sector, co-
ordination within the government system was worsened, and its political influence diminished. 
Another issue was the combination of the administrative functions with the largely research-
based functions of the rest of the NEC, which hampered Neethling's idea of creating an 
independent agency which could operate across different governmental domains. The second 
reason was that the NEC had internal difficulties: the Council could not develop consensus on a 
broader energy policy framework, and did not share criteria with NEC staff for project 
evaluation: the Council were in favour of 'commercially-viable projects', whereas the NEC staff 
were in favour of more experimental projects; this difference resulted in the massive budget of 
the NEC remaining largely unspent by the time of its demise (Interviews with NEC officials). 
The third reason was that the transition process removed the main political impetus for energy 
policy per se, and the government had little interest in the most relevant policy development 
programme for the transition ('energy for development') in the NEC: thus, political support for 
the initiative, which was strong in the mid-1980s, was withdrawn in the wake of De Klerk's 
accession to power in 1989 and the beginning of the transitional process. 
The result of the abolition of the NEC was threefold. The financial autonomy of the energy 
function in government was removed, and funding was significantly curtailed; research and 
development programmes were significantly curtailed; and a restructuring process was initiated 
which demoted the energy function within the DMEA and reduced its staff component. The 











NEC: it WIIS headed by II Dcpul)' Dircctor-(jcncral and t"()ntainalthree Chief [)ire<:tOl"Dles. which 
were P oonti"uutlon of the NEe's Gf1)IJPS: Electricity and Coal, Energy Administr.l[ion and 
Support Scn-iecs. and Transport EIlCf\:)' and Eoergy for Ikveto~t (;.Iatiorua! Energy Council 
AnllLmI Rcpon 1992:3). Following a Commission for Administr.ltion investigation in November 
1992. the I~ncrgy Ilrnoch Wil5 dowTlscalcd and reduced from 11 ' I]runch' to a 'Chief J)ireetortlte', 
which mvol\'C'd a significant rl-duction In status within th.c civil ser .... ice and within the J)MI:.A. as 
wellllli u reduction III stalT from aro...nd 60 in the NEC to around )0 posts by the end of 1993 
(Dcpanrnent of Minernl and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1993:53). This rcprescntl-d p 
significant cutback in Cllpaclty lind 5i~nalled Ihe demotion of energy policy in the rankin~ of 
national policy priorities. which OCl"()rded wilh the disappearance of the strutegie impernti\'e 
which hud drivcn polilicullllu:rest in cnergy policy since the 19705. 
Policy Activities in the NEe 
Despite the consider:.ble institutional innovation involn'<l in establishing thi:: NEe. dcveiopmem 
of new energy policy ini tiativl"S was minimal during thi s period, Coal policy W~4S limited to Ihe 
rcmoval of export rl'Strictioos in 1991 und ongoing monitoring of reserves. and was also Ihe 
sabjl"Ct of an C.'Ctensive research progmmmc based on 1970s COllI policy objectives. which 
cO\'ert:d all aspeelli of thi:: mining and ulilisution process. and Willi oonducted in elOSC' 
collaboration with the Chamber of Mi/lC5. The moSl promising projects were aimed al tJlilising 
discard coal. massl\"C quantities ofwhieh wen:: produced as a by-producl of the export industry. 
but IlOIIC ofthcsc were implcmcnlt-d, l)c\'elopmc:nts in liquid fuels policy ... ere simi larly limited, 
apan from the conlinUlllion oflne Mossgas projcctllnd tile partial t\"IlCgotiation oflhe regulalory 
system wilh the oil industry in 1991 : 11 ·Iranspon energy' research project in Ihe NEe did 
t:;xlensi\'e ... ork on altemath'c1synthc:tie fuels and on futufC poIl'llt",1 s)'nlhctic fuels planls. but 00 
further oon-crode.bascd fuel~ projects ... ere pursued. In Ihe eh:ctrieity 5~"Ctor, the NEe did in fact 
00 n::;c:an:h OIl various Icchnical aspects of eil-ctricily ~cncru(ion and transmission, lind funded 
· ... ork on elcctrification. Eskom's prohlcm with nvcrcapoci ty from the early 1990s ehnuMltcd the 
need for funher eXlXlnsion. and the moSI significant policy dCl"clopmcm du ring lho: period, 
r:.sl:om's decision to embark on lin elcctrification progr.lmmc. WIIS taken ent irely unilaterally. 
although ironically probably based on rescurch at Ul.'T partially funded I?y the: NEt and thc 
NI'~lt 
The mnin IICIt"ily of the !\'EC. alXll1 from regulation .... as the co-ordination and funding of 
rtSCllrch projects. 'Resem't:h' was an imprecisely-d~fil1<.-d teTm, and embraced many different 
kinds and levels of research, Tltcse can be rooghly catcgorised iOlo II numbcroflevcls. lK:L'Ordlng 
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progressing to h.'ChnicaJ-economic studies. tho..'fl to 
policy subst'f.1or$.. aOO finally to ("flergy potiey 
studies. AI tnc tec:hnieal end o f !he scak StudKOS 
ooncentratc purel) on tec:hnieaJ ibpo..'<:lS of II 
sllI'I:lfic problem, .... ho:n:a.s at the ene!);y potky t."IIll 
of tnc Sl:3Ie. a runge of eompo..'l.i ng eonsider..ltions 
an: matehcd with specitk proposals. '-1ost of the 
15 pages o f PfO)t."CtS listt.'ll in the National Ener!!y 
Councirs (')9ln AnnUtlI ~eport ( 1992,45-5"') 
.... ere t.:chnical sludit.osl ' , dc, eloped in close 
CQ!lubQralion ..... ,th the cnergy suppl y industry. thus 
IOC/Illy useful bUI not easily intellflllc:d into ~'leI"l!Y 
policy pl'()<;esscs (sc:e bel" .... ). rllere is II nolab!c 
progression of funding ulloelilion pal1crns during 
the NEC's cxistence. whIch wt're initially 
established by the UlIdilionaJ concerns of apanheid 
energ) policy. but shilk'll significantly away from these towards lhe end of the po....-iod. os 
ponru)t.-d in Fi!;urc 7.3 abovc. 
The traditional cunccms of the apartheid state (coal. liquid fuels and elcctril:it)·) reechoed the 
bulk of research funding. but were Prol;ressi,·dy repl:Jced hy the nc .... -cra oonccms of ·energy 
ultHlilIlion wnl effick·ncr· and '~'ICIID' fm IlcvdUpIllCIU·. 11,c fOllllcr "'UW ... IIIIIC ..... lIi .. 1I 
c~pandt.-d /;()fIsiderably dunng tiM: life1imc oftnc NEe. did 001 have any significant outeome, and 
CTlCfg) efficiency was only mum."Cted on II ' .cry ~rnaU sc-.tI", in the last few years by the post· 
lIJX1l1hcid govemment 
The latter prowwnme. howe""r. ""as highly significanL A cominuation of the NPER's 
prosramme. the parnmck'fS fur the progmmmc: developed from a fusion of energy di:mand 
studies of ruraJ households. about .... hich nothing was known, and a technical focus OIl 
'ahcmati\"t: energy t~'Chnologi("S· . into ~ brooder fmme ..... ork for approaching the problcm of 
energy POVc:r1y. Th", significance or the programmc was not its illlpact on policy, .... hich wus 
nc:gliglhh: during the NEC"! existence, but for two other reasons: first. it began 10 develop a new 
eooceptual ~SIS for energy policy. and second. by funding c:nergy poveny-rdati:d research, it 
l.."nJargro tnc SplICe available to researchers oUlside too orthodox apartheid-era CnL"Tgy polky 
eommunity to develop ahemativc pi:rsptctives. which would be very instrumenlal in defining thc 
" F", i.-. ~dl"". QfpY<i~ u.I""',,,,, .. , ""''''''low",,, _1"'>11...- ,-.".1 orcool ""no: "",Miuo: dumps-. CJ< -M~ 











post-apartheid energy policy framework during the transition. The fonner reason was based on 
the demand-side approach inherent in energy poverty research, which could not easily be 
reduced to simple questions of supply, given the variety of energy carriers used by poor 
households and the complex determinants underlying their use (Mehlwana & Qase 1998, 
Eberhard & Van Horen 1995). There was thus a nexus between 'development' issues and a 
demand-side approach, a'point made in the NEC's 1992 Annual Report proposing a "new fonn 
of categorisation" of the South African energy economy, in which 
" .. the focus falls on the consumer mther than on the commodity consumed and is more suited 
to the blend of developed and developing sectors that characterise the South African 
economy .. " (National Energy Council Annual Report 1992:4). 
A demand-side approach to energy poverty, and later to the rest of the energy system, was 
pioneered by a new research centre at the University of Cape Town, which was one of the most 
significant outcomes of the NEC's research programme because of its influential role in energy 
policy processes during the transition. What rendered the NEC's support for the centre somewhat 
paradoxical was the broad alignment of its researchers with the anti-apartheid movement. The 
centre initially comprised part of the ERI, but fonned a separate entity in 1989, initially as the 
Centre for Research into Appropriate Energy Technology (CRAET), and a year later as the 
Energy for Development Research Centre (EDRC). The EDRC was funded by the NEC for three 
years, from 1989 to 199228, and focused mainly on energy use by and technology for poor rural 
households, before expanding their brief to cover broader energy policy issues (see next section). 
The emergence and development of the NEC's interest in energy poverty issues, and the funding 
of the EDRC, was a result of the combination of a number of political currents. The concept of 
rural development was removed from the politically-charged area of urban poverty, and it 
existed outside the traditional scope of energy policy, or of apartheid policy per se; thus in policy 
terms, it was an 'unoccupied policy space'. In addition, the location of the NEC outside the 
traditional civil service, and the influence of a non-civil service 'research culture', facilitated the 
extension of the traditional delineation of 'energy research', and the creation of an unlikely 
relationship between an apartheid state agency and a community of researchers intellectually 
(and in many cases, politically) aligned with the anti-apartheid movement (National Energy 
Council Annual Reports 1989-1992). Frequent opposition from the NEC's or DMEA's 
leadership to the relationship with the EDRC (on account of their (correct) suspicions that the 
EDRC's leadership were aligned with the ANC) was partially deflected by NEC researchers 
(Interviews). Ultimately, the EDRC played a very significant role in successfully advocating 
28 The original contract with the NEC was for five years' funding, but because of the EDRes relationship with the ANC, funding 











energy poverty-related policies during the transition, but the NEC, and later DMEA, were 
sidelined due to political constraints imposed by apartheid institutions and the apartheid 
government, as well as the politics of the transition. 
The process of co-ordinating and integrating the Group activities into a broader energy policy 
framework outlined in the White Papers, based on a complicated energy planning system, was 
not implemented, and no energy plans were produced, partly from a lack of capacity, and partly 
from a lack of data, which was caused by a lack of data infrastructure coupled with secrecy 
legislation and practices within the energy sector. This lack of integration was matched by a 
decline in political commitment to specific energy policy outcomes. The NEC was initially 
tasked (via its founding legislation) with three goals: 
"a) to ensure that the energy resources of the Republic, and also those resources that may 
become available to the Republic from time to time, are exploited, developed and utilized in 
the best interests of the country, including research with regard to such exploitation, 
development and utilization; b) to promote the sound development of undertakings in the 
Republic; and c) to advise the Minister on methods by which the objects referred to in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) can best be achieved" (Energy Act (42/1987):Clause 3), 
which were a succinct restatement of the traditional apartheid-era supply-side resource-based 
energy policy framework. By the time of the demise of the NEC, its CEO outlined a completely 
different vision of energy policy, which is worth quoting at length to emphasise the contrast 
between this outline and policy frameworks before and after it: 
380 
"The major features of a realistic framework within which an energy policy and strategy for 
the future can be delineated fall into four major areas, each of which affects the others: 
• Holistie: Policy guidelines should take into account that energy is an inherent part of 
national macro-economic and socio-economic policies, that it is directly related to 
national energy security and that it should be environmentally sustainable. 
• Integrated: Energy supply and demand strategies are inextricably linked. So is the 
use of alternative sources of energy to supplement supply, including cogeneration, 
demand-side management, improved efficiency of use and production and the social 
dimension of improving both the quality of life and the standard of education. 
• Balaneed: Apart from being a sustainable policy, a future national energy strategy 
must achieve a balance between the various domestic sources and carriers of energy. 
One should avoid becoming overly dependent on anyone indigenous or imported 
resource and turning energy import dependence, like oil, into an energy security risk. 
Ultimately one strives to fulfil the country's increasing need for energy at reasonable 
prices which reflect the true cost thereof. Subsidies should be transparent and 










• Constitutional: Energy has inextricable national, regional and local dimensions. In a 
new constitutional dispensation it is possible that a different framework may emerge 
which would reshape the management and implementation of energy at the various 
levels of government 
An energy policy and supporting strategies formulated along the above-mentioned guidelines 
can only be achieved if it is supported by a proper institutional dispensation, appropriate 
long-term strategic planning procedures, flexible and adequate funding, a policy-directed 
technology support programme based inter alia on the principle of productivity, adequately 
trained manpower and finally, public debate" (National Energy Council Annual Report 
1992:2-3). 
This passage is more of a statement of principle than a policy framework, and was notable for 
two things: the first is its hybrid-like conceptual combination of some of the imperatives of the 
supply-oriented energy policy paradigm of apartheid (such as energy security) with a strong 
commitment to paradigm 2 and even paradigm 3 policy measures; the second is the remarkable 
distance between this framework and existing energy policy at the time: thus the provenance of 
this approach to energy policy was the research programmes. However, this fanciful but 
irrelevant and abstract energy policy framework was not sustainable, and was reassessed during 
the Commission for Administration's investigation of the energy policy functions in government 
in 1993, and was reformulated as the new Energy Chief Directorate's ''terms of reference": 
"1. The efficient production and use of electrical energy and coal as an energy resource; 
2. the effective application and use of the various alternative energy resources, including 
natural gas, for socio-economic development; 
3. The acquisition, distribution and use of transport energy resources; 
4. Integrated energy policy planning, in order to ensure cost-effective and sustainable long-
term energy availability and consumption for socio-economic development; and 
5. The management of an investigation and demonstration programme in support of energy 
policy" (Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1993:53). 
The list is notable for its reversion to a set of energy policy goals espoused in the mid-1980s, 
with a few differences: a subtle shift from energy resources to the energy industry (electricity 
and coal), the replacement of 'economic development" by "socio-economic development", the 
replacement of "liquid fuels" by "transport energy,,29, the ever-hopeful commitment to energy 
planning, and the addition of the last point to cater for the remnants of the NEC's research 
programme. In conclusion, the NEC represented a concerted attempt to develop an energy policy 
framework outside of the apartheid-era energy policy paradigm, and more importantly, outside 
29 'transport energy' denotes a demand-side approach to the oil problem (which would include a range of non-liquid fuels supply 











of the orthodox apartheid-era bureaucracy, but without the kind of political support which had 
characterised earlier energy policy developments, either from government or from stakeholders. 
5) 1993 to 1998 
As mentioned above, the process of transition to a post-apartheid political order was initiated in 
1990, and culminated, via a lengthy negotiation process (Codesa), in elections in 1994, which 
resulted in a 'Government of National Unity' (GNU). The structure of the GNU was based on a 
proportional representation system in which the party or coalition with a majority of seats would 
form a government, but be obliged to allocate Cabinet posts to opposition parties, based on their 
representation in parliament. The GNU would then be replaced in 1999 by a new government 
elected under a new constitution finalised by a Constituent Assembly based on the 1994 
parliament. Since the apartheid-era ruling party, the National Party, won the second-largest 
number of seats, the ANC, which won the election by a large majority, allocated to them one of 
two Vice-President positions, as well as a number of Cabinet posts. The National Party withdrew 
from the GNU in 1996 and the allocated Cabinet seats were reallocated to the ANC and other 
opposition parties. The transitional arrangements also included a 'sunset clause' whereby civil 
servants would be maintained in their line functions by the new government, which restricted the 
post-apartheid state's ability to transform the civil service. 
The end of apartheid and the transitional process had several important effects on energy policy 
processes. The first was the removal of the strategic imperative, which, as discussed above, 
resulted in the decline of political attention and patronage, and the resulting demotion of the 
energy policy bureaucracy in the civil service: in addition, the 'special relationship' between the 
state and the nuclear establishment was terminated with the termination of the weapons 
programme and the redundancy of the fuel cycle, and the oil security strategy was scaled down. 
The second important effect was the marginalisation of the energy bureaucracy during a period 
from 1993 to 1996. There were several reasons for this: the fIrst was a general outcome of the 
negotiation process, which shifted policy-making from government departments into the 
negotiating process; the second was the close association between apartheid and energy policy 
via the oil embargo and nuclear weapons programmes, which called the legitimacy of the DMEA 
further into question; and the third was the result of the inability (politically and otherwise) to 
develop a post-apartheid energy policy framework. Partly as a result of these factors, major 
policy initiatives during the transition were negotiated outside the state's policy system, in 
transitional fora such as the National ElectrifIcation Forum, the Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force 











revolutionary processes in a South African context, since for the fIrst time stakeholders outside 
the white political and economic elite were involved in energy policy decision-making. 
This pattern was continued after the 1994 elections: an important role in energy policy-making 
was played by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Minerals and Energy, particularly in 
promoting the formulation of a post-apartheid energy policy framework. The reason for this was 
that the Minerals and Energy portfolio was allocated to the National Party in 1994; thus, the 
imperative for both policy and institutional reform did not come from the Minister. After the NP 
withdrew from the GNU in 1996, an ANC Minister was appointed, and a process of restructuring 
set in motion within the DMEA; ironically, this change in leadership resulted in another delay in 
the fInalisation of a post-apartheid energy policy framework, contained in the 1998 Energy 
Policy White Paper, as the new leadership took some time to establish ownership of the policy 
process: the change in leadership in the DMEA also had a considerable impact on policy 
priorities, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
Negotiation and Reform: the DMEA and the Transitional Process 
The structure of the reformed Energy Chief Directorate in the DMEA bore a superfIcial 
resemblance to the structure of the NEC; however in reality, it represented a return to the supply-
side structure of the mid-1980s, with the exception of the 'energy for development' section, and 
a continuing research programme focused on the activities below, which was largely terminated 
in 1996. The focus of the new structure was on three activities, to which corresponded three 
Directorates: liquid fuels policy, electricity and coal, and 'energy for development'. 
Administrative and regulatory functions were divided between the fIrst two of these: ironically, 
the transition process, and the entry of Eskom into electrifIcation, had rekindled interest in 
central government in the parameters of electricity policy (see Chapter 4). The 'transport energy' 
Directorate, which had begun to develop a broader demand-side perspective under the NEC, and 
had not been the organisational site for the regulation of the liquid fuels industry, took over these 
functions, which became its primary responsibility. The 'energy for development' Directorate, 
the only programme to have survived intact from the NEC, grew substantially in the new 
environment. Energy planning, despite continued commitments to the process, was not 
undertaken by the Energy Chief Directorate, ostensibly on account of a lack of skills: the 1994 
Annual Report noted that these skills defIciencies meant that 
",.no technical staff were available for energy statistics, energy data base development, 
energy-economic analysis, energy modelling and scenario development.." (Department of 
Mineral and Energy Affairs Annual Report 1994:30). 
This skills shortage was not remedied, and integrated energy planning was not undertaken by the 











of the Energy Chief Directorate was significantly influenced by the research-based culture of the 
new leadership, including Johann Basson, the new chief energy bureaucrat, who before the 
creation of the NEe had been in the NPER rather than in the DMEA's pre-1987 Energy Branch, 
and policy processes were conceived in a very technocratic fashion, which significantly affected 
the DMEA's approach to the Green and White Paper processes. 
However, during the transition, the DMEA was displaced from its fonnal policy-making role. 
Policy-making during the transitional period was different from that of other periods in one very 
important respect: a fundamental element of public policy is that it is legitimated through a 
process of endorsement by an appropriate state agency, whereas during the transition it became 
politically costly for the apartheid state to perfonn this legitimation function unilaterally. 
Legitimacy crises in specific policy domains developed separately, and were sparked by a series 
of policy crises during the transition; for example, the 1993 policy crisis beginning with the 
petrol price increase, and progressing to the whole liquid fuels regulatory system, marked an 
abrupt historical point at which the apartheid state (in the fonn of the DMEA) was no longer able 
to unilaterally make or sustain liquid fuels policy without provoking a political crisis. In the 
same way, the legitimation function of state agencies (and on a more detailed level, specific 
policy functions) were not restored en masse after the 1994 elections, but in a piecemeal fashion 
as state agencies were integrated into the post-apartheid state. Processes of integration varied in 
specific cases, but generally these involved some fonn of leadership change (organisational 
ownership), from apartheid leadership to post-apartheid leadership3o, combined with the 
development by the new political elite of specific policy interests (policy ownershipi\ which 
together comprised a process which can best be described as 'taking ownership' by the new 
leadership. 
Thus, what developed in place of the legitimation function of state agencies during the transition 
was a set of temporary institutions which specified the conditions for establishing policy 
30 The essence of the apartheid civil service leadership was defined in two ways: elite officials were usually part of elite political 
networks. but both elite officials and the middle and lower ranks were defmed politically not in tenns of their ideological zeal for 
apartheid, but in tenns of their lack of dissent. Thus, many apartheid-era officials were not apartheid ideologues but merely 
technocrats, who were able to function effectively in the post-I 994 state. The essence of 'post-apartheid leadership' is difficult to 
define. Two processes were simultaneously in operation, which overlapped considerably: first, the new government swiftly 
adopted atrmnative action programmes, which sought to replace an entirely white leadership in state agencies with a largely 
black leadership (the aim being to redress apartheid discrimination and to reflect the demographic composition of the general 
population); and second, apartheid-era leadership (which was largely linked to the apartheid-era National party) was replaced by 
a new leadership who were broadly sympathetic to the new order. Much of the new leadership was well-connected with the 
leadership of the ANC, which facilitated co-ordination with the executive in developing new policies and institutions (both 
because of common membership of elite networks. as well as an outcome of a shared set of goals and values). State agencies 
without a new leadership did not have this advantage, and transformatinn in these was generally very slow until a leadership 
change occurred. Another factor was the authoritarian culture of the apartheid civil service, which severely discouraged dissent of 
any kind; this was largely replaced by a more open organisational culture after 1994. . 
31 One of the problems of the transition was that the ANC simply had no interest in many policy issues, which was to be 
expected, given the scope of their resources before 1994. Thus, in the run-up to the elections, new policies were only fonnulated 
in areas which were particularly important to their constituency (had been politicised in some way), or were particularly relevant 
or interesting to individual policy analysts in the ANC; other policy stances were only developed by the new government over a 











legitimation. These primarily involved processes of consultation, the scope of which was 
specified by a blend of pragmatic and nonnative considerations. The fonner were dictated by the 
realpolitik of the negotiation process, and specified participation of a minimwn of only two 
actors32: a group with a plausible mandate from the ANC (which provided pol,iticallegitimacy), 
and the relevant state agency or stakeholder (which was able to implement the policy). The latter 
was based on an ethic of democratisation, which specified broad participation, particularly from 
previously excluded constituencies33• These considerations were mediated by the negotiation 
process itself, which provided a nwnber of generalised frameworks and procedures for 
'legitimate' consultation processes. Because of the undefined structure of the process, actors who 
were not usually centrally involved in the policy process could play central roles during the 
transition, but were generally marginalised afterwards. 
In the case of energy policy institutions, the displacement of energy policy processes from the 
DMEA occurred in 1992 and 1993 with the launch of the LFITF and the NELF, and continued 
for the Green and White Paper processes: the end of the transitional process did not occur with 
the election of the new government in 1994, but was delayed by the appointment of a Nationalist 
minister; energy policy processes moved back into a formal context (the DMEAlDME). During 
this period, the key factor was the way in which the ANC was represented in the process. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the ANC did not have a detailed position on key energy policy issues, 
other than a general sense that the apartheid-era energy complex should be dismantled. The party 
progressively developed a more detailed policy position in three phases. Phase one began in 
1992 with the ANC Electrification Conference, and ended with the installation of the new 
government in 1994, but a non-ANC minister. Phase 2 began in 1994, and ended with the 
collapse of the GNU in 1996 and the appointment of an ANC minister, and phase 3 began in 
1996 and ended in 1998 with the tabling of the Energy Policy White Paper. During these phases, 
the ANC's policy positions were represented and defined differently by several groups. 
The first two groups can best be referred to as 'energy policy activists,34, and consisted of energy 
policy researchers and political activists associated with the EDRC, trade unions, and NGOs 
32 Many processes involved more than two actors, but an example of a key decision involving only the minimum was the 
accelerated electrification programme: the final decision (which established the 5-year target) was developed in a large forum 
(NELF), but made by only Eskom and the ANC (via a small group of energy policy activists), before the 1994 elections, without 
reference to the DMEA or the government. 
33 The problem with the latter approach was that there were limits to 'universal participation' in policy processes, imposed by 
organisational constraints. For instance, at the 1995 Energy Policy Summit (see below), there was a demand from policy activists 
for 'community participation', but the problem of how the 'community' would participate was not easily solved, and consisted of 
two elements: first, how the 'community' would be represented, and second, the development of sufficient knowledge and 
expertise in energy policy issues to be able to represent 'community' interests in the process meaningfully. These problems were 
not sufficiently addressed, and the concerns of poor communities in the Summit were largely represented by policy researchers, 
rather than by political representatives. The same problem has persisted, as poor communities have not had a systematic or 
sustained presence in energy policy processes since 1994, despite the high status of energy poverty on the ANC's policy agenda. 
34 'Energy policy activists' fulfilled a similar role in this context to Kingdon's 'policy entrepeneurs', in that their primary 
commitment in participating in the policy process was a specific policy agenda stemming from their professional concerns rather 











working in energy poverty-related fields, and with an ANC affiliation. The first group consisted 
of energy policy researchers from the EDRC, which began to play an activist role in energy 
policy processes in NELF (electrification); this was expanded through the EPRET project into a 
more general concern with energy policy per se based on a demand-side perspective heavily 
influenced by the EDRC's work on energy poverty. Their approach was strongly rationalist, and 
the role that this group adopted, although in a novel context (the political transition) with unique 
features, was part of a historical pattern of 'energy policy advocates' beginning in the 1970s. For 
ease of reference, this group will be referred to as 'EDRC policy activists', since almost all of 
them spent a formative period in the EDRC (although some moved into other organisational 
contexts later in the transition). 
The second group consisted of trade unionists and ANC activists, who developed their policy 
positions in the context of the ANC's broader economic policies, as well as in specific energy 
supply sectors within which unions organised (electricity, liquid fuels), in relation to which 
policy proposals' were developed, and will be referred to as 'ANC policy activists' for 
convenience. The influence of the latter group on policy outcomes was more pervasive in the 
long term: the identity of its members was primarily as political activists (either in the ANC or 
the unions) rather than policy activists, and they thus formed part of an ANC political network 
from which the EDRC researchers were largely excluded. Their primary interest, which 
coincided better with the new government's political priorities, was in developing ANC policy 
positions on, and asserting influence over, the energy supply industries (in particular the liquid 
fuels industry), whereas the EDRC policy activists envisaged a new energy policy paradigm. The 
ANC's leadership for various reasons came to share the vision of the ANC policy activists more 
closely; thus many of the non-EDRC activists were appointed to leadership positions in the post-
apartheid minerals and energy policy bureaucracy, whereas none of the EDRC policy activists 
were appointed to positions in the DMEA, and very few to other institutio~5. 
The third group was the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee36 on Minerals and Energy, which 
came into existence after the 1994 elections as a result of a post-apartheid reform of the 
parliamentary system, was chaired by an ANC MP, and played what was for a parliamentary 
committee an unusually activist role (lEA 1996b:66-67). The fourth group was the ANC's 
35 The sources for this section, the history of which has not been documented, are contained in Chapters 4,5 and 6; in addition, a 
more important source was participant observation, both in the EDRC and in the ANC's parliamentary research unit, from 1997 
to 2002. 
36 The apartheid-era parliament had also had a committee system, but it did not playa significant role in policy or oversight, and 
was also very limited in its scope. By contrast, the committee system plays a prominent role in the new parliamentary system: 
each ministerial portfolio (which correspond in most cases 10 a government department) has a corresponding Portfolio 
Committee in parliament, which process legislation in their areas (including the holding of public hearings) before it reaches the 











Minerals and Energy Group (MEG), which was initiated in the early 1990s as a policy forum 
within the organisation. 
The way in which the ANC's policy position was defined and represented evolved considerably 
in the three phases outlined above. During phase 1, energy policy activity was concentrated in 
the two negotiating fora, the NELF and the LFITF (and to a lesser extent, the NFCI). Whereas in 
the LFITF, the influence of ANC policy activists predominated, in the NELF, EDRC policy 
activists predominated, and had a dominant influence on the ANC's MEG, which oversaw the 
drafting of the ANC's two main policy statements in 1994: the Draft Minerals and Energy Policy 
Document (African National Congress 1994a) and the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (African National Congress 1994b), which served as a general policy framework for 
the new government and contained a significant section on energy policy built around 
electrification. The RDP's energy section was drafted by EDRC policy activists, who had 
lobbied the ANC's drafting committee for its inclusion. In the second phase, the PPC, in close 
association with the EDRC policy activists, played a significant role in pressurising a reluctant 
Minister and DMEA to embark on the development of an Energy Policy White Paper; the MEG 
continued to play an important role in the ANC as a forum in what was now the governing party. 
However, the pattern changed considerably in the third phase, which began with the appointment 
ofan ANC Minister of Minerals and Energy, who began a process of replacing the leadership of 
the DMEA. The PPC reverted to a more orthodox role, and the MEG stopped meeting around 
1997; attempts to revive it were made in 2001, but did not succeed. Some ANC policy activists 
were appointed to leadership positions in the DMEA and other associated institutions, and the 
influence ofEDRC policy activists declined sharply. Whereas the latter had been seen as "ANC 
resource people" (Interview with A Eberhard) in phases 1 and 2, as the ANC took ownership of 
the DMEA, they were increasingly marginalised, whereas the more pragmatic but less 
programmatic ANC policy activists became more influential. This was partly a symptom of a 
transfer of policy-making from the party to government, and had significant impacts on what 
kind of approach to energy policy the new government pursued. 
During this period, the internal structure of the DMEA remained the same until a restructuring 
process was initiated by the appointment of an ANC Minister in 1996. In 1997, the Energy Chief 
Directorate was again elevated one level to a Branch, the DMEA was 'rebranded' as the 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) with a new logo and the slogan "Minerals and 
Energy for Development and Prosperity" (Department of Minerals and Energy Annual Report 
1997:ii), and a demographic transformation programme was initiated (in 1996, the DME 











Energy Branch retired, and were replaced by new staffmore aligned (and better connected) with 
the new order. 
During the same period, the DME underwent another internal restructuring period, which 
reflected the relative importance attached to specific policy activities. The 1993 internal structure 
was maintained until 1998, when the Energy Branch was structured into three new sections: a 
liquid fuels section, a 'demand and non-grid' section (which included the non-grid electrification 
programme, renewable energy and 'demand for energy'), and an 'energy supply' section, which 
included electricity and coal policy. The electrification programme, probably the most important 
energy policy initiative of the 1990s, was at this stage still based outside the DME. The 
restructuring process was unfinished at this point, and was only concluded in 2002, with a strong 
emphasis on the energy supply industry, and limited capacity dedicated to demand-side and other 
issues. During this period, the organisation underwent another significant shift in institutional 
culture: the 1993 leadership were largely from a research background (via the NPER and the 
NEC), most of whom had not spent any part of their careers in the orthodox civil service, and 
had a strongly technocratic approach to policy-making, whereas the new leadership were more at 
home in the new political environment and better versed in the political aspects of policymaking, 
but lacked experience, and were thus dependent on the existing framework of relationships with 
stakeholders in policy processes, which was an impediment to significant policy change. 
Policy Developments During the Transition 
Against this background, the transition was characterised by two overlapping phases of policy 
activity. The rust, from around 1992 to 1995, began with the policy fora, and culminated with 
their dissolution in 1995. During this phase, aside from the policy landmarks in the LFITF and 
NELF (which have been thoroughly discussed in Chapters 4 to 6), the boundaries of the energy 
policy domain underwent considerable transformation, and a new and politically-relevant focus 
for energy policy developed in the form of energy poverty. The confluence of this development 
and the debates in the fora led by 1994 to the articulation of a set of general energy policy 
principles by the ANC. This was the starting point of the second phase, which consisted of the 
formalisation of this process in the development of a post-apartheid energy policy framework in 
the form of the 1998 White Paper. The process began in 1994, and culminated with the tabling of 
the final document in parliament in December 1998. During this phase, the other crucial 
development was the appointment of an ANC Minister of Minerals and Energy, who set in 
motion a process of transformation of state energy institutions, including the DMEA. 
The first phase was inaugurated by the 1992 ANC electrification conference, orchestrated by the 











issues and the EDRC policy activists' central role in transitional policy processes, and was 
followed in 1993 by the second major policy crisis of the transition, which led to the 
establishment of the LFITF. Without recourse to historical subtleties, these two fora epitomised 
two different modes of engagement with energy policy by the ANC and its allies: the EDRC 
policy activists' role in NELF was premised on their energy poverty-based approach to energy 
policy, and provided an impetus for significant institutional reform, whereas the unionists' role 
in the LFITF, epitomised by Dr Rod Crompton, later chief liquid fuels bureaucrat in the DME, 
was geared towards accommodation with, control of, and ultimately reform of, the existing 
system: the ANC's approach to energy policy was an uneasy synthesis of these two approaches. 
Politically, and certainly rhetorically, the first approach was more important in the first phase of 
the transition. 
The EDRC had managed to unite a number of critiques of the apartheid energy policy paradigm 
in their research into energy poverty37. The concept of 'energy poverty' emerged in the 
developing world in the late 1970s and early 1980s, both as a corrective to approaches to energy 
policy developed in industrialised countries, and also as a way of linking poverty and 
development issues to energy policy. Energy poverty in its narrowest sense can be defined as a 
lack of energy services vital to basic human needs, which would include cooking and heating. In 
practice, it is defined in a broader sense to include a host of problems associated with the 
intersection between ene~gy use and poverty, including the negative effects on households of 
energy sources such as wood, paraffin and coal (respiratory disease, loss of labour time, 
chemical pneumonia caused by accidental ingestion of paraffin, bum injuries and loss of 
property through fires, loss of forestry resources, etc). These problems can be addressed through 
overcoming problems of access to energy supply (paradigm 1), a mix of supply and demand 
solutions, including for instance better insulated houses (paradigm 2), or more complex and 
sophisticated measures which take into account issues such as social and gender relationships 
within and between households (paradigm 3). 
In South Africa, the existence of energy poverty was, and still is, widespread, as it is in many 
developing countries, with the distinction that due to apartheid it was not problematised for far 
longer. Aside from the militant neglect of the welfare of 'black' households as well as their 
exclusion from the economy, apartheid discourse naturalised poverty as being appropriate to 
'pre-modem' communities. In addition to this, the supply-side framework dominant in apartheid-
era energy policy in the 1970s and 1980s did not accommodate a concern for household energy 
37 While the EDRC was certainly not alone in developing or advocating this approach. it was by far the most significant in two 
ways: first. EDRC researchers (particularly the founding Director, Dr Anton Eberhard) had pioneered energy poverty research in 
South Africa in the mid-1980s, and second, and most importantly, the EDRC had been able to translate their research activities 











needs; where a need for electricity was expressed politicallr8, this was the province of either 
Eskom or local authorities, and the only instances of electrification outside of the boundaries of 
the orthodox electricity market was the subsidised electrification of white farm households for 
political and strategic purposes. As mentioned above, research into the energy requirements of 
rural communities was inaugurated in the state in the mid-1980s, via funding of university-based 
research units by the NPER39, but without any consequences for policy. 
The most important of these research units, the EDRC, made a fundamental transition from a 
technicalJdevelopment focus to a policy focus in 1991, with a concomitant shift of the 
organisation's primary focus from the energy needs of poor rural communities to electrification, 
and specifically urban electrification, which was placed in a broader context of energy demand in 
poor communities. The shift from rural development to electrification was a shift from a 
relatively policy-neutral area neglected by the apartheid state, to a 'dense policy space' occupied 
by various levels of government. The 1992 ANC Conference on Electrification, which was 
orchestrated by the leadership of the EDRC, was a watershed in that it signalled the beginning of 
a co-operative relationship between ANC-aligned energy policy activists and Eskom: 
... .in tenns of the state energy sector .. [electrification] was the frrst real crack where the 
disjuncture between what the state had set up as its energy policy, its concentration on 
security of supply; the disjuncture between that and the real needs of the population began to 
show; an institution within that whole group of energy supply institutions began to question 
its role. So it was a very important area." (Interview with M Pickering, EDRe researcher). 
The open alignment of the organisation with the ANC also led to the termination of the DMEA's 
funding (after 3 years instead of 5). At the same time, however, this alignment transformed the 
EDRC's role from one limited to 'energy and development' issues to a key actor in the 
transitional debates on a post-apartheid energy policy and institutional framework. The EDRC's 
focus on energy poverty was expanded into a more general policy framework through the Energy 
Policy Research and Training Project (EPRET) from 1992 to 1994, as well as involvement in a 
number of other policy-related initiatives, including the ANC-backed Macro-Economic Research 
Group in 1993 and 1994. The primary objective of EPRET was, in the words of the EDRC's 
director: 
.... to raise to the fore of energy policy issues our traditional areas of concern, that of 
widening access to energy services for the poor, urban poor, rural poor." (Interview with A 
Eberhard). 
38 This was only done effectively by white South Africans at the time; political expression by other South Africans was 
discouraged violently at the time. 
39 Much research on energy poverty was done by Eberhard and others during the 19808, with and without state funding: the first 











The EPRET project covered a wide mnge of policy topics, including integrated energy planning, 
energy demand in poor households, integrated energy provision for rural hOUseholds, and energy 
efficiency, environment, transport, and electricity distribution and pricing for poor households 
(EDRC 1994), and the research which originated in the project played a significant role in the 
establishment of Eskom's 1994 electrification target, which was included in the ANC's RDP. 
The broad framework developed in the EPRET project was derived from other developing 
country energy analysts such as Munashinge (1990), and emphasised an integrated demand-side 
approach to both energy poverty and energy policy in general, which established a strong case 
for significant institutional reform, focused in the inadequacy of the state energy policy 
bureaucracy, which did not have the capacity to undertake the kind of demand-side policies 
which this approach required. This dovetailed with political sentiments expressed at the time by 
the ANC, unions and other anti-apartheid groups that the secretive institutions of the apartheid-
era energy complex were a) not sufficiently (or at all) accountable to the public, and b) not 
adequate to address 'legitimate' energy policy problems (Le. not those of the apartheid state). 
This general impetus for institutional reform during the tmnsition was thus most often framed in 
the language of democratisation (which obviously enjoyed a wide consensus), which masked an 
important distinction between two kinds of institutional reform proposed during and after the 
transition, which can be termed 'hard' and 'soft' reforms. Whereas the latter primarily involved 
'normalising' apartheid-era governance arrangements regarding the energy system40, the former 
involved a more fundamental reorganisation of the state energy policy bureaucracy. Support for 
soft reforms was continuous and successful during and after the tmnsition, and resulted in the 
establishment of several regulators (electricity, nuclear safety, pipelines, natural gas), as well as 
the restructuring of the state's liquid fuels assets and operations and the formalisation of the 
liquid fuels regulatory system. Support for hard reforms was linked, as discussed above, to the 
support for a specific approach to energy policy, which was particularly strong in the mid-1990s, 
and was clearly expressed in the White Paper, but not sustained beyond that. 
The fading of this support, and the factors involved, is illustrated by the transformation in the 
mid 1990s of energy poverty policy into electrification policy; while the EDRC emphasised an 
integrated approach to energy poverty, to address a host of complex problems including health, 
fuel wood depletion, affordability and energy-efficient appliances and houses, the only area in 
which these were successfully translated into effective policy was in electrification. During the 
transition, the DMEA funded a wide variety of studies by the EDRC and others into various 
aspects of energy poverty, but no other major programmes were forthcoming. There were several 












reasons for this. The first was a conceptual one: the EDRC itself understood electrification as 
" .. the core of South Africa's household energy policy .. " (Eberhard & Van Horen 1995:vii), 
which was partly responsible for the neglect of other supply options common in almost all other 
developing countries such as LPG. The second was the lack of institutional capacity in the 
DMEA to pursue any household energy strategy (since the electrification programme was largely 
co-ordinated by Eskom, which had the technical, financial and organisational resources), and the 
unwillingness to create such a capacity. The third, and probably most decisive reason, was the 
success with which the electrification programme had been negotiated. The group of energy 
policy activists involved in the negotiations were also influenced at the time by the receptivity of 
both major stakeholders (primarily Eskom) and the ANC to energy policy advocacy: 
" .. there was a massive window which was completely open for changing policy, for actually 
writing policy, so all the research that we were doing, fortunately because of political 
connections, fed straight into the RDP; basically we wrote the RDP, two or three pages on 
energy, and there were two reasons we were able to do that: one was that we had done some 
work and we knew something about it, I wouldn't say a huge amount, but more than 
anybody else, and secondly, we had political connections .... politically we were in the right 
place at the right time. Without either of those.it wouldn't have been there ... .It was very 
unorthodox in research terms. That was what made South Africa so fascinating at the time; it 
was a clean slate .. " (Interview with C Van Horen, EDRC researcher). 
The concept of a 'clean slate' was in fact an illusion; for most of the transition, there was in fact 
a significant 'policy vacuum' in terms of the broad parameters of a post-apartheid energy policy 
framework, but underlying this, there were well-established (and only temporarily interrupted) 
policy trajectories which began to reassert themselves towards the end of the transition. As the 
passage above outlines, the EDRC policy activists were very successful in influencing key policy 
documents in the mid-1990s such as the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
The most significant policy expression of this approach was in the ANC's Reconstruction and 
Development Programme, which was "an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy 
framework" to guide policy formulation by, the new government (Reconstruction and 
Development Programme 1994: 1.1.1 tl. Energy policy proposals were contained in the "Meeting 
Basic Needs" section, rather than in the more traditional context for energy policy (the economic 
policy category, titled "Building the Economy" in the RDP), and were based on three main 
principles. The first was a statement of general principle for a new energy policy framework: 
"Past South African energy policies concentrated on achieving energy self-sufficiency at 
enormous cost (such as the Mossgas project), but seriously neglected the household sector. 
41 The Reconstruction and Development Programme document referred to here is the ANC's Reconstruction and Development 











Future energy policy must concentrate on the provision of energy services to meet the basic 
needs of poor households, stimulate productive capacity and urgently meet the energy needs 
associated with community services such as schools, clinics and water supplies. Energy 
policies must be developed on the basis of an integration of supply-side and demand-side 
considerations" (African National Congress 1994b:2.7.3). 
The second was a specific set of proposals and targets for the electrification programme, which 
was the outcome of negotiation between energy policy activists and Eskom, and the third was the 
proposal that an Energy Policy Council be established to make energy policy, modelled on 
NELF and involving a wide range of stakeholders (African National Congress 1994b:2.7.7-
2.7.9t2• This was echoed a short while later in a proposal in the Green Paper (1995), which 
proposed a national energy policy forum with its own staff, which would potentially 
" .. facilitate the integration of the National Electrification Forum (NELF), the National 
Economic Forum's Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force (LFITF) and various other energy 
related forums into an integrated energy planning framework .. " (1995 Energy Policy 
Discussion Document: Section 2.6). 
This represented a turning point politically for energy policy processes in the transition, since it 
represented the high point of a widespread commitment to what the lEA's report described as 
"off-campus" policymaking, Le. outside of formal government structures (lEA 1996b:70). In 
addition, it represented the peak in influence of what might be termed 'grand energy policy' 
during the transition: in other words, visions of introducing large-scale reforms which would in 
effect rebuild the energy policy system from the ground up, a project which was given credence 
by the EDRC's view of the energy policy domain as a 'clean slate,43. However, interest in 'grand 
energy policy' debates waned as major stakeholders began establishing relationships with the 
new government, and what had been a broad energy policy issue network during the transition 
collapsed as the transition drew to a close. From 1996, effort by the ANC, now the new 
government, was diverted from creating quasi-governmental consultative institutions to oversee 
energy policymaking, to establishing control of energy supply sector policy processes and to 
reforming the existing energy institutions in government. 
4:2 This proposal was elaborated in a comprehensive and detailed fonn in a paper by Eberhard (1995), whereby a National Energy 
Policy Council would provide input from stakeholders and experts to the DMEA, which would remain the main policy agency. 
43 The last attempt that the EDRC made in the 'grand energy policy' vein was an 'Energy Policy Colloquium' in late 1997, a 
closed 2-day workshop to which the most senior representatives of the energy sector were invited, including the CEOs of oil and 
other energy sector companies, the senior bureaucrats of the DME, trade unionists, MPs and others, in the vein of other energy 
policy fora during the transition. The aim of the event was to create momentum in the stalled White Paper process, and the first 
blow to the event was the failure of the Minister to attend. It became apparent however that major stakeholders had begun to 
build relationships with the new political leadership outside the transitional fora. and no longer considered them necessary. The 
outcome of the meeting was inconclusive, and it turned out to be the last in what was intended to be a series of 'Chatham House'-
type meetings of energy policy stakeholders to build consensus for a post-apartheid energy policy framework. and also a sign of 











The second phase of policy development during the transition was the development of the 1998 
Energy Policy White Paper, which was preceded by an 'Energy Policy Discussion Document' 
(Green Paper)44, published in 1995. The idea of an Energy Policy Discussion Document was 
raised by the EDRC with the DMEA in 1994, and the impetus to develop a White Paper came 
from the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, with which the EDRC policy activists had 
developed a close relationship. In 1995, in a reversal of orthodox policy roles, the chairperson of 
the PPC called the leadership of both the Energy Chief Directorate and the DMEA into his office 
and ordered them to initiate a White Paper process, and to task the EDRC with facilitating the 
process (Interview with A Eberhard). 
The drafting process was a synthesis of two different organisational contexts: the DMEA and the 
EDRC. Interviews with participants revealed a sharply different perception of the nature of the 
process and the relative value of different contributions: EDRC policy activists saw the White 
Paper as an abrupt break with the past, and as a fundamentally consultative process in which they 
played a central facilitative role, whereas DMEA officials saw the White Paper as the 
culmination of a continuous process of policy analysis begun in the NEC during apartheid, and 
continued during the transition. The DMEA began the drafting of 13 'synthesis documents', 
undertaken by outside consultants (because of lack of capacity - Interview with J Basson), the 
aim of which was to summarise the conclusions of the energy policy research programme begun 
under the NEC, and in that sense the White Paper was seen by the Energy Chief Directorate's 
leadership as the culmination of the NEC project, which coincided fortuitously with the 
requirement for a post-apartheid energy policy framework: in other words, the White Paper 
process was conceived by the Energy Chief Directorate in almost entirely analytical terms. This 
was the result of several factors. 
The most important one was probably a lack of capacity and experi~ce in policy-making in 
many areas, which stemmed from two sources. First, the Energy Chief Directorate had not 
developed capacity to make policy in most areas which were required for a comprehensive post-
apartheid energy policy (with its significantly expanded domain): as discussed above, the areas 
in which the state energy bureaucracy had been involved in policy-making itself were quite 
limited, as noted in the lEA's 1996 report: 
"Historically, most energy policy making in South Africa has been de facto performed by 
indusUy. The large private and parastatal companies that dominate the sector communicated 
their wishes to the Government in an often informal. non-transparent process. There was also 
a devolution of policy making authority to various parastatal subsectoral bodies, such as the 
44 The South Afiican Energy Policy Discussion Document was commonly referred to as the 'Energy Green Paper" since it 












Electricity Council, which supervises Eskom, and the Central Energy Fund, which looks 
after subsidies to synthetic fuels, offshore exploration and its regulation, and manages the 
strategic oil storage. One legacy of past practice is the lack of policymaking capacity within 
the DMEA. The DMEA is thus understaffed and underskiIled for the policy agenda it faces 
and for undertaking the policy making role" (lEA 1996b:70). 
Second, the Energy Chief Directorate's approach was heavily influenced by a research-based 
institutional culture inherited from the NEC (including both the head of the Energy Chief 
Directorate and the head of the DMEA), which also influenced their concept of policymaking: 
"DMEA officials appear to be primarily engaged in analysis .... while looking to industry, 
consultants and think tanks for policy formulation" (lEA 1996b:69). 
The Energy Chief Directorate's reliance on analysis as a substitute for policymaking was, in 
addition to the organisation's research-influenced institutional culture, a result of both the 
historical marginalisation of the energy bureaucracy in important decision-making processes, and 
a reaction to the political uncertainties of the transition. 
This latter factor also played a significant role in the DMEA's analytical understanding of the 
process: officials found it difficult to function in the new political environment, for two reasons. 
First, the energy policy domain had changed during the transition, and included a host of new 
issues and actors, and the long-term relationships which the energy bureaucracy had developed 
with important stakeholders were only a partial basis for policymaking in the new environment; 
and second, officials were out of their depth m the new political environment, both in terms of 
their familiarity with the new political actors and issues which formed a prominent part of it, and 
also in terms of their experience of consultative political processes. Not only were officials 
unfamiliar with these latter processes, which formed such an important aspect of transitional 
politics, but, due to the factors discussed above, were in many instances also inexperienced in the 
politics of much of the energy sector itself. The difference between officials' conception of the 
policy process, and that of the energy policy activists is clearly portrayed in this extract from an 
interview with an EDRC researcher, which also highlights the fact that policy content was not 
the main source of difference: 
"[Senior DMEA officials] were rationalists and did not in any way understand the process 
side of policy, and when in those early meetings we said 'but there's process and content', 
they were saying 'process? What's that?'; for them it was a technocratic exercise putting a 
policy document together. They weren't insensitive to including issues like household 
energy needs, but had no clue about how to conduct a policy process, and we brought that. 
I'd spent my life operating in the political realm, really, and it was a very familiar realm for 











world, so they became very dependent very quickly on the kind of inputs and connections 
that we brought.." (Interview with M Pickering, EDRC researcher). 
A point which needs to be clarified is that the 'political realm' Pickering was referring to was the 
broad political environment of the transition, and within that, familiarity with the kinds of open 
political processes which had developed in the anti-apartheid movement, and which formed an 
important institutional resource for the transition. DMEA officials were all too familiar with the 
autocratic political and institutional environment of the apartheid state (Interview with J Basson), 
and it was the stark contrast between the two environments which left them ill-equipped for the 
White Paper process. In addition to this, the kind of extensive consultative processes which were 
so central to policy processes during the transition were a historical phenomenon of short 
duration; although the post-apartheid state features many institutionalised forms of consultative 
processes, these processes ceased to have the central importance that they had during the 
transition (see above). 
The 'core project team' for the Green Paper consisted of two senior officials from the DMEA 
and five researchers from the EDRC, including the editor and project manager (1995 Energy 
Policy Discussion Documentvii). The document consisted of a structured consideration of key 
energy policy issues, with a number of competing 'opti~ns' for each issue in an attempt to 
represent the range of views on specific policy issues then current. The structure of the document 
is an indication of a significant shift in the conceptual framework of energy policy deliberation; 
in addition to the usual supply sectors, there is a detailed section on governance of the energy 
system, and sections on "cross-cutting themes", including health, environment, energy efficiency 
and human resource development (1995 Energy Policy Discussion Document xi). 
The White Paper process, which was initiated in 1995, included an "Energy Policy Summit" in 
late 1995, to which a very wide range of stakeholders were invited. The process was stalled in 
1996, when an ANC Minister of Minerals and Energy was appointed to replace Pik Botha, the 
Nationalist minister who retired when the Nationalist Party withdrew from the Government of 
National Unity. The appointment of an ANC minister also heralded a process of leadership 
change within the DMEA as the apartheid-era leadership was replaced by a new generation of 
civil servants, many of whom were aligned more closely with the policy aims of the new 
government. The final White Paper was tabled in 1998. 
Key policy objectives listed in the White Paper were increasing access to affordable energy 
services, improving energy governance, stimulating economic development, managing energy-
related environmental and health impacts, and securing supply through diversity (1998 Energy 
Policy White Paper:ix). Specific policies are elaborated in three sections, which deal with 











energy planning, energy efficiency, statistics and infonnation, environment, health and safety, 
research and development, hwnan resources, capacity building, education, and information 
dissemination (1998 Energy Policy White Paper:xv). The most notable characteristic of the 
White Paper is that it contains strong commitments to a demand-side approach to energy policy, 
with a strong emphasis on integrated energy planning, energy efficiency and the mitigation of 
environmental impacts. 
In terms of substantive policy issues, there are four areas which are notable. The first is 
household energy, or more specifically, the provision of affordable energy services for the poor, 
which outlines a programme of providing a variety of affordable and safe energy services to poor 
households in different contexts. The second is the emphasis on process and capacity within the 
DME, which emphasises a) the use of 'integrated energy planning', and b) the appropriate level 
of skills and capacity to be able to set up a functional policy system. The third and fourth areas 
of policy which are notable are the supply sectors relating to electricity and liquid fuels. These 
are interesting on account of the significant changes in these two sections between the first 
confidential draft in 1996 (1996 Draft Energy Policy White Paper) and the final draft in 1998 
which makes them stand out from the White Paper in general, the rest of which went through 
marginal changes. 
The electricity section contains far more concrete proposals for restructuring both the supply and 
distribution sectors, and creating a competitive electricity market. The liquid fuels section 
contains a nwnber of new items. The general framework for the draft was a non-specific 
commitment to long-term phased deregulation. The framework in the final version is much more 
detailed and specific, and includes a strong commitment to deregulation, a commitment to black 
economic empowerment as a condition for deregulation (entirely absent in the first draft), and a 
commitment to promoting the development of a 'refining and petrochemicals hub'. The 
deregulation process is explained in a series of 'milestones', which hinge on ''the sustainable 
presence, ownership or control by historically disadvantaged South Africans of approximately a 
quarter of all facets of the liquid fuels industry" (1998 Energy Policy White Paper:61), as well as 
various transition arrangements relating to synthetic fuels, the retail sector and regulatory 
frameworks. 
6) 1999 to 2003 
Following the White Paper, the DME was reorganised over a period of several years into its 
current structure, which consists of two branches, an Electricity and Nuclear branch, and a 
Hydrocarbons branch, both headed by a Deputy Director General. The Electricity and Nuclear 











deals with nuclear safety, nuclear technology, and nuclear non-proliferation, while the former 
deals with electricity policy analysis and regulation, electricity supply, electrification, and houses 
the Integrated National Electrification Programme. The Hydrocarbons Directorate contains the 
Energy Planning Chief DirectOrate and the Hydrocarbons Chief Directorate. The latter contains 
directorates in coal and gas, petrolewn policy and petrolewn and gas regulation. The former 
contains directorates in environment and energy efficiency, database and administration, and 
renewable energy. In terms of the White Paper, restructuring processes have been stalled in the 
liquid fuels industry and the electricity distribution industry, and indefinitely deferred in the 
electricity supply industry. 
There have been two main developments in the post-white paper institutional environment. The 
first is a series of changes in the structure of the department and its associated institutions, and 
the second is a proliferation of regulatory agencies, which represents a fundamental shift in the 
governance culture of the energy system in the wake of the transition from apartheid. 
New regulatory agencies have been established in electricity (1994), natural gas (2001), 
upstream petrolewn and gas (2000), nuclear safety (1999), and petrolewn pipelines (2003). In 
addition, the Petrolewn Products Amendment Act (2004) formalises the regulation of the retail 
liquid fuels industry, which will in terms of the Act be handled by the DME. The current 
intention is to create a consolidated Energy Regulator, which will amalgamate electricity, gas 
and pipelines regulation, and eventually liquid fuels regulation. The upstream petrolewn 
regulator and the nuclear safety regulator will remain autonomous, since their regulatory 
functions are not synonymous with economic regulation. Other notable changes include the 
restructuring of the CEF, and the formation <if the state oil company PetroSA, and the 
restructuring of the AEC and its 'rebranding' in 1999 as the Nuclear Energy Corporation of 
South Africa (NECSA). 
Another significant development since 1994 is the establishment of an effective competition 
regulatory system in the form of the Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal, 
which were established in terms of new competition legislation in 1998. The Commission has 
shown considerable interest in the non-competitive aspects of the liquid fuels industry, 
completed one investigation into the retail sector of the liquid fuels industry (the Ratplan), and 
declared the Sasol Supply Agreement illegal in terms of post-1994 competition legislation. The 
agreement is due to expire shortly, and in the meantime, the oil industry has applied to the 
Commission for a temporary exemption. 
With these developments, the post-apartheid state has almost completed the reform of apartheid-
era energy institutions specified in the White Paper, which is a very significant achievement; 











side approach to energy policy (including demand-side policies to address household energy and 
transport energy problems, and to promote energy efficiency) have been severely neglected, for a 
variety of reasons. One of the curious outcomes of the restructuring process undertaken since 
1996 was that the 'energy for development' section of the Energy Chief Directorate, which 
commissioned ground-breaking research before 1996 into household energy issues, was shut 
down in a 1997 reorganisation, as were other potential demand-side programmes, as part of a 
restructuring process. The new structure of the DME has elevated the energy bureaucracy to its 
most senior level since the NEC, but the internal structure of the energy bureaucracy is built once 
again around the energy sector, with the exception of a small section of the Department 
dedicated to a massive range of functions, including renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
integrated energy planning, and energy/environment issues: although there have been promising 
policy developments in these areas, no effective policy measures have been forthcoming. An 
exception is perhaps integrated energy planning, which was successfully outsourced to a 
resurgent ERI (now merged with the EDRC into the Energy Research Centre (ERC)); however, 
the impressive Integrated Energy Plan (released in 2003) does not playa significant role in 
policy decisions. 
Conclusion 
The development of energy policy activities in government was significantly influenced by three 
factors: the periodical occurrence of various policy crises, the structure and activities of existing 
policy communities, and the various institutional contexts within which these functions 
developed. Policy crises played an extremely significant role in generating support for various 
energy policy initiatives, and because of this important role, significantly influenced the scope of 
the energy policy domain. The first was the coal policy crisis of the early 1970s, which laid the 
foundations for an integrated approach to energy supply policy through the coal issue; this was 
followed by the 1973 oil crisis, which was seminal in creating the political impetus for the 
establishment of energy policy institutions. The third crisis was the 1979 oil crisis, which, with 
other factors, led to a reorganisation of the state's energy supply-related institutions into a 
centralised department, and had a prolonged effect on the South African economy, culminating 
in the precipitous decline of the rand against the dollar in 1985, which led to another mini-oil 
crisis as the oil price in rands rose precipitously. This 'focusing event' played a vital role in 
creating the political support required for the apartheid state's most grandiose energy policy 
proj ect, the NEe. 
The final, and prolonged, policy crisis during the period of study occurred from 1991 to 1996. 











the end of apartheid, which cast the legitimacy of apartheid state institutions and policies into 
doubt. The main features of this crisis were the collapse of the 'security' rationale, which had 
been fundamental to apartheid energy policy, and the fragmentation of traditional energy policy 
networks, which were only re-established on a new footing after the mid-1990s. The crisis 
evolved in several phases: in the first, apartheid-era energy institutions came under attack from 
the apartheid state itself as the security rationale waned: the accession of a reformist leadership 
in 1989 led directly to the dismantling of the nuclear weapons programme, and the concomitant 
end of the nuclear establishment's special relationship with the political elite. Political support 
and tolerance for the NEC also rapidly disappeared with the disappearance of the strategic 
imperative, and it was terminated in 1991, and its functions returned to the DMEA in a 
significantly-reduced form. In the second, the boundaries of the energy policy domain, as 
defined by the apartheid state, underwent significant modification as policy activities moved out 
of government into transitional negotiating forums from 1992 to 1995. The appointment of a 
non-ANC minister to the DMEA prolonged this phase, and only from 1996 on were boundaries 
and policy communities re-established, an ANC minister appointed, and policy-making moved 
from the transitional fora back into government. 
Within this historical structure of crises, South African energy policy evolved in the six phases 
noted above. In the first and second phases, the energy policy domain 'was defmed in terms of a 
coal-liquid fuels nexus based primarily on a resource-based approach, which had its institutional 
roots in the transformation of coal policy in the early 1970s. An energy policy community 
emerged in the 1970s, primarily focused on the EPC, which comprised state agencies involved in 
coal and liquid fuels policies as well as economic planners, but no private sector participants, 
who were limited to involvement in sectoral policy communities where their influence was 
substantial. In other words, energy policy in the 1970s involved collaboration between policy 
domains, rather than the establishment of a new one, or a 'weak' implementation of a paradigm 1 
energy policy. Integration of the energy sector was thus partial, and based on a limited subset of 
the energy sector as a whole defined in terms of its strategic relationship to liquid fuels supplies, 
and significant political and institutional barriers existed to further integration. Energy policy 
, 
capacity was very limited, and energy planning activities were limited to using econometric 
models to forecast demand on a linear basis. 
The energy policy paradigm was defined through a combination of different factors. First, the 
country's political leadership saw energy policy in narrow terms primarily related to oil and coal: 
typically, electricity problems (such as the policy crises in the 1970s and 1980s) were not 
regarded as 'energy policy crises': thus, political support was primarily directed at achieving an 











achieve a certain degree of agency co-ordination and integration, only extended to these goals; as 
a result, individual supply sectors were largely able to maintain their autonomy, and in the case 
of electricity and the nuclear establishment, maintain it almost completely. Third, existing 
institutional limitations, such as the lack of any existing electricity policy capacity outside 
Escom, the weakness of the ECB, and the secrecy of the nuclear establishment, posed further 
barriers to integration and the flow of information. As a result, support for the development of 
comprehensive energy policy institutions was weak, and although the small energy policy 
bureaucracy which was established did undertake (via its network of research institutes) some 
ground-breaking work, it had no political relevance. Energy policies were fmnly paradigm 1 
policies, and demand-side policies were not considered. Typical policy solutions involved 
massive investments in energy supply mega-projects such as the new coal mines, the Sasol 
plants, and the fuel cycle plants. 
In the third phase, a higher degree of integration was attained through the creation of the DMEA, 
but only of coal and liquid fuels-related policy and regulatory institutions. In the latter half of the 
1980s, after the De Villiers Commission, electricity policy was brought further under state 
control through a process of institutional restructuring, but not integrated into the state's energy 
bureaucracy, except, as in the 1970s, in terms of coal. By the mid-1980s, the limits of the 
development of the apartheid state's energy policy paradigm had been achieved, with the 
complete integration of the oil security strategy (after the privatisation of Sasol) in the 
restructured CEF and the: DMEA. A more ambitious project for the further integration and co-
ordination of the entire energy supply sector, the NEC, was not successful. Thus, apartheid-era 
energy policy was confined to the development of a limited form of paradigm 1 energy policy, 
based on resource development, and thus focused institutionally and in terms of policy activity 
on primary energy supply. 
The NEC did, however, create space for the development of a different set of perspectives based 
on energy demand, through a large-scale programme of research funding. A host of political and 
institutional factors led to the failure of this initiative; although researchers began to explore (and 
fund) paradigm 2-type energy policies, institutional and political limitations rendered these 
initiatives ineffectual. The one fruitful strand of research funding, supporting research on energy 
poverty issues, created one of the strangest organisational partnerships of the apartheid era 
between researchers broadly aligned with the anti-apartheid movement and an apartheid state 
agency, and provided the institutional context for the development of the group of ANC-aligned 
'energy policy activists' which played a central role in the transitional period. 
The political transition led to the collapse of the apartheid energy paradigm with the removal of 











the NEC, was dismantled in 1991 and replaced for a short time by an 'advisory' structure, but 
this fell into disuse within a year. At the same time, regulation of the coal market was fmally 
abolished, and the synthetic fuels programme was halted, with no further prospect of further 
synthetic fuels projects after Mossgas. The nuclear establishment also lost its special relationship 
with the political elite. Within the DMEA, energy planning, which had (at least symbolically) 
been one of the main activities for co-ordinating the supply sectors, ceased, and was only 
continued in the late 199Os. The energy policy community thus dissolved, and its key actors 
focused instead on policy activity within their individual supply sectors. These policy 
communities collapsed during the transition into issue networks, where access was relatively 
open, and there was no consensus on a general policy framework or on appropriate types of state 
intervention; the DMEA's role was further weakened, and institutional reform was high on the 
policy agenda. One of the striking features of the early transition, from 1992 to 1995, was the 
formation of an energy policy issue network: stakeholders invested considerable resources 
participating in this issue network due to uncertainty concerning the nature of post-apartheid 
energy policy, and its influence on other policy domains. A central role was played by the group 
of ANC-aligned energy policy activists, who, informed by energy poverty research, and 
influenced by other energy policy theorists in developing countries, advocated a comprehensive 
approach focused on integrated energy planning, which would require significant institutional 
reforms. The core of this approach was a paradigm 2-type demand-focused approach to energy 
policy, with many elements of a paradigm 3 approach (particularly in relation to environmental 
externalities and energy poverty), and elements of the approach which coincided with the 
critique of apartheid-era energy policy and institutions espoused by the broad anti-apartheid 
movement in the process of taking power, were supported. While these proposals were on the 
agenda, and while the individual supply sector policy networks were weakened, stakeholders 
from these networks saw energy policy deliberations as a means to gain more certainty and 
influence in their own policy domains. Major energy sector stakeholders participated in 'Grand 
energy policy' deliberations such as the 1995 Energy Policy Summit for two reasons: first, they 
wished to protect their own domains and gain certainty about future policy developments, and 
second, they wished to build relationships with the new political elite. However, interest in 
'grand energy policy' waned rapidly after the reformation of energy supply sector policy 
communities beginning in 1996, since both these aims could be achieved elsewhere, and the 
threat of a programme of major institutional reform in the energy policy system was receding. 
These elements referred to above comprised a policy framework outlined in the 1998 Energy 
Policy White Paper, on which there was a fragile consensus. However, it was superseded by the 











was based on two processes. First, policy communities in the important supply sectors 
(electricity and liquid fuels) were reformed in a process beginning with the transitional 
negotiating fora, and ending in the late 1990s when the new state had clarified its own industrial 
and economic development goals. Second, there was a process of 'regularisation', which 
consisted of the formalisation of apartheid-era regulatory systems (primarily in liquid fuels) and 
their location in the state, coupled with the establishment of new independent regulatory 
agencies, and the development of new policy capacity in the DME in the energy supply sectors. 
The primary aim of the post-apartheid state in this regard was to establish a degree of 
'infrastructural power' in regard to the energy sector. Although recognised both in the White 
Paper and in Ministerial pronouncements as significant, demand-side policies were not given 
prominence in the new institutional structure of the DME or its associate institutions. The key 
demand-side concern of the transition, household energy, was sidelined by the success of the 
electrification programme. Thus, although th~ White Paper espouses a paradigm 2 approach to 
energy policy, the post-apartheid energy policy is again a variant of paradigm 1, based not on 
primary resources (which did not feature in 1990s energy policy debates) but on the energy 
supply industries (electricity, coal and nuclear); however, the post-apartheid energy bureaucracy 
has had limited success in integrating energy sector planning processes into a general energy 
policy framework. The structure of the new energy policy paradigm is again defined and limited 
by a) the state's relationship with individual supply sectors, and b) a weak and politically 
unsupported energy policy and planning function4S• The two central issues of the post-apartheid 
energy bureaucracy are service delivery to poor households, which is mainly pursued in the 
energy realm through electrification, and control of the energy sector (including state-owned 
enterprises and various state agencies). The use of the term 'control' here does not mean direct 
control (nationalisation 46), but bringing the energy sector into the circle of influence of the new 
political elite, echoing similar preoccupations of the new government across the economy due to 
the conditions of the political transition: a (probably temporary) division between the political 
and economic elite of the country, and consequently political and economic power. The two 
main avenues through which this control is being pursued are a) the development of new elite 
45 The DME did in fact produce an impressive and detailed Integrated Energy Plan (Department of Minerals and Energy 2003), 
the production of which was outsourced to the Energy Research Institute (now merged with the EDRC into the Energy Research 
Centre), which developed significant expertise in energy modelling in the late 1990s. However, the capacity to make use of the 
Plan and its associated models within the DME is limited, and more importantly, the institutional arrangements for making key 
energy policy decisions (for instance, expansion of the electricity system) in the context of the energy planning process do not 
exist. 











networks through a range of measures including the promotion of leadership change 47, and b) a 
programme of institutional reform, which mainly consists of the establishment of independent 
regulators and the ending of informal regulatory practices which characterised apartheid, both of 
which are designed to strengthen the influence of the state vis a vis the energy sector. These are 
all goals related to specific energy supply sectors, and there are thus no strong political or 
economic pressures to develop energy policy measures per se. Thus, post-apartheid energy 
policy is negotiated primarily within the individual supply sector communities, and it is 
debatable whether there is any meaningful interaction between stakeholders in the two key 
supply sector policy communities (liquid fuels and electricity). This is reflected in the structure 
of the energy section of the DME, which is headed by two Deputy-Directors General, one 
overseeing electricity and nuclear power, and the other overseeing liquid fuels and energy 
planning. The latter forms the effective core of the energy section, since the DME's role in liquid 
fuels policy and regulation is decisive, whereas apart from the electrification programme, the 
DME has been unable to gain significant influence in electricity policy-making. 
47 Black economic empowerment and atrmnative action policies are fonnally designed to redress the previous exclusion of black 
South Africans from the higher echelons of the private sector and the state, but one of its effects is to promote integration 
between the economic and political elite, since the black economic and professional elite are generally well-connected (and 
sometimes identical with) the new political elite. The post-apartheid leadership is 1'101 however defined in tenus of race: a number 













Having reviewed in detail the five areas of policy and institutional development above, the study 
will be concluded below by a discussion of the insights into the above material provided by the 
three theoretical frameworks outlined in Chapter 1, followed by a brief discussion of the main 
research questions outlined in Chapter 1 which have not been addressed either in the text above, 
or in the discussion which follows. 
The first theoretical framework considered was the policy networks framework, with particular 
emphasis on the formation and perpetuation of a specific type of policy network, policy 
communities. This approach proved effective in explaining the development of policy in 
individual supply sectors: in all four areas of policy discussed above, policymaking could be 
shown to have taken place in a policy community: participation was extremely limited, policy 
issues were resolved within the community, and policy paradigms could be identified which 
delineated acceptable problems and alternatives. In addition, major policy change was correlated 
with changes in the policy community. The process of policy community formation was 
consistent with the requirement of the state to increase its 'infrastructural power': however, there 
were some unusual contexts in which this occurred, since in three out of the four areas reviewed, 
some or all of the major stakeholders were themselves state agencies, some of which actually 
carried out policymaking outside of the orthodox government departments which performed this 
task within the Westminster-type bureaucracy of the pre-1994 era in South Africa. In these cases, 
resource exchanges were more complex, and overlaid by jurisdictional conflicts, which were 
waged inside as well as outside the policy community; however, the same processes took place. 
Jurisdictional conflicts were in many instances contained by the policy community, and policy 
was an outcome of a negotiation process to resolve jurisdictional conflicts. An example of this 
was the jurisdictional dispute between Escom and the nuclear establishment in the 1960s, which 
was resolved through Escom's announcement of a limited nuclear programme. Thus, the 
function of policy communities was often to negotiate jurisdiction within the state, to assert 
boundaries, and to preserve autonomy, which was a significant reason for agencies to participate 











The development of energy policy itself in the early 1970s required 'a more complex analysis 
which posed several central tasks: 1) to determine whether there was an energy policy 
community; 2) to identify the energy policy domain; and 3) to explain the relationship between 
the energy policy community and other existing policy communities related to the areas 
discussed above. So far as point one is concerned, the conclusion reached in Chapter 7 was that 
there was indeed an energy policy community, from the point at which the EPC was established 
(1974) until the beginning of the transition, where a number of factors, almost all of which were 
triggered by the removal of the security imperative, caused its dissolution, and decision-making 
reverted to the individual supply sector policy communities. During the transition, an issue 
network was established, but this faded away as new supply sector policy communities emerged 
in the second half of the transition. These communities dominated energy policy decision-
making after the transition, and overall co-ordination of energy policy per se was weak, for 
reasons which will be discussed further below. 
The second and third points, the identification of the scope of the energy policy domain and the 
interaction between the energy policy community and other energy supply sector communities, 
was undertaken in Chapters 3 to 7 by examining three factors in the energy policy system: 1) the 
pattern of decision-making in individual supply sectors and in the energy policy bureaucracy 
after its establishment in 1972; 2) the conceptual basis for the existing energy policy paradigm; 
and 3) the actors involved in key decisions. The apartheid era will be discussed first, followed by 
the transition and the post-apartheid era. In terms of decision-making, the central feature of 
apartheid-era energy policy was the coal-liquid fuels nexus, and the two successful (in terms of 
the policy goals of the apartheid state) programmes of that era were focused on these areas. 
Other areas of energy-related policy were not well-integrated into energy policy decision-making 
processes, or not integrated at all. Underlying this pattern of decision-making was a conceptual 
framework which· defined energy policy in terms of primary energy/natural resources, and 
particularly the exploitation of South African natural resources. Structuring this decision-making 
pattern was a set of institutions inaugurated in the early 1970s, of which the two most significant 
were the EPC and the Department of Planning's energy section. The composition of the EPC did 
not match the decision-making pattern of the EPC: decisions regarded as the prerogative of the 
EPC excluded areas of policy such as the liquid fuels market, the electricity market and any 
decision-making pertaining to nuclear policy, although the Department of Commerce and the 
AEB were represented at the highest level. The same pattern emerged in the 1980s in both the 











effective48 energy policy domain itself, and the range of actors involved in delineating that 
domain; thus, the nuclear establishment was prominently represented in all important energy 
policy fora in the 1970s and 1980s, even though nuclear policy and energy policy were arrived at 
largely outside the energy policy domain. The disjuncture between the results of these different 
ways of assessing the scope of the energy policy domain has important implications; it implies 
that the delineation of the energy policy domain occurred within the energy policy community, 
rather than prior to its existence, or elsewhere (the executive). The question then arises as to why 
actors whose policy domains were not integrated into the energy policy domain were participants 
in the energy policy community, and in its most institutionalised forms such as the EPC and the 
NEC, and the answer can be explored through the most anomalous member of both bodies, the 
nuclear establishment, the head of which was not only a member of the NEC, but its Vice-
Chairman, even though the nuclear establishment had no intention of further integrating itself 
into energy policy decision-making processes. The composition of these fora (formally decided 
by the relevant Minister) was the result of two factors: 1) an understanding of the scope of 
'energy policy' in the Cabinet, informed by the energy and planning bureaucracy, and 2) 
political pressures, which included influence of powerful state agencies with elite connections 
such as the AEB and Escom. In terms of these two factors, the 'energy policy credentials' of 
state agencies were assessed. The AEB itself had two reasons to participate in the energy policy 
community: first, it wished to enhance its legitimacy as an energy agency, and the provenance of 
a major energy supply option for the country (exclusion would significantly damage its 
legitimacy), and second, it wished to defend its high degree of autonomy against encroachment 
by an energy bureaucracy which eceived increasing support from the state until 1991 (the 
nuclear establishment's role in the NEC, potentially the most influential period in the energy 
bureaucracy's history, was also the most elevated). Ironically, the nuclear establishment's 
participation was also strongly supported by energy policy advocates, who emphasised the 
importance of its integration. 
Another important factor in the 1970s and 1980s was the involvement or non-involvement of the 
private sector, which controlled a significant proportion of the energy economy. Until 1982, 
there were no private sector representatives on the EPC, which, as noted in Chapter 7, was 
indicative of a curious feature of the 1970s energy policy community: it was confined to state 
agencies, and co-ordination with the private sector was brought about in individual energy 
supply sector policy communities (for instance coal). After the privatisation of Sasol, a small 
number of private sector representatives were incorporated into the EPC, but Sasol was the only 
48 This tenn is used to indicate the energy policy domain as defined by energy policy decision-making, rather than its potential 
scope. as defined by the existing energy policy paradigm: while the paradigm might include the integration of policymaking for 











significant energy stakeholder. This pattern was replicated in the NEC, the apartheid state's 
model institution for involvement of the private sector: stakeholder representation took place 
primarily not in the NEC itself, but in a set of subsidiary 'advisory committees' in each sector 
(except nuclear), consisting of producer and consumer representatives. The actors involved in the 
inner core of the NEC (those represented on the NEC itself) formed part of an 'inner core' of 
state energy sector institutions which were constant members of the energy policy community in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and a few others (Sasol, which had remained very influential, a few 
representatives from the Afiikaner business establishment, and, significantly, Anglo American), 
and were defined by their relationship to the apartheid~em political elite rather than their 
significance as stakeholders (the oil industry, for instance, was not directly represented). Thus, 
one of the main functions of the energy policy community in the 1970s and 1980s was to 
negotiate the relationship between energy sector supply policy communities: to what extent 
policymaking would be integrated into an energy policy framework, how this would take place, 
and to what extent decision-making autonomy (and resource allocati n) would be maintained or 
undermined. Linked to this was the negotiation of the effective scope of the energy policy 
domain. The extent of this co-operation or autonomy was related to the ovemrching political 
imperative which drove the inauguration of the energy policy project in the first place: the 
security impemtive created by the oil embargo. Because this political imperative arose politically 
mther than as a structural foature of the South African energy system, its continued existence was 
primarily dependent on political factors rather than economic or technological factors49, and thus 
its disappearance was brought about by political changeso. In addition, the pressure to co-operate 
exercised by the state was limited to strategic aspects of energy policy: coal and liquid fuels. The 
extent of co-operation and integration was also heavily influenced by developments within 
individual supply sector policy communities: the new coal policy paradigm, which formed the 
basis for 1970s energy policy, was eagerly supported by the coal'industry and other state 
agencies, which resulted in the sidelining of the existing state policy agency, the Department of 
Commerce. 
This basic model, whereby the energy policy community comprised a space for negotiating a) 
the effective energy policy domain, and b) the co-ordination and integmtion of different energy 
supply sector policy communities, underpinned 0 by a political imperative which compelled 
specific types of co-operation, can be applied to understand the delineation of the policy domain 
49 It is arguable that the 1973 oil crisis was created largely by political factors (the Arab-Israeli war, and behind that the long-term 
support for Israel by the West), but the main effect of the crisis was due to structural features in non-oil producing economies, 
which led to a significant impetus for a new generation of energy policies. Correspondingly, in the late 1980s, when the price of 
oil dropped, political support for energy efficiency programmes was undermined. For South Africa, on the other hand, the real 
price of oil in the 1980s depended on how easily the embargo could be bypassed, and the end of the embargo meant that oil 
supply or use ceased to be a policy problem. 











and the development and interaction of policy communities during and after the transition as 
well. As outlined in Chapter 7, energy policy processes unfolded in three phases after 1992. In 
the flrst phase, during the fust part of the transition, individual supply sector policy communities 
dissolved into issue networks, and an energy policy issue network was formed, structured around 
debates on which form post-apartheid ,energy policy and its associated institutions should take. 
EDRC policy activists were able to play a key role in these processes both as brokers and as 
'grand energy policy' advocates, and mediated successfully between the new political elite and 
the traditional stakeholders, as well as advocating 'grand energy policy' reforms, which were 
supported to a certain extent by the new political elite because of the perceived closeness of the 
apartheid-era energy establishment to the apartheid state, as well as the requirement for access 
to, and control of, energy policy institutions. Traditional stakeholders were also willing to 
support these initiatives while their relationships with the new government were being 
developed. 
However, in the second phase, from 1995 to 1998, individual supply sector policy communities 
were re-established in the context of the post-apartheid government, support was withdrawn 
from 'grand energy policy' initiatives, and the EDRC policy activists were sidelined. As a result, 
the energy policy issue network collapsed. In the third phase, from 1998 to the present, the 
individual supply sector policy communities were fully established, and, lacking a strong 
imperative, co-operation between them is weak (and almost entirely conducted through the 
DME). Thus, despite the White Paper, integrated energy policy activity is minimal, and energy 
policy is primarily conducted through individual supply sector policy communities. Thus, there 
is no post-apartheid energy policy community which can be identifled in terms of the criteria 
outlined in Chapter 1: common interest in, for instance, electricity and liquid fuels usually 
originates in another policy domain such as industrial policy. There is another signiflcant factor, 
which consists of the beneflts for individual supply sector policy communities being associated 
with the energy policy domain: in the case of electricity, Eskom prefers the policy context of 
industrial policy, since this context is more sympathetic to its basic ethos (cheap electricity for 
national development), and is the source of resistance to the restructuring process, whereas the 
liquid fuels companies prefer their status as 'energy companies', since it helps to legitimate their 
remaining 'special status', and does not subject them to the scrutiny which is directed at other 
industries by bodies such as the Competition Tribunal. The energy policy framework developed 
in the White Paper, which largely originated with the EDRC policy activists in the energy policy 











supply sector policy communities, but has not yet been an impetus for the development of 
significant energy policy institutions51• 
The relationship between energy policy networks and individual supply sector policy networks 
in South Africa has been outlined above: the remaining questions which this approach poses 
concern energy policy paradigms: how did this relationship promote or constrain the definition 
and development of energy policy paradigms? From the above analyses, we can conclude that 
two processes were important in this respect. First, in the energy policy community, the range of 
policy alternatives likely to be successful was largely constrained by the policy paradigms within 
individual supply sector policy communities (which developed their own sets of acceptable 
policy alternatives and solutions): thus, within the broad parameters of the type of energy policy 
paradigm, the specific nature of the energy policy paradigm was significantly influenced by 
individual supply sector policy communities. Second, in terms of the question of a change 
between energy policy·paradigm type, in the case considered above, significant shifts in the two 
most important individual supply sector policy communities (liquid fuels and coal) were 
necessary to bring about the a shift from paradigm 0 to paradigm 1. As predicted by the policy 
networks framework, these shifts came from outside the existing policy communities. Other than 
this, the only other paradigm change that took place was from the apartheid-era energy policy 
paradigm (type 1) to a post-apartheid energy policy paradigm (type 1). Paradigm 2 initiatives 
were ultimately contained in the existing policy and institutional framework: two examples 
mentioned in the case material will illustrate this. 
The first is energy efficiency, generally a paradigm 2 measure. Despite repeated support for 
energy efficiency from Commissions of Inquiry and energy policy bureaucrats, no successful 
programmes were implemented. Liquid fuels conservation measures, applied between 1973 and 
1985, were 'managed' very carefully with the liquid fuels industry, and used only as a short-term 
mitigation measure: other measures were not explored. Pressure for electricity efficiency arose in 
the late 1970s and the mid-1980s. On the first occasion, Escom's noil-participation resulted in 
the scrapping of the initiative, and on the second, under pressure from the De Villiers 
Commission, a committee (DMEA, Escom and others) handed back responsibility for 
developing a programme to Escom, who confined the programme to demand-side management 
measures until they had extra capacity in the early 1990s, when the programme was abandoned; 
in other words, an energy efficiency programme (paradigm 2) was reduced to an energy 
conservation programme (paradigm 1), with the same short-term mitigation goals as the fuel 
conservation programme. The second case is energy poverty, which came forcefully onto the 
SI An exception to this is the Integrated Energy Plan, which was a direct outcome of the White Paper, but as noted in Chapter 7, 











policy agenda during the transition. What was advocated at the time was an integrated approach 
to energy poverty problems, and the development of a mix of strategies (paradigm 2 or even 3). 
The result was a large and very successful electrification programme (paradigm 1): the limitation 
of the response to this programme was partly because of the success of the programme (which 
was measured in number of connections rather than actual mitigation of energy poverty 
problems), partly because of the lack of similar enthusiasm for energy poverty problems from 
other supply sectors, and partly because of institutional limitations. These cases illustrate how 
the existing structure of interests within a specific energy policy paradigm mitigate against the 
development and actualisation of policies from higher-level paradigms, but the explanation can 
be fruitfully augmented by the other two theoretical perspectives, which compensate for some of 
the weaknesses of the networks approach, the most notable one being a more detailed 
understanding of the impact of political pressure on policy processes, and the process of 
elaboration and dissemination of ideas. 
The remaining question, posed in Chapter 2, concerns the influence of the MEC and the 
industrial policy elite on the development of energy policy. In the above Chapters, there was no 
evidence presented that the industrial policy elite opposed policies such as energy efficiency or 
other paradigm 2 policies; however, what was striking was the involvement of this elite in every 
individual supply sector policy community, and in fact, its overall influence in the individual 
supply sectors was greater than that of the state's energy bureaucracies, which competed for 
influence within the individual supply sector policy communities. This is well-illustrated by the 
1983 electricity policy crisis, which energy policy advocates in the DMEA hoped to make use of 
to further the integration of electricity policy into energy policy processes: however, the 
underlying issue was the autonomy of Eskom from the industrial policy elite, and the aim of the 
government in establishing the inquiry was to undermine this autonomy, in the process of which 
the energy bureaucracy was marginalised again in respect of electricity policy. The most 
significant impacts which the industrial policy elite had on energy policy was through a) 
providing influential political support for large paradigm 1 projects, such as the coal programme 
and Sasol projects of the 1970s and early 1980s, b) promoting energy-intensive industrial 
projects from the 1960s to the 19908, and c) providing sophisticated co-ordination for these 
developments within the state, and between the state and the private sector, which epitomised 
MEC-type industrialisation. The effect of this was that energy policy programmes promoted by 
the energy bureaucracy (which was relatively weak within the state) which coincided with MEC-
type policies, were backed by a powerful and influential ally, whereas those which did not, such 
as paradigm 2 energy efficiency policies, were not. While paradigm 1 policies harmonised 











structure of the South African energy system (paradigm 2 policies such as energy efficiency), 
would have contradicted it. Thus, in addition to the factors indicated above, behind the energy 
policy successes of the 1970s was an older and more highly-co-ordinated policy complex, which 
was more enduringly successful in integrating the individual supply sector policy communities 
into a broad policy framework (with the qualified exception of the nuclear establishment) than 
the energy policy advocates were, which also explains why the conservation and efficiency 
emphases of both the Petrick and De Villiers Commissions were abandoned so swiftly by the 
state. 
The second of the theoretical frameworks discussed, Kingdon's 'multiple streams' framework, 
was useful in two respects. The first was through the notion of 'policy windows' and the notion 
of 'focusing events', which has been discussed extensively in the case material: various policy 
crises played a very significant role in the development of energy policy, and Kingdon's 
framework provided a more detailed account of what actually happens when changes outside 
policy communities lead to changes in the community and paradigm change, where the new 
configurations come from, and why specific configurations are successful. Four key crises, in the 
early 1970s, two oil crises in 1973 and 1979 respectively, and a 'mini oil crisis' in 1985, all 
motivated institutional change in energy policy-related institutions as a result of energy policy 
advocates successfully making use of the resulting 'policy windows' to promote the elevation of 
energy policy functions in government. A fifth crisis, the political transition, led to major 
disruption in patterns of interaction in energy policymaking processes, which were only re-
established at the end of the transition; in this process, energy policy advocates were ultimately 
marginalised. Another set of policy crises in the electricity sector in 1977 and 1983, did not lead 
to significant changes in energy policy. The first crisis was framed in electricity policy terms 
exclusively, and although the second was framed in energy policy terms by the De Villiers 
Commission, energy policy advocates were not able to achieve their goal of greater co-
ordination and integration of electricity policy activity into an energy policy framework. 
Another type of 'policy window', which had not been discussed in the above chapters in detail, 
but was very influential in setting patterns for decision-making, was created by the 'investment 
cycle' in individual supply sectors, which created opportunities for decision-making on a long-
term cyclical basis, and set the background for the policy environment in the energy sector in an 
import respect. For instance, in the coal industry there was a wave of investment in the 1970s 
and 1980s as an outcome of a series of policy decisions made in the early 1970s: as a result, 
decision-making opportunities concerning coal production, and its broader energy policy 
contexts, were curtailed. Escom's investment decisions in the 1970s had a similar but more 











replacement (including opportunities to develop other energy sources for electricity production) 
were deferred until 2005. Similar cycles featured in the liquid fuels sector. The 'policy windows' 
in these cycles formed important decision-nodes, not only within specific sectors, but also in 
terms of energy policy generally, since opportunities arose at these points. between different 
energy policy strategies and approaches (for instance, rapid expansion of electricity supply, or 
modest expansion coupled with an energy efficiency strategy), and thus formed a structure for 
more general energy policy windows as well. Institutional development was also affected, since 
commitment at a specific decision-node to a particular energy policy strategy affected the 
importance specific institutions were accorded, and the way in which these would be resourced, 
possibly for a period of decades, which thus also contributed to the entrenchment of specific 
policy paradigms. 
The second, which has been discussed less in the text, is the concept of 'streams', and in 
particular, the 'policy stream' in which policy alternatives are developed and promoted, subject 
to limitations imposed by a 'community of specialists'. The case material indicated that this did 
in fact point to a very important phenomenon in the development of energy policy in South 
Africa, which was easily overlooked by a network approach on account of its historical 
continuity between different energy policy paradigms and governments. From the formation of 
the Energy Utilisation Unit (later the Energy Research Institute) at UCT in 1973, the government 
energy bureaucracy has been surrounded by a group of intellectuals, primarily based in research 
centres, which it has consistently used to extend its energy policy capacity. In succession, after 
the ERI, the Institute for Energy Studies was formed at RAU in 1975, the Institute for Futures 
Research played a role in the NEC e a, and the EDRC was formed from ERI researchers in 1989. 
After declining involvement in the early 1990s, the ERI began to play a very significant role 
again in the late 1990s, and merged with the EDRC to form the Energy Research Centre in 2002. 
Analysts in these research organisations (and some others) constituted a 'community of 
specialists', which did two things. First, it provided a skills base for energy policy-specific 
analysis which was not available in government, and thus provided much of the conceptual basis 
for energy policy activity. Second, members of the community were consistently advocates of 
energy policy per se, of integrated processes of energy policymaking. The parameters for policy 
alternatives in the community changed with the general political environment, but members of 
the community remained advocates of integration and co-ordination between different supply 
sector policy processes,. and for paradigm 2 and 3 policies, and consistently extended the 
'conceptual frontier' and the 'potential policy alternatives frontier' (indicated in Figure 2.3), and 
to a certain extent the 'information frontier'. The significance of this process for policymaking 











the energy policy environment, beginning in the late 1960s. The group was identified by its 
adherence to the energy policy project, or the integration of energy-related policy processes and 
institutions, and included officials from the Department of Planning instrumental in establishing 
and promoting an energy policy approach, including Van Rensburg, Kotze, Neethling, Venter, 
Basson and others. These officials, together with the 'community of specialists', comprised what 
Saba tier referred to as an 'advocacy coalition'; they were referred to in Chapter 7 as 'energy 
policy advocates'. The relationship between the officials and the analysts was mutually 
beneficial: the officials supported the analysts through contract work, which also increased their 
prestige and influence in the energy sector (since they now formed part of the state's energy 
policy machinery), and the analysts provided the officials with the conCeptual frameworks which 
they required to legitimate the energy policy function in government. This exchange 
characterised the whole history of energy policy in South Africa: even during the transition, the 
main contribution which the EDRC made to the Green and White Papers (aside from brokering 
the process itself, without which it might not have taken place) was a conceptual one - the 
development of a conceptual framework around which a political consensus could be built, 
which the DMEA was not capable of at the time. This was not merely a political task, but an 
energy policy task. 
Given the development of energy policy outlined above, the position of this advocacy coalition 
was very weak: thr9ughout the history of the development of energy policy, for two reasons. 
First, except during times of policy crisis, the energy policy project was not strongly supported 
by the political elite, which had very limited goals in this respect (energy security during 
apartheid, control and service delivery afterwards), and secondly, and partly because of this, 
dedicated energy institutions in government were almost always weak: and under-resourced. The 
only exception was the early transition, where EDRC policy activists, who were strong energy 
policy advocates, were influential for a period, but marginalised by the end of the transition, and 
energy policy activities per se (such as integrated energy planning) were not enhanced or 
entrenched. The perpetually weak: position of the energy policy advocates is illustrated by 
another aspect of Kingdon's framework, namely problem definition: the advocates consistently 
failed to entrench energy policy-related indicators as significant problem indicators, with the 
exception of coal reserves at the beginning of the 1970s, and (secret) oil import statistics during 
the late 1970s and 1980s. Other than these, energy policy-related indicators (such as energy 
intensity) were not regarded as significant. This applies equally to the post-apartheid era, in 
which time the only significant indicator has been the rate of electrification. This trend was 
obviously enforced by the lack of information collection and processing system throughout the 











during the last years of apartheid between officials in the NEC and the EDRC (not without 
conflict), which was clearly aligned with the anti-apartheid movement, and strongly suggests that 
there are other kinds of relationships and alliances within the energy policy milieu not 
encompassed by policy networks theories. One fInal feature of this advocacy coalition, which 
has been referred to briefly above, was a signifIcant rise in influence during policy crises, at 
times during which the central questions for the political elite(s) (and for many stakeholders) 
involved not how to achieve certain goals, but how to respond to the crisis: in other words, a 
retreat from strategic interaction to collective problem-solving (obviously within a broader 
strategic context), for which the energy policy advocates were well-equipped (and therefore in 
demand), both to provide potential solutions, and to elaborate on the meaning of the crisis in 
policy terms. However, as crises receded, goals were clarified and strategic interaction 
recommenced, and the energy policy advocates were marginalised. 
The third theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 1, the theory of institutions and 
organisations, provides further insights not forthcoming from the other two approaches, which 
proved significant in fIve areas. In the first, institutional approaches explained various 
constraints and opportunities for institutional reform in terms of existing institutional resources, 
which also constrained policy choices. As described in Chapters 3 to 7, this was useful in 
explaining the scope of policy choice in many situations, as well as the provenance of the 
specific form for institutional innovations (in which the state drew on existing institutional 
resources). The content of the 1970s energy policy paradigm, for instance, and the institutional 
form of the EPC, was influenced signif cantly by the existing planning institutions in the state, 
particularly by the form of the PAC. In the same way, the conception of energy policy as energy 
planning (which had a long-term effect on the culture within the energy bureaucracy, which will 
be further discussed below) had a similar provenance. Other institutional antecedents for later 
reforms included the Minerals Bureau, which was an institutional antecedent for both the 
DMEA's Energy Branch and for the NEC, and which itself was modelled on elements of the 
state's planning bureaucracy. Equally, a long-term view of the development of institutional 
resources as outlined by Skocpol & Finegold and March & Olsen (see Chapter 1) helped to 
explain the failure of many energy policy initiatives. These include Mossgas and the synthetic 
fuels programme of the 1980s, which, unlike Sasol, required the development of new capacities 
and institutions (from CEF to the project managers), the NEC, and many of the paradigm 2 
measures which were attempted at various times, including energy efficiency. One of the reasons 
why these were not successful, apart from pressures from individual supply sector policy 
communities, was the lack of existing institutional resources. Lack of institutional resources also 











in the 1990s, and the slowness of the state's reaction to the continuation of the local fuel 
manufacturing process after 1993: the state simply lacked the institutions to deal with the 
conflict between Eskom and the AEC, which was an outcome of the way in which nuclear policy 
had been made and implemented for the decades before that. 
Another institutional aspect of policy which shed light on a number of phenomena in the case 
material was the time period which is required to develop new institutions: thus the scale of 
institutional instability and change in the energy policy bureaucracy militated against the 
development of a significant organisational capacity in energy planning and co-ordination. By 
comparison, a successful programme such as the coal programme during the 1970s was built on 
existing institutional and organisation capacity: the coal industry had already developed 
centralised institutions for negotiating coal contracts and promoting technological development 
in the industry; the IDC and the railways were already involved in developing the necessary 
infrastructure, and the whole project was co-ordinated by a planning bureaucracy which had 
undertaken similar projects for decades; lastly, the development f the required information 
collecting and processing procedures (on coal reserves and production) occurred during the five 
years of the Petrick Commission, and was then institutionalised in the Minerals Bureau. In the 
case of energy planning, however, there was no existing skills base and no institutions for 
collating and processing the appropriate information. Further barriers were erected against the 
development of these institutions by individual supply sectors and by secrecy legislation. 
The second area concerns institutional and organisational culture:' differences between the 
different organisational cultures of state agencies, and the differences between the institutional 
cultures of researchers and bureaucrats illuminated various aspects of the development of the 
energy bureaucracy in the 1980s and 1990s, and some of the reasons for the marginalisation of 
the energy bureaucracy discussed in Chapter 7. Another application of the concept of 
organisational culture was the development of organisational goals and values, which in many 
instances comprised a more sophisticated explanation of organisational behaviour than an 
instrumental-rational explanation: an example of this is the explanation of Escom's behaviour in 
the 1970s, which is most successfully explained by reference to changes within the organisation 
from the 1950s to the early 1970s, during which a specific hierarchy of goals developed (security 
of supply) which was at odds with the hierarchies of other state agencies traditionally supportive 
ofEscom (see Chapter 2). 
The third area comprises the relationship between experts and policymakers, which was subject 
to various institutional limitations, and which provides a further context for the weak position of 
the energy policy advocates over the last four decades. In addition to the policy networks 











EDRC from the energy policy environment, and the resurgence of the ERl, which poses a 
political conundrum: ideologically, the EDRC was extremely close to the ANC, and EDRC 
policy activists negotiated on its behalf with Eskom in the mid-1990s, whereas the ERl had close 
ties with the apartheid-era energy bureaucracy and energy sector. However, the EDRC policy 
activists played an advocacy role during the transition, and they thus constituted political actors 
themselves. During the early part of the transition, their advocacy fulfJlled a valuable role for the 
ANC, but by the end of the transition, the ANC had assumed control of the government, and had 
developed its own policy agenda which was not entirely synonymous with the EDRC's. The 
ERl, on the other hand, in addition to providing skills required by the DME (energy modelling), 
had a traditionally more technocratic approach to policy, and did not develop public adherence to 
policy positions themselves. Thus, even given the EDRC's political affinity with the ANC, they 
were 'untrustworthy' experts, whereaS the ERl were 'trustworthy' experts; in March & Olsen's 
terms, the EDRC was not "politically irrelevant". 
The fourth area comprises an explanation for a curious phenomenon which has not been 
discussed above: the persistence of the description of 'energy planning' as the central activity of 
the apartheid-era energy bureaucracy, which was anomalous because, as documented in Chapter 
7, very limited energy planning in fact took place. In the post-apartheid era, energy planning was 
promoted during the transition by the EDRC energy policy activists, included in the White 
Paper, and resuscitated practically in 2000, an Integrated Energy Plan being published by the 
DME in 2003. However, energy planning has not informed policy processes. This raises the 
question as to why it persisted. There are two institutional explanations for this. The ftrst is the 
provenance of the energy policy function in the planning bureaucracy, which is related to the 
second, more promising explanation. Friedmann, in a detailed study of national planning in 
Venezuela in the 1960s, set out to explain the success and considerable legitimacy of economic 
planning, despite its lack of signiftcant impact; its direct signiftcance to national economic 
development was " .. only of minor importance" (Friedmann 1965:48-9). Friedmann's challenge 
was to explain ''the rising prestige of national planning in Venezuela" given this doubtful record. 
The key was to examine the " . .latent functions of planning", consisting of " .. positive 
contributions of planning to the social system other than those which may be subsumed under the 
concept of rationality" (Friedmann 1965:9). These were many: the most signiftcant ones here 
were the depoliticisation of inter-agency conflicts (by subsuming them in a planning process), 
the depoliticisation of new policy initiatives, and the legitimation of the construction of 
information networks. In a similar vein, energy policy measures, which involved potentially 
significant inter-agency conflict, could be given a technocratic veneer through placing them in a 











and avoiding potentially fatal inter-agency confrontations. Thus, the apartheid-era energy 
bureaucracy was pervaded by a technocratic culture, and lacked policy analysis skills, which 
were also lacking in the research centres which formed the DMEAlNEC's skills base; only the 
EDRC actually did policy analysis, as opposed to what the lEA called 'energy analysis' 
(Interview with J Basson). 
The final area concerns a distinction made by both new institutionalists and Kingdon, between 
defining the problem agenda, and setting out specific policy alternatives: whereas stakeholders 
were dominant in the first process, the second was dominated by 'communities of specialists'. 
This insight is useful in understanding the functioning of unusual policy communities such as the 
nuclear policy community, and explaining the co-existence of its dominance in policymaking 
and its inability to detennine its broader policy context Since it was the sole source of policy 
alternatives (after the 1950s), and had a virtual monopoly on 'specialists', it could dominate the 
policy alternatives agenda completely, but the scope of policies was circumscribed by its 
relationship with other state agencies and the executive, over which it had far less control, which 
was further curtailed on account of the secrecy surrounding the programme, which protected its 
policymaking function, but inhibited its ability to build broad coalitions. The same conditions 
applied to the electricity sector, where Escom had what was virtually a monopoly on specifying 
policy alternatives (even in the wake of the De Villiers Commission), but needed to build 
networks with other state agencies to maintain control of the problem agenda. Where the agenda 
did not exist (for instance, in electrification in the late 1980s), it could make policy at will. This 
insight augments the account of these policy communities, and provides a far more convincing 
insight into the operation of policy communities consisting of state agencies with overlapping 
institutional roles. Another useful aspect of the differentiation between problem and policy 
agendas is that it helps to explain policy failures, not in terms of strategic interaction, but in 
terms of a lack of capacity of policy agencies, which was exacerbated under apartheid for 
various reasons. 
Thus, the policy networks approach, which formed the basis for the study, was augmented by the 
other two approaches in several important ways, which provide explanations for phenomena not 
addressed by the 'former approach. Finally, two questions which were posed in Chapter 1, and 
were not addressed fully in the main study or above, will be discussed briefly below. These are: 
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• The continuities and discontinuities between apartheid energy policy and post-apartheid 
energy policy. 











Although the details of the first question have been thoroughly addressed above, some of the 
broader trends bear examination. A general approach to the question is provided by Gunther 
(1996) in a study of the transition to democracy in Spain in the 1970s; he noted "dramatic 
changes in both policy processes and outputs" (Gunther 1996:157), whereby policy processes 
were dramatically expanded in their scope (more stakeholders incorporated), and more complex 
and sophisticated policy outputs emerged, successfully integrating a far greater range of social 
and political demands (Gunther 1996:158-9). There were some significant differences between 
the Franco regime and apartheid, which primarily revolve around the existence of democratic 
institutions, and the kinds of political pressures which are expressed through these institutions. It 
is a subject of constant debate as to what kind of regime the apartheid regime was (proposals 
range from 'limited democracy' to 'totalitarian'), but the important fact here was that certain 
forms of (albeit severely limited) democratic institutions did exist, which did lead to the 
representation of a limited range of interests, and limited institutions for consultation in policy 
processes. 
The apartheid civil service was however characterised by an authoritarian culture which 
discouraged any form of dissent (political or organisational), and also by informal regulatory and 
governance procedures via elite networks, and there are enough parallels for Gunther's analysis 
to be useful. Thus, there were indeed significant changes of the kind Gunther describes as a 
result of the end of apartheid: the direct result of the introduction of the post-apartheid political 
system was to introduce a much broader representation of interests in all levels of the political 
system, and also to introduce a range of processes and institutions lacking under apartheid, 
including strong and independent competition authorities, better and more transparent public 
finance management, and more open and consultative policy processes. These developments 
immediately put pressure on a number of apartheid-era practices in the energy policy domain, 
and the scope of policy processes was broadened, which paid immediate dividends in the form of 
electrification, many new and independent institutions were developed, and policy and 
regulatory processes were formalised and made transparent, which was also a feature of the 
transition in Spain (Gunther 1996:163). The security imperative was removed with the transition, 
and strategic programmes were dismantled. Ironically, however, the removal of the security 
imperatives also removed the main impetus for energy policy per se, and current energy policy 
does not have a strong overall rationale. In the early part of the current decade, what has begun 
to emerge are two weak rationales: 1) an 'infrastructure industry' rationale across the energy 
sector, and 2) a social development rationale, which has been strongly advocated by the Cabinet, 
but less comprehensively implemented by the DME. There are also signs of interactions in the 











Mozambique, and Eskom announced a tender for several large-scale liquid fuels-fired open cycle 
peaking plants for the western Cape. This, and the high oil price, has begun to give a structural 
impetus to point 1). 
Aside from the institutional and political changes, there are a surprising number of continuities in 
policy frameworks in different sectors, the details of which have been outlined in Chapters 3 to 
7. Aside from these, the structure of the energy system itself plays a significant role. This is the 
subject matter of question 2. It has been observed in Chapter 2 that the structure of the South 
African energy system (its overwhelming dependence on coal, and the use of liquid fuels 
primarily for transport, for which there is no current substitute) resulted in a lack of development 
of energy policy institutions in the 1950s and 1960s, when these developed elsewhere, mainly on 
account of the encroachment of oil. The same lack of complexity in the South African energy 
system has remained, apart from the encroachment of coal into the liquid fuels domain, which 
has increased the country's dependence on coal. Since there are no structural imperatives to 
develop a strong basis for energy policy, the same limits to developing paradigm 2 and 3 energy 
policies will remain, which will limit the state's ability to respond adequately to policy 
challenges such as climate change and energy poverty, unless it is addressed proactively through 
the creation of new and well-resourced institutions backed by significant and consistent political 
support. 
Thus, in conclusion, using these three theoretical approaches was very fruitful in uncovering 
different aspects of the development of a specific policy milieu, which supports the contentions 
of Allison and Zelikow (1999) and Sabatier (1999). The application of the model proposed in 
Chapter 2 was also very illuminating, and the development of South Africa energy policy was 
consistent with the model, given the nature and development of the South African energy 
system. It thus appears that the model is a useful framework for understanding the emergence of 
energy policy, as well as its succession from one type of paradigm to another. There was also a 
high degree of correlation between the actual development of South African energy policy and 
the institutional limitations on paradigm type predicted by the model: however, more 













Government references have been listed separated in several categories below. Acts of 
parliament have not been included, since complete references are provided in the text. 
Note on Media References 
Most media references were to the Financial Mail, a weekly publication aimed at the business 
community, since it contained the most consistent (and in many cases, only) reporting on energy 
policy-related developments. It served two purposes: first, as a source of information, which was 
extremely valuable given the otherwise patchy written record of these developments; and second, 
as a reflection of the outlook of its target readership, which comprised the (during apartheid, 
'white') business establishment, and constituted an important part of the status quo in the 
apartheid era, although frequently critical of the state's more 'pedantic' or 'excessive' apartheid 
policies. Daily newspapers quoted were the Cape Times and the Argus, based in Cape Town, and 
the Natal Mercury, based in Durban, and the only other news publication referred to was The 
Executive, a short-lived monthly publication aimed at senior business executives in the 1990s. 
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times higher ..... ere an iJ\CCmh'c to COneenll'llte 00 the export trade 10 the detriment of the 
domeSlic maricet. This meant in pnlCtio: thaI then:: .... 015 11 degree of cross-subsidisation betw~-co 
the t'xpon and dOtnC'StK: rn.u\;l1S. As the CommiMioo 00Ied. 
-,.s funhrr diffICUlty .nay pl'C'sen4 ilSeif in lite "". futu", due to tlte possibi!;t) of SOme 
roIlicry <;On''*''U _ ...... in' on IIIe ~jpnl(:nI m.oriel: only .. ~ (1946-47 Coat 
CommilSion:IJO). 
Ihus undermininG ~ erou-subsidy pfO<1'SS. and di.l.ach·al1laging collieries ',hieh produced for 
the loc.-aJ markel at .... lut \\11:5 effcctively a subsidised price. Thus, lhe Commission re<."()Innw"nded 
oJ,,, 
• . .in tile: I:\·"nt ofeollitries oonccnlnninl! on tile: export mln.et on ly whilSl inland prices D'" 
oomrolltd. ~ction ,hould be ta~en to "'glJlUle coal supplK:S for shipment purposes .. • ( 1946-
-17 CO<II Commission: 130). 
This fl.'eonunendation the Gove rnment W:CCptl-d. und began us'"!! illi powers to control coal 
expons from 1950 as a ..... a) of compelling coal COOlpalues to produce for the inland lllIlIitet 
(Financial Mail 2111211973). Exports of cokinl! coal w~n:: lI"ocrally prevcnll-d. Coal exports aI.'iO 
suni:~d from scwrc ttanSf>On oonlenecks. oflen leaving export or<krs unli Ik-d (Lang 1995: 133), 
and undcmlining South Africa's refllJllllion lIS a reliable! supplier. Transport bottlcnecks also 
frequently resulted in domestic shonages. both for din:ct USI.-rli and for powcr plants. which 
resulted in a 1951 Commission of lnquir) (1951 Coal S~ Commission) 10 examine ways 
in \\hich future supply probkms oould be resoln-d. A oombirl:ltion or dlt"Sl: factors and the 
/,tlobal substitution of oil for 0081 in the poM-war decades k-d 10 a stagnation in the cxport tnode 
untilt"" early 19705. 
Price Regulation and Ihe Domestic and Expotl Markets 
lk'e3\ISC ofthc factors mentioned alll,we, the rq;ulated cool price in the 1950s and 1960s was 
extremely low. In additKm. gollCmment -.ought to c:ncour.l/,te ind...stnal devclopn~nl through 
cheap inputs. und the Price Comrollcr in particular saw price control as a way 10 combat inflation 
(Fin\UlC;al Mail 15112119(7). wbich b<.'eam~· the dammant frorncwurk Ii)T considering price 
Increase requests from induslry in the 1%Os. l1tt: low dOOltlotie price of coal was re1tul~tcd 
3CCOfding to a succnsioo o f ratc-of-TCtum formuiac which were calculoted wilhOll! taking into 
3CCOWlt sufficiently the impact of inflation (Financial Mpil 27/ 1111970). I'rice increases were 
V.u1\ed on an ad·hoc basis b~· tl\l: Price Com rolin, based in the [)cpurtrnem of Commcn:c and 
Industry. While this system was tolerable to industry during Ihe 1\)505, inflation. which had 
u\cragcd 2% in the 1950s and 4% in the 1960s. bellan 10 crude profit margins significantly in the 
late 19605. and particularly from the carly 19705 on. \\hen then: \.1015 a OI:lSSI\'C Increase m 











thu.s 10 facilitalC a "fai r relurn" on behalf of inVt'ston (lAng 1995:57): in OIher words. to control 
the cool market. 
h)JloYiing this. a range of othe r cartels WI.'T1' formed on a similar basis. including several 
ussociations in Natal (of which the Natal Associated CoUi~rks (NAC) "''as the " ,ost enduring 
and innul"1l lial), the Anthracite l'roducers' AssociDlioli (1 962) and the Coke Producers Ltd 
( 1925). The TCOA represented tile vast majority ofcool'111 ining activity in [he country. and its 
in,oIvemenl in polic)'maJdng. n:gulation and geneml interaction with the stoIC was the most 
$ignifiCallt: it.. along with toc NAC, "''as repll:scnted on almost every influential advisory or 
stDlutOl) body whkh had a hearing Ull Ihe coal industry, since Ihe .state reganlL-d the5C bodies as 
rcprcsen1lIli,·c oflhe coal industry IL~ D whole. 
Collieries compt'\cd for long·ternl cOI1trocts with lallle customers such as Escom. but almost all 
()\her cool nn Ihe domestic (II' e~port markets W',1S sold IhrooJ.:h the TCOA until tnc 19705. 
A mongst ils other rolC"5, tnc TCOA al$O C<l-ordinatcd productioo bclwt.'t:n collieries for large 
export conlracts, such lIS thl' early export cootraclS wilh Japan in the 19705. Non-TCOA 
members " .. ere admillcd In tJw cartel after the) had dcn1OOSlmtl-d that the) posst'SSCd significant 
markct power. "'hich was the case wilh the bloc of collieries owned hy emerging ' Afrikaner 
capital'JS in toc 1950s: these wel"1:. as .... ilh the ocher collieries al lhe lime, incorporated into an 
'Afrikaner capital ' gold ·mining cOflson ium. '~ gold-mining OOI1te)(1 "''!lS somewhat unusual. 
since lhe: cane! was not successful in ch:trging monopoly rallS for coal. ",·hith "'11$ in fact 
urnkrpric«l for large periods of its e)(istetlCC. ChriSl~ {Christ~ 1984:41) sugaCSls that gold-
mining inlereslS undcnnim:d the CM1c! b)' owning collieries inside and oulside iL This miJ.:ht 
han' been the case up 10 lhe 1920s. but the industr) was almost complclc:ly own«l hy gold 
mining 1tou5CS after that; Ihus.. a more pt.'rSUaSiw ellpll\I1;ltion lies in I"",, ameti()Qtion of risL by 
the gold milling ~'Stablishrncnl, Two of the k..,y risks fOl" the mining csublishmcnl, in nn 
environment ..... here lhe gcolog) of gold reservcs required dc-cpcr and d.!.:pcr mi~, was the 
possibility of spiralling ..,llt.'T)O' costs. 01" ""'-'11 \'Ointik ellCT"g) markets. and competi tion rOl" c"",,ap 
1II0000, The flUlCt;on of the carlel5 in cootmlling tnc market "'<IS not 10 cam monopoly rents. but 
10 prevCIII non-gold marLet participants from eXlrDC1ing rents. and from competing for labour 
(and thus increasing wages). The cool industr) "'11$ mainly VK:Wed by lhe gold industry (who 
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\1:ry linlc differentiation of product IUId liule brocfldllt;oo. Inflation in the 1960s. ",ilooul 
C(lI1C(!mit:mt price illCrea5CS, meant that capital in\estmrol was al very 10" levels. and most 
produclion came from old mines. Expansion in the coal man.el was limited 10 new long-ICon 
COf\\nII,;ts ..... ilh EscomlJ. the stale ekoclricity utilil). which IWt\: usually ..... goliutcd al ~igni ficantly 
~Iow the I'\."gulalt.'d "holesalc price. 
The th ird phase. from the 1970:; to the present, ..... as II W'dlcrs/led for the coal industry. The change 
ttl poIlC) cngendi."t\:d by the PetricK Report lead 10 significlLJlt n:1l1 increases in !he n:gulaIL-d 
domestic price. and IIl1 L'fTlphasis on increased cxlruclion and uti1i/.ation I'3t.,s.. "hich ..... .,n: 
condilions for the issuing of export permits. While till: din.'Ct cool mur\..ct remlli~d Slatic. lilt: 
ek'(:lricily indLlSlTl' launched a massi \1: expansion programme during Lhe 19705. ar.d a huge-scale 
syntheLic fLlCI, industry was inaugurated from lbe late 1970s. ..... hich LO\,'t'ther dominated cool 
demand from the laIc 19705 onwards. An additiooal factor "lIS the resurgencc of the eXport 
markel. which incn:a5Cd dramalically in Ihe Inle 1970$ as a n:suli both of a n:SUSCitaLion of the 
..... orl!.! COlli mark.,L in Ihe wake of the 1973 oil crisis.. and. chungc in gG\emment policy towunls 
cxpon~. The key lac tor in TC\'i"ing the export indllSU') was the dcvelopmcm of the Rlcharo:b BIIY 
Coal Temlinal in II dL"CP"""'"lL1CT port oonh of Durban. and an associated dedicated rai l li n]( from 
lhe most Important coalfielo:b to the port. which solved the logistical problt1ll~ "'hich had 
bcdcvilk'd lhe indusuy before the 1970s. n..: lin]( b.. ... wt. .. n the 13.1",'3) sySlem and the coal 
indust!) was Lhus lal\,ocl) broken b> the 1980s. as moSI cool\for ek:.:tricity. syntbctic fuels and 
export) "'lIS enller consumed at lhe mirr mouth. or I13nsporlL-d \'ia the ded icatcd 13i1 link 10 
Ihchards Sa). 
Increa.'ICd demand, higher rcgulalL'd prlct.'S aDd the promise of lhe export market II:lJ to 1m.: 
tr.msformation of lbe image of lhe industry ;n the eyes of in\'CSlOMl: the coal i n!.!u~l ry of lhe 
1960s only had a mariel capil:llisation ofR175 million. and key figures in lhe mill ing iU!.!USll') 
w,lh-d puhlld)' aboutlhc folly ofin\-csting in il (Financial Mail 27/1 J/1970). By the cnd oflhe 
19705. n:\·cnu.: for the iudusuy was 0\1:1' R2 billion. and the Fill8l1cial Ma il rt:p<:lncd lMt 
"Coalwl'l'S an: among.5l1t.c ml)!ll "'lKnsive on the JS[: iI's not difficuh [0 see "hy_ ... [he 
~oal sector ",'U t ...... wp pcrfoollcr on the JS£ [in 1'17617r (Financial M~i12214J1977). 
Capital now\.-d i"to lhe industry. in lime 10 fund a significant expansion in production CKp:lCi t>-. 
inclu!.!ing II largc number ofne'" cool minell. Coal OUlput mon: lhan doubled bct\I .. cc:n 1970 and 
1980. and quudntpl......1 by lhe end oflhe cenlury . 
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CommillSion:7). This basic methodology "'as revis..'<1 and cxh:l1lkd; in the 1950s. i\-'()Iogis" 
estimated n.'SOUICe$ of 59 898 million tons (1952) and 63 Q(l5 million tons (1959) (1970·75 Coal 
Commission:7). 1b., 1969 Coal Ad~i50fy Commiul'C estimated 24 885 nullion tons of 
ecooomicall) wccwerable 1l;:SCT\.t':§ of bitumioo~ coal. After an exhausti\(.· rca.ssessm .. m. agaio 
funht,r dc"eloping the methodology of reser',es cSlimation. the Petrick Commission ""achl'd a 
similar figure in 1975 of24 915 million tons of ecooomically recowrable bitumioous coal. oul 
of a lotal of HI 274 million Ions of min~abl .. bituminous coal reSQure~'s (1970·75 Coal 
COffimissioo: 7). Gh'etl extraction technologies and coal prices at the linM:. these ligun:s caused a 
policy crisis. and <'nergy analysts suggcskd that the country would haw 10 .'lCe ~ alternative 
energy lIOurce~ by 1990 (SI.."" below); iY)\l.'eVef. partly as a result of the success of 1970s coal 
policy mcasures, new estimah .. "S in the: 1980s \"t:re 121 218 million ton,. of which 51 960 milhon 
were l~ollOlnieally rcco"erable (South Africa Coal Sutistics 1993:4), and the 2001 l"Slimatc for 
c~ollomically recoverable coal was S5 333 million Ions (DcpartmC1lt of Minerals and Encrg) 
200211.:50). "hieh push .. :d back the possibility of real coal shortages to tht, last quaner ofthc 21" 
<:\:lIlury. 
The Oevelopment of the Coa l Malir;et 
Up to the 19SOS coal was milL'd on a relllli\'Cly small scale. and was used dim:tI,.n by lhe 
railwllYS. mines. industn~s. ~nd Iw':J.useholds. and for oonwrsion imn deelrieit) by 0 br.,..: I), 
d.ttmrsHscd elcctricity industry. Since 19sa. coal usc and production has b.:en innucna:d 
primaril) by four broad trends: 110 grov.1h (and e\'ffitually 0 slow dl~lilll!') in direct use of coal by 
consumers: a rupidJy expanding cool-baSJed electricity sector. the rapid dc\· ... lopmenl of the 
symhcuc flli:ls industry during tilt> 19705: and tre t:qually rapid d.. ... 'elopmcm or a massivc expo" 
in.Jwt,) f,uno the e ... l) t97<b. 11lCSC' oombiued cu:ods led ro ,"" doubling of COlli production 
from its 195() Ic\'('1 by 1970. and an eightfold illereast' by 2000. ilIustrsll:d by Figun: 3.1 below. 
The e\olution of the COlli market occum<! in tbf\."'e phases. In the first phase, fmm the inc ... ption 
of lhe industry unul lhe 1940,. tre mar~et consist.:d of CQfl'iWTlt!rs ,,00 used coal directly, 
includHI& the railways. and • IlIISa:nt electricity induslry. There was a significlillI expo" trade; 
until the late 19405. between 'll and I, •• of the annual tonnage was exporl~'d (194647 Coal 
Commissioo: 15-16) ..... hi~ h droppetilO around 2". hl'lwccll lhe 1950s and 1970s (Department of 
Mineral and '·ocrgy Affain 1995:13). Mining mtS largely labour·im ... nsiw, inefficient and 
unsafe. "ilh the llJD(luol imroduction ofml.'ChanisatiolL lhc state began to impose coal grading 
10 the 1920,. but the price mtS !IO!I by the market. subject 10 thc behaviour of a number of cartels 
L ' r"lUI· ..,. of -. ..... idI i, ,d...-.d I<J lin... belO .. , ", ....... or (I1Ot bl-' <0." .. , ....... " .. """,I"" (pri..;t~ ill "'ustry~ .. 
~ ~;t; _ by t.w.<rio, 1<1ccIn.lly, '~""""'" "".) .. hiQI "'., .. ," the "",110""""" """'» cam ... ""'idli. ,h<tI-.i 
~ I!oe ""' ........ 
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